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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is an examination of certain ideas ar1s1ng out of 
the philosophy of Donald Davidson and specifically out of his 
conception of 'radical interpretation'. The aim of the work is only 
partly one of exegesis; primarily it attempts to develop the idea 
of 'interpretative holism' implicit in Davidson's work and to 
develop also the implications which flow from that holism. The 
notiori' of interpretative holism is a development on the Davidsonian 
idea of the interdependence of meaning and belief an 
interdependence which sets the essential problem of radical 
interpretation - but it also encompasses the other Davidsonian 
marriage of truth with meaning. The first part of the work lays out 
the basic account of Davidsonian radical interpretation with 
respect to its Quinean background and as it is developed through 
Davidson's own work. Here the basic ideas of interpretative holism , 
charity and indeterminacy are set out. The second part takes up 
Davidson's application of these ideas to the problems of conceptual 
relativism and epistemological sceptici~.m; the quest.ion of the 
transcendental and verificationist status of Davidson's argument on 
these matters is also discussed. The third and final part looks at 
the Davidsonian position in the conte}tt of Putnam's distinction 
between metaphysical and 'internal' realisms and looks more closely 
at the conception of truth implicit in interpretative holism. 
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The methodology of interpretation is ... nothing but 
epistemology seen in the mirror of meaning. 
- Donald Davidson1 




RADICALLY INTERPRETING DAVIDSON 
The work of Donald Davidson has hitherto appeared, in its 
published forrn, in a very piecemeal fashion. Recently Davidson's 
otherwise fairly scattered writings have been collected into two 
volumes: Es&9ys on Act.ions and Events (Oxford, 1980); and Jnqu.i.ries 
.into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, 1984). 2 For most 
philosophers this division would reflect a twofold orientation in 
Davidson's work itself: towards the philosophy of action (and 
philosophy of mind) and the philosophy of language. Certainly 
Davidson's major philosophical contributions would typically be 
classified as being in these two areas - indeed most discussions of 
Davidson's work are undertaken from one of these two perspectives. 
The apparent bifurcation of Davidson's work into 
philosophy of action and philosophy of language and the fact that 
he has generally dealt with issues piecemeal, rather than in any 
single extended and unified treatment, belies the underlying unity 
of his work as a whole. This unity is suggested by the appearance 
2Hereafter footnoted as respectively AE and TJ. 
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of certain basic themes through much of Davidson's work. So often 
1n reading Davidson one comes upon the same familiar points being 
deployed in slightly different contexts (a similiar repetition of 
ideas will not be entirely absent from this dissertation) 
Davidson's frequent appeal to the principle of charity and the 
interdependence of meaning and belief are cases in point. Such 
. repetition is symptomatic of the 'holistic' nature of Davidson's 
thought itself: his 'philosophy of action' is not separate from but 
part and parcel of his 'philosophy of language'. Indeed I suggest 
\ 
that · an illuminating way of looking at all but the most technical 
of Davidson's work is to see it neither as philosophy of action nor 
as philosophy of language (even though Davidson would most likely 
see his work in that way himself) but as having a primary, if not 
always explicit, orientation towards what I shall call the 
philosophy of interpretation. Such an orientation is most 
appropriate with respect to those essays collected together in 
Inquiries into Trut.b and Interpretation, as the title itself 
suggests, but it can also be seen as providing the .background for 
much of Davidson's thought elsewhere - especially his 'anomalous 
monism' . 
My own approach to Davidson has been from within the 
philosophy of social science. Indeed the focus on interpretation is 
perhaps a natural one from this point of view. For what must be 
central to the philosophy of social science is the problem of 
interpreting the actions, utterances and attitudes of the human 
beings who are the primary subjects for social scientific inquiry. 
But the problem of interpretation as it arises in social science 1s 
just one manifestation of the more general problem of 
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interpretation: how to interpret other persons and the nature and 
limits of such interpretation is a matter which is fundamental to 
any attempt to understand language, truth, knowledge - fundamental 
to an understanding of understanding itself. This interconnection 
is something that will become increasingly evident as Davidson's 
holistic account of interpretation is developed in the succeeding 
pages. For one of the claims advanced here is that one cannot 
separate off questions about meaning from questions about truth and 
knowledge; one cannot separate belief and desire from one another 
or 'from meaning or from truth. All come together within the 
holistic structure of interpretation. Holism is what characterizes 
the account of interpretation and understanding which is to be 
found in Davidson's work and, indeed, holism seems to characterize 
Davidson's thought itself. His account of action and of mind cannot 
be separated from his account of meaning, belief and desire - from 
the account of understanding implicit in the idea of radical 
interpretation. 
So this is not just a dissertation in the area of the 
philosophy of social science - it is the general problem of 
interpretation and understanding which is at issue. And though the 
approach is in some respects epistemological the emphasis on a 
'philosophy of interpretation' does not quite fit with the usual 
conception of theory of knowledge. Similarly it should be clear 
that this 1s not an essay in the philosophy of language or 
philosophy of action, instead the concern with interpretation 
encompasses both those areas. Thus it seems that this dissertation 
must fall between, not just two, but many stools. Yet in one 
respect this is because the notion of there being any stools to 
s 
fall between is itself blurred by the holistic approach which is 
taken here. The idea that there are clear distinctions between 
different areas within philosophy is itself undermined by the idea 
of interpretative holism. Certainly the questions which are pursued 
here are questions which are not confined just to epistemology or 
philosophy of language - but which cut across such distinctions. 
Perhaps talk of a 'philosophy of interpretation' or 
'philosophy of understanding' will seem to be strange and 
. 
contrived. Strange, maybe, but not contrived. Certainly the idea 
' wi 11 . sound neither contrived nor strange to the ears of those 
familiar with the work of French or German philosophers. Reflection 
on the nature of understanding and on the problems of 
interpretation or 'hermeneutics' has a well established place 1n 
the philosophical tradition to which philosophers such as 
H.-G.Gadamer, Paul Ricouer, or Marlin Heidegger belong. In fact 
there is much in Davidson which seems to parallel the ideas of such 
'continental' philosophers Gadamer especially. Davidson's 
interpretative holism and his emphasis on the need for agreement 
echo similar ideas in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. To some 
extent also the fundamental role played by truth in the Davidsonian 
conception of interpretation may even turn out to have an 
ontological significance not entirely unlike that which Heidegger 
gives to truth as alet/Jeia. However I will have little more to say 
on this latter point due to the obscurity which is often thought to 
surround Heidegger's account of truth and because I have neither 
the time nor the space to deal adequately with the matter here. 
That there 1s some similarity between Davidson (and 
Quine) in their accounts of interpretation and the ideas of 
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continental philosophers such as Gadamer has already been suggested 
by Dagfinn Fi>llesdal3 and a lso by Richard Rorty's appropriat ion of 
the ideas of philosophers such as Gadamer and Heidegger, together 
with ideas found in Davidson, Wittgenstein and others, in his 
Ph.ilosop/Jy and t.he H.irror oI Nature. 4 However the claim has also 
been made that any such similarities can be no more than 
super£ icial 5 and this seems to be a not uncommon reaction to the 
attempt to draw parallels between such as Davidson and Gadamer - a 
reaction most often coming from philosophers interested 1n 
\ 
'continental' philosophy rather than from those on the 'analytic· 
side of the fence. 
The distinction between these two philosophical 
'traditions' is a distinct ion I use here with some reluctance; 
indeed part of the reason for pointing to the apparent similarities 
between Davidson and others 1s to break down, just a little, the 
idea that there is or shoul d be a sharp boundary between different 
'sorts· of philosophy. Admi ttedly there are differences but such 
differences should not blind us to the similarities which are there 
3 
' Experience and Meaning ' , H.ind and .lanquaqe, ed. Samue 1 
G~ttenplan, Oxford, 197S, p . 38. 
Princeton, 1980. 5see Herbert Dreyfus, 'Holism and Henoeneutics', lr'ev.iew oI 
Hetap/Jys.ics, 34 ( 1980) pp. 3-12. Dreyfus recognises the holistic 
element in Quine's and Davidson's thought but distinguishes what he 
calls their 'theoretical' holism from the supposedly 'practical' 
holism of Heidegger et al. Much of Dreyfus' criticism focuses on 
the Quinean approach rather than considering Davidson in any detail 
and while there is some subs tance to these criticisms when directed 
at Quine they have less f orce against Davidson. However Dreyfus' 
emphasis on a level of practical activity and skill as the basis 
for understanding relies on the notion of there being a determinacy 
at that level which is absent elsewhere· it also seems to miss the 
' point that practical activities can be embedded in 'theoretical ' 
understanding as much as the other way around. We do not need to 
embed understanding in any ontological foundation of the sort that 
'the practical' offers in any case. 
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also. Moreover it must al ways be an open question just how to 
assess the significance of the differences and similarities which 
we do seem to find. Perhaps, in some cases, differences which seem 
to be major and intractable points of disagreement at first will be 
found to diminish in importance or dissolve entirely according to 
how we read the philosophers concerned. Here is indeed a foretaste 
of the interpretative holism which is the central idea of this 
dissertation. In any case the similarities I may draw between 
Davidson and, for example, Gadamer are not central to my task here. 
' Gadamer provides a useful point of reference in the discussion of 
Davidson's ideas but is not essential to that discussion. After all 
it is Davidson's account of interpretation which is the focus, not 
Gadamerian hermeneutics. 
In many respects, however, it 1s a thoroughly 
'hermeneuticized' Davidson who appears in the pages of this 
dissertation: this is perhaps a predictable consequence of my view 
of Davidson as a 'philosopher of interpretation'. Such a figure may 
seem scarcely recognizable to those who are familiar mainly with 
the Davidson of papers such as 'Truth and Meaning'. And naturally 
this raises an important question as to where mere exegesis ends 
and the expression of my own views begins - how much of this 
dissertation is me and how much is Davidson? 
I have to confess that this is not an easy question to 
answer. One reason for this (but by no means the most important 
one) is that Davidson's own writing is most often very condensed 
and even oblique in its treatment of some issues. It is not always 
easy to decide just what Davidson's own views are on a particular 
matter and sometimes it can be hard to discern how he sees an 
argument as running. (Such uncertainty is of course in addition to 
the usual uncertainty which is an element in all interpretation. ) 
Yet my aim in looking at Davidson is not to provide a simple 
recounting of his views anyway. Instead I want to try and draw out 
what seem to be the important (and sometimes merely implicit) 
themes in the Davidsonian corpus and to weave those themes together 
in such a way that the underlying unity of those themes is made 
clear. The picture which results is not a picture which I would 
necessarily claim to be a totally accurate representation of 
\ 
Davidson's thought as he would regard it but is rather an attempt 
at an integrated account of interpretation founded 1n the 
Davidsonian conception of radical interpretation. Wherever possible 
I have tried to find support for that account in Davidson's own 
words but where he has expressed himself in such a way as to 
conflict with that account I have tried to indicate the 
disagreement and to show the reasons be.hind it. Per.haps the best 
way to encapsulate the nature of my project here, however, is to 
say that what 1s attempted 1s a radical interpretation of 
Davidson's own work. 
Part I 
FROM TRANSLATION TO INTERPRETATION 
From the structure of translation was indicated the 
general problem of making what is alien our own1 
- H.-G.Gadamer 
9 
1 Pin J osop/J.ic<-91 HermeneutJcs, trans. ed. David E. Li nge, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, 1976, p.19. 
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Chapter 1 
QUINE AND RADICAL TRANSLATION 
Radica.l Trans.lat.ion.: Some {Juinean Them£!s 
The work of W.V.Quine forms the background for the 
Davidsonian development of the idea of radical interpretation and 
it is Quine' s conception of the project of radical translation 
which marks Davidson's starting point. Radical translation 1s 
characterised by four important notions: 
1. Epistemic /Joi.ism according to which beliefs are to 
be seen as part of a network of beliefs ('the 
web of belief') within which beliefs are 
identified and individuated; 
2. Tile .inseparalJ.il.ity of meaninq and .information 
according to which we cannot clearly separate 
out the meanings of utterances from information 
about the world which bears on those 
utterances; 
3. T/Je indeterm.inac_y o.[ translation according to which 
there is no uniquely correct way of translating 
any utterance or set of utterances; 
4. T/Je principle oI charity according to which we 
assume certain basic similarities between our 
home language and the language to be translated 
or more generally between ourselves and our 
translatees. 
In Quine the connections between these ideas are not 
explicitly drawn out. It is in Davidson's work that we begin to see 
clearly how these notions interconnect as they are developed within 
11 
the framework of radical interpretation. In this respect what is 
crucial in Davidson's work is the reorganization of the ideas of 
indeterminacy and charity around the notion of the inseparability 
of meaning and information - which in Davidson is transformed into 
the interdependence of meaning and belief. The thesis of epistemic 
holism also carries over into Davidson but in Davidson's work the 
idea is developed in a much more all-encompassing fashion - as I 
will put it: Quine' s epistemic hol ism becomes Davidson's 
interpretative holism. 2 It 1s such holism which in fact underlies 
the interdependence of meaning and belief just as Quine's epistemic 
holism underlies the inseparability of meaning and information. 
Holism about the relation between beliefs and between 
beliefs and meanings is the fundamental notion in both Quine and 
Davidson3 but 1n Davidson's work it 1s tied to the equally 
fundamental idea that a theory of truth can also serve as a theory 
of meaning. This latter notion, when seen in the context of 
interpretative holism (from which it derives), gives rise to some 
important consequences for truth - but more on this in Part III. 
The aim of this first chapter will be to elaborate on 
these ideas as they appear in Quine and insofar as they are 
relevant to Davidson. The focus of my attention will be the Quinean 
project of radical translation - £or it is from there that I will 
move to Davidsonian radical .interpretation. 
2Al though I wi 11 also talk about Davidson's '-t:ttt.itud.inal hol ism -
s3e chap~er two. . In Davidson the hol 1sm encompas2,es desires also. 
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Rad.ica.l Trans.lat.ion and .Natural.ized Ep.istemo.logy 
In fiord and Object Quine presents the problems of the 
philosophy of language in an explicitly anthropological setting. As 
the title of the work suggests Quine' s interest there is in the 
relation between language and the world - but in Quine's work this 
1s as part ,.. or the more general project of a 'naturalized 
epistemology'. This naturalistic project 1s concerned with the 
epistemological problem - the problem of knowledge - reformulated 
as the problem of "how surface irritations generate, through 
language, one's knowledge of the world". 4 
Quine's epistemological question 1s put in terms of the 
relation between 'surface irritations' and 'knowledge of the world' 
- the relation between 'meagre input' and 'torrential output· 5 -
and his investigation of language and translation is undertaken 
from the same point of view. The chapter of fiord and (J.bject which 
deals with the problem of translation has as its avowed aim the 
consideration of "how much of language can be made sense of in 
terms of its stimulus conditions", that is, in terms of "the past 
and present barrage of non-verbal stimulation". 6 
Language 1s conceived by Quine as "the complex of 
present dispositions to verbal behaviour"7 and thus he presents the 
general task of translation as one which involves the 
reconstruction of the connections between present dispositions and 
past and present stimulations: 
: f+lord and Object, Cambridge, Mass. , 1 960, p. 26. 
As Quine puts it in 'Epistemology Naturalized', Ontoloq.ical 
Relativity and Other Es .... x"tYS, New York, 1969, p. 83. 
7 f+lord and Object, p. 26. Ibid., p. 27. 
The recovery of a man's current language from his 
currently observed responses is the task of the 
linguist who, unaided by an interpreter, is out to 
penetrate and translate a language hitherto unknown. 
All the objective data he has to go on are the forces 
that he sees impinging on the native' s surfaces and 
the observgtle behaviour, vocal and otherwise, of the 
native ... 
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One of the two quotations placed at the begining of fiord 
and ObJ'ect is the slogan ··ontology recapitulates philology". 9 
Certainly it is clear that for Quine translation recapitulates 
epistemology: translation is seen as essentially concerT1ed with 
uncovering the connections between surface stimulations (the 
'meagre input') and verbal and non-verbal behaviour (the 
'torrential output') - the same connections which the naturalized 
epistemologist seeks to unravel. 1 O Of course this 'essential' ta2.k 
of translation is often obscured in practice by the translator's 
reliance on his prior linguistic knowledge by his prior 
acquaintance with his own and other languages. Thus Quine's 
interest in translation is restricted to cases of what he calls 
'radical' translation - where no such prior knowledge can be relied 
upon: 
Translation between kindred languages, eg. , Fri~.ian 
and Eng 1 ish, is aided by resemblance of cognate word 
forrns. Translation between unrelated languages, eg., 
Hungarian and English, may be aided by traditional 
equations that have evolved in step with a shared 
culture. What is relevant rather to our purposes is 
rlld.ical translation, i.e. , translation of the language 
of a hitherto untouched people. the task is one that 
is not in practice undertaken in its extreme f orrn, 
since a chain of interpreters of a sort can be 
recruited of mff"Jinal persons across even the darkest 
archipelago ... 
~.Ibid., p. 28. 
18ttributed to James Grier Miller. Thus semantics can indeed be seen as identical with epistemology 
- see 'Epistemology Naturalized', p.89. 
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The notion of radical translation is thus an idealization 
of the project of translation which exhibits that project in its 
purest form. However in Quine's case we might want to say that the 
purification has gone too far: I think it is certainly reasonable 
to suggest that though reliance on prior linguistic knowledge is 
not essential to the translator's ta~t it is harder to conceive of 
that task as consisting solely· in the correlation of behaviour 
(narrowly conceived) wit.h perceptual stimulations. There is surely 
more evidence on which to translate than purely behavioural 
evidence. However more of this later. 12 
Ker:1n.inq and Indeterm.inacy 
It is out of the consideration of the problems faced by 
the radical translator that Quine develops his thesis of the 
indeterminacy of translation. Quine claims that: 
... manuals for translating one language into another 
can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with 
one another. In countless places they will diverge in 
giving, as their respective translations of a sentence 
of the one language, sentences of the other language 
· which stand to each other in no plausible sort of 
equivalence however loose. The firmer the direct links 
of a sentence with non-verbal stimulation, of course, 
the less drastically its translatif~s can diver-ge from 
one another from manual to manual. 
Quine's claim that there is this indeterminacy 1n 
translation might be thought to be an unsurprising consequence of 
his restriction of the evidence which is available to the linguist. 
11 -l ') !Yord i.CJnd lJ_b_7ect, p. 28. 
1;see especially chapter two below. l,1ord t.9nd Object, p. 27. 
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Yet the thesis does not depend, in any crucial way, on the paucity 
of evidence here. In fact the real reason behind the indeterminacy 
thesis is suggested in some remarks Quine makes on the problems 
associated with the clarification of the notion of stimulus 
meaning. 
The stimulus meaning of a sentence for a speaker 1s 
specified, in word and Object, as the class of all stimulations 
which would prompt assent, in the case of affirmative stimulus 
meaning, and dissent, in the case of negative stimulus meaning. 14 
' However such a definition fails to exclude from the stimulus 
meaning of a sentence stimulations which prompt assent (or dissent, 
as the case may be) in situations where such assent is dependent 
upon some collateral information. Quine gives as an e:>{ample the 
case of a speaker who assents to the sentence 'Gavaqa.i? ' 
(tentatively translated as "Rc.9.b.b.it? ') on the occasion of some 
half-glimpsed movements in the grass, just because he had earlier 
seen rabbits 1n the spot. Similar problems arise where the 
speaker's response is dependent upon some prior, socially shared 
information which the linguist is ignorant of. Intuitively it seems 
that the solution: 
... would be to accord to the affirmative meaning of 
' Gavaqa.i ' just thosf:! .:: , rnulat1ons that would prompt 
assent to 'Gavaqa.ii 011 ute __ strength purely of an 
understanding rt • G.9vaqa.i" unaided by collateral 
inf onnation ... 
But such a solution is not possible since we have no way in which 
to strip away the effects of collateral information so that just 
i: .I.bid. I pp. 31-35 • 
.I.bid. I p • -38 • 
1 E, 
the 'pure meaning' will stand revealed. To do this would already 
presuppose that the meaning had been established di2,tinct from the 
effects of collateral information. Quine claims that: 
. . . we have made no general experimental sense of a 
distinction between what goes into a native's learning 
to apply an expression and what goes into his learn1 ing 
supplementary matters about the objects concerned. 6 
This comment connects with a point Quine makes earlier in 
IYord and ObJect where he discusses how we might come to unders.tand 
some theory - a theory concerning a particular sort of object - say 
atomic or molecular theory. We might suppose that we could 
distinguish two stages in our understanding of the theory: first, 
we come to understand rv1/Jat the objects a.re which the theory is 
about, and second, we understand w/Jat the theory says about them. 
While such a distinction might hold water in some limited sense it 
1s generally the case that no clear distinction of this sort will 
be possible: 
. . . our coming to understand what the objects are .is 
for the most part just our mastery of what the theory 
says about them. We do not learn ff7st what to talk about and then what to say about it. 
One cannot, then, separate off the meaning of a sentence 
from the collateral information which bears on that sentence. If we 
cannot separate meaning from information in such a way, then the 
notion that translation aims to capture meanings i2. seriously 
undermined - there can be no distinct, determinate 'something', 
which is the meaning, to be captured. Here is the tie-up with the 
indeterminacy thesis. As Dagfinn F~llesdal points out: 
16 .l."J... .d 17 .LJ..1 • 
J .b.id. 1 p . 16 . 
What we are after [in translating] is a way of 
separating out, in every sentence of our theory, one 
component, its meaning, which can then be correlated 
1 with corresponding meaning components in another's 
theory. Quine claims in 'Two Dogmas' and, with more 
detail and argument, in word and Object that there is 
no distinction to be ·drawn, generally, between meaning 
and infonnation. They are inseparably intertwined and 
this inseparability of meaning and information is the 
crux of what 2uine calls indetenninacy of 
translation. 1 
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The idea that one cannot clearly separate facts about 
language - about meanings - from facts about the world is certainly 
at the heart of the Quinean attack on the analytic-synthetic 
distinction in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism·. 19 The whole point of 
Quine' s argument there is to undermine the idea that particular 
statements could be said to relate to some particular empirical 
content. In developing his famous metaphor about science as a 
"field of force whose boundary conditions are experience" Quine 
says: 
. . . the total field 1s so unclerdeterrninecl by its 
boundary condi lions, experience, that there is much 
latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate 
in the light of any single contrary experience. No 
particular experiences are linked with any particular 
statements in the interior of the field, except 
indirectly . . . it is misleading to speaJ{ of the 
empirical content of an individual statement ... 
Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary 
between synthetic statements, which hold contingently 
on experience, and analytic statements, which hold 
come what may. Any statement can be held true come 
what may, if ~ make drastic enough changes elsewhere 
in the system. 
Quine himself has pointed to the unclercletennination of 
theory by experience as the main ground for the indeterminacy 
l B 'M . d E . ' '"'9 30 
19 ean1ng an xper1ence, pp. L - . 
20 From a Loq.ical Po.int o.[ View, Cam.bridge, Mass. , 1 953, pp. 20-46. 
'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', pp.42-43. 
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thesis. 21 Underdeterrni nation and indeterminacy are thus 
distinguished by Quine. Underdetermination is seen as primarily an 
epistemological thesis, a thesis about the relationship between 
evidence and theory, and Quine does not see it as impugning the 
claim that there is something to be right or wrong about 1n 
physical theory. Indeterminacy, on the other hand , is an 
ontological thesis insofar as it involves the claim that there 1s 
no real fact of the matter as to the right or wrong way to 
translate an utterance. 22 
If underdeterrnination gives rise to indeter1ninacy , then, 
in its own turn, underdeterrnination seems to arise largely out of 
Quine's holistic conception of theory and its relation to 
experience. It is just such 'epistemic' holism which is involved 1n 
the above quotation from 'Two Dogmas' - in the idea of ~.cience as 
'a field of force·. In this respect Quine's epistemic holism (what 
has been called the 'Quine-Duhem' thesis) can indeed be seen as 
providing the basis for .both the indeterminacy of interpretation 
(insofar as it underlies the inseparability of meaning and 
information) and the underdetermination of theory by data. 
Yet perhap~. one might argue that in its own turT1 the 
holistic nature of belief can itself be seen as a product of the 
inseparability of meaning and information. Fi>llesdal characteri zes 
21 
'0n the Reason for Indeterminacy of Translation', Journal oI 
Pi/losop/JJ?, 67 (1970). 
£.See Dagfinn Fe.Sllesdal's account of the di.stinction in 'Meaning 
and Experience', pp.3 2-33. The Quinean distincti on between the two 
theses has not gone unchallenged. See Noam Chomsky, 'Quine's 
Empirical Assumptions·, words and Object.ions: Essays on tile {Jlorlf oI 
ll. V. ()u.ine, ed. Donald Davidson and Jaakko Hi ntikka, Dorclrecht, 
Holland, 1969, pp.53-68 and Richard Rorty, 'Indeterminacy of 
Translation and of Truth' , ... '->ynt./Je'._c;e, 23 ( 1972) pp. 443-462 
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the indeterminacy thesis 1n relation to the underdetermination 
thesis thus: 
The gist of Quine's argument 1s that given the 
,under-determination of our theory of nature, some 
sentences, at least, in our theory are not tied up 
with any particular pieces of evidence, or experience, 
but relate via the whole intervening theory to all of 
them. Thus such a sentence . . . 'has no fwd of 
experiential implications it can call its own'.~'" 
One might claim that it is just because the meaning of such a 
sentence cannot be separated from the information bound up with it 
that no direct link can be forged between the sentence, taken on 
its own, and any particular piece of experiential evidence. It 1s 
not merely that sentences within a theory are implied by or imply 
other sentences, but that sentences cannot be separated out, 1 n 
terms of their meanings, from other sentences. Yet of course, as 
F0llesdal says, this 1s so ''qiven t./Je underdeterminat.ion of our 
theory of nature''and that underdetermination seems to arise out of 
the holistic nature of belief. In other words it is Quine's 
epistemic holism which is still at the bottom of things even here. 
Perhaps the correct way to view the matter is to see the 
inseparability of meaning and information as one aspect of a more 
general holism. Indeed I think it is possible to show how the 
inseparability of meaning and information does derive from Quine's 
fundamental holi~.m about beliefs. 
To start with I think it ought to be clear that the 
inseparability of meaning from information entails an 
interdependence between them. This interdependence 
. . ,.. 
arises 1nsorar 
23
·Meaning and Experience', p.30. 
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as it is not possible to determine the meanings of utterances apart 
from determining the inforrnation or beliefs which bear on those 
utterances: how we translate depends on our assessment of 
collateral inforrnation, that is, on our assessment of beliefs; 24 
equally our assessment of the relevant collateral information will 
be influenced by how we translate utterances. This is so just 
because the utterance to be translated is indicative of - or 
expressive of or the embodiment of - some belief or beliefs. 25 
Translation is as much a matter of finding out what beliefs (or 
' desi_res - for they must be implicated here also) utterances can be 
used to express as it 1s about anything else. If we accept the 
thesis of epistemic holism such beliefs are of course part of a 
network a 'web' - of other beliefs. Insofar as they are part of 
such a network then they must stand in a relationship of 
interdependence with the other beliefs which make up that epistemic 
structure. Thus meanings are seen to be interdependent with beliefs 
- with 'information· - in virtue of the holistic nature of the 
belief system. 
24This 1s already to presage the Davidsonian account of the 
inseparability of meaning and information as the interdependence of 
rne.gning and belief 
2 At the very least any utterance must be indicative of and 
embedded in some specific set of beliefs - even utterances which 
are taken to be purely 'e:·rpressi ve' in the !::~ense of expressing some 
emotional or subjective response. Such responses presuppose beliefs 
about what is being re!::,pondecl to. 
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Irxietenn.inacy am Interest Relat.iv.ity 
The dependence of the indeterminacy thesi~. on the idea of 
the inseparability of meaning and information sheds interesting 
light on a claim made by Hilary Putnam that: 
... what Quine calls the 'indeterminacy of 
translation' is, in so far as it exists, explained by 
the interest-relativity of explanation ... 
indeterminacy of translation is plausible to t./Je 
e.xtentthat ~t follows from the interest relativity of 
explanation.L 
The 'interest-r elativity of explanation' 1s an idea 
which Alan Garfinkel has developed 1n his book Forms of 
.I f ' 27 £vp .. Ll1na . .1 on. Putnam il l ustrates the idea with a number of 
exarnples28 but generally speaking the notion is captured by the 
point that whether an explanation counts as adequate or not depends 
on the parameters set up by that question which the e~<planation 
purports to answer - it depends on the sort of question being asked 
and on our interests in asking. Putnam's suggestion 1s that the 
indeterminacy of translat ion ought to be seen as a case of 
explanatory relativity (so on Putnam's account we should talk of 
the relativity of translation, rather than indeterminacy). 
Certainly translation is tied up with the explanation of behavi our 
it 1s part of a~ r.i1der ex ' ·- - .J.. --.--' w !J..Lu.,.- ~ -- , the 
understanding of persons29 - and thus we would certainly expect 
~~Hean.inq and t./Je Horal Sciences, London, 1978, pp.41 and 45. 
~8New H~ven and London, 198~. 
29 Jtean.1nq and t./Je Horal Sc.1ences, pp.41-44. This is an important idea in Davidson's work and one which I 
shall discuss later in this chapter but see also: Richard Grandy, 
'Reference, Meaning and Belief', .. Tournal of P/Jilosop/Jy, 70 ( 1973) : 
David Lewis, 'Radical Interpretation ' , P/J.ilosop/J.ical Papers, vol .1, 
Oxford, 1983 and especially John McDowell , 'On the Sense and 
Reference of a Proper Name·, Hind, 86 (1977) p.160. 
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that if explanation is relative to interest (or to anything else ) 
then, as Putnam claims, translation manuals will differ as 
explanatory interests differ. 
However the whole idea of the interest relativity of 
·explanation can itself be taken as explained by the more 
fundamental notion of the inseparability of meaning and information 
(and ultimately by a more general holism). Depending on our 
assessment of the influence of collateral information we will 
interpret the meaning of an utterance, and thus of a question, 
dif~erently. If 'collateral information' is understood widely 
enough so as to encompass beliefs in general (and perhaps desires 
and intentions also) then the inseparability of meaning and 
information will yield a very similar conclusion to that embodied 
in the idea of interest. relativity. In this respect the Quinean 
inseparability thesis can happily accommodate Putnam, indeed the 
idea of interest-relativity will fit very well with the Davidsonian 
idea of interpretative holism which we will come to in the next 
chapter: interest-relativity should be seen as a necessary 
consequence of the interdependence of beliefs (and other attitudes) 
with meanings. 
However the difficulty with the" way 1n which Putnam takes 
the notion of interest-relativity is that it leads him to a 
conclusion which is quite at odds with the indeterminacy thesis and 
the associated inseparability thesis. Putnam writes: 
I think that the reason Quine's doctrine of the 
'indeterminacy of translation' ... appears so 
implausible is that we think of the doctrine from the 
point of view of our interests, explanation-spaces, 
etc. Given all of this, it is indeed unclear that 
there is any 'indeterminacy' . There may we 11 be a 
(mo30-or-less) unique 'correct' translation for us 
. . . 
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Putnam goes on to argue that indeterminacy will arise primarily in 
cases where we have "two cultures ,~.it/J different interests 
translating the same Jungle language''. Here I think it is clear 
that Putnam has indeed transformed the indeterminl1cy of translation 
into a relativity of translation - translation is now relative to a 
culture. 
In a way this might seem a natural consequence of 
understanding indeterminacy in terms of interest-relativity - not 
' just because that itself involves a relativization to interests but 
also because we might think of interests as fairly determinate 
beasts. Yet what we interpret the interests of a speaker to be, 
and indeed what we interpret our own interests to be, is dependent 
on our overall interpretative theory. Consequently such 
interpretations are always open to reinterpretation. We cannot 
escape the difficulty here by supposing that we can separate off 
interests from, say, expressions of interest in order to preserve 
some determinacy of interests de re. For as becomes quite cl ear in 
Davidson (but is not so clear in Quine) there can be no determinacy 
in the ascription of attitudes just because such attitudes are 
implicated in a wider network comprising both attitudes and 
expressions of attitudes (utterances). To repeat a familiar Quinean 
point: the indeterminacy thesis is an ontoloq.ical thesis not just 
an epistemological one - there is no unique 'fact of the matter' in 
translation or interpretation. 31 Thus Quine and Davidson can agree 
3? .lb.id., p. 45. 31 This is not to say that a speaker does not know what his 
desires, interests, or beliefs are. Insofar as he knows what his 
(Footnote continued) 
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with the idea of interest-relativity - indeed it is an interesting 
and important consequence of the holism concerning beliefs, desires 
and meanings which Davidson in particular espouses (it is indeed a 
notion which I shall come back to) - but they cannot accept 
Putnam's attempt to use the notion to transmute the indeterminacy 
of translation into a relativity of translation. 32 
.Ana.lyt.ica.l .Hypotheses am Giar.ity 
At the outset the linguist's task consists in just the 
passive observation and correlation of stimulation and response. At 
some point he will adopt the more active role of querying native 
sentences for assent or dissent from the native speaker. Quine 
claims that this procedure will result in: (1) translation of 
observation sentences - though not without some uncertainty; ( 2) 
translation of truth functions; (3) recognition of stimulus 
analytic and stimulus contradictory sentences i.e. sentences which, 
respectively, command assent or dissent "come what stimulation 
may"33 and (4) resolution of questions of intrasubjective stimulus 
synonomy - sameness of stimulus meaning - of native occasion 
sentences but without translation of such sentences. 34 
Yet in order to get even this far, the linguist has to 
31 (continued) 
words mean so he knows what he believes or desires as it 1s 
expressed in what he says. But this does not mean that there is 
only one way of interpreting what he knows even for himself. There 
w~ll be many such ways. 
LAlthough such a notion is not entirely absent from Quine - see 
c~1pter nine. 
34 fiord and Oluect, p. 66. This summary of results (1) -(4) appears at .ibid., p.68. 
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make certain a priori assumptions about the native language -
certain charitable assumptions, one might say. One such assumption 
will be that, as Davidson puts it: 
. . . when the interpreter f i ncls a sentence of the 
speaker the speaker assents to regularly under 
conditions he recognizes, he takes these condition~5to be the truth conditions of the speaker's sentence.'" 
A more obvious application of charity 1n interpretation is with 
respect to the translation of truth functions. What Quine claims is 
that we cannot but assume that the truth functional connectives of 
the native language are identical with our own - we identify 
negation, conjunction and alternation in the native language just 
as we do at home. 36 As Quine says "This approach ill accords with 
a doctrine of 'pre-logical mentality"' 37 for it will not allow the 
translation of some native sentence on the model of 'p <.'lnd not-p '. 
Yet Quine argues that we have no choice about the adoption of such 
an approach to translation: 
... what criteria [for translation] might one prefer? 
Wanton translation can make natives sound as queer as 
one pleases. Better translation imposes our logic upon 
them, and would beg the question of pre-logicality if 
there were a question to beg ... That fair translation 
preserves logical laws is implicit in practice even 
where, to speak paradoxically, no foreign language is 
involved. Thus when to our querying of an English 
sentence an Engl i~.h speaker answerE', 'Yes t9nr..i no', we 
assume that the query is meant differently in the 
af firrnation and negation; this rather than that he 
would be so silly as to affirm and deny the same 
thing ... The maxim of translation underlying all this 
is that assertions startlingly false on the face of 
them are likely to turn on hidden differences of 
language ... The common sense behind the maxim is that 
one's interlocutor's silliness, beyond a certain 
point, is less likely than bad translation - or, in 
35 
'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', 1!~11nt cfder Heqel?, 
eg6 Dieter Heinrich, Stuttgart, 1983, p.434. 
37 from 8nd Object, pp. 57-58. I.bid. , p. 58. 
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1 . ' t . d ' 38 the domestic case, 1ngu1s 1c 1vergence. 
This maxim of translation, which has elsewhere appeared 
as a 'principle of charity' , 39 is obviously crucial to translation 
at this level, i e t it has a role at a higher level also. For the 
mere observation of connections between stimulations and responses, 
even coupled with the active queryiD1 vf the natives, will not get 
us very far down the path of translation. The way in which the 
Quinean linguist does move further toward his goal is by the 
employment of what Quine calls 'analytical hypotheses' and it i2, in 
the discussion of these hypotheses that what is perhaps the central 
aspect of the trans.lator's work is dealt with: for the development 
of a set of analytical hypotheses is the development of a manual 
for translation: 
Taken together, the analytical hypotheses and 
··. ·auxiliary definitions constitute the linguist's 
jungle-to-English dictionary and grammar. 40 
Thus the analytic hypotheses give a syntactic and semantic analysis 
of the native language in accordance with the results 1 isled as 
( 1 )-( 4) above. The requirement of accordance with these previous 
findings is not a 2.trict requirement. however and some tolerance is 
allowed. Here the principle of charity, already introduced at the 
level of observation s.entences and truth functions, will have some 
part to play once again; we need to exercise a certain degree of 
judgement in attributing beliefs of a bizarre or strange sort to 
~~ .I.bid. , p. 59. 
Originally in the work of N.L.Wilson, ' Substances Without 
Substrata', Rev.ierv oI Het'-9J7hy; ... c:ics, 12 (1959) p.532; also in his 
'Grice on Meaning: The Lil timate Counter-Example', Not)s, 4 ( 1970) 
P 4doo. - . 
fiord and ab_1ect, p. 70. 
the natives. As Quine comments: 
For certainly, the more absurd or exotic the beliefs 
imputed to a people, the more susp1c1ous we are 
entitled to be of the translations; the myth of the 
prelogical people marks only the extreme. For 
transiftion theory, banal messages are the breath of 
life. 
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Yet in a way the application of charity extends a little 
further still, playing a role in the very formulation of the 
analytical hypotheses: 
. . . there is reason to draw particular attention to 
the simple form of analytical hypotheses which equates 
a native word or construction to a hypothetical 
English equivalent . :-0r hypotheses need thinking up, 
and the typical case of thinking up is the case where 
the linguist apprehends a parallelism in function 
between some component fragment of a translated whole 
native sentence and some component word of the 
translation of the sentence. Only in some such way can 
we account for anyone's ever thinking to translate a 
native locution radically into English as a plural 
ending, or as the identity predicate · =' , or as a 
categorical copula , or as any other part of our 
domestic apparatus of objective reference. It is only 
by such outright projection of prior linguistic habits 
that the linguist can find general terms in the native 
language at all, or having found them, mat.ch them with 
his own: stimulus meanings never suffice to determine 
even what words are terms, if any, much 1 ess what 
terms are coextensive. 4L 
And Quine goes on, 1n this context, to characterize the method of 
analytical hypotheses 1n a way which also stands as a good 
characterization of the operation of charity: 
The method of analytical hypotheses 1s a way of 
catapulting oneself into the jungle language by the 
momentum of the home language. It 1s a way of 
gra{~ing exotic shoots on to the old familiar bush 
:~.lb.id., p.69. 
4~ .I.bid. , p. 70 . 
.l.b.1 d. 
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It is commonplace to observe that Quine applies charity 
with respect only to observation sentences and truth functional 
logic. In fact it seems that there is, implicit in Quine, a rather 
wider application of charity than just that. This must make the 
transition to Davidson's across-the-board application of the 
principle of charity - which we will be coming to shortly - much 
less abrupt. What I would want to suggest further however is that, 
if the inseparabil.1ty of meaning and information 1s taken 
seriously, then one cannot limit the principle of charity to 
' anything less than an across-the-board application. For as Quine 
indicates, with respect to the analytical hypotheses: 
... stimulus meanings never suffice to determine even 
what words are terms, if any, much less what terms are 
coextensive ... From the point of view of a theory of 
translational meaning the most notable thing about the 
analytical hypotheses is that they exceed anything 
impli~it in 4JfftY native's dispositions to speech behaviour ... 
Davidson has said that it is because he can find no use 
for Quine's notion of stimulus meaning that he opts for the 
application of charity across-the-board. 45 Given that the 
development of analytical hypotheses is what translation is all 
. . about, then the redundancy of the notion of stimulus 
already suggested in Quine's own comments - to repeat: 
meaning is 
... stimulus meanings never suffice to determine even 
what words are terms, if any, much less what terms are 
coextensive. 
The rejection of the notion of stimulus meaning is the maJor point 
of difference between Quine and Davidson; it is tied up with 
44 Ibid. 45
'Introcluction', TJ, p.xvii. 
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Davidson"s attack on Quine·s notion of ontological relativity and 
it is rejected, as we shall see, together with the notion, also in 
Quine, of a distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical 
content. Perhaps I would add that it is Davidson's development of 
the notion of the inseparability of meaning and information into 
the interdependence of meaning and belief which must force the 
abandonment of the notion of stimulus meaning. Taken to its logical 
conclusion in Davidson's work (where it is transformed into the 
interdependence of meaning and belief) the inseparability of 
meaning from information decisively undermines the notion of 
determinacy of meaning whether of stimulus meaning or anything 
else. Without any determinacy stimulus meaning can be of little use 
in the project of translat ion. 
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Chapter 2 
DAVIDSON'S RADICAL INTERPRETATION 
rhe 'SemilntJc BnJ»:l,S.is' 
The collection of Davidson's essays titled .lnqu.ir.ies into 
Truth and .Interpretation has a dedication which reads "To W. V. Quine 
Without whom not 11 • Without doubt Davidson is very much a student of 
Quine yet he has not of course remained merely a student but has 
developed Quine's work in ways which are significantly his own. 
Davidson's interest is, like Quine's, originally in the philosophy 
of language but whereas for Quine this has been in the context of 
developing a canonical language for science, Davidson is much more 
interested in the theory of meaning as such. It is the development 
of such a semantic theory which Davidson has pursued under the 
heading of a theory of radical interpretation. Davidson himself has 
said that the term 'radical interpretation· "is meant to suggest a 
strong kinship with Quine ' s 'radical translation'". 1 Yet although 
there is indeed a familial connection here: 
Kinship is not identity ... and 'interpretation' in 
place of 'translation' marks one of the differ2nces: a greater emphasis on the explicitly semantical. 
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The question which Davidson sets for himself 1s "What 
ld .- . t t t . ?" 3 th t knowledge wou serve ror 1n erpre a 10n. , a 1s, for the 
interpretation4 of utterances. Put another way, what would we need 
to know to be able to understand the words of another? To this 
question a translation manual cannot be the answer. For, as 
Davidson argues, when we aim to understand, a translation manual 
will not necesarily suffice, providing only correlations between 
two languages neither of which we may understand. Of course 
sometimes the translation may be into a language we do know but 
' then· the translation manual will suffice for interpretation only 
because of the additional knowledge we bring to bear the 
knowledge of how to interpret the language we do know. Moreover, 
there is a further difficulty embedded here: it is not just that a 
translation manual will not always enable us to understand but it 
cannot do this insofar as it offers only correlations between 
utterances - a sort of highly sophisticated phrase book. To be 
capable of understanding the J<-9ngvaqe rather than specific 
utterances we need a theory which will give us insight into the 
structure of alien utterances. Only if we have a grasp of how the 
meanings of sente~ . .:cs in a language depend on the meaning of words 
will we have a learT1able and usable theory of interpretation. 
Davidson writes: 
1
'Radical Interpretation', TJ, p.126n.1. ~ ibid. 
4 Jb.id. 
Davidson often uses the tenn 'interpretation' to refer 
specifically to linguistic interpretation. This is clearly the case 
in this context. Except where otherwise specified, my own use of 
the term is much broader and includes the interpretation of 
linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, as well as encompassing 
the identification of attitudes. 
... the method of translation leaves tacit and beyond 
the reach of theory what we need to know that al 1 ows 
us to interpret our own language. A theory of 
translation must read some sort of structure into 
sentences, but there is no reason to expect that it 
will provide any insight into ho~ the meanings of 
sentences depend on their structure. 
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Thus Davidson claims that a theory of interpretation may best be 
seen as: 
. . . the result of a merger between a structurally 
revealing theory of interpretation for a known 
language, and a system of translation from the unknown 
language into the known. The merger makes all 
reference to the known language otiose; when this 
reference is dropped, what is left is a structurally 
revealing theory of interpretation for the ogject 
language - couched, of course, in familiar words. 
While Davidson does reject the notion that a translation 
manual can be adequate t o provide a theory of meaning it is 
nevertheless the case that Davidson's fundamental conception of the 
manner in which understanding operates 1s by way of an essentially 
translative process - "interpretation 1s essentially translation" 
writes Davidson. 7 Thus a theory of interpretation of 
understanding - takes the basic form of a theory of translation (a 
theory of translation which translates into a language we already 
understand). Moreover in a sense it is also the case that, while 
not every translation manual will yield a theory of interpretation 
for the individual interpreter, every translation manual could be 
employed, by · the right interpreter, as a theory to yield 
understanding of the utterances it translates - all that is 
required is that the translation theory be in a language which the 
~ J.b.id. I p e 13 0 • 
Ibid. 7 
'Psycho 1 ogy as Philosophy: Comments and Replies' , A£, p. 2 4 3. 
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interpreter understands. In fact it is important to recognize that 
translation is not independent of interpretation; translation, as 
we shall see shortly, can never be undertaken independently of the 
more general project of understanding speakers. Translation is 
always part of a larger holistic enterprise. In this sense then 
every t.rdnsldtion is also an .interpretation. 8 
Davidson says 1n 'Radical Interpretation' that his 
rejection of the notion of a tran2.lat.ion manual as adequate for 
interpretation ·· is not a criticism of any doctrine of Quine' s". 9 
For, as Davidson himself says, "Quine did not intend to answer the 
questions I have set··. 10 The difference on this point, at least, is 
very much 1n terms of Davidson's "greater emphasis on the 
explicitly 2.emantical". Unlike Quine, Davidson is interested in 
the development of a theory of interpretation which he believes 
will fill the role of a theory of meaning rather than in the 
elaboration of a ' naturalised epis.temology'. It is thus semantics 
that is Davidson's primary concern. One might say that while Quine 
comes from epistemology to the problems of translation and 
interpretation. David2,on begins with interpretation, to go from 
there to the problems of epistemology. 
8As H. -G. Gadamer claims, Truth and }fethod, trans. Wi 11 iam 
Glen-Doepel, ed. John Cumming and Garrett Barden, 2nd ed., London, 
1~79, p.346. 
10Radical Interpretation', p.129n.3. Ibid 
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Jzvth tmd Hean.inq 
Davidson'8 primary insight, and .his major contribution to 
semantic theory, has been in adapting a Tarskian theory of truth 
to the problem of developing a theory of meaning for natural 
languages. As Quine says: 
That meaning and truth were somehow closely related 
was evident before Russell's eponymous Inquiry and 
after, but it was left to Davidson to recognize 
Tarski' s theory of truth as the very structure of a 
theory of meaning. This insight was a major advance in 
semantics. Tarski had indeed called his theory of 
truth a study in semantics, but one felt constrained 
to add that it was semantics only in a broad sense, 
belonging more specifically to the theory of reference 
and not tf the theory of meaning. That constraint now 
lapses. 
Tarski's theory of truth12 offers an account of truth for 
a language by means of which an infinity of so-called T-sentences 
can be generated such that for each sentence in the object language 
(the language for which the theory is a theory of) there will be a 
corresponding sentence in the metalanguage (the language in which 
the theory is given) of the form: 
( T ) The sentence s of language L is true if and 
only if p 
Where 's ' names a sentence 1n the object language L and 'p ' is a 
translation of that sentence into the metalanguage. (The sentence 
of the object language is thus mentioned - but not used - on the 
left hand side while the sentence of the metalanguage is used on 
11 
'On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma' , Theories and T/J.inqs, 
~~ridge, Mass. and London, 1981, p.38. 
For a detailed account of Tarski 's work see his 'The Semantic 
Conception of Truth', P/J.ilosopl;y and P/Jenomenoloqical .Researc/J, 4 
(1944); 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages', Loqic, 
Semantics and Hetamat/Jematics, trans. J. H. Woodger, Oxford, 1 956; 
'Truth and Proof', Scientific American, 220 (1967). 
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the right hand side. ) The translation of the ob j ect language 
sentence into the metalanguage provides a specification of the 
truth conditions for that sentence. Tarski's Convention Tis just 
the requirement that, for any sentence in the object language, the 
theory should recursively generate a corresponding T-sentence of 
the form ( T ) . Such a theory wi 11 not of course provide a 
definition of truth simplic.iter but a definition of trut/J-.in-L, 
that is, a definition of truth as it applies within the object 
language. 
Tarski, of course, was interested in truth rather than 
meaning and, indeed, Tarski assumes meaning to get at truth - for 
one of the constraints on T-sentences is that the sentence on the 
right hand side should be a translation of the sentence on the 
left. Davidson inverts Tarski, using truth to get at meaning. This 
is a point Davidson himself makes. In the Introduction to Inquiries 
.into Trut..h c.7nd Interpretation he writes: 
One thing that only gradually dawned on me was that 
while Tarski intended to analyse the concept of truth 
by appealing ( in Convention T) to the concept of 
meaning ( in the guise of sameness of meaning, or 
translation), I have the reverse in mind. I considered 
truth to be the central primitive concept, and hoped 
by detailing truth's structure, to get at meaning. 
These are remarks a.bout theorie13of truth, of course, not remarks to be found in them. ~ 
Yet why should we use truth to get at meaning? It seems 
obvious that what we want a theory of meaning to do is to generate 
theorems of the form: 
(HJ) s means that p 
Yet obvious though it may seem the 'means that' locution is not a 
13 TI, p.xiv. 
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promising candidate for formalization 1n a theory. Apart from 
anything else it is inherently ambiguous but it also introduces an 
intensional element which is just what we want our theory of 
meaning to provide an account of, rather than to presuppose. So, 
what we need is a theory that will somehow match up sentences in 
the object language with sentences in the metalanguage in such a 
way that the metalanguage sentences 'give the meanings ' of the 
object language sentences. What we want are of course t..n.7nslat.ions 
from the object to the metalanguage but how to provide 
translations without relying on the notion of sameness of meaning? 
The problem seems to be finding the right filling to 
replace the troublesome 'means that' in our schema ( HJ ) above. 
Davidson's 'bold' solution to the problem is to: 
. . . try treating the position occupied by 'p ' 
extensionally: to implement this, sweep away the 
obscure 'means that', provide the sentence that 
replaces 'p' with a proper sentential connective and 
supply the description that replaces 's' with its own 
predicate. lRe plausible result is . . . s is T if and 
only if p . 
What we are after in translation are of cour2.e equivalences between 
sentences - hence the use of the biconditional. Yet equally we do 
not want such equivalences to be stated in an intensional form and 
so the biconditional has to be interpreted materially (it was just 
this point that made the 'means that' locution inappropriate). What 
might be more contentious is the interpretation of 'is T ' in terms 
of the Tarskian truth predicate - for this is of course Davidson's 
suggestion. Obviously we need some predicate to complete the left 
hand side of the schema. The sentence 's if and only if p ' is no 
14 
'Truth and Meaning', TJ, p. 23. · 
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different in this respect to the sentence 'Fred if and only if snow 
1s white' hardly well-formed. In support of the Tarskian 
interpretation of 'is T' Davidson argues that: 
What we require of a theory of meaning for a language 
Lis that without appeal to any (further) semantical 
notions it place enough restrictions on the predicate 
'is t' to entail all sentences got from [the] schema 
... when 's ' is replaced by a structural description 
of L and 'p · by that sentence. Any two predicates 
satisfying this condition have the same extension, so 
if the metalanguage is rich enough, nothing stands in 
the way of putting what I am calling a theory of 
meaning into the form of an explicit definition of a 
predicate 'is T ' .•. it is clear that the sentences to 
which the predicate · is T · applies will be just the 
true sentences of L, for the condition we have placed 
on satisfactory theories of meaning is in essence 
Tarski' s Convention T that tests thl. 5adequacy of a formal semantical definition of truth. 
In other words having arrived at the schema 
(H2) s is T if and only if p 
the claim 1s that we can now see that the constraints which must be 
satisfied by the schema are just the constraints which must be 
satisfied by a Tarskian T-sentence. Our theory of meaning 1s 
exhibited as taking the form of a Tarski-like truth theory. 
However Davidson· s comments in support of the Tarskian 
interpretation still leave the crucial connection between truth and 
meaning obscure; it is this connection which John McDowell sheds a 
little more light on within the framework of a similar Davidsonian 
account. McDowell begins with a claim about what it is that a 
theory of meaning or sense is supposed to do: 
The job of a theory of sense should be to fix the 
content of speech-acts which a total theory of the 
language concerned would warrant ascribing to speakers 
. . . in the case of any sentence whose uttP~~JiCe 
15 Ibid. 
command of the ~anguage would make fully 
comprehensible as a saying - any indicative sentence -
a theory of sense mus~ fix the content of the saying 
which an intentiona16L~terance of the sentence could be understood to be. 
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McDowell suggests that a theory of meaning should be seen as part 
of an overall theory of ur.derstanding for speakers, a theory 
encompassing the linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour of 
speakers as well as their a:.titudes and environment. The theory 
would be tested by its adec;:--1acy in describing those actions of 
speakers which would constit.·Jte speech-acts in the language and 
describing them in such a way that those items of behaviour could 
generally be seen to be intelligible in respect of speakers' 
attitudes which would in tur7 have to make sense in the light of 
speakers' behaviour ( lin;uistic and non-linguistic) and 
environment. I said that McD wel 1 's account was in the spirit of 
Davidson and indeed we can s.ee that McDowell's account of how the 
adequacy of a theory of meaning is to be tested is, in essence, 
based what we have already c~me to know as the interdependence of 
meaning and inforrnation (or .t:elief) - on what I shall be calling 
the thesis of interpretative holism. 
Naturally there is wore to what McDowell has to say about 
the development of a theory cf meaning than just this. Briefly, he 
sees that the way a theory of meaning will operate here is by being 
attached to a theory of force - a theory which wi 11 enable us to 
identify the mode of an utter=.nce as well as enabling us to extract 
an indicative sentence from t.:~at utterance, irrespective of mode or 
grammatical mood. 17 The need to obtain an indicative sentence for 
any utterance is a reflectio. of McDowell's acceptance of the idea 
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that any adequate theory of meaning should be able to explai n the 
meaning of any word or sentence in the same general way - that 
there should be some common element in all explanations of 
meaning. 18 The reasons for taking the indicative to be the primary 
element in linguistic structure is that, as Platts says: 
The indicative has a syntactic, semantic, and 
communicative completeness that the other moods lack: 
the absence of tense in imperatives; the eccentricity 
of a language with questions but no means of answering 
them: the dependence of commands on the idea of their 
being satisfied; the r~cial role of the indicative in 
language acquisition. 
Now if a theory of meaning is to be tested by its 
performance in the context of an overall theory of interpretation 
for a speaker or speakers perhaps we can already see how truth will 
necessarily enter in. For what we are involved in doing 1s 
explaining utterances by reference to certain features of the 
speaker and his situation. In its crudest form we pair up a 
sentence uttered by a speaker with some aspect of his 
circumstances, that is, with some true statement which describes 
his situation. There are of course various constraints on how we do 
this but the main point is that this 'interpretation' of a 
speaker's utterance should, once it is seen in the light of the 
speaker's overall attitudinal system, and his overall behaviour, 
make the original utterance intelligible. In interpreting the 
i~'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', pp.159-160. 
Of course we will need a syntactic theory in order to identify 
the mood of a sentence although as Mark Platts points out "It is 
. . . unclear how a theory of force could perform its second task 
without performing this third (additional?) task '". ftlays of Heaninq, 
L~P.don, Henley and Boston, 1979, p.59n.1. 
19see Platts, .i.b.id., pp.50-52 and pp.59-60. J .bid. , p . 6 0 • 
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speaker what we have of course done is 'translate' his utterance by 
correlating the utterance with something the speaker holds true; 1n 
effect we have used truth here to get at meaning. This is of course 
the original Davidsonian insight; an insight which will be an 
t 1 t ' th d . ' ' d . 20 importan e emen 1n e 1scuss1on 1n succee 1ng pages. 
As Quine says, it is Davidson who has brought home to us 
the close connection between truth and meaning. Davidson's aim has 
been to use this connection to develop a theory of meaning - truth 
is the key to an account of meaning. In this respect Davidson's 
' work is an investigation of meaning from the perspective of truth. 
However insofar as meaning and truth are so closely related 
Davidson's work must be seen as an investigation of truth no less 
than of meaning and surely this is implied in his comment that "[I] 
hoped, by detailing truth's structure, to get at meaning". The 
investigation of truth must be at the same time an investigation of 
meaning. The two are illuminated at one and the same time; indeed 
we might say that truth and meaning are two faces of the same 
relation between us and our world. This is a relation encapsulated 
in the Tarskian T-sentence itself; 1n those 'snow-bound 
trivialities' which connect sentences with the world - which 
connect the truth of the sentence 'snow is w.hi te' with the 
whiteness of snow. 21 
201t should be noted that although a theory of meaning will take 
the form of a theory of truth, not every theory of truth will be 
adequate as a theory of meaning. See McDowell, 'On the Sense and 
Reference of a Proper Name', pp.160-161; and Evans and McDowell, 
'Editorial Introduction' , F.rut..b c.'lnd Hec.'ln.inq.' £....c;,.,.c:ays .in Semantics, 
e~1 Gareth Evans and John McDowell, Oxford, 1976, pp.xiii-xviii. Introduction, T.I, p.xiv; also 'True to the Facts', T.I . Of 
course in the strict sense it is satisfaction which stands in for 
truth at the level at which the T-sentences are formally derived. 
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There is obviously much more which could be said about 
the technicalities of Davidson's work here. The task of showing 
precisely how to turn a theory of truth into a theory of meaning is 
not a simple one, nor is it an uncontroversial project. However the 
detail of Davidson's semantic theory is not something I shall go 
into22 for it is not my primary concern; it is the wider aspects of 
Davidson's work which I am interested in - not so much his 
semantics as his epistemology and metaphysics. In this respect my 
' interest is more akin to Quine's - though it is not a 'naturalized' 
epistemology which I shall end up with. What 1s crucial to 
Davidsonian semantics is however the pairing of truth and meaning 
and this notion will remain a crucial one throughout this 
dissertation. The interconnection of truth with meaning reflects 
the Davidsonian conception of the relation between language and the 
world. 
Interdepen:lence an:/ Interpretat.ive HoJ.iS/11 
There are, 1n Davidson, two important pairings of 
concepts - both involving meaning. The first of these is the 
pairing of truth with meaning; the second is the pairing of meaning 
with belief. It is this latter pairing which appears in Davidson's 
work as the .interdependence of meaning and belief and this 
interdependence is the crucial notion in the setting up of the 
scenario of radical interpretation. 
22
see the essays in the first part of TI : ( 'Truth and Meaning ' : 
Essays 1-5). 
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In interpreting a language what we need is essentially a 
theory of meaning for that language. The connection of truth with 
meaning suggests the form such a theory should take - it should be 
a Tarski-like tr1...1th theory. The interconnection of meaning with 
belief 1s what sets the scene for the practical task of 
constructing such a theory and 1n setting the scene that 
interconnection, that interdependence, also suggests the solution. 
An important element in that solution is the principle of charity 
and while in Quine the principle appears as perhaps a rather ad hoc 
' device in Davidson it can be seen to derive from the 
interdependence of meaning and belief. 
The interdependence of meaning and belief is what we have 
already met with in Quine under the name of the inseparability of 
meaning and information. Yet while in Quine the connection of 
meaning with belief is not an explicit theme, in Davidson it 
properly comes to occupy centre stage. According to Davidson 
meaning and belief are interdependent because it is not possible to 
determine what beliefs a speaker has without being able to 
interpret his utterances , while in turn one cannot interpret 
utterances without being able to identify beliefs. Moreover how we 
interpret specific utterances and what beliefs we identify a 
speaker as holding will both depend on what theory of meaning we 
employ and what theory of belier23 we have for that speaker. In 
'Belief and the Basis of Meaning' Davidson illustrates the 
interdependence of meaning and belief by an analogy with dec i sion 
theory: 
231n the sense of a theory of belief content. 
Broadly stated, my theme is that we should think of 
meanings and beliefs as interrelated constructs of a 
single theory just as we already view subjective 
values and pro~ilities as interrelated constructs of 
decision theory. 
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This sort of interdependence can be seen as leading 
fairly readily to an indeterminacy in interpretation akin to the 
Quinean indeterminacy as Davidson himself points out in 
discussing the inscrutability of reference (a Quinean thesis 
closely tied up with the indeterminacy thesis if not at times 
identical with it): 
It would be a mistake to suppose that we somehow could 
first determine what a speaker believes, wants hopes 
for, intends, and fears and then go on to a definite 
answer to the question what his words ref er to. For 
the evidence · on which all these matters depend gives 
us no way of separating out the contributions of 
thought, action, desire and meaning one by one. Total 
theories are what we ro~st construct, and many theories 
will do equally well.~ 
That the Quinean ins&._p..7rc.9.b.ility of meaning and inform..7t.ion and the 
Davidsonian .interdependence of meaning and .belief in fact embody 
the same basic idea has been implicitly acknowledged by Quine 
himself in commenting on Davidson's work. Quine writes: 
The problem of separating meaning from belief is one 
that struck me as very central. I've felt there is no 
hope, in general, of separating community wide beliefs 
into truths that belong to the meaning of words and 
truths that one would like to 2tr1ink of as universally shared collateral information. 
The connection of meaning and belief, and the bearing it 
~:'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', p.146. 
'The Inscrutability of Reference', TJ, pp.240-241; see 'Truth 
and Meaning·, p.27 where this connection is also made and charity 
i~glicat.ed. 
'Comment on Donald Davidson', .s·ynt./Jese, 27 (1974) p.325. 
44 
has on problems of interpretation, becomes evident when we ask what 
evidence is available to the radical interpreter, on the basis of 
which he can formulate a theory of interpretation. With Quine, the 
only evidence available was purely behavioural evidence and this 
was so because of Quine' s conception of translation in purely 
naturalistic terms. Davidson makes no such initial restrictions on 
the evidence available but he does claim that the evidence cannot 
include any detailed descriptions of a speaker's attitudes or 
beliefs. The reason is that this would beg the question: we make 
' ascriptions of belief largely on the basis of our interpretation of 
a speaker's utterances and yet it is the interpretation of 
utterances which our theory of interpretation aims to provide. 
Speakers' attitudes cannot be part of the evidential base for 
interpretation since the identification of attitudes is part of 
what a theory of interpretation should make possible: 
A speaker who holds a sentence to be true on an 
occasion does so in part because of what he means or 
would mean, by an utterance of that sentence, and 1n 
part because of what he believes. If all we have to go 
on is the fact of honest utterance, we cannot infer 
the belief without knowing the meaning, and have 290 chance of inferring the meaning without the belief. 
Here Davidson simply restates the interdependence of meaning and 
belief but restate~. it in such a way that it can now be seen as 
setting the essential problem of radical interpretation and also as 
constraining the solution: 
Since we cannot hope to interpret linguistic activity 
without knowing what a speaker believes and cannot 
found a theory of what he means on a prior discovery 
of his beliefs and intentions, I conclude that in 
interpreting utterances from scratch - in radical 
interpretation we must somehow deliver 
27
'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', p.142. 
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simultaneously a theory of belief and a theory of 
, L~ 
meaning. 
To repeat Davidson's earlier words - 'total theories are 
what we must construct'. We must have theories which encompass both 
meaning l'ind belief and - if we are to be absolutely correct here -
not just these two for desire is as much implicated as is either 
belief or meaning. What someone means by an utterance depends not 
only on what he .bel .ieves but also on what he .intends. That desire 
is indeed implicated here is evident enough from gr1cean 
' 
considerations of the role of speaker's intentions 1n the 
understanding of utterances but it has greater force in the context 
of the holistic approach which conceives of a speaker's behaviour 
and attitudes as a single interconnected and interdependent system. 
That desire should be so included has perhaps not always been clear 
in Davidson's work but it seems that this is something which he now 
explicitly recognises: 
I now think it 1s essential in doing radical 
interpretation, to include the desires of the speaker 
right from the start, so that the springs of action 
and intention, namely both belief and desire, are 
related to meaning .- 2-g-
At this point it is worth making a slight digression to 
make very clear that the problem set by the holistic nature of 
beliefs, desires and meanings is not avoided by moving from the 
psychological to the purely physical; that is by trying to pin down 
beliefs or whatever by first identifying the physical correlates of 
belief states (or desires or meanings) and then using this 
~~.I.bid., p.144. 
'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge ' , p.433n.7. 
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knowledge to interpret utterances and so forth. Such a strategy 
will not work because the identification of certain physical states 
or processes as correlated with certain psychological states 
presupposes that we can determine the psychological states they are 
to be correlated with - the move to the physical level is only a 
detour which ultimately returns us to the same old problem at the 
psychological level. At this point Davidson's views on the relation 
between the mental and the physical 3o 1 ink up directly with his 
account of radical interpretation. As Davidson himself explains: 
Theories of belief and meaning may require no exotic 
objects but they do use concepts which set such 
theories apart from physical and other 
non-psychological sciences: concepts like those of 
meaning and belief are, in a very fundamental way, not 
reducible to physical, neurological or even 
behaviouristic concepts. This irreducibility is not 
due, however, to the indeterminacy of meaning or 
translation . . . It is rather the methods we must 
invoke in constructing theories of belief and meaning 
that ensures the irreducibility of the concepts 
essential to those theories. Each interpretation and 
attribution of attitude is a move within a holistic 
theory, a theory necessarily governed by concern for 
consistency and general coherence with the truth, and 
it is this that sets these theories forever apart from 
those that describ~1 mindless objects, or describe objects as mindless. 
Davidson· s 'anomalous monism' 32 thus derives directly from his 
interpretative holism. It is because we cannot separate out 
meanings, beliefs and desires from one another that we can make no 
one-to-one correlations between psychological states or events and 
their physical correlates. 
Thus a theory of interpretation must be a theory for the 
30As developed in papers such as: 'Mental Events', 'Pschology as 
P~flosophy', and 'The Material Mind', all in A£, pp.207-260. 
32 'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', p.154. As he calls it in 'Mental Events', p.214. 
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understanding of persons, that 1s for the understanding of 
creatures who believe, desire and mean and not just a theory 
concerning physical systems. As a theory of persons such a theory 
must also be explanatory of their behaviour as a whole - including 
both linguistic and extra-linguistic behaviour. (This point has 
already been made in the discussion of Quine in the previous 
chapter and of McDowell above.) Now one could say that this is so 
partly because the understanding of meaning only has any practical 
point in the context of the understanding of behaviour but more 
' fundamentally it is because of the impossibility of separating out 
a theory of desire or of action from a theory of belief or a theory 
of meaning. Moreover not only is it the case that we need 'total' 
theories here but the evidence against which such theories must 
measure itself forms a totality. Our theories of interpretation 
must be tested against the totality of behavioural and other 
evidence - for there is no way in which we could even begin to sort 
through the evidence independently of some theory of 
interpretation. The evidence is itself constituted by the theory of 
interpretation we employ. It becomes a matter of testing 'total' 
theories against 'total' evidence. 33 
This was not so for Quine since there the notion of 
stimulus meaning offered some shreds of independent empirical 
evidence on which to base the development of a theory of 
translation - certain utterances were seen to have a more direct 
relationship with the world than others. However the notion of 
33As Christopher Peacocke puts it (though in a slightly different 
context): "the verification of the applicability of a scheme of 
holistic explanation is itself holistic"; Holist.ic Evpl<.''lnat.ion/ 
Act.ion., Space, Interpretation, Oxford, 1979, p. 216. 
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stimulus meaning 1s something for which Davidson "can find no use 0 
or, at least, he cannot make enough sense of the distinction 
between theoretical and observational sentences34 which lies behind 
it. And he cannot do this because, unlike Quine, Davidson 
recognises that the interdependence of meaning and belief 1s 
universal - it infects all our beliefs and all our utterances so 
that there can be no firm ground outside of that indeterminate 
realm of interpretation. In the case of stimulus meaning how are we 
to deter10ine when the stimulus meaning for two utterances is the 
\ 
same? - without, that is, assuming beliefs about what is to count 
as sameness here. Later, in chapter eight, we shall see how 
Davidson himself castigates Quine for implicitly holding on to the 
idea that there is some determinacy possible in respect of meanings 
and beliefs provided we make the appropriate relativizations. Yet 
we do not need to go even this far for evidence of Quine's 
inconsistency on this point: the notion of stimulus meaning seems 
clearly to presuppose that we can find some determinacy in the 
translational game but it is a determinacy which simply is not 
there to be found - a determinacy which the interdependence of 
meaning and belief will not allow. 
In this respect Davidson's holism 1s much more 
thoroughgoing than Quine' s and this marks a crucial, perhaps t/Je 
crucial, point of difference between them. Still it is a difference 
easily overlooked and it can appear that what is in Quine the 
notion of epistemic holism is taken on board by Davidson in a 
pretty much unchanged form: Quine talks about beliefs forming an 
34
see 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.434. 
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interconnected web and Davidson too talks about beliefs being 
"identified and described only within a dense pattern of other 
beliefs". 35 Moreover Davidson seems never to explicitly make the 
connection between the holism thesis and the thesis of the 
interdependence of meaning and belief. That there is such a 
connection is by now, I think, quite clear and once that connection 
is made then I think it is evident too how Davidsonian holism 
differs from the Quinean model. 
Quine conceives of his holism almost purely epistemically 
- it arises out of the consideration of the relation of theory to 
experience - similarly his account of the project of translation 1s 
also fairly narrowly conceived. With Davidson the inclusion of 
desire in the picture and the broadening of the notion of the 
inseparability of meaning and information into the interdependence 
of meaning and belief brings with it a transforrnation of the 
project of translation - the horizons of translation become much 
wider. No longer is it just a matter of making connections between 
stimulations and behaviour but of connecting utterances with 
beliefs held true and of making overall sense of speakers' 
attitudes, actions and utterances. Talk of interpretation rather 
than translation is a mark of this broadening in conception as much 
as of a more 'semantic emphasis·. For these reasons it seems 
appropriate to talk of a shift from the narrower epistemic holism 
of Quine to a broader, more encompassing holism in Davidson - what 
I will call, for want of a better term, Davidson's interpretative 
hol ism. 36 It is this hol ism which underlies the whole Davidsonian 
35
'The Method of Truth In Metaphysics', TI, p.200. 
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approach and which this dissertation aims to explore. 
The holistic nature of belief and desire and their 
relation to meaning would seem to suggest no point at which 
interpretation could begin; we must deliver a theory of belief and 
desire and a theory of meaning at one blow - and on the face of it 
this might seem a pretty tall order. As it turns out Davidson's 
suggestion is that we do not quite need to deliver all of it at 
once - although no one element in our overall interpretation turns 
out to be prior to anything else. The place where we begin proves 
to be a totally revisable starting point - revisable in the light 
of the interpretation which it enables. 
The structure of Interpretat.z'on 
To start with Davidson suggests that the radical 
interpreter should be able to identify those occassions on which a 
speaker holds sentences to be true. He writes: 
I suggest, following Quine, that we may without 
circularity or unwarranted assumptions accept certain 
very general attitudes towards sentences as the basic 
evidence for a theory of radical interpretation. For 
the sake of the present discussion at least we may depend on the attitude of accepting as true, directed 
to sentences, as the crucial notion. (A more full-blooded theory would look to other attitudes 
towards sentences as well, such as wishing true, 
wondering whether true, and so on.) Attitudes are 
36My use of the term 'holism' in this Davidsonian context may 
suggest affinities with Christopher Peacocke's notion of 
'explanatory holism' - especially given Peacocke's application of 
such holism to the explanation of action. Now I suspect that there 
are affinities between the two uses however Peacocke' s book is a difficult and complex work and I am loathe to make any detailed 
comments not only because I am sometimes unsure about just what Peacocke takes his hol ism to mean but also because an adequate discussion of the issue would be too lengthy for the present work. The reader is directed to Peacocke' s Hol .ist.ic E?planation. 
indeed involved here, but the fact that the main issue 
is not begged can be seen from this: if we merely know 
that someone holds a certain sentence to be true, we 
know neither what he means by the ~tence nor what 
belief his holding it true represents 
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That we should be able to identify certain instances as instances 
of a speaker holding a sentence true without being able to specify 
the content of the sentence is not something with which I would 
take issue. I think that ordinarily we are able to do this and that 
we should be able to is an undisputable condition of the 
possibility of radical interpretation. What I am not so sure of is 
the extent to which it can be done without some presupposition as 
to the beliefs and desires of the speaker. Interpreting a speaker 
as holding some unspecified belief true is surely an interpretation 
which is dependent on other assessments of the speaker's beliefs 
and desires. Thus it would seem dubious to suppose that we can find 
any place to begin our interpretative project which is unaffected 
by the holistic nature of interpretation; and yet that we can do 
this seems to be just what Davidson himself assumes. 38 But no 
matter what conclusion we reach on this matter what is clear 1s 
that being able to identify a speaker as holding some sentence 
(content unspecified) true does not, as Davidson himself points 
out, resolve the problem set by the thesis of interpretative holisrn 
- the problem of interpreting meanings and identifying beliefs and 
desires remain~ .. 
Yet given that belief and meaning do interconnect (and 
37
'on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', TI, pp.195-196. See 
also 'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', pp.144-145 and 'Radical 
I~t-erpretation', p.135. 
1Christopher Peacocke also takes Davidson up on this point, 
Holistic E?planat.ion, pp.179-216. 
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desire clso though for the sake of simplicity I will assume desire 
to be included with belief) then if we could hold one or the other 
of the pair constant we could determine the other. Of course the 
interde?9ndence which is the product of Davidson's interpretative 
holism means that we can have no prior access to beliefs or 
meanings such that either could be determined with certainty at the 
outset but what Davidson suggests is that we could begin 
interpret.at.ion by assuming beliefs and then, on that .baci' o = =, 
develope a tentative theory of meaning. That theory of meaning 
could then be used to test our initial assumptions about beliefs 
and so lead on to a revised theory of belief which, in its turn, 
could be used to test our theory of meaning ... and so on, until an 
acceptable theory - a h..9lance of meaning against belief - is 
reached. Using a Rawlsian turn of phrase we might call this a state 
of .interpretative equ.il.ihr.iUJ11. 39 Echoing this idea of 
interpretation as a semantic-epistemic balancing act, Quine writes 
that "Translating is not the recapturing of some determinate 
entity, a meaning, but only a balancing of various values". 40 
39
rhe implicit reference to Rawls' method of reflective 
equilibrium is deliberate. There are close similarities between the 
Davidsonian account of interpretation and the Rawlsian account of 
the development and justification of an idea of justice. In both 
cases "'hat is crucial is the idea that what is involved is a 
balancing of differing considerations and the requirement of some 
sort of agreement at the start. Nelson Goodman has a similar 
account of the justification of inferential procedures, Fact, 
Fiction and Foreca...c:t, Cambridge, Mass., 1955, pp.65-68. The 
reference is given by Rawls himself in A Theory of Justice, Oxford 
1972, p. 20n. ( It is sometimes claimed that simi liar ideas are 
present in Chomsky also.) F .B.D' Agostino has discussed Rawls (but 
without reference to Davidson) in a manner which is very suggestive 
of these similarities in two unpublished papers 'The Method of 
Reflective Equilibrium' and 'Relativism and Reflective 
Ewi 1 i br 1 um ' . 
'On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World', Er.A-enntn.i ... c:, 9 (1975) p,322. 
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The methodology of interpretation which Davidson 
recommends is thus one involving a continual shuttling .back and 
forth between the interpretation of meanings and identification of 
beliefs until some sort of equilibrium 1s reached (though such 
equilibrium will be only a staging post 1n the ongoing 
interpretative project). It is after all a single overall theory 
that we want here - a theory which includes a theory of meaning, a 
theory of desire and a theory of belief under the one theory of 
interpretation. Thus we play off different components of our 
overall theory one against the other just as in the case of 
decision theory we play off values and probabilities to reach an 
optimum balance. 
Of course we do need some place from which to begin this 
interpretative dialogue and it is in effect by the assumption of 
beliefs that we get such a place. We thus hold belief constant 1n 
order to get at meaning (and thence back to belief). What governs 
our initial assumptions about what speakers believe is a principle 
already familiar from Quinean radical translation - the principle 
of charity. The role of charity is as a general constraining 
principle on our theory of interpretation yet it can be seen as 
operating in a twofold way. 
Charity operates first by providing a place to begin. 
Thus charity prescribes that we take the utterances of a speaker to 
be, generally speaking, true. As Davidson says: 
... we take the fact that speakers of a language hold 
a sentence to be true (under observed circumstances) 
as pr.ima .t~c;c.ie evidence 4\hat the sentence is true under those circumstances. 
Of course charity must involve more than just an assumption to the 
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effect that a speaker is generally an utterer of truths. For any 
particular set of circumstances will be consistent with an inf_nity 
of truths. Only by assuming the beliefs and desires of a sJ::.-€3.ker 
can we determine what truths will be relevant to a speaker's 
utterances in a given situation. This is just the course \.lhi ch 
charity prescribes: that we assume the speaker to have sim1 lar 
beliefs and desires to ourselves. 42 
That we must assume agreement 1 n be 1 i ef s bet~een 
ourselves and those we interpret can in fact be seen as der1 ving 
from the idea that we should maximise the truth of spea~ers' 
utterances. For what is to count as a true utterance is deter.n1ned 
by our assessment of what is true. If we take a speaker to be 
uttering a true sentence we can thus take him to be express ing a 
belief which is in agreement with our own beliefs. We have already 
seen how truth and meaning are tied together - we interpret 
utterances by connecting those utterances with circumstances t,;hi ch 
actually obtain in the speaker's environment - and similarly how 
meaning and belief are also tied together in terms of their 
interdependence. What we can also see is that truth and belief are 
connected notions - we cannot identify beliefs independently of 
what we hold to be true. 
The reason for this connection is that beliefs can only 
be identified within a network of other beliefs but the 
identification of beliefs also requires connecting beliefs with the 
objects of belief in the world. In this latter respect beliefs are 
!1'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', p.152. 
This point is made most explicit by Richard Grandy, 'Refer-ence, 
Meaning and Belief', p.443. 
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identified, 1n part, in the same way that utterances are 
interpreted - by considering the speaker or 'believer' in relation 
to his environment. The connection between truth and meaning is 
paralleled by a connection between truth and belief. The 
requirement of agreement for interpretation to be possible is 
ultimately a matter of agreement on truths - agreement and truth 
are not separable given the holistic nature of interpretation. It 
lS the combination of agreement and truth which makes 
interpretation possible 1n the first place. It might be thought 
that we could conceive of a theory which interpreted speakers to be 
uttering truths but which also attributed beliefs which could not 
be correlated with our beliefs in any straightforward way. However 
that beliefs cannot be correlated or brought into agreement in a 
Btraiq/JtiorwL&lfd way does not mean that they cannot be correlated at 
all. Indeed our being able to recognize certain beliefs as true 
must involve our being able to make some such correlation, our 
being able to find some overall agreement, otherwise we could not 
interpret. 43 
Yet here, as elsewhere, the assumption of agreement is 
only the first step in the interpretative process - it is only 
where we begin and not necessarily where we end up. So charity can 
be seen as providing a constraint on where we may begin our 
interpretation and it can also be seen as operating 1n a second way 
by setting limits on how far and 1n what direction our 
interpretation may proceed. Charity thus counsels us to avoid the 
attribution of too much in the way of error , or inconsistency, to a 
43This problem 1s discussed further 1n chapter three. 
speaker: 
The point is . . . that widespread agreement is the 
background against which disputes and mistakes can be 
interpreted. Maki ng sense of the utterances and 
behaviour of others, even their most aberrant 
behaviour, requires us to find a great deal of reason 
and truth in them. To see too much unreason on the 
part of others is s i mply to undermine our ability to 
understand what it i s they are so unreasonable about. 
If the vast amount of agreement on plain matters that 
is assumed in communication escapes notice, it's 
because the shared t ruths are too many or too dull to 
bear mentioning. What we wan\ 4to talk about is what's new, surprising, or disputed. 
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It 1s 1n this second way, as a constraint on how our 
interpretation may proceed , that the role of charity 1s most 
important, and here it provides a constraint in addition to the 
formal constraints demanded by the Tarskian truth theory which is 
the model for a Davidsonian theory of meaning. 
Both of these aspects of the principle of charity can of 
course be seen as deriving directly from the earlier Quinean use of 
the principle: recall that Quine counsels the employment of charity 
with respect to observat ion sentences, truth functions, the 
analytical hypotheses and a lso as a general principle requiring us 
to be suspicious of attributing absurd or unintelligible beliefs to 
speakers. As I have already noted Davidson's more thoroughgoing 
holism leaves little r oom for the distinction between the 
observational and the theoretical and thus Davidsonian charity is 
much more far reaching t han Quine's; it is not restricted to the 
level of observation sentences. But as with Quine Davidson insist~. 
that our interpretation should maximise the consistency and 
intelligibility of speakers' utterance~~ and beliefs. In this 
44
'Belief and the Basis of Meaning ' , p.153. 
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respect charity, like so much else, derives from the holism which 
is so characteristic of Quine and especially Davidson. It 1s 
because beliefs form an interrelated network that charity 1s 
required since the networking of beliefs (and des.ires) makes the 
understanding of one belief and hence of one utterance 
dependent on the understanding of many others. Davidson himself 
makes this quite clear. Commenting on the need for agreement in 
order to interpret he writes: 
The reason is the holistic character of the mental ... 
We cannot intelligibly attribute the thought that a 
piece of ice is melting to someone who does not .have 
many true beliefs about the nature of ice, its 
physical properties conencted with water, cold, 
solidity and so forth. The one attribution 6ests on the supposition of many more - endlessy more. 
It is not just beliefs which are implicated 1n this 
holism but "wishes, hopes desires, emotions ... and fears". 46 In 
fact any propositional attitude attributed to a speaker takes its 
place amongst a constellation of attitudes; as part of an 
interconnected attitudinal system. One might see the holistic 
nature of this system as the basis for interpretative holism - as 
we suggested earlier, meanings are interdependent with beliefs 
largely because it is beliefs which utterances express. In Quine's 
case we talked about epistemic holism in this context; in the 
Davidsonian case it seems more appropriate to talk of att.itud.inal 
holism thus making explicit the fact that the holism extends to 
cover all propositional attitudes. It is in virtue of such hol ism 
that we must keep attributions of error to a minimum; we must 
45
'Paradoxes of Irrationality', P/J.ilosop/J.ical Essays on Freud, ed. 
R!ghard Wollheim and James Hopkins, Cambridge, 1982, p.302. 
I ibid., p. 293 • 
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maximise intell1gib1lity since this is to maximise our ability to 
identify beliefs an:i other attitudes. 
/ 
Charity 1s required because of the holistic character of 
belief - because of the interdependence of meaning, belief and 
desire. It can also be seen as an expression of that same holism. 
The interconnectedness of our own beliefs requires that we should 
be committed to ~he attempt to preserve the consistency and 
intelligibility of our own belief system - this is in effect to 
restate the holism ~hesis~ Charity extends this holistic constraint 
' (and here holism .is acting as a const.ra.int in favo1..1r of consistency 
and maximal intelligibility and not merely as a descriptive thesis) 
to others, to those whom we would interpret. So we must interpret 
the beliefs, des1~es and actions of other speakers to be as 
consistent and coherent as possible. In understanding others we 
thus have much the same committment to intelligibility as in our 
own case. 
But now T,Je see just how broad Davidson's interpretative 
holism really is! For if we are to understand the beliefs of others 
we must bring them into contact with our own beliefs. Just as 
translation involves matching up synonymous utterances so 1n 
interpreting beliefs and concepts we need to match up those beliefs 
with beliefs we also hold. This is just what charity requires. But 
then of course we see that we are real 1 y required to treat, not 
just our own beliefs or the beliefs of another speaker, 
holistically; in fact we are required to treat the conJllnct.ion of 
our beliefs and those of other speakers holistically as well. The 
beliefs of other speakers are seen as interdependent with our 
beliefs - how we decide what beliefs to ascribe to others depends 
59 
on what we ourselves believe and, to some extent, the reverse is 
also true. That this 1s so 1s implicit 1n the charitable 
requirement that we should 'maximise agreement' between ourselves 
and those we interpret. 
The idea that interpretation does involve treating both 
our own beliefs and desires and those of others holistically; that 
it i nvo 1 ves hr i ng i ng them into some sort of coherence, though it 
may seem bizarre at first, is not peculiar to Davidson. Indeed it 
has been made a central idea - in a much more deve 1 oped and 
explicit way - in the hermeneutic theory of H.-G.Gadamer. According 
to Gadamer 1 n Jrut.JJ and Het.JJod interpretation ought to be seen as 
involving a 'fusion of horizons' 
interpretee. 47 
between interpreter and 
Gadarner' s work does of course have an historical and 
phenomenological orientation absent from Davidson's but the basic 
idea that interpretation and understanding 1s a matter of 
unification between differing "horizons., or, in Davidson's case, 
differing attitudinal systems (that 1s, networks of beliefs, 
desires, and so forth) seems to be common to both. In the project 
of interpretation interpreter and interpreted come together in an 
agreement which is both presupposed by and the product oI the 
interpretative project it.self. The principle of charity requires 
the presupposition of agreement for interpretation to be possible 
but insofar as interpretation is a process which treats of the 
beliefs and desires of others as interdependent with our own then 
so interpretation is also a process by which agreement is developed 
47 See Trut.JJ and Het.JJod, pp. 273f f, 337f f and 358. 
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and articulated. The agreement which charity presc:-:.bes is thus 
never revised qlo.b..9JJy and interpretation only enables the 
modification of that initial agreement in various specific respects 
- the revision is always local. In interpretation, 1t seems, we 
find out the true nature of the agreement which our _nterpretative 
project presupposed. The interpretation which follows the 
application of charity articulates rather than does cway with the 
agreement charity prescribes. 
At this point it becomes apparent that the principle of 
' char~ty in Davidson can 1n fact be seen as having twc aspects in a 
sense additional to those already mentioned above. Hot only does 
charity operate in a twofold way as a constraint on :~terpretation 
as well as offering a starling point but the principle also 
operates both as a principle of methodology and as soIT.~thing more. 
In its first and more mundane aspect charity functions as 
a met/Jodolog.ical max.im : it thus counsels us, in any specific 
interpretative situation, to assume that the speaker- has similar 
beliefs to our own and to minimize the amount of irr~tionality or 
error we attribute to the speaker (this is the most common sense of 
charity). In this respect we might take charity as providing a 
fairly specific theory of belief for a particular speaker on a 
particular occasion. Such a theory will also tend to focus on 
specific matters pertinent to the particular speaker and ocassion 
and will, moreover, be totally revisable as the actual empirical 
evidence on which we interpret accumulates. Here charity provides 
the first approximations to a fully-fledged theory of belief - an 
approximation which enables us to get started in ti:e project of 
interpretation. It thus functions as a pragmatic device for the 
E, 1 
intitial at~ibutions of belief. 
ricr..lever in its second aspect charity 1s not open to 
rev1s1on at. all and in this aspect charity functions as what I 
j ' J 't , 4 8 Th . . th f shall call an onto og.1 ca presuppos.1 . .1 on. 1s 1s e sense o 
charity as ~t operates at the global rather than the local level; 
the sense _n which overall agreement, overall truth, is always a 
fundamenta l and inescapable presupposition for any interpretation 
whatsoever. But in this aspect charity offers no specific 
prescripticns as to what beliefs agreement must be taken to consist 
\ 
1n ~ it mer2ly stands behind the actual practice of interpretation 
as its pre~.upposition. 
These two aspects of charity are not separate: charity's 
role as c principle of methodology is founded on the more 
fundamental role of charity as a presupposition. In this respect 
the prescriptions which charity offers at the methodological level 
will always remain flexible because the agreement which must be 
presupposed 1s global and indeterminate. Considered as an 
ontological presupposition charity offers very little in the way of 
specific advice as to how, in particular cases, beliefs should be 
ascribed. Insofar as it is the role of charity as a presupposition 
which is mo~e fundamental so, to a large extent, it is this aspect 
of the princ iple of charity - rather than its methodological role -
which is t t e focus for most of my thinking here; it also seems to 
be what f_gures most often 1n Davidson's discussions of the 
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1 talk of an 'ontological' presupposition here rather than a 
'methodolog:cal ' one because in this sense charity is not just a 
presupposit_on of method; and rather than an 'epistemological ' one 
because whc~ is really presupposed is that speakers share a common 
world which i s open to them - it is also a presupposition more of 
interpretat:on and understanding than specifically of knowledge. 
principle - though Davidson never even comes close to making this 
sort of distinction explicit. Yet this more fundamental sense of 
charity must be presupposed when one talks (as Davidson does talk) 
of charity as a quite general constraint on theories or when 
mention is made of the need for 'overall' agreement, of the need 
for 'most' of our beliefs to be true. Certainly one cannot conceive 
of charity as simply a principle of methodology or as a principle 
which is only of use in the initial stages of interpretation. 49 
Charity is a presupposition of interpretation itself. 
That interpretation 1s a matter of the articulation of 
already presupposed agreement (a notion encapsulated in this idea 
of charity as an ontological presupposition) is a recurrent. theme 
1n Gadamer's work. He views interpretation on the model of a 
conversation in which the conversation is just the f incling of a 
common bond of agreement between conversational partners. He 
writes: 
. . . hermeneutical conversation, like real 
conversation, finds a common language, and . . . this 
finding of a common language is not, any more than in 
real conversation, the preparation of a tool for the 
purpose of understanding but, r~er, coincides with 
the very act of understanding ... 
That interpretation does work like this is less explicit 
1n Davidson but the idea is undoubtedly there - if only in the 
breadth of Davidson's interpretative holism. However the idea does 
seem to recieve more attention in his paper 'A Nice Derangement of 
Epitaphs'. 51 There Davidson argues that linguistic interpretation 
4 9
whi ch is how Evans and McDowe 11 seem to regard it.: "Charity is 
merely good advice in the opening stages", 'Editorial 
I~brocluction', Trut..h and }fean.inq; Es ... Ck"iy: ... cz .in ... '?emant.ics, p.xviin.15. 
- Trut./J and Het./Jod,. p. 349-350. 
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is never a matter of simply applying a priorly held linguistic 
theory to some linguistic output. Such a procedure would not enable 
interpreters to cope with cases of novel or deviant usage or with 
cases of plain error on the part of speakers. Linguistic theories 
require continual modification to fit changing situations - a new 
theory is required for almost each new linguistic encounter, each 
new utterance even. But of course what theory to apply - how to 
modify our existing theory - 1s not always known in advance. 
Instead we learn how to alter our theory of interpretation in the 
very process of trying to understand the speaker. The speaker 
supplies the evidence on the basis of which we develop or modify 
the theory by \.1hich we interpret him. 
Since Davidsonian interpretation is always a matter of 
accommodating theories to specific situations and specific speakers 
it might be thought that Davidson gives priority to idiolect over 
dialect; that in effect Davidson's account of interpretation is too 
individualistic and leaves out of account the wider linguistic 
community to which the speaker belongs. This is indeed just the 
critic ism that David Lewis has made of his own theory of radical 
interpretation. 52 Lewis complains that: 
I stated my problem in an unduly individualistic way; 
given the facts <-'l..bout Karl as a physical system, solve 
for the facts about /Jim as a person - ./J.is beliefs, 
desires, and meanings. If Karl were a unique being , 
51 In T.he P.h.ilosop/JJ-' of .Do17<..9ld .Di.9vidson: A Per,..c;pective on Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, ed. Ernest LePore, forthcoming, Oxford, 1986. See also 'Communication and Convention', TI, 
p~2276ff. 
A theory developed in 'Radical Interpretation', ... c;ynt..he'...c:e, 27 (1974); reprinted in his r-::-:·1osop.h.ical Papers, vol.1, Lewis makes 
the criticism in the first of his 'Postscripts to "Radical Interpretation"', P.hilosop.h.1 cal Papers, vol .1, pp.119-121. 
this would be the right question to a~ If not - if 
he is, for instance, human - it is not. '"1 
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Of course Davidson has never couched his account of the 
way radical interpretation proceeds in quite the same strongly 
individualistic language employed by Lewis in his Synt/Jese paper. 
Nevertheless Davidson could be interpreted as having a similar 
individualistic bias, especially since he generally concurs with 
the account Lewis gives in that paper. Yet to a great extent the 
question as to who is the proper object of interpretation: the 
individual or his 'kind' (as Lewis puts it) is not a real question 
on the Davidsonian account. (Which is one reason why, I would 
suggest, it has never occurred to Davidson himself.) Instead 
interpretation always requires us to take account of both; to take 
account of the individual 1n his social setting. Something like 
the same dialogue must go on between our particular theories for 
the interpretation of individual speakers and our more general 
theories of the speech behaviour (and belief) for the society as a 
whole. Of course practically speaking we are never involved in 
interpreting anything other than specific utterances on specific 
occasions by specific speakers (or, at the extreme, specific 
classes of speakers - in the case of public announcements or 
documents for instance. Al though even here the idiosyncrasies of 
individual speakers may have to be allowed for in a theory which 1s 
truly adequate to the task). 
Our more general theories must thus be seen as 
abstractions from the actual practice of interpretation and insofar 
53 
'Postscript to "Radical Interpretation'' - A. Karl and Others of 
His Kind', p,119. 
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as they are abstractions they are in themselves inadequate to the 
actual task of interpreting speaker's utterances. Like any priorly 
held linguistic theory they require modification in order to be 
made applicable to the specific requirements of an actual 
linguistic encounter. This is precisely the view which Davidson 
sets forth in 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' and which we have 
already discussed to some extent above. The conclusion Davidson 
draws is that the notion of speakers sharing something called 'a 
language' is a dubious one signifying no more than that a group of 
speakers have a greater tendancy to converge on passing theories 
for interpreting each others words. Indeed the indeterminacy of 
linguistic interpretation is itself sufficient to suggest that what 
language a person speaks - and hence who he is to be counted as 
sharing a language with - is never a question with just one answer. 
One person may be taken as speaking many languages (though not all 
at the same time! ) as many languages, in fact as there are , 
theories for interpreting his words. 
Interpreting a speaker involves playing off desire, 
meaning and belief one against the other; it also involves playing 
off the more general theories we have developed against the 
interpretative problems specific to the situation. And while no 
such general theory is ever adequate to interpreting actual 
utterances - it always requires application - such a theory is 
indispensable 1n interpretation for it provides the foundation for 
the deve 1 opment of a more specific, more 'practical ' , 'passing' 
theory. ThuB if we have no notion of the standard or normal 
meanings of words we have no chance of discovering their 
non-standard usages in particular situations. In developing a 
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theory for a linguistic community we are developing a set of 
standard semantic theory which can then be applied and if necessary 
modi£ ied as required in actual linguistic encounters. In a way to 
do this is just to follow a version of charity - we build on what 
we already have rather than starting completely afresh each time. 
If we always tried to do the latter we would never get anywhere. 
One thing which would absolutely preclude us from too 
individualistic approach to interpretation would be the demands of 
holism itself. For the holistic nature of interpretation requires 
us, rftakes us duty bound, to integrate all the data which comes to 
us in the process of interpr etation of a speaker. Part of this data 
is the influence of other speakers on the individual speaker both 
1n current and ongoing sit uations as well as the influence that 
permeates his current speech behaviour in virtue of past contact 
with other speakers. The marks of a speaker's involvement with a 
wider community are always evident in his speech and must be taken 
account of in any satisfactory project of interpretation. The 
individual can thus never be prised off from the wider social 
context. But neither can that wider context be totally abstracted 
from the individuals who belong to it; or at least such abstraction 
would only have relevance in actual interpretative application -
that is, in the interpretation of individual speakers. 
It might be thought that the assumption of beliefs which 
charity requires goes against the requirement that a theory of 
radical interpretation should not include as evidence any detailed 
ascriptions of speaker's attitudes. Such begging of the question is 
avoided here just because the assumptions we do make are used, not 
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as evidence for our theory, but as a starting point from which to 
theorise. Our initial ascriptions of belief - in accordance with 
charity - are always revisable and have no special priority so far 
as the order of interpretation i2. concerned. Once interpretation 
has begun we shuttle back and forth between belief and meaning and 
desire adju&ing, modifying, revising as necessary until that 
elusive equi ' ibrium is reached. And of course equilibrium never 
really is reached because we are always faced with new utterances 
to take account of, new situations, new interlocuters. The 
' 
interpretative equilibrium which radical interpretation aims at is 
thus a dynamic equilibrium - the process of interpretation is one 
of ongoing dialogue between ourselves and our interpretees and 
between the various elements of our overall interpretative theory. 
Ultimately the presumption of charity is juf·,tified not on 
evidential grounds - not by citing empirical evidence in support of 
the particular belief ascriptions charity prescribes - but because 
without charity interpretation would not be possible at all. It is 
thus presupposed by the interpretative project itself and so any 
attempt to bring forth evidence against the presumption of charity 
must inevitably fail. For as charity is an essential feature of all 
interpretation so any interpretation must presuppose the principle. 
Interpretation 1s charitable by its very nature. Indeed the 
requirement of charity simply reflects the necessary structure of 
interpretation itself; it derives from the thoroughly holistic 
character of interpretation. This is a point we will explore more 
thoroughly in the next chapter but perhaps we can already see that 
charity, in its insistence on agreement, simply reiterates the need 
for connectedness between beliefs - in our own case as well as 
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others. Since we only have the beliefs we have to start with any 
new belief must be integrated with the existing corpus of belief 
and since without charity, without agreement, we could not 
interpret, so we cannot make sense of the only case in which 
charity would fail - the case of massive disagreement between 
ourselves and others. It is here that the kernel of the argument 
against conceptual relativism and scepticism - the subjects of 
chapters five and six - is to be found. 
We have seen how Davidson, unlike Quine, applies charity 
quite generally and one result of this, in Davidson's eyes, is that 
while he accepts the idea of the indeterminacy of translation he 
thinks it will be less in the case of radical interpretation than 
1n radical translation. Davidson writes that: 
If interpretation is approached in the style I have 
been discussing, it is not likely that only one theory 
will be found satisfactory. The resulting 
indeterminacy of interpretation is the semantic 
counterpart of Quine's indeterminacy of translation. 
On my approach, the degree of indeterminacy w i 11 , I 
think, be less than Quine contemplates: this is partly 
because I advocate adoption of charity on an 
across-the-board basis, and partly because the 
uniqueness of quantificational structure is assured if 
Convention T is satisfied. But 1n any case the 
question of indeterminacy is not central ... 
Indeterminacy of meaning or translation does not 
represent a failure to capture significant 
distinctions; it marks the fact that certain apparent 
distinctions are not significant. If there is 
indeterminacy, it is because when all the evidence is 
in, alternative ways of stating the facts remain open. 
An analogy from decision theory has already been 
noted: if the numbers ( 1 ) , ( 2) and ( 3) capture the 
meaningful relations in subjective value between three 
alternatives, then the numbers (-17), (-2) and (+13) 
do a~ well. In~}errninacy of this kind cannot be of 
genuine concern. 
54
'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', pp.153-154. 
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The latter comments Davidson makes in th:~ passage will be touched 
on again when we come to discuss truth an:. indeterminacy 1n chapter 
nine. With respect to the matter curr2~ly in hand Davidson is 
surely being a little over-optirni.s-_i c in thinking that 
indeterminacy will be less for him th::-i for Quine. For Quine 
indeterminacy was at least kept at bay :n the realm of stimulus 
meaning but as I have pointed out more -::.an once, this is not so 
for Davidson. The constraints of the T=.rskian truth theory may 
provide some restriction on indeterminac::-· but this will be little 
as '·compared to the indeterrnining effec:. of Davidson's wholesale 
(excuse the pun) holism. 55 
There can be no fact of the ~-:ter for Davidson at any 
level of interpretation. Indeed it seems -:.::at not even charity will 
do very much to limit indeterminacy, c::tJtra Davidson, since the 
constraint of charity is always a flex it~e one. Charity does not 
put an absolute limit on the theories which are adequate for 
interpretation - we can always revise oc- charitable ascriptions. 
Indeterrninacy remains, charity or no. ~r::at is true, however, is 
that some of the Quinean arguments for ioc=terminacy will not apply 
in Davidson~s case56 and some forms of 1nc=t.erminacy will therefore 
be reduced. Nevertheless the indeterminac~_- ~hich is a direct result 
of Davidson's interpretative holism, an:: which can even lead to 
conflicting assignments of truth (at le=--3- on the surface), must 
55As will be discussed later, in chapter t.hree, even the Tarskian 
constraints are flexible see 'Th~ Method of Truth in Metaphysics', p.204. Moreover in 'The In.sc:-utabilit.y of Reference', TI, pp.239-240, and 'Reality Without Re:-?rence', p.225, Davidson 
a~iows that even truth may vary between tJ-.20ries of interpretation. See Gareth Evans, 'Identity and :=-:-2dication', Journal of P/J.iJ OSOp/JJ?, 72 ( 1 975) , p. 346. 
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remain. 
The application of charity does however have the same 
effect in practice as .i[ indeterminacy was to be more or less 
eliminated. For how we apply charity will depend largely on our 
beliefs and desires as they are relevant to the particular 
interpretative task. If charity is considered to be a principle 
that counsels us to maximise intelligibility (as it often is 
conceived) then what counts as 'maximal intelligibility' will 
depend on what we are interested in explaining. Here we return to 
the - Putnam-Garfinkel notion of interest-relativity which was 
discussed in chapter one and which we noted could be seen as a 
product of the interdependence of belief with meaning - as a 
product, 1n other words, of the holistic nature of interpretation 
whereby beliefs, desires and other attitudes are interconnected 
with each other and with the meanings of words. In this context 
that notion serves to explain why and how indeterminacy might 
appear to disappear or to no longer be of significance in many 
practical situations: it is because our own interests and beliefs 
are implicated in the decision as to what will count as the 
appropriate application of charity. Our own desires and beliefs 
will function as a fairly tight (though not always precise) 
constraint on what is to count as a charitable interpretation and 
where and how far the initial ascriptions of charity are to be 
revised. Indeterminacy always remains because indeterrninacy does 
not only af feet interpretation at the level of the beliefs and 
meanings of others but comes in at the level of our own beliefs and 
meanings also. T/Jere .is no .bottom line. 
Certainly, in our own cases, we can each be said to Jtnow 
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what our words mean, and therefore to Jrnow what. ~:~ believe, desire 
and so on. Moreover there is a cerlai n assymetry between the 
authority we have in self-ascriptions of attitudes and the 
authority others have in ascribing attitudes to us. It is an 
assyrnetry which derives from the fact that the speaker must always, 
or almost always (for speakers can be wrong about what they mean), 
be assumed to know what his words mean. For if a speaker's words 
are to be understood at all his words must constitute a meaningful 
utterance; a meaningful utterance must be an intentional one and 
' the speaker must speak with some knowledge of his intention for he 
must employ an utterance which is appropriate to it. 57 Yet none of 
this impugns the indeterminacy which must still attach to any 
attempt - on behalf of the speaker or any one else - to interpret a 
speaker's utterances, beliefs or other attitudes. It is not that a 
speaker might never be able to get his own self-ascriptions of 
belief or self-interpretations of utterances right but that there 
will always be more than one way of making such ascriptions and 
interpretations. This is the indeterminacy of interpretation. 
The indeterminacy which inescapably infects the 
interpretative enterprise can be seen as deriving from the 
necessarily c.ircular structure of that enterprise. Interpretation 
is a merry-go-round of belief, meaning, desire; one leads to the 
other and to the other and on to the other. Interpreting an 
utterance means riding that merry-go-round until you stop feeling 
giddy until you master the art of moving around on that 
57 
See Davidson, 'First Person Authority', IJ.ialect.ica, 38 ( 1984). 
This point was also raised briefly above p.23. 
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particular moving platform. The circularity 1s not only an 
expression of the holistic nature of beliefs, mean_ngs and desires 
but also captures the structure of the interpretative process 
whereby a theory of belief is used to develop a theory of meaning 
which is used to test our initial ascriptions of belief and which 
1n turn leads us on to modify our theory of meaning ... and so on. 
We travel round that circle until some sort of equilibrium is 
reached - until we can understand sufficient. for our purposes and 
for the moment. 
This image of circularity suggests another echo from the 
hermeneutics of Gadamer - and not just that of Ga.darner - for the 
circularity which seems to be the essential feature of Davidsonian 
interpretation is also a central feature in hermeneutic accounts of 
the structure of understanding. According to herrneneutic theorists 
from Schleiermacher to Ricouer understanding 1s an essentially 
circular process. For Schleierrnacher this meant that, in the 
context of the interpretation of a text, any portion of the text 
could only be understood in relation to the understanding of the 
text as a whole. Equally the whole could be understood only in 
relation to the parts. 58 In Heidegger's 'ontological hermeneutics' 
this idea is transformed such that understanding is always seen to 
presuppose a prior understanding. Understanding can never be 
unbiased because our biases are what provide the ground for our 
understanding to arise. 59 These two ways of conceiving of the 
58
see Schleierrnacher, 'The Herrneneutics: Outline of the 1819 
lectures', trans. Jan Wojcik and Roland Haas, Ne.w L.iterar_y H.istorY, 
1~9(1978-79). 
See Be.inq <-"ind T.ime, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, 
Oxford, 1978, H152ff. This conception of the 'hermeneutic circle ' 
(Footnote continued) 
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'hermeneutic circle' correspond to Davidsonian interpretative 
holism and the presumption of charity. The Schleiermacherian 
whole-part interdependence 1s another version of the specific 
interdependence which Davidson finds to obtain between beliefs, 
desires and meanings; the Heideggerian notion of 
'pre-understandings' 1s what is echoed (though 1n a less 
metaphysical context) 1n Davidson's talk of charity. In this 
respect 'the circle of understanding' is as much a notion central 
to radical interpretation as it is to continental hermeneutics. 
59 (continued) 
is especially developed by Gadamer: see Truth and Het./Jod, pp. 235£ f 
and 258££ and also 'The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem ' , 
P/J.ilosop/J.iC<.r,J Hermeneutics, pp. 7-10. 
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Chapter 3 
CHARITY AND AGREEMENT 
Agreement nrxi Urxierstnrxiinq 
It is the interdependence of meaning, belief and desire -
encapsulated in the idea of interpretative holism - that sets the 
essential nature of the interpretative problem. Yet this same 
interdependence also opens the way to a solution - a solution 
arrived at through the employment of the principle of charity. 
Charity thus derives from the same holism which motivates the 
problem to begin with: it is in virtue of the interconnectedness of 
meaning, belief and desire that it is possible for an interpreter 
to start with the assumption of a certain theory of belief and move 
from there to the development of a theory of meaning which can in 
turn lead back to the modi£ ication or elaboration of the original 
belief attributions. If interpretative holism did not obtain then 
this procedure could not be employed ( of course such a procedure 
may very well not be needed in that case - but that is another 
matter). 
It is clear that charity is crucial to the · Davidsonian 
conception of the nature of interpretation and it is equally clear 
that interpretative holism is crucial to the concept of charity. 
Yet so far much of my talk of what charity involves - whether as a 
methodological maxim or an ontological presupposition (and 
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generally the two aspects should be thought of toqet/Je.r ) - has 
been in the very general terms of a need to maximise the truth or 
the intelligibility of a speaker's beliefs or to maximise agreement 
between Bpeaker and interpreter (or, to put it another way, to 
minimise disagreement, error or unintelligibility). However such 
talk remains inherently ambiguous as to what in more Bpecif ic ter1ns 
is to count as maximising agreement, or intelligibility or 
whatever. One might expect something more from a principle which 
is, after all, supposed to have some methodological role to play -
one might also hope for some clearer specification of the agreement 
which is involved in the presupposition of charity. 
The pro bl em is made more acute in the present instance 
since, aside from the normal ambiguity attached to these notions, 
the thesis of interpretative holism and the associated 
indeterminacy of interpretation undermine the possibility of 
uniquely identifying or individuating beliefs such that what is to 
count as 'maximal' intelligibility or agreement will itself have no 
unique answer. Moreover, as Davidson points out, even without 
indeterminacy "there is probably no useful way to count beliefs and 
so no clear meaning to the idea that most of a person's beliefs are 
true". 1 Thus Davidson himself writes that: 
... interpretation requires the assumption of ... 
agreement .between speaker and interpreter. The 
assumption is certainly justified, the alternative 
being that the interpreter f incls the speaker 
unintelligible. But it is hard to be precise about the 
rules for deciding where agreement most needs to be 
taken for granted. General principles are relatively 
simple to state ... It is uncertain 2to what extent these principles can be made definite. 
1'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.424. 
'Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action, 
P/J.ilosop/1.ische Stud.ien, 2 ( 1980) p. 7. 
Cn.l:fze.r 
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Certainly we can state some 'general principles', some 
guidelines, as to how charity should be implemented; thus Davidson 
counsels that "agreement on laws and regular:i ties usually matters 
more than agreement on cases; agreement on what is open and 
publicly observable is more to be favoured than agreement on what 
is hidden, inferred or ill-observed". 3 Yet such guidelines do 
indeed preserve rather than dispel! much of the original ambiguity 
and, even if they could be made more precise, there would remain 
uncertainty as to just when and how those principles should be 
applied. When should one principle take precedence over another; 
when should a principle be disregarded in the interests of some 
more general interpretative strategy? The holistic nature of 
interpretation will require that, no matter how precise we make our 
rules of interpretative practice, it will always be a matter of 
warping those rules to fit the overall interpretative situation. 
These considerations suggest that we would be mistaken if 
we thought that the principle of charity could be rendered down 
into some clear and unambiguous set of formulae. The holistic way 
in which charity must be applied - the holistic way in which we 
must interpret is alone enough to ensure that. But other 
considerations reinforce this view. In an important and suggestive 
passage Davidson writes: 
3 Ibid. 
Charity . . . counsels us quite generally to prefer 
theories of interpretation that minimize disagreement. 
So I tended to put the matter in the early essays, 
wanting to stress the inevitability of the appeal to 
charity. But minimizing disagreement, or maximizing 
agreement, is a confused ideal. The aim of 
interpretation is not agreement but understanding. My 
point has always been that understanding can be 
secured only by interpreting in a way that makes for 
the right sort of agreement. The 'right sort', 
however, is no easier to specify than to say what 
consti t~tes a good reason for holding a particular 
belief. 
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It is indeed the connection between agreement and understanding (as 
the goal of interpretation) which is at issue 1n the discussion of 
charity. In invoking the idea of charity the aim is really to point 
to something which is a precondition for understanding (and hence 
for succes 0 ,ful interpretation) as such. A precondition which 
derives from the nature of understanding itself and, more 
fundamentally (but surely not unexpectedly!), from the holistic 
nature of the relationship between belief, meaning and desire. It 
is this aspect of charity which we pointed to before ' 1n 
distinguishing the concept of charity as a methodological maxim 
from the more important and underlying notion of charity as an 
ontological presupposition. 
Consider once again the problem of how to interpret a 
speaker's ~t~ 0 rances. The aim is obviously to reach a point where 
the interpreter can be said to understand a speaker's words but 
this can be achieved only by making sense of the speaker's 
utterances in relation to the speaker's beliefs, his desires and 
the rest of his linguistic behaviour. The better the connections 
here can be made the better will the interpreter understand. The 
measure of understanding will be the facility with which the 
interpreter can make sense of new utterances on the part of the 
speaker and with which he can identify the speaker's beliefs and 
4
' Introduction', TI, p. xvii. 
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desires. Understanding is thus a matter of the articulation of an 
overall theory for the speaker the more articulate and 
encompassing the theory the greater the interpreter's 
comprehension. (The same will of course be true where we begin with 
the problem of identifying a speaker's beliefs, desires or other 
attitudes and move from there to the interpretation of utterances.) 
Now if the theory is indeed such as to contribute to the 
understanding of the interpreter then it must be couched in terms 
that the interpreter can himself make sense of (recall that this 
was the gist of Davidson's rejection of a theory of trdnslation as 
adequate for interpretation ) . That is to say, he must be able to 
locate the beliefs and desires of the speaker he aims to 
understand, not only within that speaker's attitudinal system, but 
also within his - the interpreter's - own network of beliefs and 
desires. To restate the point: understanding a speaker means, 
amonst other things, identifying the speaker's beliefs; beliefs can 
only be identified within a pattern of other beliefs; identifying 
beliefs within a speaker's belief system must depend on the 
identification of those beliefs within one's own belief system 
also. This must mean identifying many of the speaker's beliefs as 
in agreement with beliefs that you, as interpreter, · already hold 
true. This is a requirement which must be met if we are to 
understand at all - it is also the same requirement which charity 
makes upon us: maximise agreement, minimise error, inconsistency 
and unintelligibility. 
The employment of charity thus follows from the holistic 
nature of understanding itself. Interestingly enough this feature 
of understanding would appear to be common to understanding in any 
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context. Understanding just isthe articulation of concepts as part 
of an interconnected whole; to understand means to see things in 
their original interconnectedness and in turn to also see that 
interconnected whole within the interconnectedness of one's own 
conceptual and attitudinal system. For coming to understand some 
new or strange phenomenon must involve adjusting or extending one's 
own belief system to accomodate it: so the phenomenon is 
incorporated into the already existing network of belief. 
Understanding is primarily a matter of making connections. 5 
The shift to the more general topic of understanding does 
not of course dispel! the ambiguity which surrounds the formulation 
of the principle of charity. But it does add further support to the 
idea that we should not expect to dispell that ambiguity 1n the 
first place. We should no more expect a precise statement of how 
charity is to apply and what it recommends than we should expect 
some precise definition of what it means to understand. 
Understanding is simply not the sort of 'thing' which can be 
defined in that sort of precise manner (as the later Wittgenstein 
was at pain2, to make clear6 ). And as this inelirninable ambiguity 1n 
talk of understanding should not lead to the abandonment of 
5This point is suggested by Davidson's comment in 'A Coherence 
Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p. 432; pointing to the 
supervenience of belief on behavioural, neuro-physiological and 
other facts Davidson says that he emphasises this, not to encorage 
reduction or epistemological priorities, "The point is rather 
understanding. We gain one kind of insight into the nature of the 
propositional attitudes when we relate them systematically to one 
another and to phenomena on other levels 11 • The holistic nature of 
understanding is something noted by R.L.Franklin, ' On 
Understanding', P.hilosop.h;~ and P.henomenoloqical Rese'-'trc.h, 43 
(6983), pp.307-328. 
See P.hilosop/}ical Jnvest.1q'-'ttions, trans. G.E.M.Anscombe, Oxford, 
1976, sections 134-241, for Wittgenstein's discussion of 
understanding and rule-following. 
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understanding as a goal or the elimination of talk about 
understanding so the ambiguity implicit in charity should not lead 
us to discard the principle. Instead we should recognise the 
holistic nature of the demands charity makes and the holistic 
nature of understanding itself - and thus recognise the inner 
connection .between agreement and interpretation. 
Nove.lty, Chanq-e, and Some .Pr.inc.ip.les of Theory Construct.ion 
The principle of charity, as we saw in chapter one, is 
not a principle original to Davidson. Indeed it is not strictly 
original to Quine either (it appears first 1n the work of 
N.L.Wilson) but it is in w'ord and Ohject that it is first 
presented as explicitly a principle of t..r<.11nsJ'-9t.ion. In fact the 
principle is really just a particular application of a more general 
idea which Quine discusses in IJ'o.rrl and Object : the idea that one 
of the guiding considerations in theory construction is familiarity 
or conservatism. 7 In 'Posits and Reality' 8 Quine discusses the 
benefits of the molecular theory in physics and lists five such 
benefits: 
One is simplicity: empirical laws ccmcerT1ing seemingly 
dissimilar phenomena are integrated into a compact and 
unitary theory. Another .i,...q J-~9mil ic.11ri tJ' of princ.ipl e: 
the already J-~9m.il iar Jaws of motion '-9re mc.CJde to serve 
1.;here independent laME{ ,.,ould otherr.;.ise hl1Ve .been 
needed. A third is scope: the resulting unitary theory 
~ 1,'o~ 8nd Ob_tect, p. 20. . . _ 
Or1g1nally intended for the .beg1n1ng of ltbrd and Ob_7ect but not 
actually used there and republished (after appearing elsewhere ) in 
lt{9ys o.F Pc.9radox , Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1976, pp. 246-254. 
implies a wider array of testable consequences than 
any likely accumulation of separate laws would have 
implied. A fourth is fecundity: successful further 
extensions of theory are expedited. The fifth goes 
without saying: such testable consequences of the 
theory as have been tested have turned out well, aside 
from such sparse exceptions as may in goo~ conscience 
be chalked up to unexplained interference. 
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Such benefits as these are the embodiment of the basic 
principles of good theory building. Of these five principles 
familiarity, simplicity and observational confirmation are 









construction is however clearly related to the notion of charity in 
interpretation. For in both cases we are exhorted to build on what 
we already know; to use our existing beliefs and concepts in coming 
to grips with the unfamiliar. In this respect to employ charity is 
simply to follow one of the basic principles of good theorizing - a 
principle applicable no matter what we theorize about. Thus Barry 
Stroud writes: 
Simplicity 1s a desideratum in theory construction and 
selection, but so also is "familiarity of principle", 
which cousels "minimum revision" and favours "the 
inherited or invented conceptual scheme of one's own 
previous work". This ''taste for old things" is not 
just an idiosyncracy of Quine's; it is the only course 
open _to anrrne in his attempts to fit theories to 
experience. 
This is so even where the theories invol vecl are theories for the 
9
'Posits and Reality', p.247. The italics are mine. Compare this 
wf5h the analogous passage in lt'ord and O.b_iect, pp.17-21. 
11see /t'ord '-'ind lJ.b_iect, pp.20-21 and 'Posits and Reality', p.247. 
'Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Interpretation', w'ords 
<.CJnd O.bject.ions: Essays on the lt'or.k oI w: V. _()u.ine, ed. Donald 
Davidson and Jaakko Hintikka, Dordrecht, Holland, '1969, p.93. 
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interpretation of utterances and the identification of attitudes 
and where the evidence is in the form of the linguistic and 
extra-linguistic behaviour of speakers. 
However this fundamental methodological unity seems, 1n 
fact, to be denied by Davidson himself. That this is so is 
suggested by his comment that: 
Any effort at increasing the accuracy and power of a 
theory of behaviour forces us to bring more and more 
of the whole system of the agent's beliefs and motives 
directly into account. But in inferring this system 
from the evld0nce, we necessarily impose conditions of 
coherence, rationality and consisten~~- These 
conditions have no echo in physical theory. 
Christopher Peacocke agrees with Davidson on this point and offers 
a more developed argument in support of the idea that charity is a 
principle peculiar to the explanation of agents. 13 
Yet surely the principles of rationality, consistency, 
and so on - principles brought together in the principle of charity 
- do have analogues in the methodology of physical theory. In fact 
as a methodological principle charity is more or less identical 
with the principle of familiarity which Quine recommends. Moreover 
the basic principles which guide theorizing in both the physical 
and social sciences can be derived from the the same holistic 
considerations in both cases. Davidson is right to claim, under the 
banner of anomalous monism, that the psychological cannot be 
reduced to the physical (this must follow from the holism of 
meanings, beliefs and attitudes in general) but this need not 
commit him to any strong methodological distinction of 'social' 
~~Davidson, 'Psychology as Philoz,ophy', p.231. 
Hol J'....cztic £.xplanation, pp. 35-40 . . 
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from physical theory - at least not at the level of fundamental 
methodological principles. 
However while I want to emphasise the way in which 
charity is indeed related to certain basic principles in physical 
science I must also acknowledge that there is an important sense in 
which the application of charity can be seen as characterising a 
particular sort of explanation distinct from explanation 1n 
physical theory. For charity 1s a principle tied to an 
intentionalist paradigm of explanation - that is to a model of 
explanation in which intentional states have an indispensable part 
to play. Charity is employed in the interpretation of speakers 1.9S 
speakers, actors and believers: that is, as intentional agents who 
are seen as having beliefs, desires and other attitudes - attitudes 
which, it is claimed, cannot be accounted for in other than 
intentional terrnB. Yet if we adopted a different explanatory 
paradigm with respect to those we interpret then charity would not 
be required (except perhaps as a heuristic aid). Thus if we adopted 
a functionalist approach and treated those we aim to interpret as 
functional systems we could explain their behaviour wi t hout 
reference to notions such as 'belief' (construed as an intentional 
state), rationality or charity. This is indeed the approach taken 
by such as Michael Devitt. Devitt regards charity as a dispensible 
principle just because he rejects the intentionalist paradigm of 
social explanation. 14 
14see Devitt, Reali .... czm and Trut/J, Oxford, 1984. It is thus that 
Devitt puts a premium on e]fpl1.9nc.!it.ion rather than charity - as 
Devitt sees it the 'best explantio11' may involve not treating the 
'speaker' as a speaker at all; see pp.175-176. The distinction 
between the two explanatory paradigms - the intentional ist and 
(Footnote continued) 
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The dispute between intentionalist and non-intentionalist 
accounts is not something I will go into here. It is worth noting, 
however, that it is a dispute which is not necessarily resolved by 
Davidson's 'anomalous monism'. Davidson's monism can in fact be 
seen as deriving from his intentionalist approach rather than the 
other way around. What should be clear is that my approach - and 
Davidson's - is one which presupposes the intentionalist paradigm. 
It is this which really lies behind the comments from Davidson 
quoted immediately above. Considered as a specifically 
intentionalist principle of explanation charity has no analogue in 
physical theory. Nevertheless this does not mean that there is no 
connection between charity and the basic principles at work 
elsewhere. What cannot be overlooked is the point that, considered 
as a principle deriving from the holistic nature of understanding, 
charity does have analogues in physical theory: charity is the 
intentionalist version of the principle of familiarity and 
charity also embodies the same holistic considerations which lie 
behind the principles of simplicity, fecundity and so on. In this 
sense charity embodies a similar conception of explanatory adequacy 
to that at work in the physical sciences. 
The claim that conservatism 1s "the only course open to 
14 (continued) 
non-intentionalist is developed by Philip Pettit in terms of a 
distinction between 'regularizing' and 'normalizing' explanation, 
'Broad-Minded Explanation and Psychology', Subject, Thouqht c.'1nd 
Context, ed. John McDowell and Philip Pettit, Oxford, forthcoming; 
Pettit argues for the indispensibility of intentionalist 
explanation; see also Pettit, 'A Priori Principles and 
Action-Explanation' , Anc.9JJ?Si .... c:, 45 ( 1985) and Graham Macdonald and 
Philip Pettit, .... 'Jemant.ics and Social Science, London, 1981, pp. 93ff. 
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anyone 1n his attempts to fit theories to experience" might at 
first sight appear to be something of an overstatement of the case 
on behalf of conservatism. "The only course'' - surely not. It might 
be admitted as an obvious psychological tendancy in theorizing but 
its epistemological necessity might be doubted. Indeed Quine 
himself sometimes writes as if the requirement of conservatism is 
really just a matter of intellectual laziness or habit. We use the 
old ideas because they are already there and using them is just a 
product of our own mental inertia something which we can 
eventually overcome 1n any specific instance. 15 Such a view is 
reinforced by Quine's repeated talk of how, while conceptual 
revision must always .be piecemeal, radical change in our concepts 
and beliefs is nevertheless possible: 
... we must not leap to the fatalistic conclusion that 
we are stuck with the conceptual scheme that we grew 
up in. We can change it bit by bit, plank by plank, 
though meanwhile there is nothing to carry us along 
but the evolving conceptual scheme itself. The 
philosopher's tak was well compared by Neurath to that 
of a16mari ner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea. 
The Neurath image 1s Quine's favorite and most famous 
metaphor, appearing at a number of places in his work, 17 and with 
it goes an emphasis not so much on conservatism or familiarity as 
on conceptual continuity. Certainly conceptual revision has to be 
. 
bit by bit, piece by piece, but many such local modifications can, 
on Quine's account, lead to global changes. Quinean conservatism 
i~See lt'ord c.9nd Object, p. 20. 
'Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis' , From c.9 Loq.icc.91 Po.int oJ--
?f.rv, PP,- 78-79. . . 
For instance 1n /ilord c.9nd (.?b..7ect, pp. 3 and 124 and 'Mental 
Entities' , 11".<tys o[ Pc.9rc.<tdox, p. 223. 
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seems to amount only to the claim that we have to work with the 
framework we have on hand but it places no restrictions on what we 
do with it so long as continuity is maintained - nwe are limited 1n 
t rt ' f t ' k d " 18 how we can s a even 1 no 1 n w11ere we may en up . 
That conceptual revision can only ever be a partial, 
though an ongoing, process is an idea which is already familiar 
from Davidson. However the possibility of such global modifications 
1n conceptual systems as Quine seems to envisage must be ruled out 
by the sort of Davidsonian account I have been developing here; it 
is ruled out .by the conception of charity as a necessary 
presupposition of interpretation. The assumption of agreement which 
charity insists on, while it may allow of local modification, 
cannot be globally revised. Substantial overall difference between 
conceptual and epistemic systems is not something which can be made 
sense of given the holistic character of interpretation and 
understanding. 
The indeterminacy of interpretation must itself render 
unclear the possibility of major differences in beliefs - it will 
always be possible to reinterpret the .behavioural and at.ti tudinal 
network so as to make differences come out differently and to 
preserve overal 1 agreement. Yet we have already seen how the need 
for the employment of principle of charity, far from being any 
arbitrary requirement, derives from the close connection between 
understanding and agreement. The same considerations must apply in 
the present context also. 
Thus the point that I made 1n discussing charity above is 
18 lt'ord ,"ind Object, p. 4 . 
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echoed by Barry Stroud in discussing conservatism and the Quinean 
response to the possibility of alternative logics; the emphasis is 
again on the need for interpretation to be in terms the interpreter 
is already familiar with. Stroud writes: 
. . . explanation must be given in a language that we 
can understand, since only then will the alleged 
possibility have been shown to make sense within the 
only terms we have for making sense of anything ... What 
is open to us in the way of new modes of speech and 
thought is cont.rolled or determined by what we have 
now. AnJ-' aJJeqedJ;.r new poss1iJ.ilitJ" must be capable oI 
.beinq Iitted into, or . undf!rstood in te~g or: our 
present conceptUc.'11 or l1nqu1Bt.1c c.'1PfoJ:Jratus. · 
Strictly speaking this must mean that there is no possibility, even 
given cumulat.i ve piecemeal change, of moving from one system of 
concepts and beliefs to another radically different system. Indeed 
this is a conclusion which Stroud draws as part of a possible 
objection to the Quinean insistence on conservatism: 
It might be thought that this view is too 
unrealistically confining or restrictive, that it 
rules out all real novelty and change. Any attempt to 
demonstrate the possibility of forms of thought or 
speech not now in our repertoire has been shown to be 
doomed to failure ... If Quine is right, how can what 
is unintelligible to us at 2cPne time come to be intelligible to us at another? 
Stroud does attempt to answer this question on Quine's behalf - in 
fact he has more than one attempt. 
His first suggestion involves a reiter~tion of the point 
that "change is only possible against an unchanging background of 
theory or diBcourse" 21 coupled with the claim that, because of 
19
'Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation', p.87 and 
P2d3. The italics are mine. 21 I.bid, p. 94 • 
.I.bid. 
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indeterminacy, sameness of mean1 ng is not transitive and thus 
"geuine novelty can arise after several small changes of the 
familiar into the still familiar ... 22 But this answer turr1s out to 
be ultimately unsatisfactory to Stroud and instead he finally 
resorts to the claim that while certain some things are not 
possible given our present linguistic dispositions what is not 
possible now may .become possible at some time in the future. "What 
is unrevisable for us now, and therefore presently without 
alternatives, can become revisable later ... What cannot happen at 
one time often happens at another". 23 If anything this line seems 
less promising than the first; indeed it seems to be an evasion not 
an answer. It also looks like an abandonment of the original idea 
of the crucial role played by familiarity in understanding. 
Yet this idea would surely not be easy to abandon for it 
would involve the abandonment of a whole account of understanding. 
So perhaps we need to bite the bullet here (or, as it might be less 
sympathetically put, embrace the reductio and the absurdity with 
it) and acknowledge that in at least one sense there is no real 
conceptual novelty or change 1n the same sense that the 
presumption of charity is never open to global revision. For if 
understanding really 1s a matter of fitting what is to · be 
understood into an already known pattern then this cannot mean that 
what was previously new or unfamiliar retains its unfamiliarity or 
its novelty. To understand it is to make it part of the familiar; 
to deprive it of its newness. In the context of translation this 
point is even more apparent since translation is not a matter of 
~~ I.bid. 
I.bid. , pp. 94 and 96. 
B9 
simply taking an unfamiliar utterance whole and transplanting it 
into the home language but instead it typically involves the 
finding of a synoymous utterance in the home language. 24 Indeed the 
Davidsonian conception of understanding can be usefully summed up 
in the slogan 'all understanding is translation', and in fact the 
idea is already suggested 1n Davidson's account of a theory of 
interpretation as a theory of translation which translates into a 
language understood by the interpreter. Gadamer puts it thus: 
All understanding 1s interpretation, and all 
interpretation takes place in the medium of a language 
which would allow the object to come into words and 
yet is ~ the same time the interpreter's own 
language. 
Indeterminacy will not help the case in favour of the . 
possibility of true novelty and strangeness. Stroud' s claim that 
indeterminacy renders sameness of meaning intransitive is correct -
as far as it goes - but it does not have the implication, which he 
suggests, that major conceptual difference could arise through many 
small and partial revisions. This is because transitivity will fail 
only where there 1s some transition between theories of 
interpretation (within a theory transitivity of meaning will hold 
as well as ever) yet this leaves open the possibility that such 
theories will nevertheless be capable of being interpreted in each 
others' terms - the theories may still allow of reconciliation. If 
we can do this then presumably we can provide a higher level t heory 
24 Where we do make such a transplantation (as we occasionally do 
with some words and phrases) this is not because we lack the 
linguistic resources - some paraphrase is always available - but 
because we lack any handy one word synonym or short phrase which 
w~~l do the trick. So we make the foreign word our own. 
Jrut./J 1.'ind }fethod, p. 350. 
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within which the reconciliation can be brought about. And of course 
within a theory there is no reason to ~.uppose transitivity of 
synonomy will not hold. 
Davidson himself discusses a somewhat similar point in 
considering the claim that translatability between languages is not 
a transitive relation: 
The idea is that :-_; (..,111e language, Bay Saturnian, may be 
translatable into English, and some further language, 
1 ike Pl utonian, may be translatable into Sat.urnian, 
while Plutonian is not translatable into English. 
Enough translatable differences may add up to an 
untranslatable one. By imag1n1ng a sequence of 
languages, each close enough to the one before to be 
acceptably translated into it, we can imagine a 
language so different from English as to resist 
totally translation into it ... [but] we should have to 
ask how we recognized that what the SaturTiian was 
doing was transldtinq Plutonian (or anything else). 
The Saturnian might tel 1 u~. that that was what he was 
doing or rather we might for a moment assume that that 
was what he was telling us. But then it might occur to 
us to wonder'""l 6whether our translations of Saturnian were correct.L 
Unless we can integrate an allegedly different or novel phenomenon 
into the system of our own understanding we cannot demonstrate even 
the possibility of such difference or novelty since such 
demonstration would involve making sense of the possibility, making 
sense of it in the only terms we have for making sense of anything 
- our terms. Yet if we can make sense of it in this way then we 
will also have succeeded in showing that the phenomenon is not so 
radically different as we initially may have thought. This is the 
gist of the Davidsonian ar,::1ument against the possibility of an 
untranslatable language and it will be a line of argument given 
more attention in chapter five. 
26
'on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.186. 
sense, 
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The idea that understanding must always work, 1n some 
within the realm of the familiar is a notion which has 
already been advanced in chapter two and there I pointed out that 
the idea was not peculiar to our account of Davidson but was also 
to be found in the work of Gadamer. 27 Within the philosophy of 
science the idea has arisen in relation to the role of models and 
metaphors in scientific thinking. 28 Yet the idea is not without 
historical precedent either and its pedigree stretches back to 
Aristotle and Plato. For Plato the problem was stated not so much 
in terms of how novelty or conceptual change are possible but with 
an emphasis rather on the problem of knowledge: how knowledge can 
be extended; how we can come to know what we don't know already. 
Thus Meno puts the question to Socrates: 
... how will you investigate, Socrates, that of which 
you know nothing at all? Where can you find a 
starting-point in the region of the unknown? And even 
if you should happen to come full upon what you want , 
how will you eve~9know that this is the thing which you did not know? 
The Platonic answer to the problem was the doctrine of 
knowledge as recollection. 30 Thus in one sense the possibility of 
27And present too, in a slightly different form, in the work of 
Noam Chomsky who also seems to recognise that understanding is 
always a matter of making use of already existing cognitive 
apparatus. The conclusion Chomsky draws is that there are definite 
limitations on human cognitive capacities as a result. See 
F.B.D'Agostino, 'Chomsky on Creativity', Syntllese, 58 (1984) 
pp. 85-117. Such a conclusion is not drawn by Davidson of course 
just in virtue of the fact that there 1s no determinacy in 
i~gerpretation or understanding. 
See Ernest Nagel, Tile Structure of .Science, London, 1961, 
pp.45-46, 114-115; and more specifically, N.R.Campbell, Physics: 
t/Je Elements, Cambridge, 1920, chapt. 6; and Mary Hesse, Hodels and 
An..<tl oqies in Sciencci, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1966. There is of course 
a 2~reat deal of additional literature on this topic. Heno ( Tile f).ialogves of Plato, vol .1), trans. B.Jowett, 4th ed., 
Oxford, 1953, 80d. 
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true extension of knowledge, of real novelty or change was denied. 
Yet the claim that there really is no such thing as conceptual 
novelty or change certainly goes against our normal intuitions. 
Such intuitions cannot easily be at~ndoned; some account of novelty 
and change needs to be retained. And of course on the Platonic 
account it is insofar as we do not have total recall of our soul's 
time amongst the Forms; insofar as knowledge 1s a matter of 
recollection of what has been forgotten. 
What then of the Davidsonian answer? How do we make room 
for novelty, change and unfamiliarity 1n the otherwise conservative 
Davidsonian realm] In fact the answer 1s quite simple given what we 
already know about the nature of interpretation. Of course there is 
conceptual novelty. We encounter it everyday 1n our linguistic 
experience in dealing with new expressions and name~., or unusual 
usages and errors; we encounter it whenever we come across a 
strange belief, an apparently inexplicable action, any puzzling or 
unusual phenomenon. We encounter it in its more extreme form in the 
highlands of New Guinea and in the jungles of the Amazon. In a way 
the strange and the new is all about us for it 1s just the 
encounter with the new and unfamiliar which prompts any project of 
interpretation. Understanding is the attempt to deal with what ·is 
presently strange or novel - that is, with what has yet to be 
understood. If there were no novelty there would be no need to 
interpret. 31 
30And how far removed is this 1s this from the Chomskyan account 
of knowledge as ar1s1ng on the basis of innate cognitive 
c~~acities? 
Interpretation does of course arise at home as well as in more 
exotic locations but this does not .mean that our interpretation at 
(Footnote continued) 
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But what is the nature of such novelty? In short, it 
represents a failure of some current interpretative practice to 
deal with a phenomenon or phenomena with which it is confronted. 
And the response is to deploy some new theory, some new 
interpretative strategy. A strategy which will bring the novel 
phenomenon into the old network and in so doing transform it into 
something known and familiar. But of course interpretation is an 
ongoing process involving the continual deployment and redeployment 
of interpretative strategies. And this means that the line between 
the new and the old, the strange and the familiar is never fixed. 
It shifts with the changing tide of interpretative practice. 
Yet the tide never of course changes so much that our 
old ways of thought, our old conceptual tools, are left high and 
dry on the beach unused and un-useful. There is always a 
presumption of overall permanence in beliefs; no amount of revision 
ever amounts to enough for the transformation of the belief system 
as a whole. That the belief system should remain unchanging overall 
1s of course a requirement of the nature of understanding and it 
can remain unchanged and unchanging at the global level since any 
new theory of interpretation will always be capable of being 
reinterpreted in familiar terms (though sometimes the old terms are 
less adapted to the new circumstances). This is to return to the 
original insistence on the pre-eminence of agreement and 
31 (continued) 
home arises in a situation of complete familiarity. Interpretat ion 
is as much a domestic problem as it is a problem for the traveler 
in foreign lands just because novelty and strangeness can arise at 
home just as much as abroad, Even what is now familiar can take on 
an alien face. Surely this has been the lesson of the surrealist 
movement in art and literature. 
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familiarity over difference and novelty. There is a priority here 
and the priority 1s on the side of the old - globally at least. We 
can only make sense of disagreement, of change, of novelty against 
a vast background of familiar, well-worr1 agreement. Certainly we 
can deploy new strategies to account for new phenomenon - we will 
even find that new strategies will lead us to discover something 
new where previously all was known and familiar but such 
strategies are always articulations of the familiar in new ways. 
Conservatism is not just a habit we can overcome; it is 
not just conceptual continuity which we must abide by; the 
principles of familiarity and charity require that we must always 
remain within the ambit of what we already understand even though 
our understanding is always capable of further elaboration and 
articulation. This is a point Gadamer makes much of: 
Misunderstanding and strangeness are not the first 
factors, so that avoiding misunderstanding can be 
regarded as the specific task of hermeneutics. Just 
the reverse is the case. Only the support of familiar 
and common understanding makes possible the venture 
into the alien, the lifting up of something out of the 
alien, and thus the broadenJ2g and enrichment of our 
own experience of the world. 
It 1s in the holistic character of interpretation and 
understanding that charity and the more general principle of 
familiarity or conservatism are founded. The application of charity 
in interpretation is just a version of the more general 
requirements of theory construction as such. This much we have said 
already. Yet the other principles of good theory building 
simplicity, fecundity, scope, observational confirmation - while 
32H.-G. Gadamer, 'The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem', 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, p, 15. 
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they are not implicated directly in charity (though charity will 
counsel that we should take such considerations into account) - can 
also be seen as capable of being founded in the same holistic 
account of understanding. This 1s clearly so in the case of 
observational confirmation. If some theory were not substantially 
confirmed by the phenomena then holism would obviously favour its 
rejection for it would offer no articulation or unification of 
phenomena (or at least would offer very inadequate unification). 
Both fecundity and scope can be seen to have a similar 
justification since they both add to the unification of otherwise 
diverse phenomena they result in a more encompassing and 
articulate theory. But fecundity and scope are also elements in 
simplicity and simplicity itself can be seen as satisfying the same 
holistic requirements of unification and a r ticulation. 
Indeed all five principles - familiarity, simplicity, 
fecundity, scope and confirmation - can be said to be justified in 
virtue of the greater explanatory power which they confer upon a 
theory - in virtue of how much more intelligible some phenomenon is 
made. And explanatory adequacy or power - intelligibility - is just 
what the holistic nature of understanding demands of any theory. 
Simplicity, confirmation, and familiarity (even in the guise ·of 
charity) are al 1 measures, of the explanatory power of a theory. 
It is the capacity of a theory to explain which 
determines the extent to which it enables u~. to understand and it 
does this by bringing greater unity and articulation to the range 
of phenomena it addresses. Charity itself is thus nothing more than 
one expression of·the demand for explanatory power - it points to 
the dependence of the explanatory effectiveness of a theory on its 
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use of what is familiar and already understood. Moreover insofar as 
charity expresses the holistic nature of understanding so it also 
captures something of the overall requirements of simplicity, 
fecundity and so on - indeed charity would cot.msel that we take 
such principles into account since they are part of our conception 
of what counts as a good explanation or of the requirements of 
understanding. Thus the problems of interpretation "come to be seen 
as the problems of all good theory builcling". 33 
Admittedly charity is tied to the intentionalist paradigm 
1n explanation and admittedly if that paradigm is not adopted then 
charity need not, as such, be required in explaining speakers' 
behaviour, however if one accepts the intentionalist paradigm then 
the notion of maximising the explanatory power of theories of 
interpretation (and such theories do aim to explain the behaviour 
of speakers) cannot be seen as something which is extrinsic to the 
principle of charity. Those theories which will be preferred by 
charity will be those theories which best explain the behaviour of 
speakers because those will be the theories that integrate that 
behaviour - and the attitudes of those speakers - ~:Ql completely 
with our own attitudinal system. 
33oavidson makes this comment in respect of metaphysics in 'The 
Method of Truth in Metaphysics', TI, p.214, but the context of the -
remark (as well as considerations such as those discussed above ) 
make the applicability to interpretation fairly clear. It is 
signficant that the principles of familiarity, simplicity, etc. are 
subject, as one might expect, to similar problems of ambiguity as 
beset the principle of charity. This is pointed out by Richard 
Rorty, Philosophy and the }firror o.[ Nature, pp. 327-328, and Rorty 
directs attention to Kuhn on this point, The ... '?"'tructure of 
Sc.ientif.ic Revolutions, 2nd ed., Chicago, 1970, p. 159. 
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JJ.isagreement, Error and other JJ.iEE.icult.ies 
Charity prescribes that in interpreting a speaker we 
should generally take him to be expressing true beliefs. Such a 
prescription has been taken here as having the same import as the 
injunction to take the speaker as holding beliefs which are mostly 
in agreement with our own. In fact charity is sometimes presented 
as prescribing just the assumption of overall agreement. Now it is 
an important theme of this dissertation that truth and agreement 
are tied together (globally at least) and thus it is crucial that 
the two ways of presenting charity aB pre~.cribi ng overal 1 
agreement and as prescribing overall truth should be tied 
together also. That they are tied together is something I have 
already touched on but it is something which merits further 
examination. 34 
Certainly it is clear that a~.sum1ng agreement will result 
1n the assumption of the overall truth (by our lights) of beliefs. 
Our holding some belief implies that we hold the utterance which 
expresses that belief to be true. Thus if we are to interpret the 
utterance of a 2.peaker as expressing some belief in agreement with 
our own then we must take the utterance as expressing some truth. 
That establishes the equivalence of truth and agreement, so far as 
34
rn fact the connection between truth and agreement is something 
which is argued for implicitly and explicitly at various points 
throughout this dissertation for it is a connection which follows 
from the holistic nature of interpretation. The connection or 
'interdependence' of truth with agreement is particularly important 
in the Davidsonian attack on scepticism discussed in chapter six 
and indeed the rejection of sceptici~.m can be seen as a rejection 
of the idea that what is true and what we agree upon might (globally) come apart. 
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charity is concerned, in one direction at least. But what about the 
other direction? Might we not be able to interpret a speaker or 
group of speakers as uttering truths but nevertheless as holding 
beliefs which do not concur with our own? 
Consider the following scenario. We encounter a group of 
speakers who appear to have identical beliefs to our own (or so it 
appears on first interpretation) but we discover that instead of 
thinking about the world as made up of temporally contiguous 
physical objects their ontology is one of temporal slices of such 
objects (indeed there are no such objects as we conceive of then in 
their conceptual universe). Now this variant ontology infects all 
of their talk, all of their beliefs, a.bout the world and the 
objects in it. Thus, it might be claimed, we could interpret all of 
their utterances and belief2. as true and yet those utterance and 
beliefs would be in subtle disagreement with our own. So truth and 
agreement would come adrift. 
Such an example is not an implausible one - we might 
recall Whorf 's claims to have found embodied in the Hopi Indian 
language a metaphysics quite alien to that found in English. It is 
not the plausibility of the initial scenario that I would want to 
challenge however (although as we go on it will become evident that 
a scenario involving real disagreement at a global level .lS 
implausible 1n virtue of its incoherence) but the claim that this 
is indeed a situation where we could be said to be in substantial 
disagreement with our interpretees. The idea that there might be 
some subtle difference in ontology between interpreter and 
interpretee is a notion familiar from Quine' s discussions in wbrd 
and O.bject and recall that there this was a possibility raised in 
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the context of Quine's argument regarding the indeterminacy thesis 
and the famous "Cc.9t·'<-9qt.9J'/" example. The point was of course that no 
behavioural evidence could tell in favour of treating the speaker's 
utterances as expressing one ontology over another. The question 
lacked any determinate answer and not just because the interpreter 
had no way of finding out the ontological commitment of the 
interpretee but because there was no fc_9ct o[ the n1atter there in 
the first place. 35 
Thus it 1s not that the scenario 1s implausible as it 
stands but that the question of the ontological commitment of the 
interpretees can never be definitely settled. Indeed there is no 
unique answer to the question of what ontology really is embodied 
in the beliefs of the speakers involved. Thus we need no exotic 
examples to encounter such a variant ontology - we can interpret 
our own ontological commitment in just this way (as J.J.C.Smart for 
one certainly would). Indeed, as we shall see in Part I I, the 
notion of different conceptual schemes, different belief systems, 
cannot itself be made sense of - at least not at any global level. 
There is no unique answer to the question whet.her this conceptual 
scheme, this belief system, is the same as that one. What must be 
presupposed, however, is that any overall epistemic or conceptual 
system can always be brought into some sort of correlation with any 
other. It is this possibility which 1s the essence of charity as an 
ontological presupposition - indeed it ultimately comes down to the 
presupposition of a 'common world'. For it is by means of such a 
35Recall the Quinean distinction between underdetermination and 
indeterminacy: the former is an epistemological claim; the latter 
an ontological one. 
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world that interpretation actually proceeds. The idea of creatures 
with different beliefs to our own, but beliefs which are 
nevertheless true, must be ultimately incoherent insofar as we can 
only make sense of such creatures having beliefs if we can connect 
up their beliefs, in some way, with the world and, therefore, with 
beliefs which we hold. If we cannot do this then it becomes 
problematic just what it 1s that they believe that is true - it 
becomes problematic whether they have beliefs. 
Interpretation is always a matter of balancing up a 
number of variables: of balancing ascriptions of belief and desire 
against the interpretation of utterances. The balancing act 
involves not only the attitudinal and .behavioural network of the 
interpretee but that of the interpreter as well. Thus the 
interpreter's own beliefs and desires have a part to play in the 
overall project. We have referred more than once to the fact that 
this is what must underlie the idea of the interest relativity of 
explanation. In that case it is quite possible that given a 
particular interpretative .backgroud questions of differences 1n 
ontological commitment may simply not be particularly important. In 
such a case, where the group of speakers described above were the 
subjects of interpretation, the general impression would quite 
possibly be of overwhelming agreement between interpreter and 
interpretees. Differences (or possible differences) in ontology 
might be regarded as not making enough of a difference! 
So 1n the context of this holistic project of 
interpretation maximising truth and maximising agreement both come 
down to the same thing - both are equally acceptable expressions of 
that which the principle of charity enJ01ns upon us. But agreement 
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aside, the persistent questioner might still want to know why we 
should emphasise truth here. Why should we not just as wel 1 assume 
the error of a speaker's ways and assume him to be speaking 
falsely? Indeed in putting the emphasis on the role of truth in 
interpretation we are setting up an asymmetry between truth and 
falsity which some philosophers would find immediately 
objectionable. 36 So it is perhaps not surprising that Colin McGinn 
should suggest that: 
... we may equally provide a basis for deriving the 
meanings of sentences held true by un:::haritably 
imputing J-~9Jse beliefs to our speaker. We simply 
suppose, with or without good reason, that he has made 
a mistake and and is expressing a false belief with a 
correspondingly false sentence. Falsity holds belief 
just as constant as truth, and affords an equally 
systematic rule for correlating sentences of theirs in 
such a way (it i.!=, hoped) that th37former wi 11 serve to give the meanings of the latter.~ 
McGinn does not claim that the presumption of error 1s a good rule 
to follow in "practice or theory" 38 but he does claim that the 
interdependence of meaning and belief does not of itself force 
charity upon us. 
Yet, in fact, only charity will provide the appropriate 
constraint on interpretation such that belief can be held constant 
in the right way. If we assume the truth of a speaker's utterances 
and beliefs then we are assuming that his beliefs will be in 
36As Kim Sterelny points out in 'Davidson on Truth and Reference', 
Southern Journal of P/Jilosoph;,.-, 19 (1981) p.109. Sterelny refers to 
David Bloor' s f(nor.,•Jed_qe t.9nd .Social l"m<-''lqery·, London, '1976, but see 
also Barry Barnes and David Bloor, 'Relativism, Rationalism and the 
Sociology of Knowledge' in Rt.9tional.ity t.9nd Relativism, eel. Marlin 
H~~lis and Steven Lukes, Oxford, 1982, pp.21-47. 




agreement with our own. Thus we are able to assume a theory of 
belief at the start which we already have good reason for believing 
- all the reasons, that is, which lead us to have the beliefs we do 
in fact have. And if we were to take McGinn's suggestion seriously 
then what false beliefs ought we to attribute to a speaker? If we 
take him to be speaking the truth then we know what beliefs to 
attribute - the beliefs we hold. But if we take him to be in error 
then that opens up a whole range of ways in which he could be 
wrong. (I am assuming that for him to be 1n error is simply for him 
to hold beliefs which could be expressed as negations of the truths 
we hold and of course for any proposition we hold true there will 
be many propositions all equally compatible with that. negation.) 
Thus if it is snowing and our alien friend makes some utterance 
which we take as referring to the weather outside and we assume he 
is speaking falsely, then what do we take him to be saying? - That 
it is not snowing? - or perhaps that the sky is clear or maybe that 
it 1s raining cats and dogs? 
Yet perhaps McGinn does have a point here. If we don't 
require any good reason for assigning beliefs then surely we are 
free to assign beliefs however we want. So long as the whole set of 
beliefs has a certain minimal consistency we can take our 
interpretees to believe what.ever we like. Certainly this would hold 
belief constant but it is not obvious that it would provide a real 
basis for developing a theory of meaning. It is the having of 'good 
reasons' for assigning the beliefs we do assign that enables us to 
get our interpretative project going. For unless we can explain the 
beliefs our interpretees have we will be unable to make the 
necessary interconnect.ions that developing an overall theory of 
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interpretation is all about. We break what McGinn calls 'the 
belief-meaning conspiracy' not merely in virtue of being able to 
assign some set of beliefs to a speaker but by being able to 
connect those beliefs up with a network of desires and other 
attitudes and with a system of behaviour in an intelligible 
fashion. This means providing good reason for the beliefs which we 
do in fact assign. The interdependence of meaning and belief is 
just one expression of an overall interpretative holism and it 1s 
that holism which forces charity upon us. 
McGinn's mistake is to see the interdependence of meaning 
and belief as something separate from the holism concerning belief 
which is also to be found in Davidson - the idea that beliefs are 
to be identified only within a network of other, largely true, 
beliefs. McGinn sees such holism as providing an additional and 
independent reason for the employment of charity, "a reason, 
moreover, that would, were it cogent, serve to underpin the 
arguments that I have thus far peremptorily rejected''. 39 However 
the point about the holistic nature of belief is not independent of 
l.Jttvidson' s general interpretative hol ism. The i nterclepenclence of 
meaning and belief does in fact derive from the more fundamental 
interdependence which obtains between beliefs thernselves . 40 
Yet as it turns out McGinn does not find the holistic 
character of belief to present any compelling or cogent 
justification of the principle of charity. For while McGinn admits 
that "there is . . . considerable plausibi 1 i ty in the idea that the 
content of a belief (etc.) is determined by its relations, logical 
!6 I.bid. I pp. 523-524. 
A point suggested above p.20. 
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and causal, with other attitudes" he insists that "it does not 
.follow from this holistic conce:r::rtion of belief content that any of 
the beliefs (etc.) thus interrelated are true'. 41 
In support of this view McGinn cites as an example our 
ascription to some of the ancients the belief that the stars are 
really holes in an immense heavenly dome which allow light from a 
fire beyond to shine through. McGinn points out that we make such 
an ascription assuming that the belief is indeed about the stars 
and that it is also false. Thus we do not take the falsity of 
belief here to undermine our identification of the object of that 
belief. On the other hand we do not attempt to preserve the truth 
of the belief by reinterpreting what it is about either - the 
belief is a false belief about the stars. 
Now McGinn's example is clearly chosen to parallel an 
example which Davidson uses to support his own holism about belief. 
Davidson's example is our ascription to the ancients of the belief 
that the earth is flat: 
This earth? Well, this earth of ours is part of the 
solar system, a system partly identified by the fact 
that it is a gaggle of large, cool, sol id bodies 
circling around a very large hot star. If someone 
believes none of this about the earth, is it certain 
that it is the earth he is thinking about?il 2 
McGinn tells us that Davidson's question here "is clearly intended 
rhetorically". 43 And while this may seem an ohvious truth it is 
worth noting that Davidson himself says that "An answer is not 
called for. The point is made if this kind of consideration can 
: 1 ibid. , p . 5 2 5 • 
43 ' Thought and Talk' , p. 168. 
'Charity, Interpretation and Belief', p.524. 
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shake one's con£ idence that the ancients believed that the earth 
was flat". 44 The point 1s not to convince us that the ancients' 
belief was about something other than the earth but merely to show 
how the identification of beliefs can become less clear cut once 
the background of belief is brought into question. 45 The point 1s 
not that we can never make attributions of false belief to those we 
interpret but only that such attributions need to be located within 
a larger pattern of qene.rallJ-' true beliefs. This leaves room for 
false beliefs while putting limits on the possible extent of such 
belief. We cannot interpret speakers as globally i~ error though we 
can interpret them as wrong on any particular matt.er. 
These considerations apply equally to a further point 
which McGinn makes against Davidson. For McGinn claims that what 
his example shows is that "relational attitudes of mind are 
'-~utonomous with respect to truth". 46 Thus we take the ancients' 
beliefs to be about the stars irrespective of the truth of those 
beliefs. This point 1s reflected in a parallel claim made 
specifically about reference: it too 1s held to display the same 
autonomy in relation to truth. 47 It is such autonomy that Davidson 
of course is seen to deny. In this respect McGinn suggests that the 
Davidsonian principle of charity has much in common with so-called 
'description' theories of reference; theories which in recent times 
have come in for a good deal of criticism. 48 
Such theories suggest that we should assign reference to 
::'Thought and Talk', p.168. 
46see also 'Paradoxes of Irrationality', pp.302-304. 
47 'Charity, Interpretation and Belief', p.526. 
48 Ibid., p. 527. The charge is echoed by Michael Devitt, Rec.9Jism and T.rut/J, p.174 
and Kim Sterelny in 'Davidson on Truth and Reference', p.105. 
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names according to what is more or less a version of charity: we 
should attempt to maximise the truth of descript.i ve statements 
about the bearers of such names. Thus N.L.Wilson's original 
formulation of charity is part of an answer to the question .,How 
should we set about discovering the significance which a person 
attaches to a given name?" 49 and is as good an account as any of 
what description theories are all about "We select as des.iqnc.'ttum 
that individual which will make the largest possible number of ... 
statements true". SO Opposed to such accounts is the causal theory 
advanced by Kripke and others51 according to which the reference of 
a term is a matter of there being some causal connection between 
the tenn and its object. Terms are held to 'rigidly designate' 
objects irrespective of the beliefs which a speaker may hold or 
come to hold about that object. Such accounts are claimed to be 
preferred because of just the sorts of considerations adduced by 
McGinn against Davidson: .because they allow the autonomy of 
reference with respect to truth. We are not thereby committed to 
denying reference to terms just because the statements in which 
those terms figure are false. 
The intuitions which lie behind the causal theory of 
reference do have a solid basis and I do not want to deny those 
intuitions. Equally I think it is clear that there is at least a 
prima .f~t:Jcie case £or saying that Davidsonian holi·sm about belief is 
:~·su~stances With~u~ Substrata', p.529. 
IbJd. , p. 532. S1m1 lar accounts are to .be f ouncl in the work of 
SSfawson, Searle and Frege. 
See Kripke, 'Naming and Necessity', and also Keith Donnellan, 
'Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions', Sen1c.t:Jntics o.t- M'ttural 
Lc.t:Jnqllc.'iqes, eel. Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, Dordrecht, 
Holland, 1972. Also Hilary Putnam, 'The Meaning of Meaning·, Hind, 
Lc.9nql.lc.'1qe 1.'tnd Reality·: Phil osop/J.ic,.9J Papers, vol. 2, Cambridge, 1975. , 
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opposed to the causal account. This latter point seems to be 
confirmed by Davidson himself when, in discussing the point that 
communication is based on some sort of convergence in the causes of 
belief, he writes that: 
It is clear that the causal theory of meaning .has 
little in common with the causal theories of reference 
of Kripke and Putnam. Those theories look to causal 
relations between names and objects of which speakers 
may we 11 be ignorant. The chance of systematic error 
is thus increased. My causal th~ory ~oes.the o~posi~2 
by connecting the cause of a belief with 1te. obJect. 
Certainly I think it is the case that interpretative holism must be 
opposed to the causal theory of reference as providing an adequate 
account of reference in general. And this is so simply because no 
causal theory will provide the basis for an overall theory of . 
interpretation. Indeed Davidson argues that in such a theory the 
concept of reference itself drops out as redundant. Once we have a 
theory that assigns truth-conditions to utterances in the right way 
the reference of terms will be fixed - we do not need a theory of 
reference in addition to a theory of truth. All we need is a theory 
of truth which will serve ae. a theory of interpretation. 53 Moreover 
Davidson's holistic approach can in fact accommodate some of the 
basic intuitions which motivate the causal account. The autonomy of 
reference, for instance, can be al lowed for on the Davidsonian 
account. To be sure, it can be allowed only at a local level but 
that is nevertheless sufficient to allow all the leeway we should 
need in our assignments of truth and reference. 
~~'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.436. 
See 'Reality Without Reference', TI, pp.215-225. I suspect that 
the real difference between Davidson and supporters of the causal 
theory of reference is preciE,ely in terms of their differing 
assessments of the importance of the problem of interpretation. 
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If we take too many of a speaker's beliefs to be false we 
undermine the possibility of being able to make any sense 
whatsoever of what he says or does. This is the essence of the 
Davidsonian insistence on charity and, strangely enough, it is also 
a point made by Hilary Putnam in 'The Meaning of Meaning': 
SuppoE.e our hypothetical speaJ{er points to a snowball 
and asks "is that a tiger?" Clearly there is no point 
in talking tigers with /Jim. Significant. communication 
requires that ~eople know something of what they are 
talking about.. 5Ll 
Isn't this what we have been saying all along? Indeed this 1s 
merely a restatement of the holism which is such a central notion 
in the account of interpretation and understanding being developed 
here. Charity derives from that hol ism: if we are to understand . 
then we must integrate that which is to be understood into the 
already existing framewocit of our beliefs and concepts. It is thus 
that we are committed to the overall truth of a speaker's beliefs 
and utterances. Without that assumption there can be no possibility 
of communication or understanding. 
This commitment to the presumption of overall truth does 
indeed bring with it a parallel commitment to a certain sort of 
asymmetry between truth and error. But it is not quite an asymmetry 
in explanation: it is not that true beliefs explain themselves 
while false beliefs need additional accounting for - this being the 
sort of asymmetry which is most often the target of criticism. The 
possession of true beliefs can often require as much explanation as 
the holding of false beliefs (especially where it seems that the 
54
'The Meaning of Meaning', p.248. See also, Reali ... c:m and Re<.'1son, 
Cambridge, 1983, pp.193ff. 
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beliefs in question arise from false or inadequate premises). The 
asymmetry does not arise in respect of the need for explanation 
but, in part, because what we take to be true is what we already 
have good reason to believe - and therefore, ceterJ~c: p.9r.i.bus, what 
we have good reason to think that others believe also - and more 
importantly because it is only against a background of largely true 
beliefs that false beliefs can even be made sense of. It is this 
same asymmetry which we noted earlier in the discussing the role of 
agreement in understanding. Agreement and difference, familiarity 
and novelty - they all display this ve1y ~Ftme asymmetry: only 
against a background of largely true, familiar agreement can 
difference, error and novelty be understood. 
writes: 
In a somewhat similar vein to McGinn, Clark Glymour 
I believe that it is just false that we cannot imagine 
circumstances in which an uncharitable reading of a 
subject's utterances, in combination with other 
conclusions about his circumstances and desires, is 
explanatory, and as predictive as a any other theory . 
I believe, then, that 5~ere can be "workable" theories that are uncharitable. ~ 
The circumstance which Glymour imagines involves a 
'speech community' made up of disembodied brains whose only 
connection with the outside world (apart from the life support 
systems) is via some apparatus which art.if icial ly stimulates their 
.. 
nerve endings to provide a simulcrum of life as we ourselves live 
it (or believe we live it - for in its sceptical employment the 
argument can be used to suggest that perhaps we are such brains) . 
55
'Conceptual Scheming or Confessions of a Metaphysical Realist ' , 
SyntJJese, 51 (1982), p.172. 
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Glymour' s question is whether we should prefer a theory which 
translates the utterances of the brains into English - a theory 
which talks about 'trees' and all the paraphernalia of the world we 
talk about - or a theory which translates the utterances into Envat 
~ a theory which talks about sensory impressions or energy impulses 
instead. Glymour identifies Enql.ish as the ur.eharitable theory 
(according to which most of the brains' beliefs are false) and 
EnVi.'lt' as the L'YJar.ita.ble theory (according to which most of the 
brains' beiiefs are true). 56 Glymour does admit that "There 1s 
nothing deep in this sort of example, and if I am correct about it 
there are no profound implications" 57 (in which case one wonders 
why Glymour thinks the example worth developing). Nevertheless 
Glymour's presentation of the e:<ample does involve some common 
misreadings of what charity is all about and to that extent is 
worth a closer look. 
First of all we might note that this is a similar sort of 
example to that which we considered earlier - where some difference 
in ontological commitment is thought to be sufficient to separate 
agreement and truth. Here the example seems to have a bit more bite 
to it for it 1s a fact that these brains have no contact with the 
things they think they have contact with (at least no direct 
contact of the ~.ort they assume they have). But as before the 
question still arises as to how much difference the difference in 
what we take them to be referring to ought to make. 
56Richard Rorty takes a f!,imilar line, 'Pragmatism, Davidson and 
Truth', p.15, forthcoming in The Ph.ilosop.hy o[ Donald .Davidson: A 
Per.gpect.ive on Inquiries into Trut.h and Interpretation, ed. Err1e~.t 
L57ore. 
'Conceptual Scheming', p.175. 
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It is by no means clear, Glymour's claims to the 
contrary, that we can straightforwardly identify Envat as the 
charitable and English as the uncharitable theory here. For if we 
use Envat to interpret the utterances of our envatted speakers then 
we will surely find that the translations we make of their 
utterances will not be translations that they are always willing to 
assent to. For presumably they will have terms in their envatted 
language which make reference to the ~.arts of concepts which we are 
actually employing in the translation of their utterances - ideas 
of sensory impressions and so on. SB If we were to translate our 
translations back into their language using such terms (and it is 
not clear whether Glymour's scenario will allow of our active 
querying of the envatted speakers - though this would seriously 
hamper our interpretative endeavours) what would be their response? 
Much the same, I suggest, as the response of speakers of our own 
language to attempts to translate our own everyday, physical object 
talk into some more 'basic' sense-datum language. And what if we 
use English as our theory of interpretation? Admittedly it may lead 
us to take certain utterances - especially those concerned with 
direct perceptual situations - as false. But it may also lead to 
the interpretation of many more beliefs as true - beliefs about the 
difference between trees and grasses, for instance; or how internal 
combustion engines work; or what some interpreter's name is ... and 
58
or they could presumably learn ~.uch terrns. It may be a 
debateable question whether the terms they employ in this regard 
(terms we take to refer to sene,ory impressions etc.) are the same 
as ours: that is, it may be a question to which there is no unique 
answer. In the same way we could ask whether the ancient Egyptians 
had such terms? What about the Greeks? At what point were such 
terms acquired - if they were? There can be no unique answers here. 
11 2 
so on and so on. Of course if we could come to convince our 
envatted friends of the real nature of their situation (this 
presupposes once again the possibility of our being in some sort of 
two-way communication) then perhaps they might come to see their 
talk about perceptual situations differently also (and then of 
course similar problems to those suggested above might arise). 59 
Deciding between the two theories will be a matter of 
trading off losses in one area for gains in another; of balancing 
the falsity of certain perceptual beliefs against speakers' refusal 
to accept many of our translations when put into their own tongue. 
The real point is that there is no clear answer to the question as 
to which theory should be preferred one way or the other and as 
there is no clear answer to the question of which theory is the 
more charitable either so it remains to be shown that "there can be 
·workable' theories that are uncharitable", 
Glyrnour's example also seems to trade, 1n some degree, on 
the assumption that error on the part of a speaker is not something 
which charity can really allow for - that charity requires that we 
59Rorty quotes Davidson in support of the interpretation of the 
brains as speaking Envat ('Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth', p.16.) 
since Davidson doe£!, counsel us to interpret by connecting beliefs 
and utterances with their causes ('A Coherence Theory of Truth and 
Knowledge', p.436,). However there are two points to be made here. 
First, it is a moot point as to how immediate the causal connection 
involved must be - we can construct a causal conr1ection between the 
envatted brains' ·tree-experiences' and trees via the scient ist or 
computer programmer who presumably controls the input to the 
brains' experience. In other words we can te 11 a story 1 inking 
trees to the brains' 'tree-experiences' even though it might be a 
long story. (But for a contrary view - though deriving from the 
point of view of the causal theory of reference - see Putnam, 
Re'-'ison, Truth and 11.istorJ,·, Cambridge, 1981, pp.11-12.) Second, the 
connection of beliefs with their causes must be subject to overall 
constaints of consistency and so on - such constraints may favour 
the 'long story' over the short one. 
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always interpret speakers as making true utterances and as always 
in complete agreement with us. This is of course not so, as has 
been made clear in our preceeding discussions, and as Davidson 
himself has been at pains to emphasise. 60 Indeed the idea that 
charity cannot allow for error is an assumption which has already 
been met with in the discussion of theories of reference. For the 
claim that charity does not allow for the independence of reference 
with respect to truth amounts to just the claim that we cannot. 
allow for our interpretees to get things wrong - unless reference 
and truth could be separated there would be no way of assigning 
false beliefs to speakers. What I have already shown is that such a 
claim with respect to Davidsonian charity is incorrect. The very 
same arguments apply here. Global error or difference is ruled out 
of course, just as any global separation of reference from truth is 
ruled out, but plenty of room is left for difference and error at 
the local level. 
Yet even given Davidson's own protests to the contrary 
the assumption that charity is completely intolerant of error and 
difference is nevertheless very widespread. (Perhaps it is simply 
indicative of how little the principle - and the general account of 
interpretation which it involves - is really understood.) Thus 
Graham Macdonald claims that the principle of . charity "is scarcely 
60
"we get a first approximation to a f inie,hed theory by assigning 
to sentences of a speaker conditions of truth that actually obtain 
( in our own opinion) just when the speaker holds those sentences 
true. The guiding policy is to do this as far as possible, subject 
to cone,iderations of simplicity, hunches about the effects of 
social conditioning, and of course our commonsense, or scientific 
knowledge of explicable error'' - 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme', p.196. See also 'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', p.152 
and 'Replies to Lewis and Quine', Synt/Jese, 27 (1974) p.346. 
persuasive" since: 
... 1n advocating maximisation of agreement in 
interpretation ... [it] counsels neglect of 
considerations as to whether the interpretees are 
likely to have attained knowledge i£1 the truths on which they are construed as agreeing. 
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In place of charity Macdonald advocates Richard Grandy's principle 
of humanity by which we aim to minimize uni ntel 1 igible 
disagreement. 62 Macdonald claims that the difficulty in identifying 
and counting beliefs makes for a ··general weakness'' in the 
principle of charity - a weakness which he suggests is overcome in 
,. :l 
the principle of humanity. b.... ' '[It] i8, clear" he tells us ''that the 
principle of humanity is a refinement of the principle of 
charity" 64 and this on the grounds that: 
[while] ... charity would have us recoil from the 
ascription of any disagreement, or, as we are going to 
see it, error, humanity would only have us do so when 
we cannot explaig5how such disagreement or error could have come about. 
Yet it is hard to see is how this really adds anything to 
the counsel which charity has to offer. For, to repeat a familiar 
point, charity does leave room for error and disagreement on the 
part of our interpretees - albeit at a local level - and it need 
not rule out our taking into account likely or known differences 
and false beliefs right from the start. 66 Thus it is simply 
mistaken to claim that charity ''would have us recoil from the 
~~ Graham Macdonald, ... '?em<.'1nt ics al7t..i .... '->ocial Science, p. 29. 
See Grandy, 'Reference, Meaning and Belief', Journc.91 of 
Pt-Jlosophy, 70 ( 1973). 
64 .Sem."lnt.ics and 5'oc.Jc.9l ... '->c.1 ·ence, p. 2E,. 
6 S .1 lJ.J:d. , p . 31 . _ 
6E .lbJd. , p. 29-30. 
'As Davidson acknowledges; 'Replies to Lewis and Quine', p.347. 
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ascription of any disagreement ... or. . . error··; while the need to 
minimize unintelligible disagreement is ~.omething clearly allowed 
for in the principle as it has been presented here. (Perhaps it 
might be suggested that this is being rather uncharitable to 
Macdonald, Devitt and others insofar as charity is open to 
interpretation in a broad and a narrower sense: that is, in the 
brv\.Ac sense in which I have presented it; and in the narrower way 
in which it is taken by Macdonald and others. My complaint is that 
the narrow interpretation simply does not accord with Davidson· s 
discussion of the principle and insofar as these writers purport. to 
criticize the version of the principle to be found in Davidson so 
they seem to misunderstand the Davicls,onian conception of 
charity. 67 ) 
If anything the principle of humanity turns out to .be 
another way of expressing the requirements of charity. Certainly it 
is prey to all of the same am.bigui tieB as charity - as we would 
expect, given the arguments we rehearsed ear 1 i er. If we cannot 
accurately count beliefs so as to maximize the number of beliefs 
agreed upon it will be just as hard to count beliefs so as to 
minimize the number on which there is unintelligible disagreement. 
One might add however that 1n no longer counselling 
maximization of true beliefs, humanity contributes to an 
obscuration of the crucial role of truth in interpretation. The 
671t might also be pointed out that they do not seem to allow for 
the sense in which charity is an ontological presupposition in 
Davidson's work and not merely a methodological maxim. Indeed this 
distinction seems not to be appreciated at al 1 - almost without 
exception every writer on the subject takes charity to be a 
specific principle of methodology. But then, not even Davidson 
makes this distinction clear. 
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insight which is peculiar to Davidson is that the way to get to a 
theory of meaning - a theory of interpretation - is by employing an 
appropriate theory of truth. Insofar as the principle of charity 
counsels us to count a speaker as right 1n most matters as on 
the whole speaking truly - it encapsulates this insight into the 
interconnection of truth with meaning. Indeed, understood this way, 
charity can be seen as embodying the notion that interpretation of 
a speaker proceeds by connecting the speaker's utterances to the 
speaker's environment: interpretation proceeds by reference to the 
world in which the speaker is located - by reference to the objects 
around him. Here once more is the interconnection of truth with 
meaning, but 1n the guise of the inseparability of our 
interpretation of language from our interpretation of the world. 
And of cour~.e this is also what is embodied in the interdependence 
of meaning and belief and 1n the idea of interpretative holism. 
Thus Davidson tells us that: 
... we must, in the plainest and methodologically most 
basic cases, take the objects of a belief to be the 
causes of that belief. And what we, as interpreters, 
must take them to be is what they in fact are. 
Communication beginE', where causes converge: your 
utterance means what mine does if belief in its truth 
is syst6watically caused by the same events and 
objects. 
Charity does not blind us to the discovery that those we 
interpret have got things wrong and in like fashion it need not 
blind us to the possibility that they are deliberately feeding us 
falsehoods either. So although charity prescribes that we ought to 
68
'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.436. This marks 
an important point of difference between Quine and Davidson, see 
ibid. , pp. 434-436. 
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count our interpretees as right about most things it does not 
prescribe that we should always assume our interpretees to be 
speaking truthfully. In practice we may often find ourselves facing 
not mere cases of disagreement but cases of calculated deceit on 
the part of an individual or community - or cases where the 
natives, out of a misguided sense of hospitality, tell us what they 
think we would want to hear. 
Certainly charity would prescribe initial acceptance of 
the deceit as sincere but of course charity, as we have talked 
about it here, will also counsel us to prefer the explanation that 
makes best overall sense of those we interpret. If the deceit can 
become evident to us at all then it should be taken account of in 
those theories which charity would have us prefer. In the case of 
individual deceit our e;.<posure to other individuals would 
eventually lead us to suspect our informant and here, as well as in 
the case of communal deceit, the discovery of anomalies would lead 
to the hypothesis of deceit on the part of our interpretees as one 
likely explanation. Where communal deceit was such as to reconcile 
even such tell tale anomalies then we might wonder just who was 
deceiving who - if the deceit is so complete as to leave no 
tell-tale traces then it is likely that the deceivers have been so 
successful that they have deceived even thernsel ves. Perhaps here 
the lie would have become the truth. 
Most generally, however, it wi 11 not be charity which 
will lead us astray when faced with deceit or error so much as our 
own interpretative insensi tvi ty or ineptitude. Charity does not 
eliminate the hard work and application required in interpretation, 
but it does make such interpretation possible 1n the first place. 69 
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Ethnocentr.ic.ity, Eilqxlthy arxi Hunan Nature 
Interpretation proceeds by connecting utterances to the 
objects and events around us: to those "familiar objects whose 
antics make our sentences and opinions true or false". 70 Yet at 
this point Mary Hesse suggests an objection: 
But we may ask 'What familiar objects?'. Sticks and 
stones, tables and chairs, stars and galaxies, 
seedtime and harvest, twins and birds, gods and 
spirits .. ? And whose objects? Those of the Nuer, the 
Lele, the Pythagoreans, the alchemis~1' Locke, 
Berkeley, or late 20th-century natural man? 
The answer is of course, our objects, not anybody else's. Yet to 
many critics of Davidson such a 'charitable' answer smacks too much 
of a return to an old-fashioned (and morally suspect) 
ethnocentrism. Thus Ian Hacking writes that: 
The very names given to these principles [of charity 
and humanity] and the fact that some writers invoke 
them as principles to enable us to translate the 
speech of 'natives', may raise a wry smile. 'Charity' 
and 'humanity' have long been in the missionary 
vanguard of colonising commerce. Our 'native' may be 
wondering whether philosophical B-52s and strategic 
hamlets are in the offing if he won't sit up and speak 
like the English. Ling1/Jstic imperialism is better 
armed than the military. '-
In reply one must reiterate the point that charity does 
not require our intolerance of differences or blindness to 
disagreements - it stipulates only that such dfsagreements cannot 
69The problem of deceit, both individual and communal, is 
discussed at length by Graham Macdonald, Se111antics and Social 
s7d·ence, pp. 21-23. 
71 'on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.198. Mary Hesse, 'Epistemology Without Foundations', Philosophy, .Its 
History c.9nc.i 11.istorioqraphy, ed. A.J .Holland, Dordrecht, Holland, 
11~5, p.57. 
i.. lilly Does Lanquc.9qe }latter to Philosophy?, Cambridge, 1975, p.149. 
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be on any qloh.91 scale. Perhaps this point has been stressed so 
often that it has now become a mite tiresome: in fact, in view of 
the persistent misunderstanding of charity on this score, I wonder 
if it can ever be stres~.ecl enough. In the at tempt to understand 
others it is not tolerance which is the primary requirement (though 
it is seldom remis.s) it is first of all a matter of taking our own 
talk about the world seriously. Not to employ charity would be to 
relinquish the one way we have of communicating with others -
communication which depends on our beliefs about, and hence our 
access to, the world and our assumption that both we and those we 
try to communicate with have got most of our beliefs correct. 
Indeed more than anything else char'ity simply enjoins us to assume 
that our 'natives' are as able to get on in the world as we are: 
that they, like us, have mostly true beliefs. We do not thereby 
demand that they speak the Queen's Eng 1 ish but we do demand that 
they be -capable of speaking about the world as we are also. 
To complain that the counsel charity offers 1s 
unwarrantedly ethnocentric is to forget not only the indeterminacy 
of interpretation, which will query the ontological determinacy 
which is assumed in such a complaint, but it is also to forget the 
nature of interpretation itself. The dialogic movement · of 
interpretation, which derives from its holi2otic character, means 
that there 1s no obstacle to our discovering-{' disagreement even 
though the overall assumption of agreement is never revisable. 
Moreover insofar as interpretation is a 'dynamic', 'dialogic' 
enterprise and insofar as charity it.self points to the implication 
of our own attitudes in interpretation so this whole account 
should, if anything, lead to a greater sensitivity on our part as 
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interpreters to the manner in which we interpret. Charity lays bare 
what otherwise may remain concealed: that all interpretation 
implicates the prejudices, the beliefs, the interests of the 
interpreter. The lesson is to be aware of that involvement and 
therefore, to some extent, to exercise control over it. This is 
surely not a recipe for ethnocentrism but a means to avoiding it. 
We can have only two sources of evidence for 
interpretation: our knowledge of the behaviour of the interpretee 
and our overall knowledge of the world (of which the former is a 
part). The knowledge which we possess is couched in our terms, our 
concepts, our language. It could not be otherwise. It is this 
knowledge which we employ 1n interpretation and which charity 
counsels us to employ. Insofar as we have no other evidence on 
which to interpret so we can have no choice about the employment or 
non-employment of charity 1n interpretation, we are committed to 
charity whether we like it or not. Whenever we interpret we 
necessarily, but not always consciously, make use of charity. If 
this often goes unrecognised then this is because, as Davidson 
says, "What is shared does not in general call for comment, it is 
too dull, trite or familiar to st.and notice". 73 Indeed in this 
connection it is interesting to note that the empirical evidence is 
in favour of much basic cross-cultural agreement. in beliefs rather 
than disagreement. It is perhaps only anthropological preoccupation 
with the exotic which suggests ot.herwise. 74 
;!'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics', p.200. 
See Steven Luke~, 'Relat.iviE,m in its Place', Rt.'ttJ·onal.it.y and 
Rel at.iv.ism, pp. 267- 270. Of course such evidence can provide no 
real support for the employment of charity and could presumably, 
given the fact of indeterminacy, be turned the other way (see this 
(Footnote continued) 
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The principle of charity counsels basic constraints of 
concistency and agreement in our interpretation of a speaker; we 
aim at making best possible sense of a speaker's utterances and 
behaviour. The employment of a Tarskian truth theory as the model 
for a theory of interpretation means that we are constrained to 
read standard quantificat.ional structures into the object language. 
Such constraints as these, however, are to be seen as constructed 
of willow rather than of oak and so they must always be seen as 
possessing a great deal of flexiblity (within certain limits). This 
is obviously the case in re2.pect of charity for the constraints of 
consistency, of explicability, are ambiguous in themselves. Yet 
even the formal constraints of a Tarskian truth theory cannot be 
taken as too rigid. As Davidson comments: 
A theory of truth for a natural language (as I 
conceive itJ differs widely in both aim and interest 
from Tarski's truth definitions. Sharpness of 
application 1s lost ... Satisfaction of Tarski's 
Convent.ion T remains a desideratum of a theory, but is 
no longer available as a formal test. 7j 
The upshot is that, for Davidson, interpretation always remains a 
matter of f lexibi 1 i t.y of theory to suit. practice. The overriding 
constraint is that we Rh~~ld be able to produce a theory which will 
allow us to understand and be understood. And of course, as we saw 
earlier, it is this that makes the principle of charity so 
ambiguous 1n its formulation - as ambiguous a~ the criteria of 
understanding themselves remain ambiguous. 
74 (continued) 
section below). Though even here there must always be a primacy 
given to agreement - no amount of interpretation could turn the 
evidence round so completely as to make global disagreement a P95sibility. 
'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics', p.204. 
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Given the flexibility, the ambiguity, of the principle of 
charity, and given its origins in interpretative holism, it would 
be mistaken to take charity as providing an argument for the 
existence any basic co-naturality, or some specificable 'common 
core' of beliefs, amongst human beings. Charity does specify the 
neeed for basic, overall agreement in order for understanding to be 
possible but that agreement does not consist in agreement on any 
specific belief or set of beliefs. And it is clear why this should 
be so: first because of the indeterminacy of interpretation which 
makes it impossible to provide any unique assigr~ent of beliefs and 
second because, as we have pointed out so often, charity only 
requires the assumption of a background of agreement thereby 
leaving plenty of scope for localised differences. Certainly there 
are basic requirements of consi~.tency which must be satisfied and 
which we might interpret in terms of agreement on certain basic 
logical truths such as the law of non-contradiction but even this 
sort of agreement remains purely formal; the requirements of 
consistency may be satisfied 1n a great variety of ways. Even the 
formal requirements of the Tarskian truth theory become 
substantially weaker when applied to actual interpretative practice 
- as Davidson himself acknowledges in the passage quoted above. 
Yet it is claimed by many writers on these matters that 
some common epistemic 'core' or some uni versa1 ly shared 'human 
nature' 1s indeed a necessary precondition for understanding 
between human beings to be a possibility. Roger Trigg's book The 
Shc.'t,Pinq of }l8n is devoted to this very idea. In that book Trigg 
makes the claim that: 
The enormous variation between human societies in 
different times and places poses an immense problem 
for anyone wishing to understand their members. One of 
the major themes of this book will be the necessity of 
of giving the notion of our common humanity some 
content if we are to assume U 10 possibility of 
understanding those beyond our own culture ... Once we 
reject the assumption that other humans, in our 
culture or beyond it, are basically like us, 
hermeneutics becomes a necessary, and at the same 
time, impossible discipline. Without the assumption of 
a common nature, any kind of understanding of ~~ose we 
regard as our 'fellow men' becomes impossible. 
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Yet it sometimes does seem as if the principle of charity 
1s taken 1n just this way by some philosophers. Thus Graham 
Macdonald writes of charity that ''it rests on a belief in the unity 
of human nature: a belief that people in different cultures are 
essentially similar". 77 If charity did rest on such a belief then 
presumably, 1n some ca2.es at least (though perhaps not in all), 
charity could turn out not to be justified. Indeed that it l c.• • ..cl not 
justified because people 1n different cultures do lack any 
essential similarity 1 C! 
~· just the claim which lS made by some 
'relativists'. 78 Of course one might reply that charity doe~. not 
depend on such empirical justification but is instead itself an a 
priori principle - inBofar as it must be a precondition of all 
interpretation whatsoever. This response is largely correct insofar 
as charity does indeed have the status of ~.omethi ng 1 ike an c.9 
priori truth79 but it will be of no help where charity 1s 
mistakenly conceived as laying down agreement over any specified 
;~ -7.:ne S.hi.9.pinq o[ !li.9n, Ox!o~-d, 1982, pp. xiii and xviii. 
78 5emant.1cs and 5oc.1al 5c.1ence, p. 31. See Barry Barnes and David Bloor, 'Relativism, Rational ism and 
t99 Sociology of Knowledge·, pp.32-47. Though we need to be mindful of using such a term in this 
context for obvious Quinean reasons. Christopher Peacocke ' s 
suggestion with respect to the principles of his system of holistic 
explanation is that they are '.constitutively true·. Holistic 
E..y_plli/7<-''itiol p. 22n. 22. 
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range of beliefs or attitudes. If interpretation did depend on some 
common core of attitudinal agreement it would still be (in part) an 
empirical matter as to whether any particular community of 
creatures or individual creature did 1n fact share 1n that 
agreement. If such agreemer1t was biologically based then presumably 
there would be little or no possibility of disagreement amongst 
those with similar biological origins. But where biology differed, 
what then? 
The problems raised here will be dealt with more 
thoroughly in the next few chapters. Yet it should be obvious that 
charity does not and cannot consist in the assumption of any 
determinate agreement amongst interpreters and those they interpret 
- at least not with respect to any specific set of attitudes. Not 
only would such an assumption leave open the possibility of certain 
relativistic consequences but it would also fly in the face of the 
interpretative irrleterminacy which is so closely tied up with the 
principle of charity as it appears in Davidson. Indeed such 
indeterminacy would undermine any attempt to demonstrate, 
empirically, the existence of some common stock of beliefs or 
attitudes for since there can be no unique way of assigning 
meanings or ascribing attitudes it will always be possible to turn 
apparent agreement on almost any specific point into disagreement. 
Certainly charity does not coun2.el us to take any ~incli vidual belief 
as universally shared (with the possible exceptions noted above). 
It counsels rather that 'most beliefs' must be held in common. So 
far as beliefs and other attitudes go charity is a holistic, rather 
than an indivualistic, constraint. It constrains the system as a 
whole more than any individual attribution of belief or attitude 
125 
within that system. 
In this respect charity turr1s out to have surprisingly 
little practical import so far as particular attitudinal 
ascriptions are concerr1ed. Certainly this. is so insofar as charity 
is considered in its most important role as a presupposition of 
interpretation but even 1n its methodological role the principle 
cannot offer a great deal of guidance 1n actual cases of 
interpretation because of the extreme flexibility of the principle. 
Moreover we never interpret absolutely from scratch - there are 
always some prior assumptions which we make about likely points of 
difference between ourse 1 ves and our i nterpretees. So charity' s 
role as a methodological principle is indeed limited (another 
reason, perhaps, for putting the emphasis on the role of charity as 
an ontological presupposition). For instance, it is not absolutely 
clear that charity would have us prefer the literalist rather than 
the symbolist. strategy 1n anthropology (although the general 
assumption has been that charity would in fact come down on the 
side of the literalist80 ) for much the Bame reasons that it was 
unclear, in Glyrnour's example of the envatted brains, whether Envat 
or English was the more charitable theory. 
Indeed the mere fact that there can be such disagreement 
over whether to prefer symbolist or literalist theories of 
interpretation should itself suggest that charity will offer no 
definite guidance either way, at least no more than we already 
have. For of course charity is a principle which is implicit and 
always has been implicit in all our interpretative practice. It has 
80
see for instance F.B.D'Agostino, with H.R.Burdick, 'Symbolism 
and Literalism in Anthropology', .5ynthe:.c;e, 52 (1982). 
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never stopped disputes such as the literalist-symbolist dispute in 
the past, why should we expect more specific guidance now. The 
problems of interpretation are the problems of all theory building, 
as we saw earlier, and the requirement of charity or, more 
generally, the requirements of familiarity, simplicity, etc. - the 
requirements of expl8nL'1tory 1."ldequacy - are requirements which 
constrain all good theory construction. But the problem about how 
to satisfy those requirements in any specific case still remains. 
The critic of charity might see the inability of the 
principle to provide definite guidance 1n cases such as the 
symbolist-literalist dispute as indicative of what he would 
perceive to be the inevitable watering down of the principle in the 
attempt to defend it. The lack of practical import would then be 
seen as the surest evidence of the emptiness and ultimate 
redundance of the principle. Such a critic will be difficult to 
persuade otherwise, I am sure, but the only way he could be 
persuaded would be by taking him back through those arguments which 
we have already rehearsed (and rehearsed again) in the preceeding 
pages. Charity remains ambiguous 1n the same way that the 
principles of simplicity and observational agreement are ambiguous. 
These principles are nonetheless important ones. 
Having considered this problem of co-naturality it 1s 
worth having a look also at a related matter ifl the same sort of 
area: the relation between charity and, what I will call most 
generally, 'empathy' theories of understanding. A criticism Colin 
McGinn makes of charity which we have not so far considered is that 
the application of the principle leads to what is really the 
.11lljX)....c;inq of an interpret.at.ion on a speaker rather than a 
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sympathetic rendering of his beliefs and utterances. McGinn claims 
that: 
You appreciate the reaBonableness of an action by 
putting yourself into the agent's shoes, not by 
forcing him into you~'I ... rationalisation calls for 
empathy not charity''. ' 
It 1s surely evident that charity does not in fact 
require that we 'force' the other into our shoes any more than we 
should force ourselves into his. Moreover there need be no direct 
opposition between charitable and empathic interpretative 
strategies. Empathy can be seen as 1n fact presupposing some 
version of the principle of charity. Certainly those theories of 
interpretation which might generally be taken as counseling 
'empathic' strategies typically assume that some basic agreement is 
necessary for understanding though u~.ually it is of a more 
determinate kind of agreement than Davidsonian charity requires -
typically an agreement of the sort. that writers such as Roger Trigg 
insist on: agreement in terms of some cdmmon nature, common beliefs 
or concepts, or common 'life Btructures·. 82 
The idea that empathy does require agreement 1s 
illustrated 1n Richard Grandy' s account of the project of 
interpretation. Grandy sees interpretation as proceeding in part 
through the interpreter carrying out a 'simulation' of the 
interpretee to reconstruct his meanings and a{titudes. And as 
Grandy himself notes: ''whether our simulation of the other person 
is successful will depend heavily on the similarity of his belief 
~1'Charity, Interpretation and Belief', pp.522-523. 
Such ideas are, for instance, to be found in Wilhelm Dilthey's 
account of the method of versteben. See He8n.inq in Hi .... c:tory, ed. 
H.P .Rickman, London, 19E,1, pp.100£ f. 
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and desire network to our own". 83 Wherever understanding lS 
conceived as a process of reconstruction or representation of the 
original context of belief, utterance or what.ever there 1s 
generally an assumption of a need for some common structure which 
make this possible. Perhaps the classic example is the hermeneutic 
theory of Schleiermacher for whom understanding has as its goal 
"the reconstruction of the mental experience of the text's 
author". 84 
Empathy does require some 2,ort of agreement. but it is 
abundantly clear that the sort of agreement which it is often taken 
to require cannot be the 2,ort charity provides. Indeed the holistic 
nature of interpretation and the indeterminacy which follows from 
it will in fact undermine the conception of understanding as a 
matter of re-e}{per iencing or 'simulation'. For of course 
simulating the thoughts, feelings, etc., of the individual to be 
understood gets us no closer to being able to interpret that 
individual's beliefs, desires, and utterances. Uncler2.tanding i2. 
just a matter of being able to interpret and articulate. 
Understanding means more than just experiencing. Perhaps in this 
respect charity and empathy are indeed opposed. 
A2.sociated with this notion that understanding means 
empathising with our subject. is the idea that understanding is 
always from r~.itiJ.in the system of thought or life t1f the interpretee 
and to enter into that system as the alien himself did: to learn 
:!·~eference, Meaning and Belie~', p.443. 
Richard Palmer, Hermeneut.1cs, Evanston, 1969, p.89. See 
Schleiermacher, 'The Hermeneutics: Outline of the 1819 lectures'. 
It is against such a notion of understanding as re-experiencing 
that Gadamer sets his account of hermeneutics Truth and Hethod , , pp.146-150. 
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from scratch as a child would (perhaps there is an element of this 
in McGinn's point above). Thus Barry Barnes and David Bloor claim 
that: 
Translation is not the most direct attack on meaning 
that is available. It was not available, nor did it 
play any part at all, in the first major attack that 
any of us made upon meaning when we acquired language 
in childhood. First language acquisition is not a 
translation process, and nothing that is absent here 
can be a necessary ingredient in subsequent learT1ing. 
To understand an alien culture the anthropologist can 
proceed in the way that native speakers do. Any 
difficulties in achievuing this stance will be 
pragmatic rather than a priori. There is, for 
instance, no necessity for the learner to assume 
shared concepts. Su§~ an assumption would have nothing 
but nuisance value. ·~ 
Yet most anthropologists are not children (or so one assumes); 
learning a second language is most definitely not the same as 
learning a first; and it is not as if we really know quite what 1~. 
involved in first language acquisition anyway. 
Quine himself has commented on this sort. of proposed 
strategy insofar as it might present an alternative to the 
techniques of radical translation as developed in /lord <-"ind Object. 
He writes: 
. . . of cour~.e the truth is that he [the interpreter] 
would not have strictly simulated the infantile 
situation in learning the native language, but would 
have helped himself with analytical hypotheses all 
along the way; thus the elements of the situat~gn 
would in practice be pretty inextricably scrambled. 1 
-('-
In practice we will have helped ourselves with charitable 
hypotheses all along. There simply are no alternatives. If we are 
to interpret we must employ charity. 
85 
'R 1 t. . R t . l . l t'- l 86 e a 1v1sm, a 1ona ism anc 11e Socio ogy of Knowledge', p.37. 
' lt'ord ,.9TJd Object, p. 71. 
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.A Sl.lTlllary of Some .Davidsonian Themes 
We began Part I \.Ji th a summary of the ideas \.Jriich 
characterise Quinean radical translation. To complete Part I it 
will be a useful exercise to summarise the main ideas which 
comprise the account of radical interpretation given above. As 
before there are four central not.ions and they can be seen as 
developing out of the analogous ideas in Quine: 
1. .Att.itudin.91 /Jol.i ..... w according to which a speaker's 
attitudes, including beliefs, desires, hopes, 
etc. , are seen a~. an interconnected net\.Jork; 
2. .lnterJ7retat2 ve /Joi.ism according to which the 
interpretation of speakers is a holistic 
enterprise involving interpretation of 
utterances, of behaviour, and of attitudes; 
3. T/Je indt?terminac:y of 2nterJ7retat.ion according to 
which there is no determinacy in the realm of 
the mental, there is no uniquely correct way of 
interpreting a speaker; 
4. T/Je pr:incipJt? oI c/Jarit.,v which encapsulates the 
connection bet\.Jeen understanding and agreement, 
truth and interpretation; which insists on the 
need for the assumption of global, though not 
always local, agreement and truth; and which is 
a fundamental presupposition of interpretation. 
These four ideas are not independent of one another but 
rather they display a similar holism to that which they articulate. 
They are all closely interconnected and all derive from the same 
basic holistic considerations. Indeterminacy ~and charity both 
follow from the ideas of interpretative and attitudinal holism. In 
turn attitudinal holism can be seen as an expression of the same 
idea of the interdependence of attitudes, utterances and behaviour 
which is also expressed in terms of the thesis of interpretative 
holism. Even the Davidsonian insight into the connection between 
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truth and meaning can be derived from the holistic nature of 
interpretation (as we saw in discussing McDowell in chapter two and 
McGinn and Glymour also). Holism thus characterises the arguments 
concerning the idea of radical interpretation as much as it 
characterises interpretation itself. 
It is the working out of this interconnected set of ideas 
1n regard to the issues of relativism, scepticism and truth which 
will be the Bubject for the remainder of the dissertation. 
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Part II 
INTERPRETATION, LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD 
... the question of being will involve us deeply in 
the question of language. 
- Martin Heidegger1 
1 Jnt.roduct.ion to Hetapbys.ics, translated by Ralph Mannheim , New 
Haven, 1959, p.51. 
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Chapter 4 
LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD 
Language and Heta_physJcs 
In 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics' Davidson writes: 
. . . in making manifest the large features of our 
language, we make manifest the larr-:;Je features of 
reality. One way of pursuing metaphysics is therefore 
to study the general structure of our language. this 
is not, of course, the sole true method of 
metaphysics; there is no such. But it is one method, 
and it has been practised by philosophers as widely 
separated by time or doctrine as Plato, Aristotle, 
Hume, Kant, Russel~, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, 
Quine, and Strawson. 
Davidson's claims for the results which would flow from adopting 
his 'method of truth' are fairly modest3 he writes that: 
The merit of the method of truth is not that it 
settles ... matters once and for all, or even that it 
settles them without further metaphysical reflection. 
But the method does s;rve to sharpen our sense of 
viable alternatives ... 
Davidson's 'method of truth in metaphysics· is a method which looks 
to the formal structure provided by a Tarskian truth theory as a 
~'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics', p.199. 
See Richard Rorty, P/J.ilosop/Jy and t..he H.irror of .Nature, 
pp.257-266 and his discussion of the distinction between 'pure · and 
'!mpure' philosophy of language. 
'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics', p.214. 
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methodological base for discussion of properly metaphysical issues 
-----------
- questions, for instance, concerning the sorts of entities we 
should admit into our ontology. However the justification of the 
method depends on Davidson's holistic approach to questions of 
interpretation. 
Interpretative holism insists that the interpretation of 
utterances is just one part of the overall project of understanding 
-
speakers. Interpreting utterances and identifying beliefs cannot be 
separated from the more general task of deciding what the world is 
like for we cannot clearly separate truths about language from 
truths about the world (recall that this was the essence of the 
Quinean argument against the notion of analyticity the 
inseparability of meaning and information). Moreover we interpret 
the utterances of ~.peakers by connecting those utterances to 
aspects of the speakers' environment - we use truth to gain access 
to meaning. So our understanding of speakers is tied up with our 
understanding of the world - indeed you might say that there is 
• 
really only one project of understanding. This holism about 
understanding is of course encapsulated in the principle of charity 
whereby our beliefs about the world enable us to interpret the 
utterances and identify the beliefs of others. 
Interpretative · hol ism requires us to assume a certain 
sort of unity with respect to the utterances and attitudes of 
speakers and with respect to the speakers and their environment. It 
also requires a certain unitary conception of the 'world·. For of 
course the beliefs held by speakers are beliefs about the world and 
the connectedness of those beliefs must carry with it a 
connectedness in the concept of the world itself. Christopher 
Hookway has suggested with respect to Davidson ' s arguments against 
relativism in 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' that what 
is involved there is the claim "that we must attribute most of our 
own beliefs and standards to him [the alien] if we are to regard 
him as an inhabitant of the same world as ourselves". 5 Nichola~. 
Rescher has noted a similar connection 1n his discussion of 
Davidson's argument. 6 But the point is made by Davidson himself: 
To understand the speech of another, I must be able to 
think of the same things she does; I must share her 
war ld . . . comunication depends, then, on each 
communicant having, and correctly thinking that the 
other has, ~~~ concept of a shared world, an 
intersubjective world. But the concept of an 
intersubjective world is the concept of an objective 
world, ~ world about which each communicant can have 
beliefs. 
It is thus Davidson's claim, not only that we must share 
similar beliefs if we are to count ourselves as sharing a world, 
but that the assumption of a shared world - the assumption of an 
accessible, objective world - is a presupposition of communication. 
This is what was indicated earlier in the talk of charity as an 
ontological presupposition. Davidson's claim here is obviously a 
much stronger one than Hookway's for it has the implication that we 
cannot make sense of the notion (which seems to be involved 1n 
some if not all versions of relativism) of a communicant who does 
not share the same war ld as we do. That we cannot make sense of 
such a notion follows naturally from Davidson's interpretative 
holism and in particular from that holism as expressed in the 
5
' Indeterrn1nacy and Interpretation', Act.ion and Jnterpretat.ion, 
eg. Philip Pettit and Christopher Hookway, Cambridge, 1978, p.37. 
'Conceptual Schemes', Studit?s in Ep.istemoloqy (Midwest Studies i n 
P~ilosophy 5), ed. P.A.French et al, Minneapolis, 1980, p.44n.1 7 . 
, Rational Animals' , lJ.iaJ ect.1 ca, 36 ( 1 982 ) p. 327. 
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principle of charity. It follows from the Davidsonian conception of 
understanding as essentially a translative process of 
interpretation. To understand is to bring what is to be understood 
within a familiar, already understood, realm. The notion of a 
communicant who possesses 'a different world to our own is the 
notion of a communicant who cannot be incorporated within the realm 
of our understanding. It is a notion which is inherently confused 
for the notion of a common world is the basis for understanding and 
communication. 
However the 'world' which must be held in common is not 
the 'world' as given by any specific theory of the world (although 
any true theory will describe that common world). The 
presupposition of a common world is just the presupposition which 
is embodied in the charitable requirement that we take those we 
interpret to have mostly true beliefs which are generally 1n 
agreement with our own. Yet the agreement which charity prescribes 
is not agreement over any specific set of beliefs and the same 
applies to the idea of the world which we hold in common. Certainly 
there are different ways of describing the world but such 
differences cannot be extended globally without undennining the 
sense, the meaningfulness, of such descriptions. Moreover the 
indeterminacy of interpretation suggests that it will always be 
possible to reinterpret apparent differences to bring them into 
agreement - provided adjustments are made elsewhere in the system. 
These are of course points that I emphasised in the 
preceding chapters but they are cr1...1cial to the notion of charity as 
an ontological presupposition - one aspect of which is the idea of 
of a common world. Yet I have also emphasised that interpretation 
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proceeds by connecting utterances with aspects of a speaker ' s 
environment interpretation seems to require being able to 
identify those objects with which speakers causally interact and of 
course it must also require the possibility of our being able to 
causally interact with speakers. As Davidson puts it "communication 
begins where causes converge". 8 In this respect then we can 
characterize the presupposition of a common world in terms of the 
the presupposition that both we and those we interpret can causally 
interact with the same objects and with each other. 
Davidson's interpretative hol ism requires us to regard 
all our interpretation, linguistic and non-linguistic, whether 
concerned directly with speakers or not, as part of an integrated 
whole and it requires us to regard the world - which we are also 
involved in trying to understand - as reflecting that holism. The 
world itself has to be seen as an integrated, intersubjective 
structure. It is thus that I think we can talk, not only about an 
ontological presupposition for interpretation, but also about an 
'ontological' holism ·as being implied by interpretative holism. By 
this I mean that our beliefs about the world must be integrated 
with our other beliefs and we must presuppose the causal 
interconnectedness of objects and events in the world - this is a 
presupposition of interpretation because of the way in which we 
must interpret speakers: by connecting their utterances up with 
their world. If the world did not display any sort of connectedness 
then we could not make the connections between utterances, beliefs 
and the rest. Moreover how we take the world to be cannot be 
8
'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.436. 
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separated from how we interpret speakers anyway and as we regard 
speakers' beliefs to be consist and interconnected so we must see 
the same interconnectedness 1n the world. This is not mere 
'anthropocentrism' for we cannot distinguish the world from our 
overall system of beliefs about the world, that 1s, from our 
overall (global) system of belief. The 'world', no matter how it is 
conceived, cannot stand outside of the interpretative project. It 
is not just that a theory of meaning presupposes a theory of belief 
and desire; it presupposes also a theory about the world - a theory 
about the objects and events that speakers can be taken to have 
beliefs and make utterances about. 
The holistic realm of interpretation extends very wide 
indeed. So wide, in fact, that the notion of anything lying outside 
of the world, out.side of our understanding, outside of our 
interpretative practice, cannot be made sense of. The sense of 
'world' that is used here is a sense which corresponds to our 
earlier comments about the need for ' global' agreement, 'global· 
truth in beliefs. Certainly we can talk about different 'worlds ' 
when what we really mean is that there are different networks of 
experiences, beliefs or concepts - different localized networks, 
that is. Where we run into problems is when we extend such local 
differences globally. There our capacity to make sense of the idea 
must founder for much the same reasons that made it diff i cult to 
make sense of the ideas of global error or global disagreement. 
A failure to take notice of the global-local distinct ion 
was what characterized much of the criticism of the principle of 
charity which we discussed in chapter three and the same f ai 1 ure 
seems to characterize relativism. Certainly talk of ,different 
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linguistic or conceptual 'worlds' (talk of 'worlds' 1n the local 
sense mentioned above) can easily slide into talk about different 
worlds s.impl.ic.iter and it may not always be clear, given the 
connection of epistemology and ontology, how they are to be kept 
separate. Edward Sapir provides a nice illustration of the problem 
1n the following passage: 
The fact of the matter 1s that the "real world" is to 
a large extent built up on the language habits of the 
[social] group. No two languages are ever sufficiently 
similar to be considered as representing the same 
social reality. The worlds in which different 
societies 1 i ve are distinct worlds, not9 merely the same world with different labels attached. 
Here Sapir's talk of 'worlds' remains necessarily ambiguous between 
the 'social world' and the 'world' as it might be used in an 
unqualified sense. Indeed Sapir seems to slide from the claim that 
different languages give rise to di£ ferent 'social' worlds 
(whatever that might mean exactly) to the claim that different 
languages lead to different worlds "not merely the same world with 
di£ ferent labels attached''. 
Davidson clearly cannot accept the notion that different 
languages might be associated with different worlds s.implic.iter. 
Davidson's claim 1s that we cannot even say what this notion means. 
And one reason why we cannot say what it means is because the 
notion of the intersubjective world - 'world' in the global sense -
is of course not a notion to be given definite content. The 
9
'The Status of Linguistics as a Science', Selected writ.inqs of 
Edftlard Sap.fr in LanquBqe,. Culture and Personality, ed. David 
G.Mandelbaum, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951, p.162. This quotation 
may seem at odds with Sapir·s comments in 'The Grammarian and His 
Language' , .i.fdd. , pp. 153-154, where he talks of the "f orrnal 
completeness" of language, namely, the intertranslatability of 
languages. 
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intersubjective world is not the world thus and so. There 1s no 
specific description of that world which cannot be revised. As we 
saw in the charitable requirement of agreement there is no one list 
of beliefs on which we must agree - we must agree overall. Our 
beliefs must be qenerallytrue. Thus the world which we must share 
is nevertheless a world which is open to innumerable different, but 
not irreconcilable, descriptions. Thus global relativism proves 
impossible to understand while local relativity need not mean that 
some sort of reconciliation of differences cannot be brought about 
by moving to a higher level of interpretation. This is the 
substance of the arguments we will encounter against relativism in 
the next chapter. Similar arguments will also be deployed against 
scepticism for what scepticism would have us consider is just the 
possibility of our own global error. 
:rhe ':rh.in:i Dogma ' 
Relativism does seem to be characterized by a tenclancy to 
talk about different 'worlds' as being associated with different 
languages, different conceptual schemes, different perspectives. 
Underlying such talk there seems to the idea of a basic distinction 
between a subjective element ('language') and an objective element 
(the 'given', 'experience') which together give rise to the world 
we know and love. Thus, although what an individual receives 
through the senses may be 'objective' and available to all, it is 
the individual's language or conceptual scheme which , on this 
account, plays the crucial role in turning mere 'experience· into 
experience of a 'world'. This distinction between ' conceptual 
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scheme· and 'empirical cont ent' Davidson labels as the "third 
dogma .. of empiricism10 to be added to the two already identified by 
Quine in 'Two Dogmas of Empi ricism' . 11 
According to Qui ne the distinction of analytic from 
synthetic truths is the firs t dogma of empiricism while the second 
is the idea of reducti onism (reduction to purely empirical 
statements). The analytic-.;:iynthetic distinction 1s a distinction 
between those statements whi ch are true in virtue of their meanings 
alone and those statement s which are true both in virtue of 
meanings and the way of the world. Thus analytic truths are held to 
be true because of linguistic (or conceptual) facts alone while 
synthetic truths depend on both linguistic· and extra-linguistic 
facts. The dogma of reduct. ionism, in turn, consists in the idea 
that all statements can ul timately be recast in the language of 
pure sensory experience - or at least that any statement, taken 1n 
isolation, 1s capable of being confirmed or disconfirmed by 
experience. According to Quine these two dogmas are intimately 
connnected: 
The two dogmas are indeed, at root identical. We 
lately reflected that in general the truth of 
statements does obviously depend both upon language 
and upon extra-linguistic fact: and we noted that this 
obvious circumstance carries in its train, not 
logically but all too naturally, a feeling that the 
truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a 
linguistic component and a factual component. The 
factual component must, if we are empiricists, boil 
10
·on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.189. This third 
dogma is also discussed by Richard Rorty ( P/J.ilosop/J_y and the Hirror 
of M"iture), Michael Williams ( Croundless Bel.ief, Oxford, 1977) and 
David Wiggins ( .... c;'ameness and Su..b....c:tance, Oxford, 1980 ) . For a 
discussion of this 'third dogma' and Davidson's views on the matter (as well as the views of Rorty et al.) see Marie McGinn, 'The Third 
Dogma of Empiricism', Proceed.inqs oI t/Je Ar.1'....c:totel.ian Society, N.S. 
8¥1(1981-82). 
pp.20-46. 
down to a range of con£ irmatory experiences. In the 
extreme case where the linguistic compon1~t lS all that matters, a true statement is analytic. 
1 d 'i • L.. 
Reductionisru ::...:: thus a direct consequence of the analytic-synthet i c 
distinction. 
The third dogma of empiricism 1s iclentif ied by Davidson 
as the distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content. 
The idea be.hind the dogma, as I noted a few J::iages .back, is that 
knowledge 1s a product of two components: an empirical or 
experiential component - the 'given' - and a purely conceptual 
component. This third dogma is intimately connected with the two 
original dogmas in Quine. Indeed we might well say that all three 
dogmas are at root identical since they all depend upon the one 
basic distinction between the conceptual and the empirical; the 
linguistic and the extralinguistic; the subjective and objective. 13 
The scheme-content distinction is the embodiment of this 
distinction insofar as it 1s a distinction between conceptu.9J 
scheme and e117P.ir.ical content. Here already, in the close connection 
between the three dogmas, the association of a language with a 
conceptual scheme - an association we have noted in respect of 
i ~ .I.bid I p • 41 • 
I say, echoing Quine, that all three dogmas are at root 
identical for the three are not always found together. In 
particular the analytic-synthetic distinction may be abandoned 
while the scheme-content distinction is maintained - as I discuss 
below. Both distinctions involve the idea of a distinction .between 
language and world, subjective and objective, but the 
analytic-synthetic distinction represents the application of that 
distinction to state111ents on the basis of what makes those 
statements true ( ' language' or 'concepts' in the case of analytic 
truths - 'the world' or 'experience' in the case of synthetic 
truths) while the scheme-content distinction is the application of 
that distinction to A·nowleclqe (such that knowledge is seen as the 
product of a language or conceptual scheme in relation to some 
experiential 'given' ) . 
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relativism - becomes apparent. 
Yet a conceptual scheme 1s not necessari ly to be 
associated with a language as a whole; certainly not if the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements 1s 
maintained. For if the analytic-synthetic distinction is held onto 
then we can distinguish within a language between those statements 
which are true in virtue of meanings and those which are true in 
virtue of the empirical facts also. A conceptual scheme could only 
be associated with the first of these: that is, with the body of 
analytically true statements and not with the total body of true 
statements possible within a language. 
If all three dogmas are indeed maintained simultaneously 
then analytic truths will be truths which involve statements about 
the concepts which go to make up a conceptual scheme (roughly 
speaking) while synthetic truths will involve statements about the 
empirical content of the scheme. If , however, we abandon the 
analytic-synthetic distinction (as we may feel compelled to do by 
the Quinean critique) then the distinction between scheme and 
content will, if retained, be radically altered. The scheme-content 
distinction will then no longer correspond to a distinction between 
the theoretical and observational statements within a language, or 
to a distinction between conceptual and empirical statements, for 
these distinctions will no longer be strictly acceptable as 
distinctions applicable with.in a language at all. Instead the 
scheme-content dichotomy will only remain viable as a distinction 
between the scheme identified with a language as a whole and 
uninterpreted, nonlinguistic empirical content. Here the 
distinction between concept and fact, between language and 
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experience, will have been pushed to the extreme. 
Such a conception of the scheme-content distinction may 
arise out of the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction or 
it may itself provide a position from which the notions of 
analyticity and reductionism may be attacked. What is significant 
is that it appears that the scheme-content dichotomy, and its 
extreme separation of the linguistic from the nonlinguistic, can 
survive the rejection of t he analytic-synthetic distincti on: 
If we give up the [analytic-synthetic] dualism, we 
abandon the conception of meaning that goes with it, 
but we do not have to abandon the idea of empirical 
content; we can ho l d, if we want, that c.~11 sentences 
have empirical content. Empirical content is in turr1 
explained by refer ence to the facts, the world, 
experience, sensat ion, the total i:ty of sensory 
stimuli, or something similar. Meanings give us a way 
to talk about categories, the organizing structure of 
language and so on ; but it is possible ... to give up 
meanings and analyt icity while retaining the idea of 
language as embodying a conceptual scheme. Thus in 
place of the dualis m of analytic-synthetic we get the 
dualism of conceptua l scheme and empirical content ... 
an emp1r1c1sm ... s horn of the unworkable idea that we 
can uniql\e}y allocate empirical content sentence by 
sentence. 
Thus as the analytic-synthetic distinction is rejected, 
while that of scheme and content is retained , then so a language 
comes to be seen as the embodiment of a conceptual scheme. The 
notion of an alternative conceptual scheme is now cashed out in 
terrns of an untranslatable language. Davidson himself proceeds to 
locate this scheme-content dichotomy and the associated notion of 
an untranslatable language in the work of Benjamin Whorf, Kuhn and 
Feyerabend, and even in t he work of Quine himselr. 15 
~~'On_ the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.1B9. 
- I.fJ.Id. , pp. 189-191. Quine' s response on this point 1s 




Of course the arguments which press in favour of the 
abandonment of the analytic-synthetic distinction are the very same 
arguments which Davidson uses against the scheme-content 
distinction also. Thus in Quine the inseparability of meaning from 
information or belief is a major reason for rejecting the notion of 
analyticity. But that inseparability 1s the .basis for the 
interpretative holism we find in Davidson and which is adumbrated 
in Quine. One of the difficulties with Quine in this respect is 
that he seems to go only half the way he rejects the 
analytic-synthetic distinction and yet still makes use of the 
scheme-content distinction. It is this sort of halfway-house 
approach which enables conceptual schemes to be associated with 
languages and the scheme-content distinction to be retained. 
rhe Inconerence of the Scheme-Content D.ist.inct.ion 
It is in the attack on conceptual relativism 1n ·on the 
Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' that Davidson's argument against 
the scheme-content distinction is most clear. We have already seen 
how Davidson views conceptual schemes as being possibly associated 
with languages. The distinction between schemes and their content 
suggests that we might think of languages, or schemes, as 
characterised in terms of how they stand in relation to some other 
thing, namely, empirical content. Thus Davidson says: 
15 (continued) 
see 'The Very 
Cambridge, Mass. 
Idea of a Third Dogma' , 
and London, 1981, pp.39-41. 
Theories and T.h.inqs, 
The idea is then that something is a language, and 
associated with a conceptual scheme, whether we can 
translate it or not, if it stands in a certain 
relation (predicting, organizing, facing, or fitting) 
[to] experierge (nature, reality, sensory 
promptings). 
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Such a conception of the scheme-content relation, and language's 
role in it, Davidson supports with references from Quine and 
others. He quotes passages in which Quine contrasts beliefs , or 
theories, or conceptual schemes, with experience. 17 
The idea of a conceptual scheme is indeed a common one -
it does not appear only in Quine - but it appears in a number of 
dif £ erent farms. And the variants on the scheme-content idea are 
reflected in the various ways in which tbe relation between a 
scheme and its content is conceived. One thing which is always true 
is that the relation is described in metaphorical or imaginative 
terms and as Davidson point s out: 
The images and metaphors fall into two main groups: 
conceptual schemes ( languages) either organize 
something, or they .F.it it (as in 'he warps his 
scientific heritage to fit his ... sensory 
promptings'). The first group contains also 
systen1at.ize, d.iv.ide u_o (the stream of experience ) : 
further examples of the second gropup are pred.ict, 
account .for, face ( t he tribunal of experience). As for 
the entities that get organized, or which the scheme 
must fit, I think again we may detect two main ideas: 
either it is rea lity (the universe, the world, 
nature), or it is experience (the passing show, 
surface irritations , sensory promptings, sense-data, 
the given) . 1 ~ 
The problem with the first of these two sets of metaphors 
is that it is difficult to see how whatever it is that is 
i~'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.191. 
18 I!7.1~d. . 
.lbfd. , pp. 191-192. 
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organized, or systematized, or divided up, can fail to possess some 
such organization already: 
We cannot attach a clear meaning to the notion of 
organ1z1ng a single object (the world, nature etc.) 
unless that object is understood to contain or consist 
in other objects. Someone who sets out to organize a 
closet arranges the things in it. If you are told not 
to or:9"anize the shoes . and shf~s, but the closet 
itselr, you would be bewildered. 
If a conceptual scheme is to perform some organizing function then 
it can only organize those things that are there anyway. But in 
that case it is hard to see how the organization 'imposed' by a 
conceptual scheme could add anything to, or even be distinguiE,hed 
from, the organization already to be found in what is organized. 
This brings us on to the second of the metaphors employed 
here: the notion of a scheme fitting some content. The problem with 
the notion of a scheme concei vecl as organizing experience, or the 
world, is that we cannot make any sense of what is to be organized 
as lacking any prior organization. If what is to be orr:1anized 
already possess such organization then we would expect that this 
organization would be reflected in the organization embodied in the 
scheme (otherwise it is hard to see how the scheme could be said to 
apply to some content, t./Jat content). Thus the notion of a scheme 
orqan.izinq experience ( or the world, or reality etc. ) seems to 
involve the notion that the scheme .[.its experience (or the world, 
or reality etc.) But what does talk of fitting, or facing up to 
experience really mean? According to Davidson what it must really 
amount to is the idea that the conceptual scheme .1s true ( or 
perhaps as Kant might have said 'objectively valid' ). 20 
This is the crucial point for Davidson's argument here: 
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talk of fitting, or facing up to, the totality of experience, like 
talk of fitting the facts, adds nothing to the idea of just being 
true. 21 A theory is not made true by the facts or the evidence, it 
simply is true. Here Davidson's argument connects with his 
discussion of truth in 'True to the Facts'. In that paper Davidson 
elaborated an account of truth in the context of his theory of 
interpretation, claiming that talk of truth needB no reference to 
facts, or things JJ1a.kinq sentences true. 22 For of course it. is 
really sentences or propositions which are true and false and no 
fact, nor any t./Jinq can, as it were, come into contact with 
sentences to ITlaA-e them true. Being made true, moreover, is just to 
be true. What it is to be true for a sentence of a language is, of 
course, just what the Tarski an theory of truth aims to te 11 us. 
'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow iE, white. "Here" says 
Davidson "there is no reference to a fact, a world, an experience, 
or a piece of evidence". 23 
If to say that a scheme stands in some relation to a 
certain empirical content 1s to say only that the scheme is true 
then we might wonder whether the notion of scheme and content are 
actually doing any real work here. Certainly it looks as if the 
notion of a scheme as distinct from some content is not a notion 
with any real content itself. And of course this is what the 
holistic nature of interpretation would lead us to expect. For if a 
16· .I.bid. , p. 1 92. 
Davidson, J.b.id. 21
certainly it can amount to nothing more than this even 1£ some 
might claim that it amounts to something less - as the metaphysical 
realism might want to claim in holding that even our .best confirmed 
t~2ory might be false. 
23 The claim is repeated, .f.b.1d. , p .194 . 
.f.b.1d. 
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conceptual scheme 1s considered as a set of beliefs, as in one 
sense it surely is, then we cannot make sense of those belief2, 
independently of their connection, not only with utterances, but 
with the experiences of the believer, with the world which 
surrounds him. Indeed we cannot investigate one of these elements -
beliefs, e1,{per1ences, environment, utterances - without implicating 
all the others. How then can we separate off a conceptual scheme 
from some empirical content? Certainly there 1s no way of 
describing the relation between the two which will leave them 
separate and distinct. This 1s the point of the Daviclsonian 
critique: certainly we can employ the notion of a conceptual scheme 
but only so long as we do not imagine that in doing so we are 
talking about something which is separate from the war ld or from 
experience - from some content. Similarly we can talk about a 
theory of belief, or a theory of meaning, so long as we keep 1n 
mind that such talk already has all the other elements of 
interpretation in the picture already. Strictly speaking we cannot 
separate one element from the other. 
The principle of charity is closely tied to the argument 
here insofar as the impossibility of separating off belief from 
meaning, language f ram the wor id, is an idea encapsulated in the 
principle of charity which counsels the as2.umption of agreement, of 
truth, in order to interpret. The Davidsonian argument against the 
idea of an untranslatable lang1..1age, or alternative conceptual 
scheme, can be seen as based on the presupposition of charity 
according to which we cannot interpret (and so cannot even 
determine language-hood or scheme-hood ) without some basis in 
agreement. But the presupposition of such agreement w111 tend to 
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undercut the original supposition of untranslatability or radical 
conceptual divergence. As Davidson writes: 
The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that 
of differing points of view, seems to betray an 
underlying paradox. Different points of view make 
sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate 
system on which to plot them; yet the existence of a 
common system ,.. 4belies the claim of dramatic incomparability. 2 
The rejection of the scheme-content distinction on these 
grounds is something with which Nicholas Rescher expresses strong 
agreement. He puts the Davidsonian argument 1 n terms very 
~ reminiscent of my discussion of the Quinean thesis or 
inseparability of meaning and information in chapter one: 
One . . . cannot separate questions of the mean.inq o[ 
terms (how our concepts function in their linguistic 
setting) from questions of trut/J (views on how matters 
go in the world) ... On the view being criticized ... 
the form-oriented issue of /Jo{v people think - of the 
categorial and taxonomic framework of their discourse 
is hermetically separated from the the 
content-oriented issue of 1v1/Jat they 25t.hink, of the substantive materials of their belief. 
the 
This sort of separation cannot of course be made, just as we do not 
learn first what to talk about and then what to say about it. And 
on this Rescher agrees: "This criticism is right-minded; the view 
it condemns is surely incorrect". 26 
However Rescher thirJ~s that some sense can sti 11 be g1 ven 
to the notion of a conceptual scheme itself. 27 But what lS 
concomitant with the notion of the inseparability of meaning from 
truth, or of meaning from attitudes, 1s the thesis of the 
24 
2 S Ib.id, p. 18 4. 
26 'Conceptual Schemes', p.39. 27 J.b.id. 
.lb.id., p. 40. 
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indeterminacy of translation. What indeterminacy suggests is that 
there is no one conceptual scheme, nor language, nor theory of 
interpretation, which is the only scheme which can appropriately be 
applied to a speaker. There will always be more than one way of 
interpreting a speaker's conceptual and linguistic commitments. 
Indeed there is no one answer to the question of whether one scheme 
is the same as or different to another. Even this is indeterminate. 
If this does not render the notion of a conceptual scheme totally 
unintelligible it does make the notion rather less powerful than I 
think Rescher would have expected. 
Re.lat.iv.ism, Sceptic.ism and the Scheme-Content Sp.I.it 
Davidson summarizes his argument in 'On the Very Idea of 
a Conceptual Scheme' as being an argument for the unintelligibility 
of the doctrine, the "heady and exotic doctrine", of conceptual 
2'"' relativism. c, Conceptual relativism 1s attacked through the 
undermining of the idea of a conceptual scheme itself. And, as we 
have seen, it certainly does appear that the idea of a conceptual 
scheme plays an important role in formulaions of conceptual 
relativism. Indeed it is hard to see how recourse to such an idea 
(or some suitable surrogate) could be avoided by relativists. It 
l o "-", after all, to a conceptual scheme of one sort or another that 
relativism typically relativizes: 
Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of 
organizing experience; they are systems of categories 
that give forro to the data of sensation; they are 
points of view from which individuals, cultures, or 
periods survey the passing scene. There may be no 
28
'on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.183. 
translating from one scheme to another, in which case 
the beliefs, desires, hopes and bits of knowledge that 
characterize one person have no true counterparts for 
the subscriber to another scheme. Reality itself i~. 
relative to a scheme: wh~t counts as real in one 
system may not in another.L 
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What it is that a relativist relativizes will vary: 
ontology, truth, meaning, values, reasons - these are some of the 
more usual candidates. The relati vization of truth and meaning 
however are perhaps the most important. Certainly they are the most 
crucial for our present concerns and more generally it is the case 
that whatever else is relativized it is always the truth of 
sentences which is made relative - though there may be differences 
over the sorts ·of sentences which are subject to such 
relativization. 
Direct relativization of truth does have its problems 
however - not least being the fact that the relativization of truth 
alone seems to lead fairly quickly to self contradiction of the 
familiar Protagorean sort. Some relativization of truth is typical 
of most relativisms but it is most often not a clear-cut 
relativization. Many relativists will deny the translatability of 
the sentences they relativize. If translatability fails (an extreme 
version of the relativity of meaning) there can be no true 
relativity of truth since in that case it 1s not possible to 
establish that there is one proposition that is held true within 
one 'scheme' and false within another. Thus Davidson comments that: 
We get a new out of an old [ conceptual J scheme when 
the speakers of a language come to accept as true an 
important range of sentences they previously took to 
be false (and, of course, vice versa ) . We must not 
describe this change simply as a matter of their 
29 .lb.id. 
coming to view old falsehoods as truths, £or a truth 
is a proposition, and what they come to accept, in 
accepting a sentence as true, is not the same thing 
that they rejected when formerly they held the 
sentence to be false. A change has come over the 
meaning of t~D sentence because it now belongs to a 
new language. 
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The denial of translatability is thus an important element in many 
relativist posi lions. It does indeed seem to be the only way in 
which relativism can avoid the charge of straightforward 
self-contradiction. It is for this reason that 'incommensurable· 
has generally been taken to mean 'untranslatable'. 
The role of the idea of a conceptual scheme in 
relativistic thought is repeated by Richard Rorty and he provides a 
neat characterization of relativism using that notion: 
Relativism is an unoccupied philosophical position 
which says that "good", "real", "true'', etc. are 
subscriptable terms, and that each conceptual scheme 
makes different entities existent, desires worthy, 
etc. This position would be occupied by somebody who 
both believed in alternative conceptual schemes and 
had a coherence view of truth. Such a person would 
have to a~i t that each scheme was "coherent" in its 
own terms. 
If relativism is indeed an 'unoccupied' position 1n 
philosophy then this is because, since Protagoras, it has been more 
a term of abuse than compliment amongst philosophers. Yet outside 
of philosophy the situation has almost been reversed and relativism 
may appear as accepted doctrine amongst sociologists and 
30
·on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.1 88. See al~.o 
R3tcher, ' Conceptual Schemes', pp.329-331. In an early draft of 'Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth', given as 
a seminar in Canberra 1982. The revised paper appears under the 
same title in T/Je P/J.iloso_p/Jy o.f l)onald l)l7V.idson.: A Perspect.ive on 
Inquiries .1nco Truth and Interpretation, ed. Ernest Lepore , 
forthcoming. 
anthropologists - almost an article of faith: 
It is important to see that sociology is but one of 
the manifestations of the deepening sense of 
relativity in modern Western history ... indeed, the 
problem of relativity is at the heart of what we know 
as modern Western culture, understandable as a kind of 
progressive disintegration of an order of objective 
certainty embodied in Christendom. On the level of 
intellectual reflection, the same problem gave birth 
to the so-called turn to the sl.ibjective, at least from 
Descartes on - a new and radical concern with the 
stn1ctures of human subJecti vi ty, moti vatecl precisely 
by deepening u1Jc;.ertainty as to what one may call 
objecively real. L · 
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Al though the idea of a conceptual scheme is central to 
the idea of conceptual relativism, relativism has no monopoly on 
the scheme idea. The idea of a conceptual scheme, the 
scheme-content distinction, is common coin on the philosophical 
exchange. Both relativist and anti-relativist may make equal use 
of the conceptual scheme idea, the difference 1s that while the 
relativist is a pluralist in this regard, arguing for many such 
schemes, the anti-relativist is solidly monist. Thus Davidson 
comments: 
Philosophers of many persuasions are prone to talk of 
conceptual schemes . . . Even those thinkers who are 
certain there is only one conceptual scheme are in the 
sway of the scheme concept: even monotheists have 
religion. And when someone sets out to describe "our 
conceptual scheme", his homey task assumes, if we-:i5ake 
him literally, that there might be rival systems.J 
Relativists and anti-relativists may differ . . .l-over W11u:.... 
sorts of sentences should be subject to what sorts of 
relativizations, relativists and anti-relativists may differ within 
32Peter Berger and Hansfriecl Kellner, .Sociology Re.interpretea: 
Hjr:-mondsworth, Middlesex, 1982, pp.61-62. 
-:i,On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.183. 
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their own camps on this matter: relativists and ant1-relat1v1sts 
may disagree as to whether conceptual schemes are one or many; yet 
1n one sense they are often united in their acceptance of the idea 
of a conceptual scheme itself and 1n their acceptance of a 
bifurcation between conceptual schemes and empirical content. So 
relativism, though it depends on the notion of a conceptual scheme, 
is better distinguished from non-relativisms or anti-relativism by 
its insistence on the plurality of incommensurable schemes; as 
Bernstein writes: 
Since the relativist believes that there 1s (or can 
be) a nonreducible plurality of such conceptual 
schemes, he or she challenges the claim that these 
concepts can have a determinate and uni vocal 
significance. For the relativist, there 1s no 
substantive overarching framework or single 
metalanguage by which we can rationally adjudicate or 
univocally- 4evaluate competing claims of alternative paradigms.j 
Emphasis on the non-reducible plurality of schemes as 
characteristic of relativism may lead to relativism being seen in 
as primarily an epistemological thesis. Of course it is not just 
that it has important ontological implications also. As we 
mentioned earlier relativism, 1n separating language from the 
world, leaves open the possibility that there might be 'worlds' 
forever closed to us; that there might be languages we could never 
translate. 
Although I have said that relativism 1s specifically 
characterised by the idea of conceptual pluralism, still , it is the 
idea of a conceptual scheme which stancl2. at the heart of 
34Richarcl J. Bernstein, Beyond O.bject.iv.i __ c:m and R't?lat.iv.i._c:m, Oxford , 
1983, p.8 
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relativism. It is only when we think of knowledge as made up of two 
components - a conceptual component (the 'subjective' conceptual 
scheme) and an empirical component (the 'objective · empirica l 
content ) - that relativism can arise. In this respect we might view 
relativism, in its contemporary forms, at least, as the product of 
the meeting of Kantianism and Hegelianism. From Kant we get the 
distinction of understanding from sensibility (of concepts from 
exper ience) and an emph&sis on the active role of the 
understanding in knowledge (the mind Hmaking nature·· ) , while from 
Hegel we get an attack on the apriori ty of the understanding 
itself . Combine the two and you get a view of knowledge as being 
the product of two factors, concepts and experience , with concepts 
playing the decisive role but lacking any a priori determination -
thus although our knowledge is crucially determined by the nature 
of our understanding, there can be no guarantee of the universality 
or even legitimacy of that understanding. 35 
Yet of course this path need not lead exclusively towards 
relativism, it can lead just as easily towards scepticis,m also. For 
both relativism and scepticism arise out of the same split between 
concepts and experience: 
. . . if we accept with complete generality the idea of 
human knowledge as a combination of a subjective and 
an objective factor, and we see the objective 
contribution of the world as small relative to the 
total set of beliefs we hold about the world, we must 
see the subjective factor (the contribut i on of the 
knowing subject) as largely detennining our total set 
of beliefs about t he world. Countless 'hypotheses· or 
'theories' could be 'projected' from those same 
slender ·data·, so if we happen to accept one such 
3 5ch . s t l ' · · · . · . t th . t f r1s woyer presen s re at.1v1sm as ar1s1ng 1n JUS 1s sor o 
way in his paper ' True For' , .lrc?lat.iv.ism: Coqn.it.i ve and Horal, ed. 
Jack W.Meiland and Michael Kranz, Notre Dame and London, 1982 , 
p. 86. 
'theory· over others it cannot be because of any 
objective superiority it enJoys over possible or 
actual competitors ... our continued adherence to our 
present 'theory' could be explained only by appeal to 
some feature or other of the knowing subjects rather 
than of the world they claim to know. And that is 
precisely what the traditional epistemologist has 
always seen a3,. undermining our knowledge of the external world . b 
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As the distinction between scheme and content 1s not 
peculiar to relativism so that distinction is the common source for 
a number of philosophical problems. Thus, in attacking the very 
idea of a conceptual scheme, Davidson is not simply attacking 
conceptual relativism, but instead is attacking a notion which is 
embedded in many philosophical positions, including relativism and 
scepticism . Moreover the attack on relativism and scepticism, in 
particular, is also closely tied to the justification of the 
principle of charity. For insofar as charity is a presupposition of 
interpretation then so it must be presupposed by scepticism and 
relativism; yet charity amounts to just the presupposition that 
most of our beliefs (as well as those of other speakers) are true 
and that there is always an overall basis of agreement in beliefs 
between· ourselves and others. Such a presupposition must be 
inconsistent with the sceptical and relativistic points of view. 




RELATIVISM AND TRANSLATION 
The 'Essence ' of Langu:1ge 
In 'The Concept of Truth 1n Formalized Languages' Tarski 
writes: 
A characteristic feature of ordinary language (in 
contrast to various scientific languages) is its 
universality. It would not be in harmony with the 
spirit of this language if in some other language a 
word occurred which could not be translated into it: 
it could be claimed that 'if we can speak meaningfully 
about anything at al\, we can also .speak about it in 
colloquial language'. 
Tarki's view of language is that it is coextensive with whatever is 
meaningful or intelligible - if something can be said at all then 
it can be said in any language. In various places J .J .Katz has Bet 
forth a very similar view of the nature of language in terms of 
what he calls a principle of linguistic 'effability' 2 according to 
which any proposition can be expressed by some sentence in any 
1.loqic., Semant.ics and Hetamat1Jem."lt.ics, p .164. 
See especially 'Ef fabi li ty and Translation', 




natural language. Katz himself recognizes that versions of this 
principle have appeared elsewhere and he acknowledges Tarki's work 
1n particular. 3 
Katz argues that 'effability': 
. . . comes much closer to expressing the essence of 
natural language than any proposal so far. In 
particular ... even Chomsky's principles of 
creativity, appropriateness and stimulus freedom, 
significant as they are to our conception of natural 
language, fail to put their finger on just what it is 
that makes a natural language unique . . . only the 
ability of natural languages to provide a sentence for 
any thought . . . differentiates them from artificial 
languages (which gain their expressive power 
parasitically from natural languages), and from animal 
communication systems (which, alt.hough they can bear 
amazing resemflance to natural language, are patently 
non-effable). 
For both Tarski and Katz the 'universality' or 'e~fability' of 
natural language 1s a property almost essential to the nature of 
such language. Indeed we might go further and suggest that they 
would also see this property as essential to thought itself - what 
can be thought and what can be said and what is meaningful would 
then all be seen as coextensive. 
According to Katz there 1s much empirical, as well as 
intuitive, support for the notion of 'effability' . 5 Yet we may also 
suspect that similar support could be adduced in favour of the 
contrary thesis. The suspicion may be that, far from opening things 
up to us, language may actually close things off from our sight. 
Language may turn out to be itself a 'prison-house'. Indeed this is 
just the view which we saw to be a component of some ( if not, 
3Also the work of Searle and Frege. See 'Effability and 
T~anslation', p.209. 
5 'Effability and Translation', p.210. Ibid, pp.209ff. 
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implicitly, all ) relativisms. Thus, while Katz and Tarski may 
regard all languages as interlranslatable, the adherents of this 
latter view would instead consider as quite possible (if not 
likely) that there might exist languages which we could not, under 
any circumstances, translate. 
Such relativism seems to be an element 1n the 'linguistic 
relativity' of Benjamin Lee Whorf. 6 Whorf argues for the 
impossibility of 'calibration' ( the term is Whorf 's) , or 
translation, between languages whose conceptual structures are 
' 
sufficiently different. Thus where untranslatability obtains it 
does so because of a difference .intr.ins.ic to the languages 
involved; it follows from the inherent limitations of those 
languages. Whorf cited English and the American Indian language 
Hopi as examples of two such languages. 
The work of Noam Chomsky provides another and more recent 
example of the same sort of untranslatability idea (although 1n 
Chomsky the idea is a much more abstract possibility than it is 1n 
Whorf - Chomsky offers no examples of untranslatable languages as 
Whorf claims to). According to Chomsky linguistic capacity 1s 
dependent upon the mastery of a grammar for a language and, 1 n 
. 
turn, the acquisition of such a grammar 1s only made possible 
because the language user is innately equipped with a schema for 
the construction of such grammars. However that innate schema not 
only makes possible the acquisition of a grammar but it also 
limits the possible grammars which can be acquired and so in turT1 
6
cited as such by Davidson, 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme', pp.11-12; for Whorf 's views see Lanquaqe/ T/Jouq/Jt and 
Reality.' Selected l,lr.it.inqs or- Ben_i9Jl7.in .lee wnorf, ed. J .B.Carroll, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1956. 
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places limits on linguistic capacity. Thus, 1n a sympathetic 
account of Chomsky's views, Fred D'Agostino has said: 
Chomsky's account of linguistic productivity is of 
interest primarily because of his suggestion that it 
is possible to acquire the abi 1 i ty to use language 
productively because there are biologically fixed 
limits on the kinds of g7ammars which human beings can 
master in the usual way. 
This 'Limits thesis· covers not only the case of language but 
extends to all areas of creativity such that: 
According to the Limits thesis, there are systems of 
beliefs and objects of aesthetic value which human 
beings must fail to find ir§C'elligible, or which they 
must be unable to construct. 
It 1s crucial to see that this sort of limits thesis 1s 
essential to any relativism which aims to preserve some sort of 
relativity of truth without lapsing into immediate contradiction. 
For only if the resources of a language or conceptual scheme are 
limited in expressive or conceptual power can the thesis of 
untranslatability be maintained. It is not enough to claim9 that 
one scheme talks about things that the other does not for this need 
not lead, of itself, to any untranslatability. I can always extend 
my vocabulary to encompass new interests and new topics of 
conversation. The untranslatability thesis is thus tied to the idea 
of there being limits to linguistic or cognitive capacity. 
Tarski and Katz claim that languages are 'essentially 
intertranslatable'; Whorf and Chomsky suggest that in some cases 
they will be essentially un:.ranslatable. Davidson has allied 
; 'Ch?msky on Creativity' , .. -,:vntJJe:..c:e, 58 ( 1984), p. 87. 
9 I.b.1d., p.114n.3; see al~.o p.88. As Nicholas Rescher does for instance; 'Conceptual Schemes' , 
p.331-333. 
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himself with Tarski on this point and in the course of his defence 
of Tarski's Convention The writes: 
Tarski was right, I think, in proposing that we should 
think of natural languages as essentially 
intertranslatable (though I don't see why this should 
require word-by-word translation). The proposal 
idealizes the flexibilty and expandab1.1.. ~:: :1 of natural 
languages1 cfut can be justified by a transcendental argument. 
This 'transcendental argument' is something I shall be 
spending a good deal of time examining here and in chapter seven. 
That Davidson should side with Tarski on this point is only what we 
would expect - the notion of an untranslatable language is rendered 
unintelligible by the Davidsonian pairing of truth with meaning and 
by the nature of interpretative holism. As Davidson tends to see 
language and ontology as tied closely together so it makes no ~~ense 
at all to suppose that language might somehow be limited in its 
resources. We have mentioned how Davidson's holism can be 
interpreted as arguing in favour of the concept of a shared world 
as a precondition for communication. The claim that natural 
languages should be seen as intertranslatable is a corrolary of 
this notion - languages must share the same realm of, to use Katz's 
term, 'effability ' . 
H. -G. Gadamer takes a very similar view - for him, as I 
suspect it is for Davidson, understanding and the realm of the 
linguistic are co-extensive with the world itself. nBeing that can 
be understood·· says Gadamer, in a Heideggerian tone, ,. ' lS 
language" 11 and as he says elsewhere: 
i~' In Defense of Convention T', TJ, p. 72.). 
Trut./J and .lfet./Jod, p. 432. 
What we have seen in the case of translation and the 
possibility of communication across the frontiers of 
our own languages is confirmed: the linguistic world 
in which we live is not a barrier that prevents 
knowledge of being in itself, but fundamentally 
embraces everything 1n which our insight can be 
enlarged and deepened ... the connection with language 
which belongs to our experience of the w~e,ld does not 
involve an exclusiveness of perspectives. L 
Roi.ism and Frans.lat.ion 
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Davidson identifies the notion of an untranslatable 
language with the notion of an alternative conceptual scheme. Such 
a move seems in keeping with the tendency of relativism to claim 
(sometimes equivocally) some element of untranslatability as 
obtaining between different conceptual frameworks. Indeed, as I 
mentioned earlier, such a claim seems almost mandatory if 
relativism about truth is to escape straight out incoherence. 13 So 
conceptual schemes are associated with languages and 
translatability is held to be a criterion of .=,ameness of schemes 
while untranslatability is a necessary condition of difference. 
Thus the Davidsonian attack on the idea of an alternative 
conceptual scheme is, at the same time, an attack on the idea of an 
untranslatable language. Both ideas are tied up 1n the notion of 
conceptual relativism and both ideas are attacked through an attack 
on the fundamental concept which sustains them: the scheme-content 
distinction or, put another way, the separation of language from 
12 I.bid. , pp. 405-406; the whole section, pp. 397-447, 1s relevant 
here. Note also Gadamer · s comments on the use of the expression 
'y~rld in it~el~', p.405. , 
The assoc1at1on of a language with a scneme follows of course 
from the retention of the scheme-content idea 1n the face of the 
rejection of the notion of analyticity. See chapter four pp.145-146 
above. 
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the world - a distinction and a separation which goes against the 
necessarily holistic nature of interpretation. 
The basis of Davidson's argument against the idea of an 
untranslatable language is given very early on in 'On the Very Idea 
of a Conceptual Scheme': 
It is tempting to take a very short line indeed: 
nothing it may be said could count as evidence that 
some form of activity could not be interpreted in our 
language that was not at the same time evidence that 
that form of activity was not speech behaviour. If 
this were right, we probably ought to hold that a form 
of activity that cannot be interpreted as language in 
our language is not speech behaviour . . . On the one 
hand it is clear that speech requires a multitude of 
finely discriminated intentions and beliefs. A person 
who a~.serls that perseverence keeps honor bright must, 
for example, represent himself as believing that 
perseverence keeps honor .bright, and he must intend to 
represent himself as believing it. On the other hand, 
it seems unlikely that we can intelligibly attribute 
attitudes as complex as these to a speaker unless we 
can translate his words into ours. There can be no 
doubt that the relation between being able to 
tran~.late someone's language and being able to 
describe his attitudes is very close. Still, until we 
can say more about wYk'it this relation is, the 1 ~ase against untranslatable languages remains obscure. 
The essence of Davidson's argument is indeed to show that ··a form 
of activity that cannot be interpreted as language in our language 
is not speech behaviour" and thus to show that translatabi 1 i ty is 
the primary criterion of language-hood or scheme-hood. Even if a 
language is associated with a conceptual scheme there is still no 
other criterion of deciding whether something is a language or a 
conceptual scheme - notions of 'fitting' or 'organizing' some 
empirical content provide no al terr1ati ve criteria. However that 
there are no alternative criteria is something which Davidson does 
14
'on the Very Idea of a Conceptu~l Scheme', pp.185-186. 
165 
aim to s/Jow - hence his dissatisfaction with the 'short line' of 
argument mentioned above15 - and his attack on the scheme-content 
distinction is part of this attempt. Yet in fact it is the thesis 
of interpretative holism, working in various ways, which provide~. 
the basis for the argument against conceptual relativism and 
against the idea of an untranslatable language. .Just how it does 
this is something I now want to turn to. 
Davidson himself points towards the relation between 
translating utterances and identifying attitudes as being the 
crucial relation here. Of course Davidson has said something more 
about this relation in his work on radical interpretation and it is 
that work which was the focus for our discussions 1n Part I of this 
dissertation. Central to radical interpretation 1s the thesis of 
interpretative holism and it is that thesis which provides an 
account of the relation between "being able to describe someone's 
language and being able to describe his attitudes". The relation is 
one of interdependence: the interpretation of utterances and the 
identification of attitudes are not separate projects but elements 
of a single interpretative project which aims at the understanding 
of persons. 
Indeed it is something of an illusion here to think that 
we can talk about there being these different elements of the one 
project. Any attempt to interpret utterances is simultaneously (and 
necessarily) an attempt to identify the speaker's attitudes. 
15Note his comment, .ibid., pp.185-186, "Putting matters this way 
is unsatisfactory, however, for it comes to little more than making 
translatability into a familiar tongue a criterion of 
language-hood. As fiat, the thesis lacks the appeal of 
self-evidence; if it is a truth, as I think it is, it should emerge 
as the conclusion of an argument··. 
166 
Conversely any attempt to identify attitudes is not just that but 
also an attempt to interpret utterances. Perhaps the real 
inseparability here is something which was missed in the original 
discussion of the structure of interpretation back in chapter two. 
The truth is that the interplay between the theory of meaning and 
the theories of belief and desire in the development of an overall 
theory of interpretation is almost more of a monologue than a 
dialogue. For strictly speaking we cannot separate off a theory 
just of belief or just of meaning. To speak of 'playing off meaning 
against belief and desire', while it has its point, is already to 
have abstracted from the real situation. Interpretation truly is an 
holistic matter. 
Given this sort of holistic approach to interpretation it 
is clear that to talk about an untranslatable language is to talk, 
not merely of a set of utterances we cannot understand, but of a 
set of attitudes we cannot identify, an array of actions we cannot 
give reason to, a group o.t-- people~ r~e cannot l!ll1.ke l'in_.v sense or: 
Yet here the holism of interpretation has the further consequence 
that even being able to identify creatures as 'persons' means being 
able to find some agreement and so make some sense of them. The 
idea of 'a group of people we cannot make sense of' 1s just the 
idea of a group of 'people' who we cannot make sense of as being 
persons. All of our interpretation presupposes the possibility of 
finding some overall ground of agreement this 1s the 
presupposition of charity. 
The holistic character of interpretation and the 
associated principle of charity thus makes it impossible to 
completely separate off the problem of translation from the problem 
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of determining whether some set of utterances constitutes a 
language or portion of a language. This is most evident when we 
recognise that the very first problem in linguistic interpretation 
is just to identify utterances as utterances. Doing this must 
involve separating utterances from other intentional acts and 
thereby also separating intentional from non-intentional behaviour. 
Naturally such a procedure will also require the attribution of 
beliefs and desires . 
So any initial hypothesis of language-hood must always 
carry with it a commitment to the possibility of translation. For 
it is only through translation (that is, through the exhibition of 
the appropriate correlations between behaviour, utterances, 
environment and so on - which is what a theory of translation 
offers) that the initial hypothesis can be substantiated. Thus, if 
we were confronted by creatures who seemed to have a language and 
no correlation could be made between their hypothetical 
'utterances' , their physical environment -and their behaviour -
where there seemed to be neither pattern nor reason behind their 
'utterances' then 1n such a situation we would have to be 
sceptical about there being a language. If we had assumed initially 
that some aspects of the behaviour of such creatures were 
action-like then this assumption too would run into difficulties. 
Such a situation may turn out to be perplexing, but I doubt that we 
could reasonably attribute either beliefs or a capacity for 
language to such creatures. 
This does raise a problem which has spawned a whole 
literature in itself: the question of whether animals (other than 
the human animal, that is) can be said to have a language and 
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whether they can be said to have beliefs. Davidson's contribution 
to this debate has been a major ( if controversial) one and he has 
discussed the matter directly in two papers: 'Thought and Talk' and 
'Rational Animals'. 16 
Davidson's approach to the matter follows directly from 
the views encapsulated 1n interpretative holism. We cannot 
attribute beliefs to (non-human) animals unless we can interpret 
their utterances. If there are no utterances to interpret then we 
cannot identify beliefs. An important element in the ar-r~1ment 1s 
the idea of the holistic character of belief. To suppose that a dog 
has the belief that a cat is in the oak tree is to suppose al~.o 
that the dog has many further beliefs about trees and cats and so 
on. 17 Once again we have to keep in mind that to identify beliefs 
is to be involved in the translation (or at least in forming 
hypotheses about the translation) of utterances. 
If we decide we cannot identify a creature as having a 
language then we cannot interpret that creature as having beliefs. 
This is not to be anthropocentric, but, as Davidson says, it is 
merely "to describe a feature of certain concepts" . 18 And thus 
Davidson claims that "Neither an infant one week old nor a snail is 
a rational creature" . 19 For on the Davic.:.onian account to be a 
rational creature "is just to have propositional attitudes". 28 Of 
i ~The latter paper appears in IJ.ial ect.ica, 36 ( 1982) . 
18 'Rational Animals', pp.320-321. 
1 9 ILu:d. , p. 31 9 • 
20 Ib.1d. , p. 317 (Summary). Ibid. , p. 318. Davidson adds here "no matter how confused , 
contradictory, absurd, unjustified or erroneous those attitudes may 
be". Hopefully this is rhetoric on Davidson's part since error , 
absurdity and so on must be kept within the limits which charity 
demands. However one interesting consequence of this account of 
(Footnote continued ) 
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course we do use intentional language in describing and explaining 
animal behaviour and our explanations often work quite well. Yet 
this is not to say that there might not be better ways of 
explaining such behaviour or that we are justified in using such 
concepts. 21 To be quite correct we cannot use intentional language 
where the evidence for its appropriateness is lacking. 
The identification of utterances as linguistic - as 
utterances - requires that a great amount of interpretation be 
possible already. Of course such interpretation goes on alongside 
of our attempts to decide whether some set of noises are actually 
linguistic. Deciding whether a creature has a language is just a 
matter of deciding whether the creature has beliefs and desires. 
Being able to do this must depend on being able to make a great 
many fine distinctions and on being able to discover significant 
correlations .between hypothetical utterances, environment, and the 
rest. That is, it depends on being able to carry out the sort of 
interpretative procedure we nonnally employ 1n understanding 
others. And more than this, for if I am right in claiming that, in 
one respect, there are no significant met..hodoloq.icc.91 di£ ferences 
between interpreting persons and explaining phenomena in the world 
generally (the same general principles of explanatory adequacy 
apply: fami 11.:t11ty - charity - simplicity and so on) then being 
20 (continued) 
rationality is that it cannot make sense to attempt to explain a 
creature· s ove.r'-&fll behaviour as irrational since this would be 
merely to deny that the creature has propositional attitudes. 
Nevertheless irrationality has some place though a limited place -
irrationality, considered as a failure in the connectedness of 
attitudes, (a hole in the attitudinal net) can still arise at a 
l~ral level; J".bJd., p.321 and also 'Paradoxes of Irrationality'. 
'Rational Animals', p.323. 
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able to discover whether a creature has a language is dependent on 
the viability of the same general interpretative practices which we 
employ in all realms of inquiry. If those procedures should prove 
inoperative in the one area - in the area of interpreting persons -
why shouldn't those same procedures fail elsewhere? 
In which . case we may ask - if untranslatable languages, 
why not inaccessible portions of reality?22 That reality .is open to 
our investigative techniques must be a presuposition of being able 
to carry on any sort of inquiry at al 1. That we cannot or should 
not make such a pressuposition 1s, I suggest, just the line of 
approach which characterises scepticism. Maybe, says the sceptic, 
the world isn't so open to us after al 1. This sort of move shifts 
the whole problem of untranslatability into the more general realm 
of epistemology. 
In fact I think that this sort of shift can be detected 
in Richard Rorty's early discussion of Davidson's conceptual 
schemes argument in 'The World Wel 1 Lost' . There Rorty seems to 
take the principle of charity and invert it to get an argument 1n 
favour of the notion of an untranslatable language. If agreement 1s 
necessary for interpretation then without agreement we cannot 
interpret. So let's imagine a case where there is no agreement and 
so no possibility of interpretation or mutual understanding. Thus: 
. . . it seems that the world may come to be f ul 1 of 
persons whom we could never conceivably recognize as 
such. A Galactic time-traveller come among us [with a 
conceptual scheme and language different to our own] 
22The indeterminacy which infects physical theory at the quantum 
level does not count as any sort of inaccessibility in this 
respect. For the whole point of the modern approach to quantum 
indeterminacy is that there is no fact of the matter concerning a 
particle's position and moment tun, and so no fact of the matter 
which is inaccessible to us. 
... would eventually be forced to abandon his original 
presumption that we were persons when he failed to 
correlate our utterances with our environment in any 
way that enabled him to construct an English-Galactic 
lexicon. Our initial assumption that the Galactic 
emissary was a person would be frustrated by the same 
sort of discovery. How sad that two cultures who have 
so much to offer each other should fail to recognize 
each others existence! ... But the situation is even 
worse than that . . . We can now see that, for al 1 we 
know, our conte117Po.rary world is filled with 
unrecognizable persons. Why should we ignore the 
possibility that the trees and the bats and the 
butterflies and the stars all have their various 
untranslatable languages in which they are busily 
expressing their beliefs and desires to one another? 
Since their organs suit them to recieve such different 
stimuli and to respond in such different ways, it is 
hardly surprising that the syntax and the primitive 
pred~3ates of their languages bear no relation to ot.1r own. 
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Rorty says that, for himself, he "can see nothing wrong 
with the proposed extrapolation". 24 But surely there is something 
wrong with it. If the extrapolation is supposed to derive from the 
principle of charity then this can only be from a misunderstanding 
of what charity involves. Of course charity does not preclude us 
from discovering disagreement between ourselves and others. It does 
preclude the possibility of global disagreement, global difference. 
And the reason is that such difference cannot, literally, be made 
sense of - as was seen in chapter three. Making sense means 
'translating' into O1..1r own terms. What we cannot so 'translate' we 
make sense of - 'cannot make sense of' Just because of the internal 
contradict.ion of such a notion. 
Moreover, while global disagreement is ruled out we are 
not, 1n any case, at liberty to postulate any disagreement 
23
'The World Well Lost', Journ.'71 oI P/J.ilosop/Jy, 6Sl ( 1972), 
p~4656-657. Ibid., p, 657. 
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whatever - even at the local level. The holistic constraints of 
charity require that we should have some reason for disagreement 
which we do claim to hold - even particular disagreement must fit 
into the overall interpretative picture. In this respect we have no 
reason to suppose that rocks or butterflies or even small, furry 
animals can talk or believe. 
To be worried that we might be consistently wrong on 
this matter is to be worried that maybe our standard interpretative 
practices are not to be trusted. But to have this sort of a worry 
is just to be worried by the sort of sceptical doubt which bothered 
Descartes - if maybe rocks are really persons then maybe it is 
equally possible that the people around us now are really just 
automata (as Descartes wondered 1n the second of his Hed.itat.ions ) . 
Of course there are different varieties of scepticism. There is 
that scepticism which is always aware of the fallibity of knowledge 
and seeks to guard against the claim to knowledge which 
over-reaches itself. Such fallibilism 1s surely an element in 
Davidson's own account of interpretation - indeterminacy and the 
ongoing character of interpretation should mal<e us ever wary of 
claiming that we have the last · word on anything. Yet there is also 
that scepticism which extends its doubts to the very basis of an 
interpretative practice, which doubts our very ability to interpret 
or to understand. Such scepticism, as we will see in chapter six, 
must be as unintelligible as the conceptual relativism with which 
it has an intimate (if often unacknowledged) connection. 
As Davidson presents it the problem of understandi ng 
persons 1s necessarily interconnected with the problem of 
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understanding the world as a whole. After all we interpret by 
reference to the objects in a speaker's environment - by connect i ng 
utterances with truths about the world. The problem of deciding 
whether certain creatures have a language and how to translate any 
language they do have is a question the answering of which will be 
as much a job for the biologist as for the anthropologist, and a 
job which must implicate our knowledge about the world in general. 
In this respect Quine's thoroughly naturalistic approach to matters 
of translation, while not wholly to be recommended, is certainly 
worth keeping in mind. For as Quine himself comments nThe whole 
truth about the most outlandish linguistic behaviour 1s Just as 
accessible to us, in our current Western conceptual scheme [ s.ic.], 
as are other chapters of zoology''. 25 
It 1s the thesis of interpretative holism which is the 
basis for the argument against the idea of an untranslateable 
language or an alternative conceptual scheme. However the emphasis 
on holism might obscure the fact that charity is also involved - as 
we pointed out before. Charity derives from holism and the 
arguments against relativism · and untranslateability which are 
considered above can all be regarded as depending on interpretative 
holism as it is represented in the principle of charity: they 
depend on the idea that overal 1 agreement is al ways required to 
make sense even of disagreement. Indeed overal 1 agereement 1s 
required even to make sense of creatures as capable of be 1 ief or 
the use of language. Charity 1 ~. .::, a presupposition of 
25Quine, 'SpeaJ{ing of Objects', Ontoloq.ical Relat.ivit...,v, p. 25. 
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interpretation whatsoever. Later we shall see how holism as it is 
expressed in the indetenninacy thesis also operates against the 
idea of conceptual relativism. 
J1Je Mlture o.t· :!rans.I at.ion 
Davidson claims that we can make no sense of the idea of 
an untranslatable language. However on at least one interpretation 
that claim is straightforwardly false and some critics of Davidson 
have made a great deal of hay from interpreting Davidson in that 
particular way: in interpreting him as claiming that there can 
never arise a situation in which we are faced with a language but 
cannot translate. 
Clark Glyrnour thus suggests that we can envisage a 
situation in which we discover signals which emanate from a star 
believed typically to have planets: signals which possess certain 
significant features (variations of frequency to form a 
'sufficiently' complex patterr1 which varies over time but for which 
variation there is no determinable rule of prediction, although 
there do P,t.2111 to be 'pattern constraints' looking very much like 
syntactical rules) and for which no natural, physical explanation 
can be found. Glymour argues, quite rightly, that: 
Features of this sort would, together, constitute 
reasons for believing that the signals are generated 
by intelligent creatures, and that the signals are 
messages. And yet the2t might well be no way to interpret such signals. 
26
'conceptual Scheming', p.171. 
Nicholas Rescher points out that: 
We knew well from the factual context that cuneiform 
inscriptions represented writing well before we had 
decoded them. As any cryptanalyst knows, we can tell 
that a language is being used, and even a good deal 
about how if is being used, short. of any ability to 
translate. 
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Now what What Reset er and Glymour Rescher have to say 
here is all perfectly correct as far as it goes, but it does not go 
far enough so as to present a serious problem for Davidson. For 
neither of these cases stand as counter-examples to the claim that 
' Davidson is actually making. He 1s not denying that we could 
discover a language which we knew to be a language but which we 
were at some time unable to translate - obviously there have been 
cases of just this sort. What he is claiming is that we could not 
discover a language, know i t to be a language, and have reason to 
think that it would be impossible, at any time under even the best 
conditions, to translate 1t into our own tongue. Here I think we 
might almost say that Davidson is arguing less for the possibility 
of perfect intertranslatat1lity as aqa.inst the notion of essential 
untranslatabi l i ty. It i s the claim that languages may be 
intrinsically limited in t errns of their expressive or conceptual 
powers that bothers Davidson. It is this sort of untranslatability 
- the sort which Wharf and Chomsky argue for - that Davidson is 
concerned to argue against: namely that 'essential' 
untranslatability which derives from inherent limitations in the 
languages themselves. 
Tarski's original ciaim was that natural languages should 
27
'Conceptual Schemes', p.327 . 
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be thought of as 'essentially intertranslatable'. With this in mind 
Davidson may be seen as arguing in favour of 2.ome sort of 'in 
principle' translatability while allowing for the obvious fact that 
inability to translate does arise 'in practice' . The claim would 
then be that no language will ever lack the resources to translate 
any utterance in another language even though it is quite possible 
that translation will fail under certain less than optimum 
conditions - where cont.act between the languages in limited, where 
the translator lacks motivation, time, technical resources or 
knowledge. This does seem to be just the sort of claim Katz wants 
to make. 28 
The problem with this line is that talk of 'essential 
translatabi 1 i ty' could be taken to suggest that there 1s some 
determinate meaning which is always able to be translated. Yet such 
a suggestion would go against the the thesis of the indeterminacy 
of interpretation. There is no 2,uch detenninate meaning. Thus it 
seems as well to stick to the point that Davidson is really arguing 
that the only sort of untranslatabi l i ty that makes sense is the 
sort which derives from lack of evidence, time, technical resources 
or something similar. No sense ·can be attached to untranslatability 
of any other sort. Our understanding is not intrinsically limited 
but it is fallible. This is as much as Davidson need claim· to , 
claim more to claim the total lack of limitation on our 
understanding - would run the risk of obscuring the fallibility of 
understanding and might also suggest that understanding was a more 
'detenninate' process than in fact it is. 
28
'Effability and Translation', pp.209-220. 
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In taking this line I have one slight qualm - and not 
about the correctness of the argument but about Davidson's attitude 
on th~ matter. For Davidson does repeat the Tarskian phrase about 
translatability being essential. Moreover in a passage in 'Reality 
Without Reference' he suggests that "what is invariant as between 
acceptable theories of truth is meaning". 29 This point is one he 
takes as i 11 ustrated by the analogy he draws between the 
indeterminacy of interpretation and the fact that we can measure 
temperature in centigrade or fahrenhei t - the one is merely a 
transformation of the other . So different, but equally acceptable, 
theories of interpretation are merely transformations of one 
another in which the same pattern of assignment2, is preserved. JO 
But of course different theories of interpretation can and do 
interpret the same utterance as having different meanings; Davidson 
even allows that, this being so, the same utterance can be given 
differing truth values. This makes the parallel with systems of 
measurement not so straightforward. Perhaps it would be more 
correct to say that if anything is invariant as between theories of 
interpretation it is truth rather than meaning (truth is 'absolute' 
as shall be seen later). For the whole point of the indeterminacy 
of interpretation 1s to undermine the notion that there is 
something, namely the meaning, which translation or interpretation 
aims to grasp. Still Davidson does also think that indeterminacy is 
less on his account than on Quine~s. I suspect that whatever makes 
him think this also leads him to take this view on meaning. 
Having said this, I must also say that the idea that 
~
9
0 'Reality Without Reference', p.225. 
'" Ib.id. 
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meaning does remain invariant 1s not without some ground. If we 
interpret Davidson charitably enough then perhaps we can see the 
idea as indicative of the way in which differing theories of 
interpretation need never be taken as in irresoluble conflict - at 
least not globally. It is in this respect that truth always remains 
the same even as theories of interpretation differ. But of course 
truth and meaning are connected and so we can perhaps see meaning 
as invariant at the global level also - though I am not quite sure 
of what this would mean or what significance there would be to the 
claim. However this is a matter I will discuss later in chapter 
nine. 
Untranslatabi 1 ty can of course al ways arise where the 
evidence available is slight. This is a particularly important 
factor 1n the cases which Rescher and Glymour cite. The 
interpretation of isolated linguistic fragments 1s a rather 
different matter to the interpretation of living utterances. The 
difference here is the same as that between trying to understand 
the nature of some solitary artefact - say some specialized tool -
and trying to achieve the same understanding against the background 
of the cultural context from which that artefact came. The reason 
for the difficulty here can be seen as due, once more, to the 
holistic nature of interpretation. Presented with isolated 
fragments of a language we have very little on which to build our 
translation for if we are to interpret the meanings of the words we 
need also to be able to identify the associated beliefs and 
desires. It is very difficult to do this where all we have are 
fragmentary stone inscriptions or radio signals from a distant 
star. 
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Davidson does not deny the practical difficulties 
involved in the proJect of translation. Indeed the holistic picture 
of interpretation which he develops should sharpen our sense of 
those difficulties. What he does deny is that we can give any real 
sense to the idea of an untranslatability which flows from some 
inherent limitation in language or concept. It is this idea which 
is at the heart of conceptual relativism. 
The impossibility of completely separating the question 
of translation from the question of determining language-hood 
(which reflects the impossibility of clearly separating translation 
from interpretation) leads to an especial problem when the attempt 
1s made to demonstrate any 'in principle' or 'essential' 
untranslatability between languages of the sort that the relativist 
attempts. For, as I have already pointed out, such in principle 
untranslatability must derive from limitations intrinsic to the 
languages involved. Demonstration of such limitations, however, 
would require reference to the resources and structures of those 
languages. This would seem · to require just the possibility of 
translation which 1s supposedly being denied. This problem 1s 
suggested by Davidson at the very beginning of 'On the Very Idea of 
a Conceptual Scheme': 
Wharf, wanting to demonstrate that Hopi incorporates a 
metaphysics so alien to ours that Hopi and English 
cannot, as he puts it, ,.be calibrated", uses English 
to convey the contents of sample Hopi sentences. Kuhn 
is brilliant at saying what things were like before 
the revolution using what else? our 
post-revolutionary idiom. Quine give~. us a feel for 
the "pre-individuative phase in the evolution of our 
conceptual scheme", while Bergson tells us where we 
can go to get a view of a mountai~ undistorted by one 
or another provincial perspective. 1 
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We need to stand somewhere if we are to understand at all. The only 
standpoint we have is our own - hence the requirement of charity. 
The problem with relativism in this respect is that it expects us 
to understand something but only from within its own narrowly 
conceived standpoint. 
Interpretative holism itself suggests that translation 
may very well fail in those cases where our access to the language 
to be translated and the attitudinal system with which it is 
associated is limited. The holism thesis is often put by Davidson 
in terms of the interdependence of meaning and be 1 i ef and that 
interdepedence is also particularly relevant to another point which 
Nicholas Rescher attempts to make against Davidson. 
Rescher argues that Davidson's concern with 
translatabi 1 i ty as a criterion of language-hood is fundamentally 
misplaced. Rescher writes: 
There is good reason ... to think that the whole focus 
on actual translation is misguided. The key category 
1n this area 1s surely not t.ransl,9t.ion but 
interpret,9t.ion . . . To establish that a purportedly 
"alternative language" is a genuine language, there 
is certainly no need to claim intertranslatability 
with our own language (be it tot.al or partial). This 
requirement would be much too stringent. We need to 
be able to report intelligently and inforrnatively 
about what they are saying - to interpret it - but not 
necessarily to translate into the verbal resources of 
our own language. Paraphrase, circumlocution, and all 
the other makeE.hifts of linguistic approximation can 
come into the picture. Bwt translatability is 
certainly not the touchstone.Jt:: 
In many ways this is a strange charge to hear someone 
~~'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.184. 
L'Conceptual Schemes ' , p.327. 
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make aga.inst Davidson given his interest in what he has called 
'radical .interp.retat.ion ·. Yet the charge is one with which Michael 
Devitt concurs adding that he would prefer to say that the key 
category in this area is explanation. 33 
Devitt's position on this matter derives from the same 
anti-intentionalist attitude as does his rejection of charity. Of 
course on the account of charity offered here - which begins by 
accepting the intentionalist paradigm of explanation for human 
agents - explanation and interpretation are bound up together. So 
far as Rescher and his emphasis on interpretation is concerned it 
is worth recalling that Davidson himself has distinguished between 
theories of translation and ,. or interpretation. In 'Radical 
Interpretation' Davidson argues that a theory of interpretation 
ought not to be considered the same as a theory of translation. 34 
Davidson's distinction here, however, is quite different from 
Rescher's, despite the verbal likeness. 
The distinction which Rescher makes is between what might 
u~.efully be terrnecl 'literal' and 'free' translation - where free 
translation is what Rescher · seems to mean by 'interpretation'. 
Translation in the 1 i teral sense, or in the sense opposed to 
interpretation, is constrained on Rescher's account by the 
requirement that the translation employ only the linguistic 
resources of the translating language as they exist at the time of 
the attempt to translate and that the translation be without 
recourse to "paraphrase, circumlocution, and all the other 
makeshifts of linguistic approximation". Translation, literal 
~!.Real.i...w arn Trut./J, p.179. 
'Radical Interpretation', pp.129-130. 
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translation, ought to be exact. 
Davidson, however, distinguishes interpretation from 
translation only insofar as he regards a theory of translation as 
providing correspondences between sentences 1n the , object' 
language with sentences 1n the 'subject' language35 such that a 
user of the theory might know the translations but might not know 
the meanings of the sentences involved - for Davidson a theory of 
interpretation ought to provide an understanding of meanings. 
Whether a theory of translation can provide a theory of 
interpretation 1s therefore contingent on whether the subject 
language is known and contingent on our knowledge of how to 
interpret sentences in the subject language. Thus the difference 
between interpretation and translation 1s (as Davidson says 1n 
radical interpretation from Quine's radical 





1n "a greater emphasis on the explicitly 
Davidson's distinction 1s thus clearly not the same as 
Rescher · s. However what is more important here is that Davidson· s 
insistence on the crucial interdependence of meaning and attitudes 
must itself undercut the very possibility of the sort of 
'translation-interpretation' distinction which Rescher seems to 
think is so obvious. For as the translation of meanings and the 
attribution of attitudes must go together so any translation must 
be permeated through and through by interpretative assumptions 
35T.his talk of 'object' and 'subject' languages derives from 
Dalidson, .i.b.id. , p. 129. 3 J.b.id., p.126n.1. 
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about the overall attitudinal system of the translatees. 
Translation just is the interpretation of utterances (at least f or 
someone who understands the subject language) and any theory of 
translation has built into it a theory of belief and desire also. 
Rescher's assumption of translation as some sort of direct 
correlation of utterances employing a very restricted portion of 
the translating languages total resources can represent only a 
stipulative definition of translation - it does not answer the 
problem of the essentially interpretative character of all 
translation. It merely stands as an illustration of the fact that 
we can exercise considerable choice as to just howwe are going to 
translate and as to the constraints we are going to be bound by. 
Davidson himself uses the terms 'interpretation' and 
'translation' almost interchangeably in 'On the Very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme· and in the passage quoted from 'In Defense of 
Convention T ' he comments that he does not see why the claimed 
intertranslatability of natural languages should be a matter of 
'word-by-word' translation. Indeed Rescher provides no reason for 
thinking that intertranslatability should be 'word-by-word' - yet 
this is what Rescher' s notion of 'exact' translation seems to 
amount to. 37 
37J.J. Katz suggests that we might think of different levels of 
translation in terms of an example based on current 
transformational theory whereby there is a hierarchy of 
translational relations ranging from the phonological to the 
semantic level (Katz also suggests a level of 'stereotypical' 
translation), 'Effability and Translation·, pp.225-230. In the same 
vo 1 ume ( Hean.inq and Transl at.ion, eel. F . Guenthner and 
M. Guenthner-Reuter) Edward Keenan argues that there is no such 
thing as 'exact' translation, 'Some Logical Problems in 
Translation·, pp. 157-189. Keenan and Katz each argue against the 
other - Keenan sees his conclusions (erroneousl v I think ) as ~ (Footnote continued ) 
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The holistic character of interpretation means that the constraints 
on acceptable translation are not hard and fast; indeed it is t he 
very flexibility of the constraints which make it difficult t o 
establish a notion of untranslatability to apply to languages. As 
Quine says: 
We are already accustomed, after all, to cutting 
corners and tolerating rough approximations even in 
neighborly translation. Translatability is a flimsy 
notion, unfit to bear the weight of the theories of 
cultural incommensurabJJity that Davidson effectively 
and justly criticizes.~ 
But of course translatabilty has to bear that weight if such 
theories are themselves to stand up. 
It might be argued against Davidson at this point that 
there lS a straightforward counter-e}{amp le to the 
interlranslatability claim. There do exist formal languages which 
are not interlranslatable. Al 1 we need to do to get a 
counter-example to Davidson's argument is to imagine two such 
languages instantiated as the actual languages spoken by two 
communities. Two points, however, ought to be made. 
First, Davidson has suggested that: 
There is much to be said for restricting the word 
'language' to sys tems of signs in actual use: 
uninterpreted formal systems are not languages through 
lack of meaning, wh i le interpreted forroal systems are 
best seen as extensions or fragments~ ff the natural 
languages from which they borrow life. 3 
37 (continuecl) 
falsifying Katz's effability principle. What I think Keenan's 
arguments do show is that if translation is thought of as ' exact ' 
translation - as distinct from interpretation - then translation 
b~gomes impossible. So too, I would suggest, does language itself. 
'On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma', p.42. 
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Formal systems do seem to represent fragments of languages rather 
than whole languages in themselves. Certainly such systems are 
parasitic on the natural languages 1n which they are embedded and 
in which they can be interpreted. That we could find some formal 
system instantiated as the actual language of some speech community 
is I think dubious in the extreme. 
Second, a formal language which is taken as instatiated 
1n some natural language will, in its instatiated form, be subject 
to the usual indeterminacy affecting natural languages. Under such 
conditions I doubt that the claimed untranslatability could be 
maintained. Thus Davidson has gone so far as to say that: 
. . . the notion of translation, which can be made 
precise for artificial languges on which 
interpretations are imposed by fiat, has no w0ecise or even clear application to natural languages. 
Untranslatability may obtain between artificial languages but only 
insofar as we impose an interpretation on the language and impose 
cerlan restrictions on translation such that the untranslatability 
will hold. 
Trans.lat.ion am Sensory O.ifference 
Davidson has not himself given any real consideration to 
specific counter-examples to the Tarskian translatability thesis; 
Davidson's argument operates at a wholly general level. Yet 
typically the reaction is that of course we could encounter a 
39
·1n Defense of Convention T', p.71. 4o 'The Method of Tn..ith in Metaphysics', p. 204. 
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language we could not translate - and not merely because of some 
practical impediment - we need only consider the case of creatures 
who might possess a language but who might also have very different 
sensory capacities to our own. 
At the outset of his discussion of the conceptual ~.cheme 
idea Nicholas Rescher presents an argument against Davidson which 
rests on just this sort of notion: 
Imagine intelligent and actively inquiring creatures 
(animals, say, or beings from outer space) whose 
experiential modes are quite different from our own. 
Their senses are highly responsive to quite different. 
physical parameters - relatively insensitive, say, to 
heat and light, t~t substantially sensitized to 
various electro-magnetic phenomena. Such intelligent 
creatures . . . could plau~.ibly be ~:uppoE:,ed to operate 
within a largely differen\1 framework of empirical concepts and categories ... 
It might also be supposed that such creatures could have a language 
which we could not translate precisely because of the difference in 
sensory experience between ourselves and the aliens. 
However it is by no means clear just what difference the 
existence of sensory difference would make in such a case. One 
thing it would make no difference to is the fact that, in some 
sense, we and the aliens would share the same physical environment 
- even though we may describe and experience it differently. This 
would be manifest in the possibility of our being able to intervene 
in the lives of the aliens and of them being able to intervene in 
our lives also. That there is one shared physical world, regardless 
of sensory difference, 1s particularly crucial for Davidson's 
41
·conceptual Scheme~.', p.323. See al~.o Thomas Nagel, 'What is it 
like to be a bat?', ffortal ()uest.ions, Cambridge, 1979, pp, 165-180 -
especially pp.169-171. 
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account of radical interpretation and 1s a presumption which is 
fundamental to the employment of charity. Thus Davidson writes 
that: 
. . . from the interpreter's point of view . . . he 
interprets sentences held true (which is not to be 
distinguished from attributing beliefs ) according to 
the events and objects in the outside world that cause 
the sentence to be held we ... Communication begins 
where causes converge ... L 
So,tn the case of the Quinean radical translator, even though the 
meaning of 'qav'-ciqa.i' may lack any determinacy , and even though the 
native may perhaps perceive the qavaqai by means of bat-like sonar 
or infrared vision, sti 11 the qavaqa.i would represent a phenomenon 
for both the native and the translator. 
Generally speaking, the fact of our sharing a common 
physical environment with the aliens will make for a vast common 
ground of agreement between them and us. Often this agreement will 
consist in agreement over much that is, ordinarily, "too dull , 
4~1 
trite or familiar to stand notice". J However we may also find that 
there will be significant convergence in scientific and technical 
knowledge between the aliens and ourselves - depending, of course , 
on the respective levels of development which we and the aliens 
have reached 1 n those areas. Such agreement would exist 
independently of sensory differences. 
Yet we do not need to depend on any specific shared 
knowledge, for one thing that has become familiar 1n our 
discussions is that there is no determ.iil<.t:tte agreement of any sort 
which charity requires for interpretation to be possible. In the 
42, ~ 
43 A ~~1eren~e Theory of !ruth and Knowledge :, 434-435 . Davidson, The Method or Truth in Metaphysics', p. 200 . 
r 
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globai sense sharing the same world means being able t o 1nL1...-~-::,ret, 
and reinterpret the utterances of others as about, more or less , 
the same things that our utt erances are about. The emphasis here 1s 
on the phrase 'more or less'. There is no single set of beliefs on 
which we must agree in order to understand one another. Indeed the 
dynamic character of interpretation means that we would have 
trouble specifying a list of our own beliefs anyway (the very 
process of trying to do so -would lead us to revise many of the 
beliefs we thought we held) . The notion of the agreement required 
for interpretation 1s simp~y that of a shared environment - it 1s 
with that environment that utterances are connected and so come to 
be understood. 
Thomas Nagel attempts to support his own version of the 
untranslatability idea by taking a similar line to Rescher -
al though in Nagel' s case t he emphasis is more on the claim that 
particular creatures possess quite particular subjective 
experiences. One interest i ng feature of the argument is that it 
makes clear the connection between the untranslatability claim and 
the scheme-content distinction. Nagel argues from a relatively 
innocuous claim in the f i rst instance; the claim that bats (the 
furry, winged sort) have exper-ie·nce. But he moves from this to the 
further claim that "there is something that it is like to be a bat" 
such that the structure of our own minds may make it impossible for 
us - as human beings - to know what that something is like: and 
from there to the ultimate conclusion that "there are facts that do 
not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human 
language". 44 
As it turns out Nagel' s argument against the 
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intertranslatability of natural languages depends on another 
version of that distinction between interpretation and translation 
which I have already mentioned in discussing the views of Nicholas 
Rescher. For the argument must rest on the possibility of taking 
the notion of translation in a very strict and narrow sense - so 
narrow in fact that it almost ceases to be a matter of the 
translation of utterances to involve something like a translation 
of our very selves. ( Indeed it seems that this idea is also 
required for the viability of Rescher's own example regarding the 
impossibility of translation across sensory difference). Nagel' s 
case here centres on the idea that there really is something 
'precise' which translation ought to grasp but which it cannot: 
namely the 'precise' something that it is like to be - 1n this case 
- a bat. That there .1s something precise here is just what Nagel 
claims45 and must claim if he is to put the strict constraint on 
translation which is to yield the conclusion of untranslatability. 
Now I suspect that Nagel's own phenomenology falls rather 
short of the mark here: it is by no means clear that there 1s 
something precise here which could be captured linguistically no 
matter what the language (and here I put myself at odds with 
Nagel's claim later 1n the paper of the possibility of an 
'objective ,1'" phenomenology· .b). Moreover the idea that there lS 
something precise that it is like to be something - whether it be 
me or a bat - is just the idea that there is some irreducible and 
distinct (insofar as it is precise ) experiential or empirical 
44 
'What is it 1 ike to be a bat' , pp. 1621-17·1. Later 1 n the paper 
Nl~el does seem to weaken this claim. 
4E, J.b.1:d. I p, 170 • J.b.1d. , pp. 173f f. 
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content to the concept of being, say, me. The notion embodies, in 
other words, the scheme-content distinction itself. In fact on this 
point Nagel himself seems happy to confess that what is really 
involved here is just the problem of "the relation between facts on 
the one hand and conceptual schemes or systems of representation on 
the other". 47 Moreover the distinction between conceptual scheme 
and empirical content and the associated separation of language 
from the world 1s just what typically must underlie the 
translation-interpretation distinction anyway. If Davidson's 
arguments against the very idea of the scheme-content distinction 
are to have any application then they must apply against Nagel as 
much as against anyone else. 
On the Davidsonian account, then, no sense can be g1 ven 
to the idea that there is something precise that it is like to be a 
bat - or anything else - because no sense can be given to the idea 
of experiential content distinct from conceptual scheme. Thus there 
can be nothing precise here which translation ought to grasp but 
cannot. But there is more to be said here: all this talk of there 
being something precise to being a bat, to what it is like to be a 
bat, surely involves a claim to the effect that there 1s some 
determinacy, some fact of the matter, as to the experience of 
'bat-ness' which we could express in language (if we were h~ts that 
is). But the indeterminacy of interpretation tells us that if there 
1s one way to talk about what it is like to be a bat then there are 
many ways. And no one way is to be preferred above all the others. 
The question is of course whether there is even one way at all. 
4 7 
.l dd. , p . 1 71 . 
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Admittedly we will face difficulties in the translation 
of alien utterances - alien experiential terms would not be the 
only problem: aesthetic concepts, amongst others, might also 
present particular difficultie~·.. Indeed the holistic character of 
interpretation makes interpretation a very, very difficult task. A 
task which is never-ending , complex and in which there are no 
sure-fire right answers. But this is as it should be. Moreover the 
difficulties faced 1n i nterpreting the utterances of alien 
creatures would be of much t he same order as those which we have to 
face in interpreting at home - even within our own language. The 
translation of philosophi al terms, for example, is difficult 
enough and it is not clear that the explanation of such terms is 
always any easier within a language. It is also doubtful if we are 
very much better off when it comes to our giving an account of what 
beauty is or what the experiences of eating pistaschio icecream or 
just perceiving 'a reel patch· are like than we are in trying to 
interpret the experience of aliens. 
Alt.hough sensory difference seems intuitively a good 
reason on which to base an argument for untranslatability between 
languages, it is by no means clear just how much difference a 
difference in sensory capacities would make to the possibility of 
translation. Not only wo ll cl there always exist overall agreement 
between ourselves and any other creatures but the holistic 
character of interpretation itself means that interpretation will 
always proceed on a fai r 1y broad evidential base; a base broad 
enough so that it shou l d be able to accommodate even sensory 
difference. Linguistic 
relating of physical 
nterpretat1on typically involves the 
environment to both linguistic and 
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non-linguistic behaviour. Behaviour which 1s understood as acti on 
is understood as the outcome of belief and desire and those 
objects and events which are part of the physical environment are 
themselves causally implicated in belief. Here, in the conception 
of linguistic interpretation as involving the correlation of 
utterances with environment and behaviour (a conception of 
interpretation which has been held to throughout this dissertation 
and which is crucial for the connection of tr1..1th with meaning ) , we 
can discern the familiar thesis of interpretative holism. And, of 
course, according to Davidson we are able to interpret precisely 
because of this holism. Thus interpretation is always involved in 
seeking to correlate, not just utterances and stimuli, but 
behaviour, environment and utterances, as well as beliefs and 
desires . This makes interpretation more complex but it also makes 
it possible just in virtue of the breadth of evidence it brings 
forth. 
If there lS a problem for translation associated with 
sensory difference then perhaps it might arise because of the 
impossibility ,.. , psychological to physical or ree1uc1ng or 
neuro-physiological predicates. ( I argued briefly 1n chapter two 
that there is no such reducibility - at least of a type-to-type 
sort.) If the differences 1n sensory capacity were great enough -
where there was no overlap in sensory capacities for instance - and 
where ordinary language predicates of the aliens supervened on, but 
were not reducible, to neuro-physiological predicates then perhaps 
we would find it very difficult, if not perhaps impossible, t o tune 
1n to the aliens' use of those predicates. 
I must admit to not being entire ly convinced by this l ine 
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of argument myself, but in any case , whether we could translat e 1n 
such a situation or not, this would not provide a counter-example 
to the Davidsonian argument. For on the account given here the 
target of Davidson's attacks is the notion that we might be totally 
unable to translate some language because of some intrinsic 
limitation on our own linguistic or cognitive capacity. But where 
we are unable to translate because of insuperable difficulties in 
connecting alien utterances with physical regularities we are not 
faced with that sort of .intrinsic untranslatability. If 
untranslatability makes sense in this scenario then it 1s an 
untranslatabi 1 i ty much 1 ike the other sorts of untranslatabi 1 i ty 
which arise where we have insufficient access to a language or lack 
the technical skill to assist in the translation. There need be no 
implication of cognitive or linguistic limitation here. Indeed we 
could only demonstrate such limitation if we could show that what 
the aliens say in their language we cannot say in ours. But of 
course in order to do this we need to be able to understand what 
the aliens say in the first place - in which case we need to be 
able to translate. Supervenience cannot help us to make sense of 
the notion of there being intrinsic limits to the express1 ve or 
cognitive capacities of speakers. 
ITXietenn.inacy aIXi rrans.latJon 
Earlier, at the begining of this chapter, I cited Noam 
Chomsky as a proponent of just the sort of untranslatability thesis 
which Davidson opposes. Yet I also had cause to mention Chomsky 1n 
discussing the role of charity in interpretation and there , it 
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seemed, Chomsky was more on Davidson· s side. This highlights an 
interesting feature of the Davidsonian position, for the conception 
of understanding as a matter of translation and the idea that 
understanding always depends on finding what 1s familiar and 
already understood in what is new or strange, can certainly be 
taken as having relativistic implications. This is something we 
noted 1n discussing Rorty 's development of the untranslatabi li ty 
argument. Recall that he took an inversion of the principle of 
charity to suggest that if agreement was necessary for 
interpretation then where agreement was lacking interpretation, or 
translation, could not go ahead. The anthropologist Mary Douglas 
seems to see Quine's arguments concerr1ing charity as leading to a 
similar conclusion: 
The better the translation, the more successfully has 
our provincial logic been imposed of the native 
thought. So the consequence of good translation is to 
prevent any confrontation between alien thought 
systems. We are left as we were at the outset, with 
our familiar world divided by its established 
categories and activated by the principles we kno~8 ... translation flourishes where experience overlaps. 1 
So Douglas would have us conclude that good translation, and, 
presumably, good interpretation, is poor understanding. 
What of course has to be assumed here, and what also has 
to be assumed 1n Chomsky's ar,::rurnent for his 'Limits thesis', 1s 
that there is actually something determinate for us to be right or 
wrong about in our attempts at translation. Yet this is just what 
Quine, and following him, Davidson, denies. Thus Quine writes that: 
48Mary Douglas, Jmpl.ic.it }fean-1nqs, 1975, p.277. Such an 
interpretation may be seen as supported by some of Quine· s own 
comments - such as that on p. 58 of fiord and Object. 
the obstacle to correlating conceptual schemes 
[ s.1c. J is not that there 1s anything ineffable about 
language or culture, near or remote . . . The obstacle 
is only that any one intercul tural correlation of 
words and phrases, and hence of theories, will be just 
one among various empirically admissable correlations, 
whether it is suggested by historical gradations or by 
unaided analogy; there is nothing fo[g such a 
correlation to be right or wrong about ... 
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On the Qu1nean-Davidsonian account there is no sense to the notions 
of meaning, or belief (or any of the other propositional attitudes) 
outside of the project of translation or interpretation. Meanings, 
beliefs and desires are not ,Beparate entities which have an 
existence each on their own, they exist only insofar as they are 
part of an interpretative and attitudinal network. Meaning, 
Davidson tells us, is "a theoretical construct". 5o Thus even if , 
on one interpretation, the beliefs of those we interpret look to be 
1 n direct con£ 1 i ct with our own, such con£ 1 i ct may be reso 1 ved as 
interpretation moves on - we may reinterpret the original conflict 
so as to resolve it or even in such a way that it will cease to be 
significant. The conflict cannot be taken as an indisputable fact 
of the matter. 
In this respect, as was mentioned earlier, the 
indeterminacy of interpretation must aid in undermining the notion 
of a conceptual scheme itself. For if there is no fact of the 
matter regarding the meanings to assign to a speaker's words, or 
the attitudes to be attributed to him, then equally there can be no 
fact of the matter as to what conceptual scheme he is taken as 
employing. In that case we cannot conceive of a conceptual scheme 
4 9 , ~ -- I . ,- "'\b . t , ,.. s 
50 ~pecu~ing or L, Jee s, p,L_. 
'The Material Mind', pp . 256- 257. 
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as some entity which organizes or fits some empirical content. For 
of course even our interpretation of the empirical content is 
subject to indeterminacy. The notion of the scheme-content 
distinction becomes redundant and at the .s.ame time it becomes 
difficult to see how we can attach any sense to the idea of a 
conceptual scheme different from our own. For in neither our own 
case nor in the case of t he alien is there any uniquely correct 
interpretation which could settle, once and for all, the conceptual 
schemes we each possess. 
This was, after a ll, ju.s.t the sort of point which I made 
in discussing the Glymour case of the envatted brains in chapter 
three. There we saw that i -r:. was by no means clear whether we should 
interpret the brains as speaking Envat or English. We could equally 
say that the problem was :.ne of deciding whether their conceptual 
scheme was the Envat scheme or the English one. (Talk of the 
'English' scheme should not lead us to think that the English 
language can be identif ied as embodying a specific scheme 
incletenninacy reigns supreme.) Thus Davidson emphasises that: 
It would be wrong to summarize by saying we have shown 
how communication i s possible between people who have 
different schemes, a way that works without need of 
what there cannot be, namely a neutral ground, or a 
common coordinate system. For we have found no 
intelligible basis on which it can be said that 
schemes are different. It would be equally wrong to 
announce the glorious news that all mankind - all 
speakers of language , at least - share a common scheme 
and ontology. For 1f we cannot say that schemes are 
differen~1 neither can we intelligibly say that they are one. 
What we can say 1s that gl obal agreement in beliefs 1s an essential 
51
'on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', pp.197-198. See also 
'Psychology as Philosophy : Comments and Replies', p.243. 
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element 1n interpretation and communication but that such agreement 
always remains indeterminate - hence the lack of a clear answer to 
the question as to whether or not two speakers share the same 
conceptual scheme or belief system. 
The argument that works for conceptual ~.chernes works also 
for languages. As more than one theory of interpretation will work 
for a speaker so there is always more than one language which he 
can be taken as speaking. This is something Davidson himself points 
out: 
. . . it is not entirely an empirical question what 
language a person speaks; the evidence allows us some 
choice in languages, even to the point of allowing us 
to assi~2 conf 1 i cting truth condi t1 ons to the same sentence. 
The reason for this, and for the similar problem with respect to 
schemes, is that the evidence on which we base our interpretation 
is holistic. We can revise our theory of meaning provided only that 
we make the necessary shifts elsewhere in the interpretative 
system. 53 
Davidson's holism on this matter and the indeterminacy .it 
creates leads Davidson to reject the idea that language is in any 
important sense a matter of convention. 54 Davidson recognises that 
speaker and interpreter must agree about something, they must share 
some linguistic 'theory', if they are to understand and be 
understood. But the theory they share will most often be a theory 
jury-rigged for the specific linguistic ocass1on, a theory 
constructed by speaker and interpreter to take account of their 
~~'Th~ Inscru~~bility of Reference', T.l, p. 240. 
5 4 .I.tu d. , pp . 2 J , - 2 4 0 . See 'Communication and Convention', pp. 265-280. 
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respective interpretations of each other's beliefs, desires, 
linguistic dispositions, and so on. Such are the 'theories' (a 
better word may be 'strategies') we actually employ in linguistic 
interpretation; such theories are continually being modified and 
are always occasion (and speaker ) specific. They cannot count as 
languages in the usual sense. And of course what we norrnally take 
to be languages - those exhaustive semantic and syntactic theories 
which a pure theory of meaning might set out to elaborate - are 
always too abstract and general to be of use, as they stand, in any 
actual linguistic encounter. As Davidson himself tells us: 
I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, 
not if a language 1s anything like what many 
philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is 
therfore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or 
born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly 
defined structure wg~ch languages users acquire and 
then apply to cases. 
Of course Davidson holds that knowing a language cannot 
be separated from knowing about the world, since linguistic 
55 
'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' , p. 27. This pas2.age should make 
clearer how the criticisms of such as Herbert Dreyfus (referred to 
in a footnote in the Introduction above) are based on a mistaken 
view of Davidson's position. It should also be a corrective - along 
with the rest of my account here - to the views of Gordon Baker ('Following Wittgenstein: Some Signposts for Philosophical 
Investigations 143-242', w.ittqenste.in, To Fol lolv' a Rule, ed. Steven 
H.Holtzman and Christopher M.Leich, London, 1981, pp.65-68) who 
presents Davidson, amongst others, as holding a picture of 
language as a 'calculus ' . Baker associates the view of language he 
attributes to Davidson with ''a transient stage of Wittgenstein · s 
thought", that is, with the views of the early Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus. There are parallels between the Tractatus Wittgenstein 
and Davidson (as Saul Kr i pke and J. J.C. Smart have both suggested; 
see Kripke, lv'.ittgenstein on Rules and Priv~<tte Langvaqe, Oxford, 
1982, pp.71-71n.60; and Smart, 'How to turn the Tractatus 
Wittgenstein into (almost) Donald Davidson', The P/J.ilosop/J..,v oI 
.Donald lJavidson: A Perspective on Inquiries .into Truth and 
Interpretation ) but there are parallel~·. - perhaps more important 
parallels - with the later Wittgenstein also. 
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interpretation is always tied up with the beliefs which speakers, 
and interpreters, have about the world. Once again this is to 
repeat the familiar point about charity and the connection between 
truth and meaning. It is thus that Davidson concludes his argument 
in 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' by saying: 
... we have abandoned not only the ordinary notion of 
a language, but we have erased the boundary between 
knowing a langu~%8 and knowing our way around in the 
world generally.~ 
In the same way the distinction between scheme and content is also 
abandoned and with it the idea of conceptual relativism. 
Relativism must typically rely on an assumption of our 
ability to distinguish differing conceptual schemes, differing 
languages, as the frames of reference to which relativization can 
be made. But of course if interpretative holism is true then there 
1s no one right way of distinguishing schemes, or languages, or any 
such frames of references. In that case it looks as if the very 
idea of relativization to a frame of reference loses any clear 
sense. 
The problem cannot be escaped by turning to one's home 
language, one· s domestic scheme, in the attempt to find a secure 
interpretative base. For interpretative holism, and the 
indeterminacy that goes with it, applies at home as much as abroad. 
Indeed Davidson himself explicitly draws our attention to this 
fact: 
The problem of interpretation is domestic as well as 
foreign: it surfaces for speakers of the same language 
in the form of the question, how can it be deterrnined 
that the language is the same? .. All understanding of 
the speech of another involves radical 
Sb,A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' , p.26. 
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interpretation. 57 
We cannot, as I mentioned in chapter three, rely on any assumption 
that the line between the alien and the familiar, between what we 
understand and what we do not understand, is hard and fast. It 
shifts as interpretation shifts. Thus the situation of our 
attempting to translate some alien language - even the language of 
aliens with different sensory capacities to our own - presents the 
very same problem of radical interpretation as do our efforts at 
translation and interpretation closer to home. It is the same 
problem whether we interpret the aliens or ourselves. The one caBe 
is just a more dramatic and extreme version of the other. One 
cannot distinguish the domestic caE.e from the alien by appeal to 
the notion that in the former case we can interpret because we do 
share a language and a conceptual scheme while in the latter case -
the alien case - we do not have such a base of agreement. For . 
apart from any other cone.iderations, this is to ignore the question 
which Davidson himself puts "how can it be determined that the 
language is the same?" . Or , for that matter , how can it be 
determined that the language is different? 
57 
'Radical Interpretation', p.126. See also 'On Saying That', T.1, 
pp . 1 0 0-1 0 1 . 
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Chapter 6 
SCEPTICISM }JID INTERPRETATION 
The Scept.ica.l Cha.l.lenge 
An element of s cepticism can easily creep into the 
relativistic arguments for the possibility of an untranslatable 
language or alternative conceptual scheme. This appeared to be the 
case, as was seen ealier, in Richard Rorly' s presentation of the 
idea in 'The World Well Lost'. Yet whether or not relativism does 
involve some form of sceptic sm (and my own feeling is that it 
typically does) relativism often does in fact share with scepticism 
the idea of a dichotomy bet ween subjective and objective components 
of knowledge. This is a mat ter I touched on in chapter four. 
In the case of s cepticism the difficulty in finding any 
way to guarantee the right sort of connection as holding between 
these two elements 1 eads t o doubts about the very poss i bi 1 i t y of 
knowledge itself. The possi bility that the sceptic suggests is that 
maybe most, if not all, of our beliefs are false. Maybe we are 
profoundly mistaken as to how we think the world 1s. That the 
sceptic can countenance such a possibility is only because he 
assumes that our beliefs about the world can be considered 
independently of the way the world actually is - because he assumes 
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that subjective belief may be independent of objective fact. Here 
1s the scheme-content distinction once again; here is the 
separation of attitude from environment; and here the same 
Davidsonian arguments concerning interpretat.i ve hol ism must apply 
- just as they did against the idea of an untranslatable language. 
Recently Barry Stroud has written: 
I think many philosophers who qhow little interest in 
scepticimn are in fact committed to it by their own 
theories of knowledge, and that others who would 
simply avoid the issue cannot give a satisfactory 
explanation of how it is to be overcome. I do not mean 
to legislate intellectual tast.e. I do not suggest that 
everyone should be interested in scepticism, or even 
that all philosopher~. should be interested in 
understanding how human knowledge is possible. But I 
do think that tho2.e who ponder this latter quest.ion at 
all are wrong to suppose they can now be irdifferent 
to the workings of philosophical scepticism. 
As the title of Stroud's work - The .5.iqnificance of Scepticism -
suggests, the question raised by scepticism, the question as to the 
justification of our clairn to know, is an important one, not to be 
lightly dismissed. The question is central to epistemology and, 
indeed the theory of knowledge may itself be seen as a response to 
the sceptical challenge. 2 Thus Quine writes: 
Doubt has oft been said to be the mother of 
philosophy. This has a true ring for those of us who 
look upon philosophy primarily as the theory of 
knowledge. For the theory of knowledge has its origin 
in doubt, in scepticism. Futhermore, doubt is also the 
first line in developing a \heory of knowledge, if we 
adopt the line of Descartes.~ 
' 
1 The S.iqn.if.icance oI .Sceptic2~c:n1, p. 1x. 2see R.H.Popkin, 'The Sceptical Origins of the Modern Problem of 
Knowledge', Perception and Pe.r._c:onaJ identity~ ed. N.S.Care and 
R H.Grirnm, Cleveland, Ohio, 1969. 3
'The Nature of Natural Knowledge', Hind and Lanquaqe, ed. Samuel 
Guttenplan, Oxford 1975, p.68. Quine's comments immediately 
following this passage are to be noted. 
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The theory of knowledge, as it has developed 1n 
post-Cartesian philosophy, 1s indeed rooted in the problem of 
scepticism. Yet scepticism 1s in turn rooted in the idea of a 
distinction between subjective and objective elements of knowledge, 
in the distinction of knower from known and 1n the distinction of 
conceptual scheme from empirical content. 4 In his attack on the 
scheme-conte·nt distinction Davidson attacks the separation between 
subjectivity and objectivity which is at. the base of scepticism but 
1n so doing he also attacks epistemology insofar as it is conceived 
of as an attempt to bridge that subject-object gap. 
Typically the attempt to perform such a bridging task has 
led post-Cartesian epistemology along a founclationalist path: the 
idea has been to found knowledge in some criterion of certainty 
(Descartes' 'clear and disti net' idea8); on the necef!,sary validity 
41t is no accident that the rise of philosophical scepticism as a problem about A:nowJed_qe (rather than as an answer to the question 
as to what is 'the good life' for man) and the rise of epistemology 
should have coincided with the demise of aristotelian thought and 
the rise of modern science. For it was with the new science of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that there came about a 
separation of man from the world with knowledge (which concerns 
man's relation to the world ) becoming problematic as a result (see 
especially E. A. Burtt, The }fetap/JJ?S.ical Foundations oI Hodern Science, London 1932). With the loss of any immanent teJos uniting 
man and co,...c;mos so man' E', relation to the cosmos became problematic 
and questionable - particularly insofar as that relation was 
conceived as an epistemic relation. It was preciE:\ely this relation 
which remained largely unquestioned by the Greeks and their immediate philosophical heirs (see M.F.Burnyeat, 'Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed', Philosophiec.11 Revier.,•, 91 ( 1982 )) . It. was with Descartes that 
epistemology came to the fore and with the Kantian 'transcendental' project of the Lritique of Pure .Reason it reached its culmination. The rise of German Idealism, and its offshoots, in the years after Kant, and even the contemporary debate between realism and 
anti-realism, can be seen as direct products of the sceptical, and hence epistemological, turning of the seventeenth century. If (Footnote continued) 
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of some fundamental beliefs or concepts (in Kant this is attempted 
by means of the Transcendental Deduction) or on some pure 1 y 
empirical basis (the path adopted by Quine amongst others). 
Foundationalism can rnake no sense on Davidson's holistic conception 
of things - if one adopts a holistic point of view then there can 
be no epistemological priority given to one set of beliefs, 
concepts or experiences over others. 5 Insofar as Davidson's 
arguments aim to show that there is no epistemological gap to be 
bridged (both subjective and objective are brought together in the 
same holistic project) so his arguments can be taken as bringing 
about, if not quite the end of epistemology (although it is the end 
of the old foundationalist concept.ion of the project), then 
certainly a transformation of epistemology: the questions of 
epistemology come to rest on questions of interpretation and 
understanding. 6 
Sceptic.ism and Bnp.i.rici.sm 
Quine is Davidson's acknowledged philoBophical teacher, 
yet just as Davidson disagrees with Quine . over the role to be 
4(continued) 
knowledge became problematic with the divorce of man from the 
world, so too did the concepts of 'reality', 'objectivity' and 
tsuth. 
This is connected with the point that there i~. no one set of 
belief which charity prescribes we must agree upo11 or which must be 
true. The only sen~·.e to be given the not.ion of a 'foundation' here 
is the sense in which Wittgenstein comments that .. one might almost 
say that these foundation walls are carried by the whole house" (On 
Certainty·, ed. G. E. M. Amscombe and G. H. van Wright, trans. Denis Paul 
agd G.E.M.Anscombe, Oxford , 1977, para.248). 
Thus I am in agreement with Marie McGinn _('The Third Dogma of 
Empiricism', pp.98-99) insofar as epistemology is not brought to an 
end by the anti-£ ounclational ist turr,. 
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assigned to sensory stimulations in a theory of meaning so he also 
disagrees over the role of sensory stimulations in the theory of 
knowledge. 
The epistemological question asks for justification of 
our claims to know, of our beliefs. We cannot, on the face of it, 
appeal to other beliefs, other claims to know, 1n answering that 
question of justification without falling prey to the charge of 
circularity. Thus it seems that we must appeal to some 
justificatory foundation outside of our beliefs. The most obvious, 
if not the only, candidate, is sensory experience. Indeed, as it is 
by means of our senses that. our beliefs connect with the world, so 
this would seem the obviouE, path to take. In Quine's case it is 
not altogether clear whether the epistemological question of 
justification the 'doctrinal question' (as he calls it 1n 
'Epistemology Naturalized' 7) - 1s a quest.ion to which he offers an 
answer. He writes: 
What then of the doctrinal side, the justification of 
our knowledge of truths about nature? Here, Hume 
despaired. By his identification of bodies with 
impressions he did succeed in construing some singular 
statements at~ut bodies as indubitable truths, yes; as 
truths about impressions, directly known. But general 
statements about the future, gained no increment of 
certainty by being construed as about impressions. On 
the doctrinal side, I do not see that we are farther 
along the road today than where Hume left us. The 
Humean predicament is the human predicament. 
Yet Quine does present himself as providing some sort of 
epistemological answer and he writes elsewhere that ''Epistemology 
is best looked upon ... as an enterprise within natural science". 9 
7 
gP. 7!. ~I 
9 Ib1d., pp, 71-7 L. 
'The Nature of Natural Knowledge' p,68. 
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Indeed, Quine does seem to make some sort of answer to the 
epistemological sceptic. Quine acknowledges that epistemology is 
rooted in scepticism, yet he also insists, 1n turn, that such 
scepticism arises only out of knowledge. Thus the role of doubt in 
our epistemological questioning is only half the story: 
Doubt prompts the theory of 
knowledge, also, was what 
Scepticism is an offshoot of0 doubts are scientific doubts. 
knowledge, yes; but 
prompted the doubt. 
science . . . sceptical 
According to Quine science contributes much that is necessary for 
scepticism to get off the ground - notably the crucial idea of a 
distinction between reality and appearance: 
The basis for scepticism is the awareness of illusion, 
the discovery that we must not always believe our 
eyes. Scepticism battens on mirages, on seemingly bent 
sticks in water, on rainbows, after-images, double 
images, dreams. But in what sense are these illusions? 
... Illusions are illusions only relative to a prior 
acceptance of genuine bodies with which to contrast 
them. In a world of immediate sense data with no 
bodies posited and no questions a~.ked, a distinction 
between reality and illusion would have no place. The 
positing of bodies is already rudimentary physical 
science; and it is only after that stage the;:~ the 
sceptic's invidious distinctionB can make sense. 
Now Quine is not complaining that there is some 
circularity in the sceptic's position; he says that the sceptic is: 
... quite within his rights in assuming science in 
order to refute science; thi~., if carried out, would 
be a s~rat~htf orward argument by .reduct.io <.9d 
a.h..qun?um. 
What Quine Be ems to be say 1 ng is rat.her that the ~.cept i c is 1 oak i ng 
at the question inappropriately. As he writes in Tile Roots of 
i~ Jhid., pp. 67-68. 
12 J hid. , p . 6 7 . 
Jbid., p. 68. 
Reference: 
Are we to conclude then that the old epistemologist's 
problem of bridging a gap between sense data and 
bodies was a pseud~~roblem? No, the problem was real 
but wrongly viewed. 
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What the sceptic has misunderstood 1s precisely the scientific 
character of his doubt and hence the possibility of a scientific 
(though not deductively sound) answer. This does not lead to 
circularity just because we have given up the hope of deduc.inq 
science from observation. 14 
Quine accepts the "hopeles~mess of grounding natural 
science upon immediate experience in a firmly logical way"; he 
accepts "The Cartesian quest for certainty ... as a lost cause". 15 
but he does not see this as the end of our epistemological hopes. 
When we recognise the scientific origins of scepticism and 
recognise that it is to be treated on a par with any other 
scientific hypothesi2, then, on that basis, it starts to look like a 
hypothesis which, so far, is not justified scientifically: 
Experience might, tomorrow, take a turn that would 
justify the sceptic's doubts about e}rter·nal objects. 
Our success in predicting observations might fall off 
sharply, and concomitantly with this we might begin to 
be somewhat Bucce~.sful in basing predictions upon 
dreams or reveries. At that point we might reasonably 
begin to doubt our theory of nature in even its 
broadest outlines. But our doubts would still be 
immanent, 1gncl of a piece with the scientific endeavour. 
This sort of reply to the sceptic does not consist 1n a complete 
~ ! The Roots of Reference, La Sa 11 e, I 11 i no is, 
15 'Epistemology Naturalized', p.76. 
1973, p.2. 
16 I.bid , p. 7 4. Quine, 'Reply to Stroud', The Foundations of .An..9/J?tic Ph.1'/osophJ? 
(Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6), ed. P.A. French et al., 
Minneapolis, 1981, p.475. 
r 
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rejection of scepticism, rather it consists in the idea that, when 
we understand scepticism against its scientific background, when 
the sceptical problem is viewed in a scientific light, then we can 
see how a scientific answer is possible. 
What Quine does is to transform epistemology from the 
old search for certainty into, on his account, a much more 
reasonable and moderate scientific project concerned with the 
empirical study of the relation between science and its sensory 
basis. This move 1s all of a piece with Quine·s general naturalist 
approach to philosophy and ref lect.s his intellectual descent from 
the positivists, such as Carnap and Neurath, of the Vienna School. 
For Quine both the philosopher and the scienti~.t are in the same 
boat, a boat which must be rebuilt while remaining afloat; it is, 
however, from the planks of natural science that that boat is being 
rebuilt. Epistemology, and, to a large extent, philosophy with it, 
has been thoroughly naturalized by Quine: 
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into 
place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural 
science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a 
physical human subject. Thi2, human subject is accorded 
a certain experimentally controlled input - certain 
pattern2. of irradiation in a2,sorted frequencies, for 
instance - and in the fullnes2. of time the subject 
delivers as output a description of the 
three-dimensional external world and its history. The 
relation between the meagre input and the torrential 
output is a relation that we are prompted to study 
for somewhat the same reasons that always prompt.eel 
epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence 
relates to theory, and in what ways one '.s theory of 
nature transcends any available evidence. 11 
So although this new, naturalized epistemology 1s, Quine 
admits, "a far cry ... from old epistemology" 18 still he maintains 
that: 
... it is no gratuitous change of subject matter, but 
an enlightened persistence rather in the original 
epistemological problematic. It is enlightened in 
recognizing that the sceptical challenge springs from 
science itself, and that in coping with it we are free 
to use scientific knowledge. The old epistemologist 
failed to recognize the strength of his position. The 
epistemologist ... emerges as a defender or protector. 
He no longer dreams of a first philosophy, firmer than 
science, on which science can be based: he is out to 
defend science from within, against its self-doubts. 
His project becomes one of major scientific and 
philosophical interest, moreover, even apart from 
protective moti veE'., - even apart from any thought of a 
sceptical challenge. For we can fully grant the truth 
of natural science and still raise the question, 
within natural science, how it is that man works up 
his command of that science from the 1 imi ted 
impingeme11~s that are available to his sensory surfaces. 
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Quine's notion of a 'naturalized epistemology', and with 
it his response to the sceptic, has been an important and 
influential development within contemporary philosophy. Moreover 
Quine's transformation of the sceptical-epistemological problematic 
would seem to represent the inevitable outcome of the attempt to 
do epistemology purely empirically, that is, by giving knowledge an 
evidential foundation 1n sensory experience. Yet I think we have 
good reason to feel uneasy about Quine's 'enlightened' 
epistemological approach. For the sceptical problem, in its old, 
perhaps rather disreputable, Cartesian dress, sti 11 seems to be 
hanging around. Indeed, Quine's position looks as if it explicitly 
grants that problem a certain continued existence - the Cartesian 
sceptic is tolerated even though he is no longer heeded. It is this 
sort of uneasiness which underli es Stroud's dissatisfaction with 
the Quinean approach. 20 Indeed Stroud claims that Quine' s 
i~'Epistemology Na!uralized', pp.82-83 . 
19 T.he Root_s o.t lr't?J-erence, p. 3. Ih.id 
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epistemology ''not only tolerates scepticism . . . but 1s actually 
committed to it". 21 
Given that Quine aims to "understand how our knowledge is 
possible by understanding how the 'meagre input' at our sensory 
surfaces gives riBe to the 'torrential output'" 22 Stroud begins by 
asking "how, in the most ordinary or even scientific contexts, we 
explain someone's knowledge, or e}rplain how it iE!, possible". 23 On 
Quine' s account we do this by observing a human being in his 
environment, and by observing the relation between stimulations and 
responses. Now the beliefs which a speaker has will always be 
underdetermi necl by his environment, that 18,, the beliefs a speaker 
has must be viewed as 'constructions· or 'projections' from a 
meagre sensory base. That a Bpeaker's beliefs are so 
underdetermined does not mean, however, that we cannot make 
assessments with respect to those beliefs - that is distinguish 
justified from unjustified beliefs, true from false beliefs. We can 
do this provided we have some standpoint from which to make such 
assessments. Thus Stroud writes : 
Si nee I am in a position to see whether what the 
person says about the world around him is true, I can 
determine whether his belief on a particular occasion 
is a n1t?1--e posit or projection - something he believes 
or asserts, but with no basis in fact. If I find, in a 
particular case or in general, that what he says is 
true of the world around him, I can sti 11 hold that 
his beliefs go well beyond his sensory impacts and in 
20stroucl exami neB Quine' s approach in The ... '?-'iqnifio.9nce of 
Scept.icisn7; the chapter on Quine is a revised and expanded version 
of 'The Significance of Naturalized Epistemology', first published 
in The Found.9t.ions o[ Anc.9.iyt.ic Philosop/J;.r (Midwest Studies 1n 
P~!losophy 6), ed. P.A.French et al., Minneapolis, 1981. 
22 The S.iqnificance of ... '>ceJ7ticism, p. 234. 23 Ibid., p. 234. 
Ib.id. 
that sense are 'projections' ... If he says 'There is 
a tree' in a situation in which I find there ~i a tree 
before him, I know that what he says is true. 
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Indeed if we are to provide any sort of explanation of a 
speaker's knowledge then it is vital that we should be able to make 
such assessments of a speaker's beliefs. For, as Stroud points out, 
in order to explain a speaker's knowledge we need to establish that 
the speaker's beliefs are true and also ju2.tif ied. So: 
I can explain the subject's knowledge in the right way 
only if I know that the world around him is as he says 
it is, and that its being that way 1s partly 
respo~sible for his saying or believing it to be that 
way.L-
So if we are to e}tplain a speaker's knowledge we need to be able to 
sort true from false beliefs, and to show how that speaker's true 
beliefs are appropriately connected up with the world. The 
implication is that, if we are to explain the knowledge of others, 
we must ourselves know what is true and what is false, or be able 
to find out. We must ourselves have knowledge in the first place. 
This suggests the strategy which Stroud follows in attacking Quine, 
for what Quine attempts is to explain our knowledge in the same way 
as we would explain another's. Quine's 'naturalized epistemology' 
would treat our own beliefs as grossly underdetermined by our 
sensory inputs, would treat our beliefs as mere 'posits' or 
'projections· , and would attempt to explain our· 'knowledge' on that 
basis: 
We are studying how the human subject of our study 
posits bodies and projects his physics from his data, 
and we apprecyf,te that our position in the world is just like his. 
~: I.bid. , pp. 235-236. 
I.bid. , p. 238. 
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We are certainly not in any specially privileged 
epistemological position (in tP.rr. :~ ut justifying our beliefs) just 
in virtue of being ourselves - that is not to be denied. What is 
problematic in Quine's naturalistic approach 1s rather the 
assimilation of epistemology to natural science. A naturalistic 
epistemology may offer one way in which we can treat of the beliefs 
of other knowers but it cannot offer a way of explaining our 
knowledge in its entirety, for to treat our own epistemological 
position in a purely naturalistic fashion is to undermine that 
position. We would no longer have anywhere to stand from which to 
make the necessary assessments of the truth and falsity of our 
beliefs. The naturalistic ~.tategy may work for localized portions 
of our knowledge but it cannot work globally - just as error and 
disagreement cannot be given any global application either, More 
generally, if we treat epistemology as primarily a matter of 
showing how our beliefs arise out of our meagre sensory input, then 
we forsake any possibi 1 i ty of explaining .knor,.,Jedqe just because 
truth must drop out of the picture completely - on a naturalistic 
account at least. Sensory inputs have no truth or falsity attaching 
to them and it is precisely t.rvth which is tied up with the 
question of knowledge. Whatever else knowledge is it is at least 
true belief. 
Yet not only rnust Quine's naturalism fail when it 1s 
applied to ourselve2., the attempt to apply it 1n our own case 
forces us back to scepticism: 
26
'Epistemology Naturalized', p,83. 
Trying to follow Quine's proposal and apply his 
conception of knowledge to myself ... I would be left 
in an even worse position than that of an observer 
barred only from information about the truth of his 
subject's beliefs. Perhaps the closest parallel to it 
in a third-person case would be that of finding 
myself alone in toal darkness and silence and suddenly 
hearing the words 'There is a tree' coming from 
somewhere. Obviously there is simply no telling in 
that situation whether those words express knowlege, 
or even truth, so there would be no possibility of 
explaining, with only that sort. of information, how in 
that case knowledge or even true belief is possible. I 
would have nothing but that bit of 'ouput' to work 
with. But that is the position I would always be in 
with respect to my own belief9, about the physical 
world if I 'appreciated' that all my beliefs about the 
physical world are 'projection9,' from 'meagre' sensory 
data. I would have nothing but my own 'output'. That 
for m27would be no better than whistling in the dark. 
Knovledqe and Interpretation 
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In the paper 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', 
Davidson attempts to answer the question: 
... how, given that we cannot "get outside our beliefs 
and our language so as to find some test other than 
coherence'', we nevertheless can have knowledge of, and 
talk about,. an ff,jective public world which is not of 
our own making. 
This question is essentially the question posed by scepticism; the 
sceptical answer being, of course, that we cannot have knowledge 
about an objective world at all. The answer which Davidson provides 
is one the outlines of which have appeared elsewhere in his work29 
and which has been adumbrated in much that I have said already -
2 7 
'T'J.. .., ' ' ... - ' ' ... - ~ t ' ' "'I 4 9 2 5 0 
28 Jue 5JqnJ.L JCL'lnce O.L 5cep . .1c.1sm, pp. 1.. - _ • 29 .Ibid.; pp. 426-427. . . 
·see The Method of Truth 1n Metaphysics', and 'Empirical 
Content', CJ:c..'izer P.hiloso_p/J.ische Studien, 16/17 ( 1982). 
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indeed the argument turns out to be another version of the argument 
against the idea of a conceptual scheme. Once again it is the 
thesis of interpretative holism which is crucial. 
Like Stroud, Davidson does not accept the Quinean 
resolution of the sceptical problem. Yet while Stroud often seems 
to accept that the path which any epistemological justification 
ought to take 1s empirical apparently accepting that 
justification can only proceed by means of experience even though 
he is pessimistic about the chances of success along that path -
this is a path which Davidson specifically eschews. And the reason 
1s simple: causes are not reasons. Davidson writes: 
The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot 
be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or other 
propositional at.ti tudes. What then is the relation? 
The answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is 
cau2.al. Sensations cause some beliefs and in this 
sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a 
causal explanation of a be3Mf does not show how or 
why the belief is justified. 
Davidson has discussed this same problem as something 
specifically recognized by Neurat.h 31 and 1n that discussion 
Davidson presents the problem in a way which immediately suggests 
the argument he employs against the ~·.c.heme-content distinction. 
"Neurath was right'' Davidson tells us "in rejecting the 
intelligibility of comparing sentence2. or beliefs with reality". 32 
Such an idea was the basis for Davidson's own rejection of the 
scheme-content diE,tinct.ion. Davidson can make no sense of comparing 
30 
'A Coherence Theory of Truth and l(nowleclge', p. 428. This line of 
argument echoes Wifrid Sellars' criticisms of Locke, Science, 
Pff;-eptto:7 c.9nd Rt?alJt}·', London, 1963, pp, 157-161. 
32 Emp1r1cal Content, p.476 and pp.486-487. IiJid., p.486. 
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sentences with reality just as he can make no sense of sentences 
being made true by the facts or anything else. Much of the reason 
for this is his thorough9oing holism about the relation between 
beliefs, and between beliefs, other attitudes and utterances. Such 
holism makes it impossible to see beliefs as made true by something 
from outside the attitudinal network. Davidson finds a version of 
this attitudinal holism adumbrated in Neurath's coherent.ism (not 
surprisingly, given Davidson's Quinean connection) and in Neurath's 
claim, which Davidson reiterates, that: 
We are left ... in a situation where our only evidence 
for a belief is other beliefs; this is not merely the 
logical situation, but also the pragmatic situation. 
And since no belief is self-cerY{ying, none can 
supply a certain basis for the rest.~--
Nothing which lies outside of the network of belief can provide a 
reason to justify any belief - the causes of belief2, cannot be 
their reasons. 34 Of course, as the last sentence of the passage 
just quoted makes clear, neither can any single belief provide 
certain ground for any other belief. But we shall come to this 
latter point in a moment. 
~ ~ .I .bid. , p . 4 8 7 • 
Not that reasons cannot be causes - Davidson claims in the 
influential paper 'Actions, Reasons and Causes' (A£ ) that if 
reasons are to be explanatory of behaviour they must be the causes 
of behaviour. But while reasons may be causes not all causes are 
reasons. The point with respect to the justification of beliefs is 
that causes, considered merely as the physical causes of beliefs, 
cannot in t.hemsel ves be rea~.ons, that is, they cannot count as 
evidence for beliefs. Only other beliefs can perform this role. 
Indeed in the case of action explanation an analogous situation 
holds: it is not the physical causes of action which explain the 
action qua action - which rationc.9J.i2e the a ction - but rather it is 
the agent's reasons which do the explaining. We explain the acti on 
by fitting it in to the overall attitudinal Bystem of the agent. 
Thus action explanation exhibits the same holism as does the 
interpretation of utterances - indeed both are aspects of the ~.ame 
interpretative project. 
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Davidson's conception of the relation between the mental 
and the physical is tied up with his approach to the problem 
concerning the justification of beliefs; certainly his 'anomalous 
monism' will lead hi1n away from any purely physicalistic account of 
knowledge and, consequently, away from any purely physicalist 
attempt at the just.if icat.ion of knowledge. Davidson suggests that 
Quine makes just the mistake of tending to identify causes as 
reasons, of assimilating sensory causes to evidence. In support of 
this view Davidson quotes a number of passages from Quine's work. 35 
Indeed it is not difficult to find substantiation of Davidson's 
point in Quine's naturalization of epistemology. The very claim, 
which Quine himself makes, for a naturalized epistemology to be 
still a continuation of the epistemological enterprise iE, strongly 
suggestive of an assimilation of sensory causes to evidence: 
The relc.1tion .betr1een the meaqer .input c.9nd t./Je 
torrentic.91 out.J.7Ut is a relation that we are prompted 
to study for somewhat. the same reasons that al ways 
prompted epistemology; namely, in order to see how 
evidence relates to theory·, and in what ways on36 s theory of nature transcends any available evidence. 
Yet this is why Quine's naturalistic project must fail: the aim of 
any epistemological justification is to establish the truth of the 
beliefs 1n question, but that cannot be done by 'grounding' those 
·beliefs in the purely E,en9,ory. Trying to find truth, the truth 
which we want to demonstrate as inhering in beliefs, in such a 
location is simply impossible. The path of empirical justification 
of beliefs cannot yield truth. 
Thus Davidson set.s up a di lemma for those who would 
~~'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.428. 
'Epistemology Naturalized', p.83. 
attempt the empirical justification of beliefs: 
The approach to the problem of just if icat.ion we have 
been tracing must be wrong. We have been trying to see 
it this way: a pers on has all his beliefs about the 
world, - that is, a l l his beliefs. How can he tell if 
they are true, or apt to be true? Only, we have been 
assuming, by connecting his beliefs to the world, 
confronting certain of his beliefs with the tribunal 
of experience. No such confrontation makes sense, for 
of course we can't get outside our skins to find out 
what is causing the internal happenings of which we 
are aware. Introducing intermediate steps or entities 
into the causal chain, like sensations or 
observations, serves only to make the epistemological 
problem more obvious. For if the intermediaries are 
merely causes, they don't justify the beliefs they 
cause, while if they deliver information they may be 
lying. The moral i s obvious. Since we can't swear 
intermediaries to truthfulness, we should allow no 
intennecliaries between our beliefs and their objects 
in the world. Of course there are causal 
intennecliaries. What we 7 must guard against are epistemic intermed1aries. 3 
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That there is a problem about the Quinean assimilation of 
causes to evidence is a point which we have already seen suggested 
by Stroud; Stroud comments : 
A naturalized epistemology . . . would study the 
relation between o' r 'input' and our eventually coming 
to believe what ~ do about the world around us by 
studying how those events at our sensory surfaces 
cause other events closer to 'our cognitive mechanism' 
and eventually cause our beliefs about the world 
around us ... But ... such an investigation ... would 
not provide an explanation of how our ·meagre sensory 
data' give rise t o a 'torrential output' about the 
world that is gros sly undertletermined by those data. 
It would not show by what 'bold inference' we manage 
to 'bridge' the · wide gap between our data and our 
knowledge of the externai ~0rlcl'. That is because it 
makes no sense to say that between one event and 
another in the same causal chain there is a 'gap' that 
is to be 'bridged ' by 'inference'. There is just one 
event whi3~ leads to another, and then to another, and so on ... 
~;'A Coh~re:1c~ Theory_ o! Tn.1~h . and Knowle~lge', p. 429. 
The S1g771£.1cance o.f ,!:Jcept-1c.1sm, pp.250-L51 , see p.252 also. 
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Stroud does not, however, see this problem as so completely 
destructive of the project of empirical justification as does 
Davidson. Certainly it is not so central to his critique and nor 
does it lead him towards anything like the account of truth and 
knowledge which Davidson arrives at. 
In 'Epistemology Naturalized' Quine distinguishes two 
aspects to the epistemological task: the conceptual aspect 
concerned with meaning and the doctrinal aspect concerned with 
truth. From a Davidsonian perspective, of course, such a 
distinction must be thoroughly artificial - truth and meaning are 
intimately connected within epistemology as elsewhere. Thus 
Davidson comments: 
... theories of meaning are connected with 
epistemology through attempts to answer the question 
how one determines that a sentence is true. If knowing 
the meaning of a sentence (knowing how to give a 
correct interpretation of it) involves, or is, knowing 
how it could be recognized to be true, then the theory 
of meaning raises the same question we have been 
struggling with, for giving the meaning of a sentence 
will demand 3}hat we specify what would justify asserting it. 
Quine 1s right then to see epistemology as compr1s1ng both a 
conceptual and a doctrinal side, as comprising both questions about 
meaning and questions about truth, but he is wrong in seeing those 
two sides to epistemology as separate. Moreover insofar as he does 
separate them so he adopts a much more foundationali2,t approach 
than Davidson does. The conceptual task, as Quine sees it, 
ultimately involves providing a reductive account of the concepts 
of natural knowledge - ··explaining the notion of body in sensory 
39
'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.429. 
terms" 40 while naturally he views the doctrinal task - the task of 
answering the sceptic - as a matter of "justifying our knowledge 
· t " 41 N . th ,.. th ... . t b 1 1n sensory erms . e1 er or ese approac11es 1s accep a e 
to Davidson: coming to understand our concepts and beliefs and 
coming to understand whether they are true are both part of the 
same task - and it is not a task to be undertaken by reduction or 
empirical justification. 42 
Given the connection between epistemology and theory of 
meaning one can see that , just as Davidson disagrees with Quine 
over the role of sensory stimulations in the interpretation or 
translation of utterances (Davidson, recal 1, abandons the Quinean 
notion of stimulus meaning), so this disagreement will also mark a 
major disagreement 1n their approaches to the problem of 
epistemology. Here Davidson's differences with Michael Dummett also 
come to the fore. 43 
Both Dummett and Quine demand some experiential or 
sensory 'rock' on which to anchor the theory of meaning, and, 
presumably, the theory of knowledge also. Davidson eschews such an 
4o'Episternology Naturalized', p.71. !~ I.bid 
LMarie McGinn ('The Third Dogma of Empiricism', pp.9Bff.) sees 
the sort of anti-foundati onalism which Davidson espouses as in fact 
doing away with the conceptual task altogether while the doctrinal 
task remains (insofar as Davidson does attempt to provide an answer 
to the sceptic). My position is slightly different: I think that 
both tasks can be seen as remaining (in a sense) but they are no 
longer separate and the way in which they are approached 1s 
completely transformed. As I said in an earlier footnote I agree 
with McGinn that epistemology is not brought to an end by the 
Davidsonian approach but the sense in which it remains is a sense 
in which the theory of knowledge is transformed into, or seen as a 
~t of, the theory of interpretation. 
See Dummett, 'What Is a Theory of Meaning', H.ind and Lanquaqe, 
ed. S.Guttenplan, Oxford, 1975, for Dummett·s criticisms of 
Davidson's approach to the theory of meaning. 
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approach in both semantics and epistemology, not only because it 
will not work, however, but also because such an approach is itself 
conducive to scepticism. "For clearly a person's sensory 
stimulations could be just as they are and yet the world might be 
different". 44 As Davidson writ.es: 
Quine and Dummett agree on a basic principle ... that 
whatever there 1s to meaning must be traced .back 
somehow to experience, the given, or patterns of 
sensory stimulation, something intermediate between 
belief and the usual objects our beliefs are about. 
Once we take this step, we open the door to 
scepticism, for we must then allow that a great many -
perhaps most - of the sentences we hold to be true may 
in fact be false. It is ironical. Trying to make 
meaning accessible has made truth inaccessible. When 
meaning goes epistemological in this way, truth and 
meaning are necessarily divorced. One can, of course, 
arrange a shotgun wedding by redefining truth as what 
we are juE:,t.ified in4~sserting. But this does not marry the original mates. 
Once again we can see how Davidson's paramount concern 1s 
to preserve that all-important pairing of truth and meaning, and it 
1s, of course, just that pairing which is here under threat. 
Davidson has seen that the failure of the Quinean approach is 
representative of the failure of the founclationalist, empiricist 
approach as such. Any attempt to found knowledge on the senses 
must fail. It must fail because what gives ~ise to scepticism, and 
the epistemological problem, 1s just the distinction between 
knowledge and the claimed sensory basis of knowledge. This point 
even Stroud recognizes: 
I . . . echo Kant's idea that a completely general 
distinction between everything we get through the 
senses, on the one hand, and what is or i s not true of 
the external world, on the other, would cut46us off forever from knowledge of the world around us. 
::,A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.430. 
J.bid. 
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'A Coherence Theory of Knowledqe" 
Davidson's own attempt at answering the question how we 
"can have knowledge of, and talk about, an objective public world 
which is not of our own making" proceeds by applying the lessons of 
radical interpretation directly to epistemology. Epistemology 
concerns beliefs and their truth, and, for Davidson, this is also 
pa~t of the subject matter of radical interpretation - indeed it is 
in radical interpretation that the connections between belief, 
meaning and truth are made perspicuous. The Davidsonian argument 
against scepticism; advanced most fully in 'A Coherence Theory of 
Truth and Knowledge' (but which also appears in a more abbreviated 
form in 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics', 'Thought and Talk' 
an1 in 'Empirical Content'), thus proceeds from the perspective of 
the interpretation of uttterances. So the argument is essentially a 
repetition of points which Davidson has already rehearsed in other 
places and other contexts. In essence, the stategy 1s to turn the 
lessons of radical interpretation on ourselves: if we are to 
interpret our own utterances, then, by the principle of charity, we 
must take most of our beliefs to be true. 
In 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge' Davidson 
presents his argument as having two parts: 
First I urge that a correct understanding of the 
speech, desires, intentions and other propositional 
attitudes of a person leads to the conclusion that 
most of a person's beliefs must be true, and so there 
1s a legitimate presumption that any one of them, if 
it coheres with most of the rest, is true. Then I go 
on to claim that anyone with thoughts, and so 1n 
46 7'1-. 5' · · .- · - c- t . . ,.. 48 
.1.1.1e ..... .1qn.1r.1cance o.f ..... 7cep . .1c.1sm, p. L'. • 
particular anyone who wonders whethe~ he has any 
reason to suppose he is generally r1<;:"!t. about t he 
nature of his environment, must know wha~ o belief is, 
and how in general beliefs are to be jetected and 
interpreted. These being perfectly genE:-al facts we 
cannot fail to use when we communicate w_~h others ... 
there is a pretty strong sense in wh_ :h we can be 
said to know that there is a presumpti rr: in favor of 
the overall tr'-atJ1fulness of anyonE s beliefs, 
including our own. 
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These two parts to the argument seem to re£ ~ect the differing 
approaches which Davidson has taken in the two ~rlier papers 'The 
Method of Truth in Metaphysics' and 'Thought a.Ld Talk'. It should 
be evident, however, just how much the argu·ient against the 
sceptic consists in simply a redeployment of t he more familiar 
arguments concerning interpretative holism end the associated 
principle of charity. Once we recognise tte interlocking of 
meaning, belief and truth, we must recognise t hc.1=. "belief is in its 
nature veridical". 4~ This is the substance of the Davidsonian 
'coherence' theory of knowledge. 
One problem which Davidson considers 1s whether it might 
not be possible for interpreters to understand one another "on the 
basis of shared but erroneous belief". 49 Davidson's solution to the 
problem involves the consideration of t h2 position of an 
'omniscient interpreter' in interpreting t he utterances of a 
fallible (and perhaps mistaken) speaker. This _s a strategy which 
Davidson has also employed in 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics': 
We do not need to be omniscient to 1:--iterpret, but 
there is nothing absurd in the idea of an omniscient 
interpreter; he attributes beliefs to others, and 
interprets their speech on the basis of his own 
beliefs, just as the rest of us do. Since he does this 
:~'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge' , ;i . 431 . 
49 Ib.id. p. 432. Ibid. , p. 435. 
as the rest of us do, he per£ orce finds as much 
agreement as is needed to make sense of his 
attributions and interpretations; and in this case, of 
course, what is agreed is by hypothesis true. But now 
it is plain why massive error about the world is 
simply unintelligible , for to 2.uppose it intelligible 
is to suppose there could be an interpreter (the 
omniscient one) who correctly interpreted someone else 
as massi ve1g0 mistaken, and this we have shown to be impossible. 
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Whatever the merits of this particular line of argument, 
it 1s by no means clear that it is needed to establish the desired 
conclusion. Much of the force of the argument for the truth of our 
beliefs, as it derives from a consideration of the nature of 
interpretation, consists i n the recognition of the inseparability 
of 'the world' or the speaker's environment GL 't:ruth' from the 
speaker's utterances and .be liefs. The notion of a speaker who is 
massively mistaken is the notion of a world radically divorced 
from the beliefs and utter ances of a particular speaker. Yet such 
separation is just what Davidson maintains is unintelligible, and 
he can maintain this without any recourse to the notion of an 
'omniscient interpreter' (in fact Davidson's most recent 
presentation of the argument - in 'Empirical Content' - makes no 
reference to this idea at all) for this is just what lies behind 
the rejection of the scheme-content distinction. Thus, neither from 
the interpreter's point of view, nor from any other point of view: 
... is there any way ... [to] ... discover the speaker 
to be largely wrong about the world. For ... [one] ... 
interprets sentences held true (which is not to be 
distinguished from attributing beliefs) according to 
the events and objects in the5?utside world that cause the sentence to be held true, 
~~'The Method of Tn..1th in Metaphysics' , p. 201 . 
'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.435. 
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Davidson's overall line of argument 1s perhaps made 
clearer with the second part of the argument in 'A Coherence Theory 
of Truth and Knowledge': 
In order to doubt or wonder about the provenance of his beliefs an agent must know what belief is. This brings with it the concept of objective truth, for the 
notion of a belief is the notion of a state that may 
or may not jibe with reality. But beliefs are also 
identifJ~d, directly and indirectly, by their 
causes.JL 
Being able to identify, and hence attribute, belief~., means being 
able to identify a majority of true beliefs within a network of the 
speaker's attitudes. This is the nature of belief - beliefs, along 
with other attitudes, form a holistic system. Such is the thesis of 
attitudinal holism. Failure to be able to identify beliefs in this 
way would mean a failure to find any reason to suppose that there 
were any beliefs present in the first place - here we are back, 
once more, with the argument against untranslatability. Thus 
Davidson claims that, as beliefs are in their nature veridical, all 
beliefs are justified in this sense. This leaves open, as an 
empirical question, the issue of whether any particular belief or 
set of beliefs, are justified in some particular context. But what 
1s closed off is the question as to whether all our .beliefs might 
be unjustified and unjustifiable. The point here is analogous to 
that which was made in discussing charity and the possibility of 
error on the part of those we interpret. There 1 ocal error was 
admissable so long as global truth was preserved. If this i~. so in 
the case of our interpretees it must also be the case with respect 
to ourselves - that 1s, if we are to be interpreted as having 
52 ibid. , p. 437. 
beliefs and using a language. 
The impossibility of justifying beliefs by looking to the 
non-epistemic causes of belief seems to leave open only one course 
for justification to take. Only beliefs can provide a reason for 
other beliefs. Events in the world provide no reason to hold a 
particular belief except insofar as they cause some belief to be 
held which may itself provide evidence for further beliefs. "And 
then it is the belief that is properly called the evidence, not the 
event" 53 and then it is also the belief, not the event, which is 
properly called the reason. This seems to force us towards some 
sort of coherence theory of knowledge - a theory whereby beliefs 
are warranted as knowledge because of their relationship to other 
beliefs. However as Davidson himself points out no single belief 
can provide a certain basis for any other belief and indeed there 
is always the possibility that we have got some of our beliefs 
quite wrong. 
So why should we think that most of our beliefs are true? 
Well the answer which we have seen Davidson already give involves 
seeing belief in its proper relation to meaning and to the world 
within the context of interpretation. It is in interpretation that 
belief and truth - the way the world is - come together. Charity 
requires that we take the beliefs and utterances of those we 
interpret as mostly true. Thus Davidson writes that: 
. . . our basic methodology for interpreting the words 
of others necessarily makes it the case that most of 
the time the simplest sentences which speakers hold 
are true . It is not the spea.ker who must per£ onn the 
impossible feat of comparing his belief with reality; 
it is the .1 nte.rpreter who must take into account the 
causal interaction between world and speaker in order 
53Dav1dson, 'Empirical Content', p.486. 
to find o~} what the speaker means, and hence what he 
believes. 
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The methodology of interpretation provides the element of 
'correspondence' which was needed if 'coherence· was to provide a 
justification of our beliefs. However it is not that. beliefs are 
true because they correspond to reality rather beliefs are 
identified because of the causal relationship between a speaker and 
his or her environment. And most of our beliefs can be said to be 
true not just becau~.e of the internal coherence of our belief 
system but more importantly because our beliefs are interpreted to 
be what they are by reference to the way the world is. Belief, 
truth, meaning, the world, are all interconnected notions 
interconnected within the holistic project of interpretation. 
Interpretation is an intersubjective activity which always proceeds 
withiti ·an inter-subjective realm - witt1in a world which both speaker 
and interpreter share. 
However while the nature of interpretation requires that 
most of our beliefs must be true it always remains an open question 
just what beliefs are true. Just as charity requires global 
agreement but makes no stipulations about what beliefs must be 
agreed upon, so Daviclc.on's anti-sceptical argument establishes the 
overall truth of our beliefs - any one of our beliefs could turn 
out to be false nonethele~.s. In this respect it is by no means 
clear whether the perspective of interpretation renders 
unintelligible that archetyi::,al sceptical scenario in which it is 
alleged that perhaps we are all 'disembodied' brains in vats (the 
S 4 Ibid. , p. 4 B 8 • 
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example we encountered in discussing Glymour in chapter five). Most 
philosopher2, seem to assume that if sceptici2,m is to be defeated 
then this is just the sort of example that has to be dealt with. 
Yet if scepticism is taken as encapsulated in the view that it is 
possible that most of our beliefs (even if satisfying the strictest 
tests of simplicity, coherence, observational corroboration and so 
on) could be false tt1en I suspect that the scenario of the envatted 
brains is not in fact an example of such a sceptical possibility -
for the simple reason that it is not clear that we need to take 
most of the beliefs of such brains to be false. 
Indeed I think that we could interpret the brains' 
utterances as about tree2,, tables, cabbages and kings - rather than 
about sensory impressions or whatever - and still hold that most of 
their beliefs are true. This is a point I discu2,sed at length in 
chapter three; the point now is that if the envatted brains can be 
interpreted as having mo2.tly true beliefs their envatment 
notwithstanding then we have no reason to take Davidson's 
arguments as showing that we might not ourselve2, be brains in vats. 
For what Davidson's argument shows is that most of our beliefs must 
be true; but we could be brains in vats and yet most of our beliefs 
could still be true. £rqo, we could be brains in vats. The moral' to 
be drawn here is not that sceptici2,rn can be made sense of after all 
but rather that the possibility that we are brains in vats need not 
be taken as a sceptical possibility in the first place and thus 
that this sort of envatment scenario need not have any 
philosophical interest - at least it need have no epistemological 
relevance. 
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The necessarily inter-subjective character of 
interpretation on the Davidsonian account means that Davidson can 
attach no sense to the notion of a truly 'private' language -
language is public by its very nature. Here Davidson is in complete 
agreement with Wittgenstein's famous argument against the notion of 
a private language 1n the P.h.ilosop.h.ical Jnvest.iqat.ions. Yet 
Davidson's arguments against the sceptic closely parallel 
Wittgenstein's anti-sceptical arc::iuments in On Certa.intJ? also. In 
that later work Wi ttgen~.tein developed a number of arguments 
directed at traditional Cartesian scepticism - arguments which 
arose chiefly in response to G.E. Moore's own attempts at rebuffing 
the sceptic55 but which had their beginnings very early 
Wittgenstein's career. In the TractatusWittgenstein wrote: 
... doubt can only e}tist where a question exists; a 
question can only exist where an answer exists and 
this can only exiRt where something can .be sa.id. 56 
' 1 n 
The idea that. doubt always requires some background which 
is itself not doubted 1s a notion at the heart of the 
anti-sceptical arguments of On c-:'erta.intJ' and it is a notion which 
also seems to be an element in Davidson's own anti-sceptical 
position. It is embodied in the idea of attitudinal holism and the 
notion that beliefs can only be identified against a background of 
55Moore 's argument, if it can be cal led an arc::iument. - and some 
have expressed doubts on that score, consisted largely in ''holding 
up my two hand~., and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the 
right hand, 'Here is one hand' , and adding as I make a certain 
gesture with the left, 'and here is another'" (Moore, 'Proof of an 
External World·, P/1.1losopll.ical PaJ7c?rs, London, 1959, p.146). In so 
doing Moore claimed to have proved the existence of two human hands 
a~g .ip...c:o J-~::,cto, to have proved the existence of the external wo1 lc . 
J"'.n.9ct1..9tus Loqico-P/Jil osop/J.icus, trans. D. F. Pears and 
B.F.McGuiness, London, 1961, 6.51. 
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other ( largely true) beliefs. In this vein Marie McGinn writes of 
DavidS.O"fl' s argument in 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' 
that what it suggests is that: 
It is only through the commitment to an unquestioned 
background of beliefs that it is possible to mean, and 
therefore to j1_1e~, doubt, confirm, disconfirm, etc., 
anything at all. 
Much of the central argument in On l-:'ertaJnty· likewise consists in 
the notion that doubting always presupposes a wider background 
where doubt does not arise. Thus: 
Our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions 
are exempt. from clout~8 are as it were like the hinges on which those turn.-
And so "the game of doubting itself presupposes certainty". 59 
Like Davidson, Wittgenstein seems to have been concerned 
to overcome the separation of the subjective from the objective, of 
concept from experience. For Wittgenstein, there 1s only the 
community, the practice, the language game, the life. There can be 
no possibility then of any access to 'the world' except through the 
language and the community in which one re2.icles. 60 Indeed the 
notion that the world is something which stands over against these 
things is itself senseless - another version of the scheme-content 
~~'~he Third.Dogma o! Emp~ricism', p.96. 
59w1t~genste1n, lJn certa1nty·, para.341. 
60 J.b1d. , para. 115. Though sometime2, Wittgenstein, and certainly many of those who 
have interpreted his work, seems to veer towards a much more 
relativist conclusion here than Davidson perhaps because 
Wittgenstein takes 'forms of life' to have a greater immunity from 
interpretative indeterminacy than they actually do. Quine seems 
almost to make the same mistake in his notion of ontological 
relativity - see chapter nine below. 
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split. The mistake is to divorce human knowledge from the world by 
misunderstanding the manner in which knowledge is already in the 
world, 1n its embedding in the interpretative practice. Here we may 
return to Davidson to Bee that his reject.ion of the 2-cheme-content 
distinction is at one with his rejection of the notion of truth as 
a relation between sentences and the facts, or the world, or some 
other thing. 61 As Marie McGinn puts it: 
Thus, for Davidson, the attack on the empiricist 
not.ion of the evidence for· science is part of a 
general claim that the concept of truth as a relation 
between sentences and some independent thing 
("experience" or "reality'') is itself empty, and is 
anyway quiff 1...mnecessary to the aim of making truth 
objective. 
:1oavidson, 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', pp.193-194. 
'The Third Dogma of Empiricism', p.94. It is to be noted that 
some ~lement of ·correspondence' still remains in the Davidsonian 
conception of truth - see e2-pecially 'True to the Facts'. However 
the correspondence which remains is very different from the 




TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND VERIFICATIONISH 
£Jav.idson am T.ranscementa.l Argumentat.ion 
Al though he does not make much of the point, Davidson 
refers to the argument against untranslatability as a 
'transcendental arg1..1ment' 1 and many other readers of Davidson have 
taken the argument in the same way. Colin McGinn , 2 Richard Rorty, 3 
and Hilary Putnam4 all agree on the transcendental status of 
Davidson's argument. 
In many respects it seems quite natural to view, not only 
Davidson's argument against relativism but also the argument 
against scepticism, as transcendental; especially if one views 
those arguments - particularly the arguments against scepticism -
as providing a sort of justification for the principle of charity. 
For as we saw 1n chapter two charity is not and cannot be justified 
on any empirical grounds - the interpretation req1..1ired in order to 
1
'in Defence of Convention T', p.72; Davidson does not, of course, 
develop the argument itself in this paper but in a footnote to this 
comment in TI he direct~. the reader to 'On the Very idea of a 
C~nceptual Scheme' and 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics'. 
3 'Charity, Interpretation and Belief', p.522. Especially in 'Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference and 
Pragmatism·, Transcendental A.rquments and Sci ence, ed. P .Bieri, 
R~-P.Horstrnann and L.KrOger, Dordrec.ht., Holland. 1979 , pp. 95-99 . 
.Real i .... c:m and .Reason, pp. 191-196. 
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gather any empirical evidence either for or against charity must 
presuppose the principle itself. Here is the essence of the idea 
that charity might be a 'transcendental' presupposition: a 
principle justified by a tran~.cenclental argument. For if charity is 
not justified empirically it is justified insofar as without it 
interpretation would not be possible and neither would 
communication, discursive understanding, or language itself. As 
Davidson comments "What makes interpretation possible, then, is the 
fact that we can dismiss a priori the chance of massive error". 5 
And of course Davidson's account of interpretation 1s not 
restricted to the inter-lingual level but applies also to 
interpretation 'within' a language. Thus the employment of charity 
is necessary for our own understanding at home as much as for 
understanding abroad. In the course of developing an argument very 
similar to Davidson's, Martin Hollis puts the point nicely when he 
says: 
... what is here true of two languages applies equally 
to one ... we are seeking 1.-i priori6condi tions for the possibility of language in general. 
It is this justification of charity as a necessary 
precondition for the possibility of interpretation which leads to 
the argument 1n support of charity being regarded as 
transcendental. For typically a transcendental argument is taken to 
be an argument which moves from possibility to necessity - from the 
idea of a thing to that which is necessary for that thing to be. It 
is this aspect of transcendental argumentation which seems to be 
~'Thought and Talk', pp.168-169. 
'Reason and Ritual', Rationality~· eel. Bryan Wilson, Oxford, 1970, 
p.230. 
233 
captured in the aristotelian notion of 'hypothetical necessity' .7 
Thus Davidson can be taken as arguing from the possibility of 
language, interpretation, cornmunication, to the necessity of 
agreement and of most of our beliefs being true. 
Moreover the idea that Davidson's argument8 does concern 
the possibility of language 1 or, more generally, interpretation or 
understanding, gives added weight to the view that the argument is 
a transcendental one. Transcendental arguments are most 
characteristically employed in the attempt to demonstrate 
conditions for the possibility of knowledge9 or for the possibility 
of language or understanding . Thus Ji •• Phillips Griffiths defines 
transcendental deductions as arguments "directed to showing that 
some a priori principle is necesary to the possibility of claiming 
that some class of judgements is objective" 1 O and characterises 
transcendental arguments more generally as arguments "to the 
7 Aristotle, IJe Parti.bus Ani111al .ium ( The #or.ks oI Ar.1'...c:totle, vol. 5, 
ed. J.A.Smith and W.D.Ross), trans. William Ogle, Oxford, 1912, 
639-' 25-64(1> 10: "For there is absolute necessity, manifested in 
eternal phenomena; and there is hypothetical necessity, manifested 
in everything that is generated by nature as in everything that is 
produced by art, be it a house or what it may. For if a house or 
other such final object is to be realized, it is necessary that 
such and such material shall exist; and it is necessary that first 
this and then that shall be produced, and first this and then that 
set in motion, and so on in continuous succession, until the end 
and final result is reached, for the sake of which each prior thing 
is produced and exists. As wi th the productions of art, so also is 
ig with the productions of nature ... " 
By 'argument' here and in succeeding pages where I discuss 
Davidson's 'transcendental argument' i am really referring to that 
cluster of arguments deriving from interpretative holisrn which are 
employed against scepticism, relativism and related ideas and which 
c~n be ~een as pr:-o~iding ~n ,d priori" justification of charity'. 
See Kant, t.r.1 t.1que o.t Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp-Smith, 
London, 1933, Al 2/B25: "I entitle transcendental al 1 knowledge 
which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our 
knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be 
possible a pr.1or.11'. 
23 4 
conclusion that the truth of some principle is necessary to t he 
possibility of the successful employment of a specified sphere of 
discourse". 11 In this respect transcendental arguments are also 
typically employed against the sceptic as a way of justifying the 
beliefs or concepts to which we are committed: 
[They] are supposed to refute the sceptic by showing, 
as against copnceptual relativism, that certain 
conceptual or lingu i stic frameworks have priority over 
others, and that the E-.pplication of certain concepts 
or linguistic structures is a necessary con1~tion for 
all talk about 'knowledge' and 'experience'. 
Generally speaking all of these features do indeed seem to be 
present in Davidson's case : the feature of hypothetical necessity; 
the concern with understanding and knowledge: and the 
anti-sceptical, anti-relativi2tic orientation. 
Yet admittedly t his is to take a fairly broad view of the 
nature of transcendental argumentation and it must be noted thcit 
for many philosophers Davidson's argument will not count as 
transcendental from the very start. Jonathan Bennett would not 
count the argument as transcendental insofar as it is not (or not 
primarily) "an argument concerned to rebut some form of scepticism 
by proving something about the necessary conditions for 
self-knowledge, self-consciousness, or the like". 13 Bennett thus 
emphasises the central ro l e of the unity of apperception in Kant's 
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Moltke S. Gram would 
1 O 'Transcendental Ar'<"Juments' , Proceedinqs oI t./Je Ar.i.._c;totel i an 
Sffiety, supp. vol. 43 ( 1969) p. 166. 
12 Ibid , p . 1 6 7 . P.Bieri, R.-P.Horstmann and L.Kruger, 'Editorial Introduction ' , 
Tf39nscendental Arguments and Science, p. vii. 
'Analytic Transcendent al Arguments ' , Tr..9ns cenden tal Arguments 
and Science, p. 50. 
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similarly refuse to count the argument as transcendental in virtue 
of a much narrower definition of the notion which would tie the 
idea of transcendental argumentation even more closely to Kant . 14 
Moreover J.J.Maclntosh has pointed out that the characterization of 
transcendental ari:rumentation given by A.Phillips Griffiths and 
quoted above is so broad that it allows almost anything to count as 
a transcendental argument. 15 Indeed, on this account, almost any 
argument involving hypothetical necessity could be made out to be 
transcendental. 
Given the lack of agreement as to how to use the term 
'transcendental· perhaps we ought to regard the question of the 
transcendental status of Davidson's argument as merely a 
terminological or classificatory quibble and move on to other 
issues. Certainly Davidson himself, while he mentions the fact that 
he considers his argument ( in 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme' at least) to be transcendental, makes the comment only in 
passing; he merely directs attention to the point and says no more 
about it. However the issue 1s an important one, not because it is 
important to be able to say 'yea' or 'nay' to the question whether 
the argument is transcendental, but because there are a number of 
other related and substantive issues which are involved. Thus it 1s 
not particularly important for my purposes here to defend the broad 
conception of transcendental argumentation which allows Davidson's 
argument to count a~. transcendental against the objections of Gram, 
MacIntosh and others. Many of these objections have much in their 
i:'Transcendental Arguments', NoOs, 1 (1971), especially pp,15-20. MacIntosh, 'Transcendental Arguments', Proceed.inqs o[ t/Je Ar.istotel .ian 5oc.iety, supp. vol. 43 ( 1969) pp. 185-186. 
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favour. But it is not the terminologi cal question which is at 
issue. If I label Davidson's argument 'transcendental' it is on the 
clear understanding that this is a very broad use of that label. In 
fact, as will become evident in the following pages, Davidson's 
broadly 'transcendental' argument does undermine the possibility of 
certain narrower (and perhaps terminologically more 'correct') 
forms of transcendental argumentation - specifically the sort of 
'transcendental deduction' to be found in Kant's Cr.it.ique of Pu.re 
Reason. 
In discussing scepticism in chapter six I pointed out 
that scepticism arises out of the idea of there being a separation 
between subjective and objective components of knowledge. 
Traditional epistemology attempts to answer the sceptic by 
providing some sort of connection between these separate 
components: the aim of epistemology is the justification or 
legitimation of our claims to know. Such legitimation is just what 
the Kantian Transcendental Deduction can be seen as attempting to 
provide. Thus Kant presents the Deduct ion as concerned with the 
question of our 'right' to the employment of certain basic 
concepts16 and he presents the aim of the Deduction as the 
demonstration of the 'objective validity' of those concepts. In 
this respect the Kantian Deduction can be viewed as an attempt to 
provide a necessary foundation for knowledge - a foundation in the 
necessity of the System of Categories. Such foundationalist 
16concepts set out in the Metaphysical Deduction, Lr.itique o.F Pure Reason, A70/B95-A83/B11. Kant distinguishes the question of right 
addressed by the Transcendental Deduction, the quaesr..10 ]lJr.J',__c;, from the quaest.10 f-~~ct.i (the question regarding the fact that we have certain concepts and the manner 1n which they were acquired ) 
which is the concern of empirical deduction, A.84/B116- i\.85/BllS. 
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epistemology is of course opposed by Davidson - so too does he 
reject the scheme-content distinction which underlies such 
foundational ism 1n general and Kantian foundational ism in 
particular. 17 
Indeed the whole Kantian project arises out of a 
conception of knowledge as a product of reason and sensibility - a 
product of empirical intuition and categorial ~.ynthesis. The 
scheme-content distinction thus provides the framework for the 
problem of the Tranf!,cenclental Deduction: the aim of the Deduction 
is to provide an "explanation of the manner in which concepts can 
. . . relate <.9 priori to objects". 18 Such a conception of 
transcendental argumentation does 1 n fact seem to be the 
traditional conception - generally transcendental arguments aim at 
establishing the validity or necessity of some conceptual scheme. 
Yet if that is ~.o then DaviclE,on' s argument cannot be a 
transcendental argument as traditionally conceived. Indeed it will 
actually be opposed to traditional forms of transcendental 
argumentation - Kant's included. 
However the transcendental issue is also tied up with the 
question as to whet.her there 1s an element of verificationism in 
Davidson's work. One of the moBt common reactions to Davidson's 
argument especially the argument against an untranslatable 
language - is that. the argument is plainly verificationist (the 
charge 1s more generally directed at the principle of charity as 
such19 and perhaps we might see elements of it in the claim that 
17see Richard Rorty 'Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference and 
Pfggmatism ·. 
Ibid. , A85/B117. 
charity is just a form of ethnocentrism ) . Thus it might be objected 
that the argument against an untranslatable language can, at most , 
only show that we could not come to know of, could not verify, the 
existence of some untranslatable language - it cannot demonstrate 
that one such could not exist; the claim 1s that only a 
verificationist premise could turn this into an argument against 
the very idea of an untranslatable language. 
According to some philosophers, however, transcendental 
arguments typically employ some verif icationist premise - Barry 
Stroud claims that they ultimately reduce to a verif icat.ionist 
claim. 20 Indeed Jonathan Bennett has claimed that Kant himself 
~rgues from a verificationist position. 21 The question a.bout the 
verificationist nature of Davidson's account is thus itself tied up 
with the transcendental problem. If Davidson's argument 1s 
transcendental then the inference which philosophers such as Barry 
Stroud would put to us 1s that the argument 1s also 
verificationist. And the verificationism question is clearly not 
just a terminological issue since for many philosophers the taint 
of verificationism 1s enough to firmly discredit any argument to 





whether Davidson's argument lS a 
lS not a mere terminological or 
classificatory quibble. The question relates directly to an 
19
see Kim Sterelny, 'Davidson on Truth and Reference', p.109: "a SJilQCies of verificationism renamed the principle of charity". 
L Barry Stroud, 'Transcendental Arguments' , Journal of-- P.h.il osop.hy, 65 ( 1968); see also J .J. Thomson, 'Private Languages', J1J11er.1can 
Ph.iloso}:Lh.ical (}ua.rt2rly, 1 (1964). See Rorty, 'Verificationism and Transcendental Arguments·, Nous, 1 ( 1971) for a summary and 
c2iticisrn of the arguments in these two papers. 
'.Analytic Transcendental Arguments', p.50. 
,-,-~9 L. .... , . 
important line of objection against the argument: the complaint of 
verificationism. Yet it also raises issues concerT1ing Davidson ' s 
rejection of foundationalist epistemology and his attack on the 
scheme-content distinction (ideas apparently tied up with 
transcendental argumentation). I will not be traditional 
particularly concerned with the question whether or not 
transcendental arguments are necessarily verificationist or not; 
but, on the other hand, I do think that answering the question 
about the possible tran2,cendentai status of Davidson's argument 
will lead to an better understanding of the nature of that argument 
itself. 
However, it lS with Kant. that the notion of 
transcendental argumentation has its origins. Indeed, as we have 
seen, the Kantian conception of transcendental deduction seems to 
come into direct conflict with the Davidsonian argument against 
relativism and scepticism: the argument against the scheme-content 
distinction. Thus it is v.1a Kant that I want to pursue the 
transcendental issue in relation to Davidson. In :particular I 
intend to examine an important line of objection to transcendental 
deductions in particular, and to a general form of transcendental 
argumentation, advanced by Stephan Korner. Korner' s claim is that 
transcendental deductions are impossible and in examining his 
arguments in support of this claim, as well as the arguments which 
Eva Schaper directs at Korr1er in turn, some interesting light will 
be shed on Davidson's position and its 'transcendental' status. As 
we shall see the argument which Schaper develop2, on the basis of 
Korner' s discussion of the impossibility of transcendental 
deduction turns out to be almost identical to Davidson's, own 
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supposedly 'transcendental' ar~ument. 
r.he Impo.ss.i.b.i.JJty of a T.ranscendenta.l Deduct.ion 
The Transcendental Deduction 1n Kant· s C.r.it.ique of Pu.re 
.Reason follows on directly from the Metaphysical Deduction. The 
Transcendental Deduction thus assumes the uniqueness of the set of 
categories for which it aims to provide a legitimation. Indeed the 
question of the uniqueness of the Table of Categories22 does not 
seem to arise in Kant; there can be only one derivation for the 
categories and that 1s the derivation from the Table of 
Judgement. 23 Consequently there can only be one Table of 
Categories. Elsewhere 1n his Critique Kant displays simiiar 
confidence in the correctness and uniqueness of Euclidean geometry 
and Newtonian physics. Yet just as, since Kant's time, Euclid and 
Newton have ceased to be the sole authorities in their respective 
fields so too has the un i que apriority of the Kantian Table of 
Categories come to be doubted. This must raise serious problems for 
the project of a transcendental deduction. For what is at stake in 
such a deduction is not the legitimation of any set of categories 
but the legitimation and demonstration of that set of categories 
which are necessary a p.r.zo.r.i for knowledge as such. If a 
transcendental deduction cannot assume the uniqueness of the 
conceptual or categorial scheme which it seeks to legitimate then 
it must itself demonstrate that uniqueness. The question of 
uniqueness thus becomes tied up with the question of legitimation. 
22As set out in Cr.it.ique of Pu.re .Reason, AE:0/B106. 23 Ibid , A70/B'34. 
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It is by focusing on this very que2.tion of uniqueness that Stephan 
K<:>orT1er argues that transcendental deductions in general - and 
Kant's in particular - are impossible. 24 
1;5 Korner characterises a categorial or conceptual schemeL-
in terms of +-!".~i:e being a ·method of external differentiation' (or 
a 'method of prior differentiation') which belongs to the scheme. 
Such a method is a means of differentiating, within a region of 
experience, between objects and their attributes (there are clear 
echoes of the 'organizing' metaphor here which I discussed earlier 
' 
in relation to the scheme-content distinction). 26 According to 
Korner providing a transcendental deduction of such a categorial 
scheme presupposes the possibility, first, of being able to 
establish a method of differentiation as belonging to the scheme 1n 
question, that is, being able to establish the scheme as suc.h27 
and, second but more importantly (for Korner's argument at least), 
24
'The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions', Hon.i .... c:t, 51 
(~~67), pp.317-331. 
Following Eva Schaper, 'Arguing Transcendentally', fi.~9nt-Stud.ien, 
63 ( 1972), I use the term ·scheme' rather than Korner' s term 
' ~. ·hema ' . 
L~see chapter four - pp.146-157 above. 2 Establishing that such a method belongs to a scheme is a matter 
of satisfying certain requirements discussed by Korner: a method of 
differentiation will belong to a categorial scheme if and only if, 
of the concepts which it employs, some are constitutive (tell us 
what is to count as an object) and some are individuating (tell us 
how to distinguish between objects). More specifically those 
concepts must be: in the case of constitutive concepts, 
'comprehensively applicable' - the concept must be applicable to 
external objects and its applicability must logically imply and be 
implied by the object's being an external object; and, in the case 
of individuating concepts, those concepts must be 'exhaustively 
individuating' - the concept must be applicable to every external 
obJect and its applicability must logically imply and be implied by 
the object's being distinct from every other external object. ( 'The 
Impossibi 1 i ty of Transcendental Declucti ems' , p. 317. Kt'>rner has also 
discussed these notions elsewhere, notably in the first chapter of 
his Cateqorial Framer.;orA:...c::, Oxford, 1974.) Although 'establi2.hing 
(Footnote continued ) 
242 
it presupposes the possibility of being able to demonstrate the 
uniqueness of the scheme. 28 In fact KorT1er defines a transcendental 
deduction 1n terms which emphasise the second of these two 
conditions: 
A transcendental argument can . . . be defined quite generally as a logically sound demonstration of the 
reasons why a particular categorial schema is not only in fact, but also necessarily 29mployed, in differentiating a region of experience. 
To demonstrate the uniqueness of a scheme is just to provide a 
demonstration of the necessity of that scheme in differentiating 
experience. As Kaner puts it the implication is that anJ,,. method of 
differentiation actually or possibly employed must belong to the 
scheme concerned. 30 · 
KBrner argues that there are, _pr.1m_9 f;.9c.ie, three ways 1n 
which a demonstration of such necessity or uniqueness could be 
attempted. What he endeavours to show is that in fact none of these 
ways are possible. His claim therefore consists specifically in the 
thesis that: 
27 (continued) 
the scheme' means exhibiting a method of differentiation as belonging to the scheme this is not to imply that one could have a 
scheme which lacked a method of differentiation (as Eva Schaper 
seems to think, 'Arguing Transcendentally', p.104 ) . A wethod of differentiation may perhaps exist without belonging to a categorial 
scheme provided such a method could exist. which, though it possessed individuating and constitutive concepts of a kind, lacked 
concepts which were exhaustively individuating and comprehensively 
applicable (whether such a possibility is conceivable may be open 
to doubt). A categorial scheme, however, could not exist without a 
method of differentiation, for a categorial scheme would seem to be just the embodiment of a method of differentiation, that is, of a 
method comprising concepts which are exhaustively individuating and 
comprehensively applicable ( 'The Impossibility of Transcendental D~~uctions', pp.318-320 ) . 
29 Ilu:d. , pp. 319-320 . 
.... 0 Ib.1d. , pp. 318-319 . 
.j Ibid. , pp. 319-320. 
... uniqueness demonstrations of a scheme by comparing 
it with undifferentiated experie .ce, by comparing it 
with other sch~ata, or by exam1n1ng it from within, 
are impossible. 
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The basic complaint which KcSrner makes to all three met.hods of 
uniqueness demonstration is that no such demonstration can rule out 
all possible competitors to the scheme in question (even 1f it 
might be possible to rule out some - and KcSrner does not concede 
that this 1s possible). Yet ruling out the possibility of any 
competing or alternative scheme 1s Just what a uniqueness 
demonstration must do. 
In the case of the first method - demonstration by 
compar1sori with undifferentiated experience - Korner points out 
that even if we could make sense of such comparison (and K5rr1er 
claims that we cannot32 ) it could still not provide a demonstration 
of uniqueness since: 
. . . even if there were und if fer ent i a ted e xper 1 ence , 
one could at best show that a certain schema 
'reflects' it, and 31gt that some other schema could not also reflect it. 
31 J.bid., p. 321. KcSrr1er points out that he is prepared to reduce 
his claim to this specific thesis "in order to avoid vague appeals 
to demonstrations of a categorial schema's uniqueness by other 
m~~hods, e.g. some mystical insight or some special Logic'' . 
.j As Korner writes: ''to demonstrate the schema's uniqueness by 
comparing it with experience undifferentiated by any method of 
prior di£ ferentiation . . . cannot be done since the statements by 
which the comparison would have to be made, cannot be formulated 
without employing some prior differentiation of experience" ( 'The 
Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions', pp.320-321). The 
problem is that, just as Davidson can make no sense of 'empirical 
content' as something which a conceptual scheme could 'organize· or 
'fit', so the notion of undifferentiated experience cannot be made 
intelligible as something with which comparisons can be made. 
Either no comparison 1s possible because one term of the 
comparison is missing - or the comparison must ultimately reduce to 
a comparison between the categorial scheme embodying a particular 
method of differentiation and some other method of differentiati on. 
'"'44 t. -
Indeed showing that no other scheme could not also 
'reflect' undifferentiated experience would seem to lead on to 
method two - to involve comparison between schemes. But such 
comparison cannot be successful in demonstrating the uniqueness of 
a scheme because it presupposes what we have no reason to 
presuppose: that all possible schemes - all possible competing 
schemes - can be exhibited. Moreover method three fares no better 
by Korner's account either since KBrner claims that the attempt to 
prove the uniqueness of a scheme by internal demonstration could at 
best: 
... only show how the scheme functions 1n the 
differentiation of a region of experience, not that it 
is the only possible schema to w~1jch every 
differentiation of the region must belong. 
Essentially Korner seems to argue that any demonstration 
of uniqueness either falls woefully short of its aim or, insofar as 
such a demonstration aims to rule out any possibi 1 i ty of there 
being other equally acceptable but different schemes, must involve 
a comparison between schemes. However K5rner holds that even such 
comparison cannot succeed primarily because of the impossibility of 
exhibiting every possible candidate for the title of · alternative 
conceptual scheme' and because of the consequent impossibility of 
carrying out an all-encompassing comparison . No matter how many 
schemes we examined there could still remain schemes we had not 
looked at and among those schemes there might turn out to be the 
one real al terr1ati ve which would force the abandonment of the idea 
of uniqueness. 
33.1..·J... . ' ..... 21 3 4 .Ll.l a. , P . _j • 
Ibid., p. 321. 
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In this respect Korner·s argument against the possibility 
of transcendental deduction seems to be echoed in Richard Rorty 's 
claim that transcendental arguments are always ad /iominem 
arguments; arguments directed at showing that some specific 
candidate for alternative scheme-hood is really just parasitic on 
the scheme we already employ. 35 As Rorty comments: 
All that the paradigmatic Kantian arguments do is to 
show that a given skeptic's alternative description of 
experience or knowledge only seems to make sense ... 
To show that eve.(:v alternative proposed had the ~.ame 
defect would be to kno~ in advance the range of the 
sceptic's imagination.-:i 
However while Rorty accept s that such ad /Jominem argument might 
indeed work 1n specific cases Kc'>rr1er tends to be much less 
sympathetic to such transcendental argumentation. In fact Korner 
claims that any attempt to demonstrate uniqueness by comparison 
with other schemes is self-contradictory since it assumes that 
there are other schemes to be exhibited and so attempts a 
demonstration of uniqueness "by conceding that the scheme was not 
unique". 37 
Clearly this is not how Rorty views things: he sees no 
difficulty in the idea that we might compare some scheme with a 
specific al terr1ati ve to show that the apparent alternative 1 s 
really no alternative at all - we can admit schemes as candidates 
for alternative scheme-hood (as possible alterr1atives) without 
thereby conceding that such schemes are real alternatives. 38 Indeed 
JS,u ' f ' t · . d d t l A t ' 5 6 d ver1 1ca 1on1sm an Transcen en a rgurnen s, pp. - ; an 
'Transcendental Arguments , Self-Reference and Pragmatism', pp.82-83 
a~g p. 99. 
37 'Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference and Pragmatism', p.82. 
'The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions', p.321. 
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we would not normally regard this sort of ruling-out of 
alternatives by comparison as problematic. Yet it is problematic in 
this case and what makes it problematic is that KBrner sees the 
question of demonstrating uniqueness as separate from the question 
of establishing the scheme. A demonstration of uniqueness by 
comparison with other schemes thus presupposes that those other 
schemes have been established, that is, established as schemes in 
their own right. Thus the question of their viability as 
independent schemes must be decided prior to any attempt to 
demonstrate the uniqueness of the original scheme and the question 
of uniqueness must already have an answer - in the negative. It is 
in this sense that a demonstration of uniqueness by comparison must 
be self-contradictory. 
However what I think is connected with this objection 
against the second method (and perhaps underlies it) is KBrner' s 
be 1 ief that in fact there are alternative conceptual schemes to 
that embodied in the Kantian table of categories. Thus while KBrner 
does not accept that one can demonstrate uniqueness by comparison 
with other possible schemes he does think that this method can and 
does yield a demonstration of non-uniqueness; he writes that: 
The most convincing way to expose Kant's failure to give a transcendental deduction of the schema of 
external differentiation established in the r,: rit.ique 
of Pure Reason, is simply to provide an exa"Jg1e of a different method of external differentiation.~ 
And KBrner goes on to do just this, or so he claims, by presenting 
relativistic quantum mechanics as embodying an alternative method 
38This is a point which Schaper makes much of, 'Arguing T3~nscendentally', p.107. 
'The Impossibility of Transcendental Deduction', p.325. 
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of differentiation to that set forth by Kant. 40 
That it is possible to provide this sort of demonstration 
of non-uniqueness is something which Eva Schaper denies. Indeed she 
claims that the very notion of comparison between schemes turns out 
to be unintelligible. Now Schaper claims to be able to show this on 
the basis of arguments which Korner himself employs41 but in fact 
it seems doubtful whether the arguments Schaper purports to find in 
K5rner can fairly be attributed to him. Yet in the present context 
that is somewhat by the way since, regardless of whether the 
arguments are to be £ ound 1 n Korner or not, they do demonstrate a 
fundamental incoherence in Korner·s approach; an incoherence 
deriving from the incoherence of the notion of comparison of 
schemes . Unfortunately for Schaper's defence of transcendental 
deduction this incoherence undermines, not only any attempt to 
demonstrate non-uniqueness, but any attempt to demonstrate 
uniqueness also. 42 
Korner claims that any attempt to demonstrate uniqueness 
by comparison must be self-contradictory: such a demonstration must 
concede that there are other schemes to make comparison with and 
this, according to Korner, is to concede the non-uniqueness of the 
original scheme. Now it is clear why Kc'>rT1er takes this view but it 
is not a view shared by Eva Schaper. Indeed if one ignores the 
relevance of K5rner' s distinction between the establishment of a 
scheme and a demonstration of uniqueness (as Schaper apparently 
4
°K5rner' s argues in the same fashion with respect to Kant's P~f ct i cal phi 1 osophy, .i.bid. , p. 3 2 6 . 
42 'Arguing Transcendenta~ly', pp. ·108-109. . . That Schaper does aim to defend a Kantian conceot1on of 
transcendental deduction is quite clear, ilud., pp. 110£ £. 
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does) then Korner's objection will seem completely unfounded. Thus 
Schaper takes the view that one can attempt a comparison without 
conceding non-uniqueness: the question 1s whether the schemes 
offered as candidates for alternative scheme-hood really are 
alternatives or whether they are merely apparent alternatives which 
can be shown to reduce to the original scheme. If they can be so 
reduced then the existence of such apparent alternatives 1s no 
threat to the uniqueness of the scheme. (This is the line I 
considered briefly above. ) 
The problem, however, 1s to distinguish the real from the 
merely apparent ·competitors'? What we need is some criterion by 
means of which we can sort out the really competing scheme.B from 
the merely apparent alterriatives. Yet we could only be 1n 
possession of such a criterion if we could exhibit the necessary 
preconditions for the possibility of experience as such, or, to be 
precise, for the possibil ity of conceptualized experience43 (that 
which Kant calls, most generally, knowledge, or, more specifically, 
synthetic a pr.zor.z judgement). In other words a scheme will be 
ruled out as not a real scheme and thus as not a competing 
alternative if it can be shown that the purported scheme fails to 
satisfy some necessary feature of a categorial scheme - a feature 
which is necessary to the possibility of conceptualized experience 
as such ( in addition, as I said above, a scheme will be ruled out 
as a competitor if it can be shown to reduce to or be parasitic on 
the original scheme in question ) . 
43 1 speak of 'conceptualized experience' to make clear that by 
·experience· here I do not mean 'experience' as it 1s opposed to 
'conceptual scheme ' . 
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Yet it 1s just such necessary 'precond itions of 
experience' which are what we claim are embodied in the categorial 
scheme whose uniqueness we aim to demonstrate. This is precisely 
what the claim of the uniqueness and necessity of the scheme comes 
down to: that the scheme 1s necessarily employed in the 
differentiation of experience and hence that it is the necessary 
condition for the possibility of (conceptual i zed ) experience. Here 
the argument turns out to be circular. We aim to demonstrate 
uniqueness by comparison with possible alternatives such that those 
possible alternatives are shown not to really be alternatives at 
all. This means showing that such poss ible alternatives, if they 
are to be distinguished from the original scheme in question, al l 
fail to measure up to a criterion of scheme-hood which can only be 
supplied by the scheme whose uniqueness is to be demonstrated 1n 
the first place. Yet that criterion can only be supplied if the 
scheme in question is indeed unique. 
At this point it becomes evident that Korner's original 
distinction between 'establishing the scheme' and demonstrating the 
scheme· s uniqueness 1s an artificial one. Establishing the scheme 
as a scheme means showing that it measures up to a criterion of 
scheme-hood; g1 ven the aims of a transcendental deducti on that 
ought to mean showing that the scheme does embody certain necessary 
preconditions of experience. But of course showing this is t o show 
that the scheme concerned 1s unique or , better, it i s t o 
demonstrate its necessity. The demonstration of uniqueness is thus 
involved in the establishment of the scheme. 44 This point i s never 
44This takes a little further Korr1er's own objection t o Kant' s (Footnote continued ) 
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clear in KBrner· s discussion of the issues largely because he 
conceives of conceptual schemes as merely the embodiment of 
differing scientific conceptions: Kant's scheme embodies Newtonian 
physics; KBrner's alterr1at.ive scheme embodies the ideas of 
contemporary quantum theory. And al though such a view does have 
relevance here, at least to the understanding of Kant, it does seem 
to obs~ure the point that a conceptual scheme is supposed to 
incorporate the neces .... 'x7ry condit.ions £ or the possibility of 
experience. Certainly this is so with respect to Kant's 
'transcendental' project. Thus Schaper claims that insofar as 
KBrner appears insensitive to the problem of exhibiting the 
necessary conditions of experience so "he misrepresents the nature 
of transcendental deductions''. 45 
Yet having come this far it seems that an impasse 1s 
reached between Kant and KBrner. For the Kantian idea that the 
categories represent the necessary condi lions of experience is 
simply a reiteration of the claim that the categories are unique. 
On the other hand K5rner's argument against the possibility of 
being able to demonstrate uniqueness seems to consist in little 
more than an elaboration of K5rner 's own assumption that there is 
more than one categorial scheme available to us - for KBrner 
conceives of the notion of a categorial scheme in a way which 
appears to prejudge the issue in favour of non-uniqueness. 
The impasse could be broken if there was some other way 
44 (continued) 
"spurious distinction" between metaphysical 
transcendental deduction - see 'The Impossibility 
oiguction', p.317 and pp.327££. . 




of achieving the aim of a uniqueness demonstration - a way which 
did not invoive comparison. So we might be led to look once more at 
the third method of uniqueness demonstration - demonstration from 
within . However, as Schaper herself points out, method three must 
succumb to the same difficulty as that which undermines method two. 
For just as demonstration by comparison consists in showing that 
possible competitors are not genuine competitors because they do 
not satisfy certain preconditions so the only way of demonstrating 
uniqueness from within turns out to consist in showing that the 
scheme in question does satisfy certain preconditions. Yet here 
once again we are faced with the problem that those preconditions, 
on which the demonstration of uniqueness depends, are supposed to 
be embodied in the scheme whose uniqueness we want to demonstrate; 
the demonstration of uniqueness is thus dependent on the scheme 
being demonstrated to be unique. 
Recall that K5rner' s objection to method three was that 
such a demonstration could only show how a scheme works in the 
differentiation of experience and not that such a scheme was the 
only scheme that could perform that task. Schaper argues that what 
this means is that, since an internal demonstration must presuppose 
the scheme concerned (it operates from inside the scheme), so any 
conclusions arrived at in such a demonstration are valid only 
'within' the scheme concerned. Thus Schaper present·s Korner' s 
objection here as being that: 
We cannot . . . think outside the scheme in terms of 
which experience is organized, but this proves only 
that the scheme is the one we employ, not that it is 
the only one which could intelli~tbly fulfil the same 
function and serve the same ends. 
46 Ibid., p.108. 
252 
That "we cannot think outside the scheme'' 1s something 
which an internal demonstration, on this account, could exhibit; 
such a demonstration could show that some particular scheme is the 
scheme which as a matter of fac.t, we do use and which, indeed, we 
must use (although only in the sense that there 1s not as a matter 
of fact any other scheme available to us). However K5rner's claim, 
as Schaper presents it, is that this would not rule out the 
possibility of some alternative scheme existing; albeit a scheme 
which we could never have access to. It is our entrapment within 
our own scheme which 1s the problem here and it reflects the 
circularity of any attempt at a uniqueness demonstration. Such a 
demonstration seems to require some neutral point outside of our 
own scheme from which comparison could be made and demonstration 
could be carried out . We cannot do this and so are left within the 
circle according to which we must presuppose our scheme in order to 
demonstrate its uniqueness. So, at any rate, does Schaper present 
Korner's argument as running . 
Schaper, however, takes up the point that "we cannot 
think outside the scheme in terms of which experience is organised" 
and, having attributed this point to Korner, she argues that Korner 
attempts to do just thus, to think outside the scheme, while he 
also insists on its impossibi 1 i ty. Accardi ng to Schaper, K5rner 
argues that, given some scheme, we will be unable to state any 
alterr1atives to the scheme except in terms of that scheme (in 1..Jhich 
case they cannot be alternatives ) but that does not rule out the 
existence of genuine al terT1ati ves - it simply means that they wi 11 
be unstatable relative to that scheme. Schaper' s point is that 
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unstatable alternatives of this sort cannot, however , be relevant 
here since such alternatives cannot be made intelligible. The 
noti c,;·r of their existence cannot be made sense of since sense 
belongs only within the scheme. 
Kc:>rner is thus claimed to be asserting both that sense 
can only be given to questions arising {,I.it/Jin a scheme and that 
sense can be given to a question arising outside a scheme - the 
question whether alternatives exist. Properly speaking such an 
'external' question not only lacks an answer but it also fails to 
count as a question: 
There is therefore a certain incoherence in Kc:>rT1er' s 
rejection of the third method, which is perhaps of the 
kind Carnap had in mind when he said that the question 
of alternative schemes is a noncognitive issue: that 
is, for Carnap no st?nse can be attached to the 
question whether the scheme in use is unique. This is 
perhaps more consistent with Kc:>rner' s view than the 
argument he actually deploys against the third method. 
To speak of falsifying and in that sense disproving a 
uniqueness claim must be as suspect as speaking of 
proving it: to argue about alterr1atives must be at 
least4~s "non-cognitive" as to maintain the absence of them. 
Schaper reformulates this line of argument by presenting 
it in a linguistic context. We can imagine, she says, alternative 
languages which are used to describe or account for phenomena and 
which are intertranslatable so that everything that can be said in 
the one language can be said in the other. Yet such alternative 
languages could hardly be said to embody alternative categorial 
schemes in the sense K5rner requires since they would merely 
reproduce the same scheme in different linguistic dress and would 
47 Ib.id., p.109. Schaper's reference to Carnap is to 'Empiricism, 
Semantics and Ontology' , Hean.znq and .Necessity, Chicago, 1956. 
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be limited by the same constraints. Indeed for translati on to be 
possible, argues Schaper, it would seem that there must be certain 
shared features common to the languages to be translated: 
For it might be argued that any translation, 
considered simply as such, presupposes what might be 
called "general principies of significance" shared by 
both original and translation. If Korner meant 
"alternative" in this sense, therefore , the force of 
his attack is cons i derably reduced . . . On the other 
hand what is certainly true is that if a categorial 
scheme is proposed which is incompatible with t~gse 
principles, it must be rejected as an alternative. 1 
At this point the similarity between Schaper's arguments 
against Korner and Davidson's arguments against conceptual 
relativism become obvious. In summarizing her argument Schaper 
writes: 
Either, then, alternative schemes are merely variants 
within a pattern of features necessary to all 
experience, which are the features transcendental 
deductions are essentially concerned with, or they 
must escape the restrictions on intelligibility ,49 if such exist, which must be satisfied by any scheme. 
So, either an alternative scheme is really reducible to the scheme 
which we employ (which is the scheme the transcendental deduction 
attempts to legitimate as embodying those features necessary to all 
experience) or that alternative is not a genuine scheme: either way 
it is no alternative. This line of argument fits neatly with 
Davidson's comment on 'On the Very idea of a Conceptual Scheme' 
that: 
... nothing, it may be said, could count as evidence 
that some form of activity could not be interpreted in 
our language that was not at the same time evidence 
that that form of activity was not speech behaviour. 
I£ this were right , we probably ought to hold t hat a 
!~'Arguing Transcendentally', pp.109-110 . 
.lb.id. , p . 11 0 . 
form of activity that cannot be interpreteg
0 
as 
language in our language is not speech behaviour. 
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So either an untranslatable ('alternative') language is 
really translatable into our own language or it is not translatable 
at all and so not a language: either way it is not an 
untranslatable ('alternative') language. Similarly Schaper's point 
that translation presupposes 'general principles of significance' 
shared by both original and translation seems to closely parallel 
the Davidsonian employment of the principle of charity - the 
requirement of agreement as the possibility of interpretation. 
However the- apparent convergence of the views of Davidson and 
Schaper at this point ultimately masks a crucial and profound 
divergence in their positions - a divergence which leads Schaper to 
defend transcendental argumentation and consequently the idea of 
uniqueness and which must also lead to a final recognition of the 
anti-transcendental (in the narrower sense of the term) element in 
Davidson's own position. 
After stating the dilemma which faces any attempt to 
demonstrate the non-uniqueness of a categorial scheme - the dilemma 
of attempting to state unstatable alternatives or stating no 
alternative at all - Schaper writes: 
If categorial schemes, therefore, depend upon but do 
not include in their formulation what I have called 
principles of significance, the question of uniqueness 
becomes a question about the relation between these 
principles and the schemes which depend on them. This 
question, it seems to me, can only be answered as an 
i nterT1al question, to b~ argued out in a manner 
an..9Joqous to method three. 1 
~~'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.185. 
'Arguing Transcendentally', p.110. 
256 
So Schaper does think that sense can be attached to the uniqueness 
question after all; provided that it is understood as a question 
about the requirements of intelligibility. Schaper thus conceives 
of a true transcendental argument as an argument which attempts to 
exhibit the principles of intelligibility which place necessary 
restrictions on the choice of categorial schemes open to us: 
Whether something can be envisaged as an alternative 
to a scheme depends on whether it is intelligible as 
an alternative, and this can only be the case if it 
does not violate certain m1n1mum standards of 
intelligibility common to both schemes ... To bring 
out these limitations and restriction~. on the choice 
open to us is, it 2.eerns to m~2 what a · proof of uniquenes~.' should be e1.ttempti ng. 
What is in quest i t)n 1n a transcendental deduction is 
whether a particular cacegorial scheme 1s unique. It is not 
particularly important wha t form this scheme takes in its details 
the important point is t hat we assume that it is the scheme we 
employ which is in quest~on. Now Schaper apparently acknowledges 
the problems of the three methods of attempted un1cp..1eness 
demonstration and she righc ly points out that .iI any method were to 
be possible it would be method three53 demonstration by 
examination from within the scheme (it also seems correct to say 
that this method, or some analogue of it, is the method actually 
pursued by Kant). Yet while Schaper acknowledges even the 
objections against this t hird method she nevertheless presents a 
method 'analogous· to this as providing some ground for a 
demonstration of uniqueness. For Schaper does claim that the 
~~ Ib.id. , p. 111 and p. 112. 
She claims that methods one and t-wo must both reduce to method 
three - .ibid. , pp. 105-108. 
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question of uniqueness can be answered by a exhibition of the 
principles of intelligibility which any scheme must satisfy and 
which will be satisfied by the categorial scheme which we do 
employ. Exhibiting those principles and exhibiting them as 
satisfied by the scheme 
demonstration as doing. 
is what Schaper sees a uniqueness 
Schaper distinguishes between categorial schemes and 
those 'general principles of significance' upon which they depend 
but which are not included in the forrnulation of those schemes54 
and this distinction seems to lend some p.r:ima f-acie plausibility to 
the claim that a uniqueness demonstration is in some sense still 
possible - that is, by examining the relation betr.Jeen a scheme and 
those general principles. Yet this _pr.illk..9 .f~9c_ie plausibility can be 
no more than that. For given a distinction between scheme and 
general principles of significance the question of uniqueness 
ceases to be a question about the uniqueness of a scheme to devolve 
instead onto the question of the urnqueness of just those general 
principles of significance. Here the very same problems which 
threatened the demonstration of the uniqueness of a categorial 
scheme threaten once more. 
The question which a transcendental deduction aims to 
answer is the question of the possibility of knowledge itself and 
this is a question about the objective validity of the subjective 
conditions of thought. Thus a deduction aims to demonstrate or to 
deduce the necess.ifJ? 0£ those subjective conditions for thought as 
such. Those subjective conditions are the ultimate conditions which 
S 4 J.b id. , p . 11 0 • 
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make thought possible; whi ch make experience possible. If ~,cha per 
distinguishes a categorial scheme from general principles of 
significance on which a scheme depends then those general 
principles are what stand as the subjective conditions to be given 
a deduction of; if no such distinction is made, as in Kant, then 
the categorial scheme must be taken to stand as the subjective 
condition 1n question. Whichever, what 1s required 1s a 
demonstration of necessity , of uniqueness. Only then will the 
transcendental task of leg i t im,:;.tion have been completed. 
Yet although the attempt to demonstrate non-uniqueness 
results 1 n di lemma and paradox the attempt to demonstrate 
uniqueness cannot avoid c i rcularity. Ultimately both attempts at 
demonstration, either of un iqueness or non-uniqueness, must assume 
the objective validity and necessity ('uniqueness') which, 
respectively, they aim to disprove or to prove. Thus the task of 
legitimation can neither be demonstrated to be predicated on a 
false assumption - that certain subjective conditions have no 
objective validity - nor can legitimation be carried out. In 
Schaper' s case the demons tration that some scheme does satisfy 
certain general principles of significance does not achieve the aim 
of the transcendental proof but, ironically, achieves only a 
demonstration of, what Korner calls, the non-unique apriority of 
the scheme. 55 It demonstrates that , g.1 ven certain general 
principles, the scheme in question is a priori and can be justified 
1n its employment. Yet this is only given those general principles 
of significance. 56 
55
see 'The Impossibili t y of Transcendental Deductions', pp.327ff . 
Ultimately it seems that something like the claim which 
Schaper attributes to Carnap is pretty close to the truth here: 
namely that ''no sense can be attached to the question whether the 
scheme in use is unique'' and equally no sense can be attached to 
the question whether it is not. To attach a sense to such questions 
would mean being able to provide some specification of uniqueness 
which would not be circular and this, we have seen, is not possible 
- not so long as the aim is to legitimate a particular categorial 
scheme or set of beliefs. That we cannot make sense of the question 
of uniqueness itself is just the conclusion which we would expect 
given Davidson's arguments against the very idea of a conceptual 
scheme. For as Davidson says: 
... we have found no int;:.iligible basis on which it 
can be said that schemes are different if we 
cannot intelligibly say that the57 are di£ ferent neither can we say that they are one.-
56something akin to this circularity, which here seems to be a 
problematic feature of transcendental deductions, is identified by 
Jaakko Hintikka and also by Rudiger Bubner as in fact an essential 
characteristic of transcendental argumentation as such. As Bubner 
and Hintikka see it transcendental arguments, insofar as they 
attempt to prove the objective validity of certain principles or 
concepts as necessary to the possibi 1 i ty of know ledge, language, 
understanding or whatever, must themselves presuppose the validity 
which they attempt to prove. Unless the basic concepts we employ 
are objectively valid we will be unable to deploy any argument 
which relies on those concepts - and where the concepts concerT1ed 
are fundamental to the possibility of language or knowledge then so 
they will also be fundamental to the possibility of argument 
itself. As Hintikka puts it: "The conclusion (the possibility of 
certain conceptual practices) is arrived at by reasoning which 
itself relies on those practices. The conclusion makes possible the 
very argument by means of which it is established" ('Transcendental 
Arguments: Genuine and Spurious', M:n)s, p.278). Transcendental 
arguments are, in Bubner's term, 'self-referential' (see 'Kant, 
Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Deduction', Review o[ 
Hetap./Jys.ics, 28 (1975) p. 467) for in referring to the preconditions 
of knowledge, experience, language or understanding, they refer to 
the preconditions of their own possibility. This feature of (Footnote continued ) 
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If we cannot clearly distinguish between schemes then the very idea 
of uniqueness or non-uniqueness can make no sense. Indeed the very 
idea of a conceptual or categorial scheme becomes problematic and 
in this respect the idea of an internal demonstration of uniqueness 
faces the difficulty that it appears there is nothing £or such a 
demonstration to be 'internal' to. 
Of course the reason why we cannot intelligibly say that 
schemes are the same or different (in the global sense at least) is 
that there can be no unique way of interpreting the attitudes which 
speakers possess. In this respect it is thus the indeterminacy of 
interpretation which underrnines the possibility of a uniqueness 
demonstration. Even if we regard Davidson's own argument as in some 
sense 'transcendental' and as providing a demonstration of 'the 
general principles of significance' on which interpretation or 
language rests, sti 11 it does not provide a demonstration with 
56 (continuecl) 
transcendental argumentation clearly follows from the conception of such arguments as involving a notion of hypothetical necessity where it is the possibility of something like knowledge or language as such which is at issue. In this respect transcendental arguments can be seen as working insofar as the preconditions they attempt to exhibit must be the preconditions for any argument whatsoever - for any argument opposed to the conclusion of a transcendental argumer1t as well as for transcendental argument itself. The preconditions exhibited are the preconditions of intelligibility. Where this feature becomes problematic, however, is where that attempt is made to deduce the necessity of some specific conceptual scheme - where a deduction of a scheme's uniqueness is attempted. This is what has become evident in our reconstn..1ction of the dispute between K5rT1er and Schaper: the attempt to demonstrate the uniqueness of a scheme must presuppose that the scheme does in fact embody the basic principles of intelligibility common to all schemes and yet this is just what the attempt at a uniqueness demonstration is supposed to prove. Here is the inescapable circularity of transcendental deduction. It is a circularity which Schaper's arguments bring to our attention but it is also a circularity to which Davidson ' s as~ument against relativism (in :part.~cular) points. 
'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.198. 
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respect to any one set of beliefs or concepts. What it can be s een 
as exhibiting is the necessity of charity - of overall agreement 
and truth - but charity does not consist in the requirement of 
agreement or truth with respect to specific beliefs but with 
respect only to the belief system as a whole. The requirements of 
charity can always be satisfied in more than one way and that 1s 
why char1 ty does not do away with the indeterminacy of 
interpretation. The charitable constraint is a holistic one and it 
is holism which is the obstacle to the determinate interpretation 
of speakers. 
I noted above that Richard Rorty conce1 ves of 
transcendental arguments as al ways ad /Jom.inem arguments - as 
arguments which demonstrate not the absolute uniqueness of a 
conceptual scheme but which attempt to show that some particular 
scheme which 1s claimed to be an alternative to our present 
conceptual scheme is actually reducible to or parasitic on that 
scheme which we already Pc)c.•oeoo ......,......, ,_i..:_, • Rorty claims that Davidson's 
'transcendental' argument, while it is not an argument which aims 
to legitimate some some particular conceptual scheme 58 , lS 
nevertheless a transcendental argument which operates in a similar 
ad hom.inem fashion. As Rorty sees it Davidson's argument against 
the scheme-content distinction - and which also operates against 
scepticism and against relativism - works by showing that there is, 
at the moment, no better conception of truth than that embodied in 
58Arguments which do attempt such legitimation Rorty terms 
'realist' transcendental arguments - to be distinguished from what Rorly sees as the 'pragmatist' version of transcendental 
argumentation employed by Davidson, 'Transcendent al Argument s, Self-Reference and Pragmatism', p.79 and p.83. 
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Tarski' s Convention T and there is no other way than in terms of 
the Tarskian 'is true' to cash out the metaphors employed to 
characterize the scheme-content relation ('organizing', 'fitting', 
etc.). Similarly the only going criterion of language-hood is 
translatability. Rorty claims: 
There is no general argument against the 
scheme-content distinction. There are simply the same 
sort of arguments which have always been given against 
attempts by the sceptic to "pretend to use a 
conceptual scheme while quiet5~ rejecting one of the conditions of its employment ... 
The first point to make here 1s that traditional 
transcendental arguments, which according to Rorly operate as ad 
/Jominem arguments, cannot be made sense of on the Davidsonian 
account since no sense can be given to the idea of comparison 
between schemes - not even to the sort of comparison which attempts 
to show one scheme to be parasitic on another. More important, 
however, 1s the point that the argument which leads to this 
conclusion - the argument against the scheme-content distinction -
does not proceed merely by showing that certain specific metaphors 
reduce to the notion 'is true'. Neither does the argument against 
the idea of an untranslatable language work by demonstrating just 
that the only going criterion of language-hood is translatability. 
If that were so then maybe Davidson's arguments would be merely ad 
/Jominemdemonstrations. But the argument against the scheme-content 
distinction, the argument against relativism and scepticism, does 
not need to rely on a 'transcendental argument' of that form. 
Indeed the argument represents a quite general argument 
S 9 ibid , p. 9 9 . 
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against the very idea of the scheme- content distinction: such a 
distinction violates the fundamentally holistic nature of 
interpretation. The more specific arguments which Davidson offers 
against the idea of conceptual relativism, scepticism and so on all 
derive from the basic ideas of interpretative and attitudinal 
holism. It is because attitudes, meanings, behaviour and 
environment cannot be separated off from the single interpretative 
whole of which they are parts - because how the world is cannot. be 
considered independently of how speakers are - that one cannot 
separate off a conceptual scheme from some empirical content.. This 
1s the substance of Davidson's 'transcendental argument' and such 
an argument is not ad /Jominem in Rort y ' s sense - much as Rort.y 
would like it otherwise - although it is "a transcendental argument 
to end all transcendental arguments''. 60 
Davidson's 'transcendental argument' does not attempt to 
demonstrate the necessary absence of al terT1at.i ves to our own 
conceptual scheme for the notion of an 'alternative' scheme has 
been rendered senseless - together with the notion of a conceptual 
scheme itself. Yet in this respect the question of our scheme's 
'uniqueness' or 'non-uniqueness' ceases to be a problem. Thus 
Davidson's argument does, in a way, achieve the goal of the Kantian 
qlA.'ie ... qtio jlLrJS, but it achieves that legi ti mat.ion - shows that 
'most of our beliefs must be true· - by showing that legitimation, 
as the legitimation of t/J.1s scheme or just those beliefs, makes no 
real sense. And of course it is not just that we cannot attach a 
sense to the possibility of alternative belief systems or 
60AsRorty says, .1.f).Jd., p.99. 
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alternative schemes; legitimation 1s senseless insofar as the 
distinction on which it depends the distinction between 
subjective beliefs or concepts and objective 'experience' or 
'reality' - 1s itself senseless. 
Both K5rner and Schaper themselves point to the 
difficulty which arises in the first method of uniqueness 
demonstration of makinq sense of the idea of comparing categorial 
scheme~ with undifferentiated experience. From a Davidsonian 
perspective this difficulty merely points towards the more 
fundamental problem of making sense of the relation between a 
conceptual or categorial scheme and its content - of making the 
scheme-content distinction intelligible in itself. That we cannot 
make sense of ~.uch a distinction 1s a direct and necessary 
consequence of Davidson's holistic approach to language and the 
world. Yet of course the distinction between scheme and content is 
at the heart of the idea of a transcendental deduction as a 
deduction of the applicability of certain concepts to experience. 
Thus Davidson's holism operates against the traditional 
conception of transcendental arc::1umentation. Yet that holistic 
approach also suggests an interesting point of similarity between 
Davidson and Kant in particular. Clearly the distinction between 
scheme and content, subjective and objective, can have no major 
part to play in the Davidsonian pict.ure. Davidson .begins with a 
conception of interpretation as an holistic enterprise and proceeds 
to elicit the elements of that whole given their interconnection. 
Kantian transcendental argumentation, on the other hand, begins 
with an asst~ption of a separation of knowledge or .experience into 
its subjective and objective elements and only then attempts to 
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exh1bi t the unity of those elements. Nevertheless transcendental 
arguments of the Kantian 2.ort are preoccupied with the problem of 
the unity of knowledge61 and so too is Davidson preoccupied with 
the holistic unity of int.erpretation (the difference is that the 
Kantian project does beg :. n, at least on the surf ace , with the 
assumption of a separa t ion between subjective and objective 
elements). This does suggest a point of continuity between the 
Kantian and Davidsonian proJects; it also suggests a sense in which 
we might indeed consider : avidson's account to be a transcendental 
one and on very geed grounds. For the older notion of 
'transcendental' refers t ·::, trmt unity (the trans-categorial unity 
of Being, the unity of es ..::.enc<?, the unity of apperception62 ) which 
is the basis for knowledgt-_ and understanding. 
This preoccupat .:.on with unity provides an important link 
between Davidson and Kant. Fer in one sense the primary concern of 
the Kantian project in t he L--.:--.itique oI Pure l?eason iz, the unitary 
structure of experience - the transcendental unity of apperception 
is the binding material 1n t hat unity as well as its focus. But 
Kant faced an insurmount s bls problem in this respect, for having 
set out his conception of e~{pt?.rience as a product of two elements -
61 A point which Schaper emphasises against KcirTier, 'Arguing 
Tr~nscendentally', pp.115 -1 16 . 
bLOriginally, in scho l astic doctrine, the 'transcendental2i' ( transcendentalia) were noti,Jns applicable to any being whatsoever 
- they were notions applicable across all the categories. As the 
concept of the transcendental was taken up within seventeenth and 
eighteenth century metaphy,::ics it came to involve, not mere 
universality, but also apriority. It came to r e fer, in the 
essentialist metaphysics of Baumgarten, to the essence which wa~. 
the ground of the poss1 b1l 1ty of the existence and knowledge of 
things. It is a short st ep :rom Baumgarten to Kant on this matter 
at least. See Ange lell1, 'On the Origins of Kant's 
''Transcendental··· , A~'tntsrud.1 :?n, 63 ( 1972) . 
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sensibility and understanding - the difficulty was to get the two 
together. That this was a major problem for Kant was recognized by 
Hegel as well by subsequent philosophers such as Dilthey. Indeed it 
seems to have been a problem which Kant continually grappled with. 
If the importance of the concept of a unity to reason and 
understanding links Davidson and Kant it is their differing 
attitudes towards the scheme-content distinction which separates 
them. In Kant the tension between the idea of unity and the idea of 
the separation between the elements of knowledge (an idea which 
leads to what is often seen as Kant's 'faculty psychology') is 
quite clear - Kant's primary concern 1s the necessary unity of 
experience but the rift between concepts and percepts proves an 
insurmountable barrier to such unity. 
For Kant concepts were conceived as rules, and the 
problem of the demonstration and legitimation of such rules was 
central to Kant's Lr.itique oI Pure Reason and to his practical 
philosophy also. Thus, in Kant, the problem of the relation between 
conceptual scheme and empirical content took on the form, also, of 
a problem about the relation between rules and their application. 
In an essay on the relation .beteeen theory and practice63 Kant 
writes: 
,. "' 
It is obvious that no matter how complete the theory 
may be, a middle term is required between theory and practice, providing a link and a transition from one 
to the other. For a concept of the understanding, 
which contains the general n..1le, must be supplemented 
by an act of judgment whereby the practitioner distinguishes instances 
6
~here the rule applie~. from 
those where it does not . 
bJ,o t~ c c · n 11e .ommon ~,ay i ng: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does 
in /(ant 's Po.l.1 t.1 cal fvrit.1 nqs, ed. Hans 
Cambridge, 1970, pp.61-92. 
not Apply in Practice' 
Rg!ss, . ~rans. H.B.Nisbet, 
J b.1 a, I p • 61 , 
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The problem Kant considers here seems not unrelated to the problem 
which leads Davidson to conclude that no prior ling1..nstic theory 
can ever be adequate f or the interpretation of a speaker's 
utterances such theories require application to specific 
instances of speech and 1n being so applied they require 
• C: 
modification also. 6 J 
In Book II of the Transcendental Analytic, 'The Analytic 
of Principles', in the lr.1t.ique oI Pure Reason and specifically in 
the Introduction to tha t Book ('Transcendent.al Judgment in 
.... 
General·) Kant makes much the same pointbb but here it is in the 
context of the relation between understanding and sensibility -
between concepts and intuitions. The problem is the application of 
concepts to intuitions: 
. . . pure concepts of understanding being quite 
heterogeneous from empirical intuitions, and indeed 
from all sensible intuitions, can never be met with in 
any intuition. For no one will say that a category, 
such as that of causality, can be intuited through 
sense and is itself contained in appearance. How then 
is the subsumpt.ion of intui lions under pure concepts, 
the appl.i;..7 t.ion of a category to appearances possible?b 
And this problem 1s resolved, supposedly, with the introduction of 
,. r· 
the schematism and the doctrine of judgment. bo The protlem which 
Kant attempts to deal wJxh 1n the schematism chapter is in many 
respects the fundamenta l and unresolved (because unresolvable ) 
problem of the (r.it-1qu2 as a whole - it is Just the problem of how 
65see 'A Nice Derangement of 
Copvention · . 
bb5 - 't . .f- r; -
6~ ee c.r..1 . ..1que o r'l.Lre .h€'ason, I Th --1 A1_'...,/B17., 71 1-, ... · r 1'7~ t/'' .1.1.Jll. ., ,J/ b-r. -.:,t,/ b ; / . 
ci .l.b..1d. , B177 /A138-B178 1 ;:. 13 '~1• 
Epitaphs' and 'Communication 
especially A133/Bl72 . 
and 
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synthetic a prJori judgments are possible. Yet Kant tells us that: 
This schematism of our understanding, in its 
application to appearances and their mere form, is an 
art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose 
real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever6~o allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze. · 
Martin Heidegger, whatever 'violence' he did do to Kant, was surely 
quite correct in locating the schemati2-m at the centre of the 
Critique and in suggesting that the mystery of the schematism was 
something from which Kant ultimately 'recoiled'. 70 
The problem raised by the Schematism can be seen as the 
same sort of problem as that which Davidson pointed to in asking 
after the nature of the relationship (and the nature of what is 
related) between conceptual scheme and empirical content, in 'On 
the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'. How indeed can concepts be 
related to non-conceptualised experience? The problem of this 
relation is not restricted to the Schematism, however, but as we 
saw earlier it is what comes up again in the transcendental 
deduction in the problem of legitimating the application of the 
Categories to objects. 71 But of course there can be no such problem 
for Davidson, for as he comments: 
In giving up the dualism of 2-cheme and world, we do 
not give up the world but reestablish unmediated touch 
with the familiar objects whoBe ~~tics make our 
sentences and opinions true or false. 
We re-establish such 'unmediated touch' between objects and 
~6 I.bf'd. , A141/~180-B181. _ 
71 He1degger, .lt<.9nt and t.he .Problem of- }fetap/JysJcs, pp.166ff. In the first Critique the difference between the two approacheE, 
is that in the Deduction the problem is conceived of as a matter of 
the legitimation of the Categorie~., while in the Schematism it is a 
m~~ter of their operation with respect to intuition. 
'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.198. 
269 
sentences insofar as both are brought t ogether 1n the holistic 
project of interpretation. 
The problem addressed by the Schernatism and the Deduction 
disappears with the abandonment of the scheme-content dist inction. 
The essence of Davidson's 'transcendental' argument is to show that 
the notions of a conceptual scheme and of the separation of beliefs 
and utterances are simply not intelligible. And if they are not 
intelligible then the demand for the legitimation of our concepts, 
our beliefs, our use or language, can no longer be made. 
Understanding the holist ic nature of interpretation means 
understanding how m .. ir bel i E:- i s ,:ire, by their very nature, veridical; 
how our utterances are , gsner:1lly speaking, true. Davidson begins 
with a conception of inter pretsttion as holistic - he starts from a 
perspective with respect L O which scepticism and relativism must 
already be unintelligible . For making sense of such noti ons means 
being able to separate off questions of interpreting utterances and 
attitudes from questions about how the world is - and this sort of 
separation cannot be made. 73 
73 1n this respect bavidsr n 's response to scepticism, while it can 
appear to be be something al ong the lines of a traditional answer 
to the sceptic, 1s more along the lines suggested by Martin 
Heidegger's diagnosis of t he sceptical problem. Heidegger writes, 
with respect to Kant's at -:.empt to provide a proof of the external 
world in the Refutation or Idealism, that "The ' scandal of 
philosophy' is not that th is proof has yet to be given, but that 
suc.h _/1.roo[._c; a.re e.~pectea· and attem_pted aqa.in and aqa.in. Such 
expectations, aims, and demands arise from an ontologically 
inadequate way of starting w1 t h so/llet.h.inq of such a character that 
independently o.F it and 'outside' o[ .it a 'world' is to be proved 
as present at hand. It i s not that the proof s are inadequate, but 
that the kind of Being of the entity which does the proving and 
makes requests for proof .has not yt?t .been made de[.in.ite enouq.h ... 
If Dasein is understood correctly, it defies such proofs, because, 
1n its Being, it already 1~ what subsequent proofs deem necessary 
to demonstrate for it ( Be1nq and Time, H205; see also H202-207 ) , 
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Hol..ism and Verification.ism 
Whether choose to call Dav i dson's argument 
transcendental or not it is quite clear that it 1s a rather 
different ari::rument to what 1s traditionally thought of to be a 
transcendental argument - even if there are some shared features. 
It 1s the more traditional transcendental arqument which Barry 
Stroud lS specifically concerned with 1n claiming that 
transcendent.al arquments ''amount to nothing more and nothing less 
than an application of some version of the verification 
princi.ple''. 74 As Stroud conceives of such a transcendental argument 
it "is supposed to answer the question of 'justification', and in 
so doinq it demonstrates the 'objective validity' of certain 
concepts". 75 This is of course the sort of Kantian conception of 
transcendental argumentation which we have been considering here 
and which the Davidsonian argument seems to undermine. However the 
mere fact that it is the traditional Kantian argument that Stroud 
is explicitly concerned with does not render the verificationist 
objection inapplicable 1n Davidson's case. It 1s clear from 
Stroud's discussion of the matter that he would most likely regard 
the Davidson1an argument as affected by the same verificati onism as 
the Kantian one. 
Certainly Stroud' E', description of the aims of a 
transcendental argument is broad enough for Davids on's argument t o 
fall easily within its scope: 
A sound tran~.cenclental argument . . . would show that it 
is wrong to think (with the conventionalist) that the 
;:stroud, 'Transcendental Arguments', p.255 . 
.I.bid. I p, 256 o 
only possible justif icat ion of our ways of thinking 1s 
"pragmatic'' or pract icol, and equally wrong to think (with the skeptic) that they can be Justified only7by collecting empirical evidence of their reliability. b 
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For of course Davidson' 2, argument is directed at both the 
conventionalist (or relati-1ist) and the sceptic in demonstrating 
the overall agreement and ~rut h of our beliefs. However it is the 
arguments of P. F. Strawson- 7 e.nd Sydney Shoemaker78 which Stroud 
specifically takes issue w:~h. 
The details of Strawson's and Shoemaker's arguments shall 
not concern me here - what does concern me is Stroud' s conception 
of their arguments. In bc-r:.h cases Stroud sees the arguments as 
attempting to show that there 1s some 'privileged class' of 
sentences which must be t r~e if language is to be possible; whose 
truth is a necessary cond::1on for anything at all to mak~ ~~~qe. 
Insofar as that 'privileged class' of sentences are part of what 
the sceptic doubts so the effect of the argument is to exhibit the 
sceptic's doubts as incoherent since if his doubts are to be 
meaningful they must presuppose the truth of what is doubted - they 
must presuppose the truth of those sentences which are members of 
the 'privileged class' .79 Here it seems there is a clear analogy 
between Stroud's character12at1on of the arguments of Strawson and 
Shoemaker and Davidson's argument . For we can see David2.on as also 
claiming that the principle of charity must be assumed (with all 
that it implies 1n terms of agreement and truth) not on empirical 
;~ .! .bi~ , _ ~ . 2 4 4 . ~ , . _ _ . 
.lnd.1 v.1auals,, An 1:ssa_y .1n .Desc:r1pc.1 ve hetapnys.1cs, New York , 
17~9. 
79 .... -,e1[-Kr101.;Jed_ae and ... '->elf -Io".9ntit._v, Ithaca, N. Y. , 1963 . Stroud, 'Transcendenta l Arquments', pp.251-254. 
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grounds but because otherwise interpretation, 
language, would not be possible. 
commun1cat1on , 
As Stroud presents them the arqurnents of Strawson and 
Shoemaker both operate 1n the following way: in order for certain 
concepts or statements to be meaningful there have to be criteria 
for deciding when those concepts are applicable and when those 
statements are true; if the sceptic is to talk meaningfully about 
such concepts or such statements then he must accept that these 
criteria are sound; however the only criteria that can be 
associated with such concepts or statements are the criteria which 
we use anyway and such criteria are indeed E:·.atisfied - we can know 
that the concepts concerned are applicable and that the statements 
in question are true. Take the example of Strawson' s argument for 
the existence of material objects as reconstructed by Stroud. 
Strawson argue~. that talk about such objects involves the 
possession of criteria for identification and reidentification of 
objects. The only criteria we can have for such identification are 
the criteria we use in our ordinary judgement of such matters but 
we know that such criteria are satisfied in specific cases. Thus we 
know that material objects do exist . 
The problem with such an argument is that ordinarily we 
would say that criteria for the truth of statements might be 
satisfied and yet the statements be false. Thus Stroud poi nt2. out 
that all that arguments such as Strawson·s can show is that certain 
statements wi 11 ap_,vear to be true - not that they a.re true: 
for any candidate s, proposed as a member of the 
privileged class, the sceptic can al ;Jays very 
plausibly insist that it is enough to make language 
possible if we .beJ1eve that ~.,- is true, or if it looks 
for all the world as 1£ it is, but that S needn't 
actually be true . Our having this belief would enable 
us to give sense to what we say, but some additional 
ju8tification would still h~v(T to be given for our 
claim to .know that 5 is true. 1 
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But this 1s just where the idea of a transcendental argument came 
1n - the whole point of a transcendental argument on thiE=, account 
1s to show that that the statements in question are indeed true. 
Stroud' s claim is that this cannot be done unless we invoke some 
additional premise - a premise which would tie the meaningfulness 
of statements firmly to the criteria by which we can verify those 
statements. In Strawson's case Stroud presents this premise in the 
form: 
If we know that 
reidentification 
then w,e k81p w unperceived. 
the best criteria we have for the 
of particulars have been sat.is£ ied 
that objects continue to exist 
More generally Stroud claims that 1n order for a transcendental 
argument to work: 
The conditions for anything's making sense would have 
to be strong enough to include not only our beliefs 
about what is the case, but alBo the poBsibility of 
our knowing whether those beliefs are true; hence the 
meaning of a statement would have to be determined by 
what we can Jtnow. But to prove this would be g·~ prove 
some version of the verification principle ... 
To provide a proof of such a principle would, according to Stroud, 
render any more indirect argument super£ luous - if we have such a 
proof we will not need to go through the rigmarole of a 
: ~ I bJd. , p. 2 5 5 • 
Stroud, I.bid, p.246; and again (p.247) "The verification 
principle that the argument rests on is: if the notion of objective 
particulars makes sense to us, then we can sometimes know certain 
conditions to be fulfilled, the fulfillment of which logically 
implies either that objects continue to exist unperceived or that 
tg2y do not'' . Ibid. 
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'transcendental' argument. 83 And without such a principle "the most 
that could be proved ... is that, for example, we must believe that 
there are material objects and other minds if we are to speak 
meaningfully at a11··. 84 
The way in which Stroud sees transcendental ar"<"::fUments as 
working 1s thus by tying the meaningfu lness of a 'privileged class' 
of statements ( and con2.equently of all statements - since the 
possibility of meaning itself rests on the meaningfulness of 
statements of the 'pr-i vi leged class' ) to certain cr1 t.eria £ or 
deciding whether those statements are true or false. Similarly the 
meaningfulnes2. of certain concepts i2. tied to a set of criteria for 
deciding whether those concepts apply. Given this sort of approach 
the sceptic who claims that we can never know whether those 
statements are true or that those concepts are properly applied is 
shown to be involved 1n contradiction. For 1n order to talk 
meaningfully about the statements or concepts in question one must 
know the conditions under which those statement2. would be true or 
false, under which those concepts would be applicable or not, and 
it must be possible for us to know whether those concli tions are 
fulfilled. Self-contradiction enters in with the sceptic·s attempt 
to claim both that he is talking meaningfully and that we never can 
know that the requisite conditions (under which our talk 1s 
meaningful ) are fulfilled. Verificationism 1s clearly involved in 
such a 'transcendental argument' insofar as making sense is made to 
depend on their being a procedure which we can carry out which will 
show the statements in question to be true or false. It is this 
.0.3 :b d ~· .f . ";I s s ') c; ,,. f"l ,I J • , PP • i.. - - L. _ t1 , 
Cl'i .f_"J... . ' ":15"' 
.f.}.1 a. 1 p O L b 1 
dependency of sense on the possibility of verification which 1s the 
essence of verificationisrn. This is confinned by A.J.Ayer's account 
of the 'verifiability' or 'verification' principle 1n Langz.1aqe/ 
Truth and Loq.1 c. He writes: 
The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of 
apparent statements of fact 1s the criterion of 
verifiability. We say that a 2.entence is factually 
s1~nificant to any given person, if, and only if, he 
knows how to verify the proposition which it purports 
to express - that is, if he knows what observations 
would lead him, under -:erta1n conditions, to accept 
the pr~osi tion as being true, or reject it as being 
false. 6 
The question as to whether Stroud i2, correct 1 n 
attributing such verificationism to Strawson 1s something we can 
leave to one side. 86 For the important question here is whether 
such verificationism is to be found in Davidson. Certainly if we 
look at the argument against conceptual relativism then it might 
well appear as if a verif icat1onist principle is involved. For on 
one reading Davidson can be taken as arguing that we can only make 
sense of something being a language if it is possible to translate 
that putative language into a familiar tongue. But this 1s just to 
claim that something is only a language if we can know it to be a 
language - if r..Je can translate. The meaningfulness of talk about 
language-hood is thus tied to a means of verifying such talk, that 
1s, to a criterion of translatability. A s1nnlar verificationism 
might be attributed to Davidson in his rejection of scepticism if 
that reJect1on is seen to depend on the idea that the possibility 
~~Ayer, Lanquaqe,, Trut../J and Lo~7ic, 2nd ed., London, 194E:, p.35. 0 On the question of whether it 1s to be found 1n Kant see Peter Hacker, 'Are Transcendental Arguments a Version of Verif 1cat1onism', Amc?r.1can F/Jilosoplncal (Juartt?.rly, 9 ( 1972 ) . 
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that 'most of our beliefs m1gh~ be false' could never be verif ied 
by us . In this latter case the meaningfulness of talk about truth 
might be seen to be tied ;::. o our possession of sound criteria by 
means of which we can de-.:2rnnne whether statements are true or 
false such that any talk ') t truth or falsity which went beyond 
those criteria would be deemed nonsensical - indeed it would count 
as undermining the possib ~l ity of attributing any sense to the 
speaker at all. 
Interestingly enc gh I think that the discovery of such 
verificationism in Davids n 1s dependent on interpreting the 
Davidsonian position in =-• ·;;ay which 1s 2,imi lar to Rorty' 2, 
conception of Davidson's a .... ; ument as an ad homine111 'transcendental 
argument' . For Rorty ter-:ts to tie the argument against the 
scheme-content distinction ~l o3ely to the idea that, for instance, 
the Tarskian account of -c::.-uth is the best account we have. The 
argument is made to depe -1 ' on a claim about satisfaction of a 
certain criteria for the appl 1 cation of a concept ( 'language-hood' 
or 'scheme-hood') as a : riterion for meaningful use of that 
concept . Admittedly Rorty -· oes not, unlike Strawson, want to claim 
that this means that the bEst criteria we have now (translatability 
as a criterion of langua,;e or scheme-hood; the notion of truth 
derived from the Tarskian account) are the only possible criteria 
we could employ. Rorty is happy to agree that better criteria might 
come along in the future but this merely reflects Rorty 's own 
pragmatism . And such pragmatism might well be regarded as 
verificationist in itself. Indeed Rorty has, at times, accepted the 
verif1cationist label as app l ied to the 'pragmatizecl' versi on of 
Davidson with which he associates himselt. 87 At other times he has 
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attempted to deny the label by claiming that a l i he (and, by hi s 
account, Davidson) are saying is that we "ought not to have hi gher 
than usual standards for the application of words like 'true· or 
'good' or 'recl'". 88 
Whether Rorty's pragmatism is verificationist is perhaps 
not a question to which there is a clear answer: it can be a 
difficult enough task to 2,ee what Rortyan pragmatism amounts to in 
the first place. In any case the Rortyan conceotion of Davidson's 
argument as an ad /Jom.1 nelll 'transcendental' argument 12, a 
conception which I have already rejected. And similar reasons must 
lead to the charge of verificationism, in this sense at least I 
being rejected also. For Davidson's argument 1s not that conceptual 
relativism is incoherent because we could never verify the 
existence ( lack any cr1ter1a for verification ) of an untranslatable 
language or alternative scheme but simply that such notions do not 
cohere with the demands of holism and cannot be reconciled with the 
nature of interpretation. Indeed we are unable to interpret - make 
sense of - such relativistic ideas. That translatability is, to all 
practical purposes, the primary criterion of language 1s a 
consequence of this argument but it is not a premise . 89 
At this point it might be worth going back to Stroud's 
~~See 'The World Well Lost', p.652. 
cL P/Jilosop/JJ' and t./Je ff.Jrror of Nature, p. 311. Rorty 's himself 
raises the point about the Davidsonian argument as being 'ad 
/Jpff.1nem' in this context, see pp.309-311 . 0 As Davidson himself points out ('On the Very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme·, pp.186-lf17 ) and as we noted in chapter five 
above. Indeed it might be pointed out that there will be situations 
in which it will make sense to talk about there being a language 
which we cannot translate - situations where the untranslatab1lity 
derives from something other than a claimed l1m1t at1 on intr i nsi c to 
the language itself. 
')7 r, 
J..., 0 
or1g1nai discussion of Strawson's 'transcendental' argument t o 
recall just why Stroud claims a verification principle 1s 
presupposed by that argument. Stroud' s claim is that while the 
criteria we employ for the application of certain concepts may 
indeed be satisfied in particular cases it is always possible that 
we could think tho2,e criteria to be sat is£ i eel and yet be wrong. A 
verification principle is thus required in order to ensure that 
such a possibility 1s ruled out at least 1n the case of 
statements of the 'privileged class'. Now of course so far as 
Davidson is concerned it will always be possible that any specific 
belief we hold may turn out to be false and there is no 'priv i l eged 
class' of beliefs or statements whose truth must be assured. So no 
verification principle is needed to ensure the truth of any 
particular belief . Davidson can be and is a fallibilist about 
almost any belief we might hold. I say 'almost' for what Davidson 
cannot countenance is the possibility that we could be mistaken 
with respect to our beliefs as a whole - most of our beliefs must 
be true - making sense of beli efs means embedding them in a network 
of other, mostlv true, beliefs. This is just what the principle of 
charity is all about. 
Now there are two lines we could take here: we could say 
that Davidson's account is not verification1st because there is no 
'privileged class' of statements whose truth rnu2.t be assured and 
because truth and beli ef cannot come apart anyway - at least not at 
the global level which Dav idson is concerned with; or we could say 
that Davidson has merely shifted the verif1cationism up to a higher 
level to apply 1t, not to specific statements , but to the belief 
system as a whole. Thus, 1n this latter case , it might be claimed 
that the thesis oi interpretative holism 1s itself ver1ficationist. 
For that thesis does involve the idea that it is not possible to 
separate off quest.ions about what is believed from questions about 
what is true - fr0m questions about what is known. It 1s for this 
reason that most of our beliefs must be true. We cannot make 
coherent the notion of a global separation of truth from belief. 
And this means that the meaningfulness of statements and beliefs is 
dependent on our ~nowledge of a vast body of truths. Yet as Stroud 
presents verif ics.t.1onism it consists in just the claim that "the 
meaning of a statement would have to be determined by what we can 
know". 90 
Yet perhaps the characterization of verif icationism in 
terms of just dependence of meaningfulness on knowledge is too 
broad. Certainly t.he application of such a notion in Davidson's 
case would lead to an unusual version of verificationism: the 
emphasis on global truth means that there is no requirement that 
any belief must, 1£ it is to be meaningful, be capable of being 
known to be true or false. The requirement is always a global, 
rather than a local, one and thus Davidson cannot be 
verification1st with respect to the meaningfulness of specific 
statements. 
Moreover if a verification pr1nc1ple was to be located at 
this point in Da..iidson's work then it would have be a form of 
verificationism consisting 1n the claim that it must be pos~·.ible to 
determine or to ·verify' the truth of most of our beliefs if some 
of our beliefs are to be false. Yet in fact this claim does not 
go,Transcendental Arguments', p.255. 
accurately characterize the Davidsonian position. For there 1s no 
question of deter1nining, or verifying, the truth of beliefs in 
order for other beliefs t o be true or false - it is simply that 
most beliefs n1ust .be true and be held to be true if some beliefs 
are to be false. Thi8 does not mean that we must have verified the 
truth of mo~.t of our beli e fs for verification is something which 
can only be done with respect to specific beliefs. Rather overall 
truth is indeed simply a presupposition of interpretation , 
communication and verification itself. The way in which truth is a 
presupposition of interpretation 1s something I have already 
touched on it 1s invo l ved in the concept of charity as an 
ontological presupposition . It 1s truth which will be the subJect 
for Part III - the final part - of this dissertation. 
According to t te traditional verificationist account 
meaningfulness is dependent on the possibility of verification. In 
Davidson such a principle of verification or ve.rif.ia_b.ility is 1n 
fact replaced by what amounts to a principle of .inter:,.n.reta.b.ility. 
Meaningfulness is thus made dependent on the possibility of 
interpretation. And to interpret an utterance or identify a belief 
means to connect that utterance or belief with a mass of other 
utterances, beliefs and desires (attitudes in general ) . Moreover 
being able to do this also presupposes that most of those 
utterances and beliefs are true for one interprets primarily by 
connecting sentences held true by speakers with sentences which 




an utterance or belief means being able to 
utterance or belief within an overall network of 
behaviour. Such is the nature of interpretative 
( Footnote continued) 
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holism. Richard Rorty seems, at times, to regard holism in this 
sense as verificationist. In 'Verificat1onism and Transcendental Arguments', p.14, he writes: "the insight which lay behind the 
original (Peircian) verificationist notion that 'you don't know 
what an 'This is an X' means unless you know how to confirm it' may be explicated as the insight that to know meaning 1s to know inferential relationships". Elsewhere Rorty talks of "the pragmatical, 'verificationist' intuition that ever y difference 
must ma.ke a difference' (expressed by Wittgenstein in the remark 'a 
wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism')" (' Introduction', L-:C..-:>nsequences 0J--
Praqmat.i.:>"'l!1: essays J_-?/~-;-_1.9b'i.~ Brighton, Sussex. 1982, p.xxxv ) . If 
this is verificationism then Dav1dsonian holisrn may indeed be 
verificationist but, as Rorty points out, such verificationism 1s 
"not obviously false, and not the utterly implausible sort 
which Stroud suggests may be needed" ( · ver1£1cationism and Transcendental Arguments', p. 14). In fact I trunk that it 1s 
scarcely 'ver1ficationism· at all. 
Part III 
OBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH 
'We' presuppose truth because 'we', being in the kind 
of being which Dasein possesses, are 'in the truth'. 
We do not presuppose it as something 'outside' us and 
'above' us, towards which, along with other 'values', 
we comport ourselves. It is not we who presuppose 
'truth'; but it is 'trut.Jl that makes it at all 
possible ontologically for us to be able to .be such 
that we 'presuppose' anything at all. Truth is what 
makes possi.bl e anything 1 ike presupposing. 1 
- Martin Heidegger 
1 




REALISM AND SUBJECTIVISM 
.Reconc.i.l.ing n,;o .Perspect.ives 
Some years ago, Richard Rorty wrote: 
... the "subjectivist bias of modern philosophy" can 
only be reconciled with realism if we can find a way 
of reconciling the fact that all knowledge is 
perspecti val with the fact that knowledge is about 
objects distinct from and independent of the 
experiencing subject. For to show that the objects of 
knowledge are characterizable only in token-reflexive 
terms is to show that all knowledge is perspecti val, 
and it is also to show ... that there can be no such 
thing as "the complete description of reality" ... 
this consequence - the fact that it is logically 
impossible that there should be a description of 
reality which is not a description from a perspective 
which is one among many alternative perspectives -
does not involve a surrender to idealism. To grant 
this consequence is to take the wind out of the 
idealist's sails; to show that it is compatible with 
the claim that reality remains remains distinct from, 
and ~ndependent of, our knowlege about it is to defeat 
him. 
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I doubt that Rorty would express himself nowadays, if his recent 
work is an indication, 3 in quite the same way as he did, in this 
2
'The Subjectivist Principle and the Linguistic Turn', Al.fred 
Hor-t.h wn.ite/Jead: Essays on His Philosophy, ed. George L.Kline, 
E~glewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963, p.153. 
Philosophy and the Hirror of Nature, £or instance. 
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passage, twenty-odd years ago. Yet I do think that the problem 
which he sets out in his discussion of the 'subjectivist bias of 
modern philosophy' captures something of a problem which is central 
to much of Davidson's work and which I believe is also central to 
much contemporary philosophizing. 
As we shall see, Davidson eschews al 1 talk of 
\ 
perspectives along with talk of conceptual schemes, although he 
I 
does not abandon talk of an 'objective reality' ·. Yet he does 
abandon the idea of 'the complete description of reality' insofar 
as he acknowledges some truth to the claim of the perspectival, the 
'relativistic', character of all knowledge. The problem then is, as 
Rorty suggests, to reconcile subjectivism with realism, to 
reconcile the notion of objectivity with the insights which 
motivate relativism. This is a problem which has underlain much of 
the previous discussion, indeed the problem was already suggested 
by Barry Stroud's characterization of a transcendental argument as 
attempting to show: 
. . . that it 1s wrong to think (with the 
conventionalist) that the only possible justification 
of our ways of thinking is "pragmatic" or practical, 
and equally wrong to think (with the skeptic) that 
they can be justified only by collecting empirical 
evidence of their reliability. 
This 1s just what Davidson's arguments concering the nature of 
interpretation attempt to show and in the process they aim also to 
make sense of how our beliefs can be true and objective - how they 
can be beliefs about an public world - while those beliefs are 
nevertheless also to be understood always in the context of a wider 
network of attitudes and utterances. All of these ideas we have met 
with before, the purpose of this final part of the dissertation 1s 
- , .. 
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to see those ideas in the context of the contemporary dispute 
between relativistic and more strongly realist points of view and 
to bring to the fore Davidson's conception of truth. 
Rorly' s problem of reconciling 'the s1.lbjectivist bias of 
modern philosophy' with realism suggests a basic tension between 
two, seemingly opposed, philosophical positions. One, I shall call 
I 
it 'subjectivism', insists on the perspectival character of , 
knowledge, sometimes to the point of invoking an outright 
relativism. The other, which I shall call 'objectivism', insists on 
the absolute independence of the reality which we aim to know from 
the liguistic dispositions, beliefs or thought patterns of 
speakers, and insists further that this objectivity, this 
independence, consists in there being a uniquely true and complete 
description of that reality. Hilary Putnam has formulated a 
distinction between two sorts of 'realism' which seems to 
correspond very closely to the distinction between the subjectivist 
and objectivist positions. Putnam's distinction is between, what he 
calls, 'internal', and 1 metaphysical', realism. In }fean.inq and the 
Horal Sciences Putnam presents internal real ism as an 'empirical 
theory' which aims to explain, among other things, the convergence 
of scientific theories. Internal realism consists 1n a certain 
scientific attitude towards the explanation of a speaker's 
behaviour. It aims to explain that behaviour 1n terms of a 
speaker's relation to the environment as conceived from within some 
scientific _theory. Metaphysical realism is distinguished from its 
empirical, internal counterpart, according to Putnam, primarily 
because the metaphysical real j c-+-_ :101ds that: 
. . . THE WORLD is supposed to be .independent of any 
particular representation we have of it - indeed it 
is held that we might be unable to represent THE WORLD 
correctly at all ... The most important consequence of 
metaphysical real ism is that truth is supposed to be 
rad.ict-'1.lly non-ep.istemic - we might be 'brains in a 
vat' and so the theory that is 'ideal' from the point 
of view of operational utility, inner beauty and 
elegance, 'plausibili}y', simplicity, 'conservatism', 
etc.,· m.iq.bt .be £::ilse. 
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That metaphysical realism corresponds very closely to the 
position I have label led 'objecti vism' is clear and in Reason, 
Truth and H.1:...c:tory Putnam not only reinforces that connection, but 
he also presents internal realism as occupying much the same 
position as subjectivism. In that work Putnam talks of 'two 
philosophical perspectives' which he terms the 'externalist' and 
'internalist' perspectives. The first of these he identifies as the 
perspective of metaphysical realism and the second, the internalist 
perspective, seems to be a further development of the perspective 
of internal realism. 
writes: 
Of the perspective of metaphysical realism, Putnam 
On this perspective, the world consists of some fixed 
totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly 
one true and complete description of 'the way the 
world is'. Truth involves some sort of correspondence 
relation between words or5 thought-signs and external things and sets of things. 
4 Hean.inq and tJ;e Horal Sciences, p. 125. With respect to the 
characterization of metaphysical realism as the idea that the 
'ideal' theory might be false or that most of our beliefs might be 
false J.J.C.Smart points out that unless 'may' (in 'may be wrong') 
is taken as meaning no more than loqical possibility there is a 
'pragmatic paradox' in talk of 'most of our beliefs may be false· 
since he takes 'may' as referring to contextually understood 
background assumptions ( "in fact core science"); this point was 
made in Smart 's address to the A. A. P. Con£ ere nee in Canberra in 
1983, 'Realism v. Idealism, see also his 'Metaphysical Realism', 
A(:-9lys.i._c:, 42 ( 1982) . 
Reason, TrutJ; and H.istory, p. 49. 
- , . 
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Metaphysical realism is contrasted with Putnam's 'internalism' of 
which it is char·acteristic to hold that the question: 
. . . what o.b_7ects does the ~,or.id cons.ist of? is a 
question that it only makes sense to ask within a 
theory or description. Many 'internalist' 
philosophers, though not all, hold further that there 
is more than one 'true' theory or description of the 
world. Truth, in an interr1alist view, is some sort of 
(idealized) rational acceptibility - some sort of 
ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and 
with our experiences as those experiences are 
themselves represented in our belief system - and not 
correspondence with mind-independent or 
discourse-independent 'states of affairs'. There is no 
God's Eye point of view that we can know or usefully 
imagine; there are only the various interests and 
purposes 6 that their descriptions and theories subserve. 
Thus i nterna 1 rea 1 ism, as Putnam presents it, seems to 
lead in the very same direction as subjectivism. The relativistic 
tendency of such internalism or subjectivism is also made fairly 
clear - an outright relativity of truth is in fact suggested. On 
this matter, however, I shall have more to say in the next few 
pages. 
Yet at this point we might easily suppose that just this 
sort of internalism or subjectivism is what Davidson, and Quine 
too, would be led towards. Certainly Putnam's characterization of 
the internalist perspective is strongly suggestive of Quine's 
ontological relativity and Quine has himself stated that indeed 
''there is more than one true theory or description of the world''. 7 
Putnam's account of internal realism in HeanJnq and the Horal 
~.I.bid., pp.49-50. 
See his 'On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World', 
Erlrenntn.i ... q, 9 ( 1975 J pp. 327-3 28. 
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Sciences, with its emphasis on realism as an empirical theory tied 
up with the explanation of speaker's behaviour, 8 is also very 
suggestive of the concerns of Davidsonian radical interpretation. 
In fact, in Davidson's case, if not so obviously in 
Quine's, the internalist perspective is not a view which he can 
find acceptable. Indeed both metaphysical realism - externalism or 
objectivism - and internal realism - internalism or subjectivism -
must be rejected by Davidson. He does claim to espouse a form of 
realism, but, as he himself says: 
My form of realism seems to be neither Hilary Putnam's 
internal realism nor his metaphysical realism. It is 
not internal realism because internal realism makes 
truth relative to a scheme, and this is an idea I do 
not think is intelligible ... But my realism is 
certainly not Putnam's metaphysical realism, for it is 
characterized by being "radically non-epistemic" which 
implies that all our best researched and established 
thoughts and theories may be false. But of course 
.. . [my9 realism] cannot allow that all of them can be wrong. 
Part of the aim of these rema1n1ng pages 1s to clarify the nature 
of Davidsonian realism. In fact the notion centres on the role of 
truth in interpretation and on the need for the concept of an 
intersubjective reality for interpretation to be possible. In this 
respect what 1s involved 1s a recapitulation of much of the 
argument against relativism and scepticism; but it 1s in the 
context of this problem of reconciling the underlying intuit i ons of 
realism and relativism - of showing how what is important 1n those 
intuitions 1s preserved 1n the Davidsonian account. In this 
chapter, however, I want first to look more closely at the 
~Hean.ing and t./Je Horal Sciences, p.123. 
'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', pp. 425-426 . 
- , . 
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apparently opposing philosophical positions which are involved 
here. 
:rlle Externa.l V.iev 
Metaphysical realism, according to Putnam, has as its 
most important consequence the idea that truth is 'radically 
non-epistemic' - truth i.s made quite independent of, and separate 
from, what it is that we believe. Thus all of our beliefs might 
turn out to be false. As Putnam sees it, this means that we might 
all turn out to be brains in vats. 1° For the metaphysical realist, 
truth, or reality, is seen as totally distinct from human beliefs 
about what is true or what is real - a radical disjunction emerges 
between truth and belief. An extremely good example of this 
disjunction is in Popper's notion of verisimilitude. 11 Popper 
accepts the fallibility of all knowledge but this leads him to 
insist that human claims to know can only approximate to the truth, 
to a greater or lesser extent. Thus truth is replaced, to al 1 
intents and purposes, by verisimilitude. Truth becomes a regulative 
ideal, al though remaining a metaphysical absolute, and becomes a 
goal which we must always seek but can never achieve. With this 
sort of radical separation of truth from belief, metaphysical 
realism is exhibited as implicitly capitulating to the arguments of 
10As I suggested 1n chapter six it is by no means clear that this 
possibility would involve all, or even most, of our beliefs being 
fi±se. 
See Popper, Con_fectures and l?e.[utat.ion..c:, 4th eel. , London, 1972, 
p.223ff - Popper talks of truth as a 'regulative principle' (p.226). 
-- . ,,. 
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the sceptic. For, like the sceptic, the metaphysical realist 
accepts that all our beliefs may indeed be false. Certainly this 
seems implicit in the Popperian notion of verisimilitude. 
Davidson, however, rejects just this separation of truth 
and belief. To the interdependence of meaning and belief Davidson 
would add the interdependence of belief and truth - belief is held 
to be, in' ·its nature, veridical .12 Of the separation of truth from 
I 
belief withi'n metaphysical realism, Davidson says: 
This is scepticism in one of its traditional garbs. It 
asks: Why couldn't all my beliefs hang together ar1 
yet be comprehensively false about the actual world? 
Davidson's arguments against scepticism are thus also his arguments 
against metaphysical realism, and in both cases those arguments 
depend crucially on his holistic approach to interpretation and to 
the connections between meaning, belief and truth. His arguments 
against the metaphysical realist, as against the sceptic, operate 
by underrnining the separation of subjective from objective, of 
belief from truth - here we can see the argument against the 
scheme-content distinction once more. The argument against the 
metaphysical realist can, however, be put in a sl i ghtly different 
way also - in the forrn of an argument against the very idea of a 
purely 'objective' account of the world. 
In his book on Descartes! 4 Bernard Williams presents what 
he calls 'the absolute conception of reality': 
... if knowledge is what it claims to be, then it is 
knowledge of a reality which exists independently of 
that knowledge, and indeed (except for the special 
i~'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.432. 
1 4 Ibid. , p . 4 2 6 • 
.Desc'-'lftes: The Project oI Pure Enqui ry, Harmondsworth , 
Middlesex, 1978. 
- ... 
case where the reality known happens to be some 
psychological i tern) independently of any thougt,_\ or 
experience. Knowledge is of what is there anyway. 
291 
But Williams also sees this conception as leading to a basic 
dilemma: 
On the one hand, the absolute conception might be 
regarded as entirely empty, specified only as 
'whatever it is that tnese representations represent'. 
In this case, it -no longer does the work that was 
expected of it, and provides insufficient substance to 
the conception of an independent reality; it slips out 
of the picture, leaving us only with a variety of 
possible representations to be measured against each 
other, with nothing to mediate between them. On the 
other hand, we may have some determinate picture of 
what the world is like independent of any knowledge or 
representation in thought; but then that is open to 
the reflection, once more, that that is only one 
particular representation of it, our own, and that we 
have no independent point of lev::ra.ge for raf ~ing 
this into the absolute representation of reality. 
This di lemma arises also 1n the context of the 
distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content (the 
dilemma will arise whenever an attempt is made to understand 
objectivity apart from subjectivity). 17 If the content which the 
scheme is supposed to organise or fit is too indeterminate then the 
content drops out as irrelevant. Thus Richard Rorty suggests that: 
If a stimulus is thought of as somehow ''neutral" 1n 
respect to different conceptual schemes, it can be so 
only, I would argue, by becoming "a wheel 1that can be turned though nothing else moves with it''. 
i ~ J _b_Z:d. , p . 6 4 • 
J.b.1d., p. 65. John McDowell takes up this dilemma in 'Aesthetic 
Value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World', Pleasure, 
Pf7.rerence and Value, ed. Eva Schaper, Cambridge, 1983, pp.2-15. 
The connection with the notion of objectivity here is made 
ef~licit by McDowell, i.bid. 
'The World Well Lost', Jour77t.'tl of P.hilosop/JY, 69 (1972) 
p,651n.1. 
-- , .., 
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Such a wheel Rorty, following Wittgenstein, would regard as "not 
part of the mechanism". It can have no substantive part to play, 
certainly it can provide no way of filling out a notion of 
objectivity. Rorty goes on to make the connection with the dilemma 
Williams presents even clearer: 
The notion of "the world" as used in a phrase like 
'different conceptual scheme carve up the w~rld 
differently' must be the notion of something 
completely unspecified and unspecifiable the 
thing-in-itself, in fact. As soon as we start thinking 
of "the world" as atoms and the void, or sense data 
and awareness of them, or "stimuli" of a certain sort 
brought to bear upon organs of a certain sort, we have 
changed the name of the game. For we are now well 
~itr~n some particular theory about how the world 
lS. 
If we refuse to ascribe any content to the notion of 'the 
world' then, on the scheme-content picture, it 1 ooks as if the 
notion of 'the world' (and perhaps the notion of empirical content) 
ceases to have any clear sense. Yet on the other hand if we attempt 
to cash out the notion of empirical content or 'the world' 
determinately then we cut down the possibility of there being 
alternative conceptual schemes which could organise or fit this 
content. We thereby _ reduce the possibility of untranslatability 
between conceptual schemes but we also lose out once again in being 
unable to attach a clear sense to the notion of 'the world', or the 
notion of some empirical content, which is common to all schemes 
(which 1s 'objective'). This is because 'the world' can now be 
taken as more or less identical with some scheme (according to the 
determinacy of our specification of 'the world'). It is this 
'dilemma' which forms the basis for a large part of Davidson's 
19 Ibid., p. 663. 
- ... 
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argument concerning the relation between scheme and content in 'On 
the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'. As Davidson puts it, in a 
passage we quoted earlier, the problem is that: 
The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that 
of differing points of view, seems to betray an 
underlying paradox. Different points of view make 
sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate 
system on which to plot them; yet the existence of a 
~omrnon srs~em 20belies the claim of dramatic 
1ncomparab1l1ty. · 
The problem is making sense of the very idea of a conceptual scheme 
as something which stands 1n some sort of relation to some 
empirical content and this is the very problem which Davidson 
specifically takes up in his discussion of conceptual relativism. 21 
Part of the argument that Davidson develops against 
conceptual relativism is that: 
Our attempt to characterise languages or conceptual 
schemes in terms of the notion of fitting some entity 
has come down, then, to the simple thought that 
something is an acceptable conceptual scheme or theory 
if it is true . . . And the criterion of a conceptual 
scheme different from ou:~2 own now becomes: largely true but not translatable. 
And of course the conclusion is that in fact truth and translation 
cannot be divorced in the way that seems to be required for making 
sense of the notion of a conceptual scheme. Similarly the notion of 
the 'absolute ·conception of reality' must fall prey to the same 
difficulty. For if the notion is indeed of reality as independent 
of any scheme then it seems to require a conception of reality, a 
conception of how the world really is, of how it is to be truly 
~~'On_ the Very Idea of A Conceptual Scheme', p.184. 
2" .l.b.zd. I pp 4 1 92-194 4 
L .I .bid. , p . 1 9 4 • 
- . ~ 
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described, which is independent of any particular way of describing 
it. It requires a conception of truth which does not depend upon 
the notion of translation - a conception of truth 'on its own' . 
This is a conception which Davidson can find no meaning for. As 
Stroud says in discussing Quine' s attack on conventional ism, "the 
notion of a possible war lcl sub specie aetern.itas, without a 
connection with any actual set of verbal dispositions and beliefs, 
makes no sense". 23 If truth and translation are bound together then 
the 'absolute conception' must stand (or fall) equally with the 
idea of an untranslatable language: objectivism or metaphysical 
realism is thus seen to be entwined, not only with scepticism, but 
relativism also. 
Nevertheless metaphysical realism 1s surely correct in 
insisting on the need for a conception of the world which is, 1n 
some sense, common to all speakers - the conception of the world as 
a public realm. Put very simply such a conception seems required by 
the idea that there is something which our beliefs are about and 
about which they can be right or wrong. Indeed that our beliefs can 
be wrong (which is what the sceptic emphasises) is a very strong 
reason for not tying the notion of the world to any particular set 
of beliefs. For any belief we might specify, no matter how 
well-supported it might seem, it could still be false. This much of 
metaphysical realism is undeniable - the problem arises in the 
attempt to make something more of these basic truths, something a 
great deal stronger, and to extend their application to the network 
of belief as a whole. This is where scepticism enters in and where 
23 
'C t . 1. d th d .-onven 1ona ism an e In eterminacy or Translation' , p. 93 . 
See chapter three - p.87 above. 
- . 
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Davidson and the (metaphysical) realist must part company. 
Metaphysical realism requires a separation between truth 
and meaning - between truth and interpretation; it requires an 
appropriately 'metaphysical' conception of truth. On Putnam's 
characterization, metaphysical realism conceives of truth as 
involving "some sort of ·correspondence relation between words or 
thought-signs and external things or sets of things". The 
difficulties of such a correspondence theory were criticized most 
powerfully by P.F.Strawson 1n his discussions of J.L.Austin's 
correspondence theory of truth. Strawson claims that one cannot 
elucidate the notion of truth in terms of any sort of 
correspondence between statements and facts; such a direct attempt 
on the problem cannot provide the necessary elucidation "for these 
words contain the problem, not its solution°. 24 and Strawson 
suggests, as Michael Dummett has also, that the aim of any 
philosophically interesting theory of truth ought to be to see how 
the word 'true' fits into ordinary discourse25 - as Dummett puts 
it, to see the point of the notion, the purpose which it serves. 26 
In support of such an approach David Wiggins argues that 
the trouble with the notion of truth as correspondence with 'the 
world' or 'the facts' is that: 
. . . for purposes of detenni ni ng the proper scope of 
'true', there is perhaps no neutral or uncontroversial 
accotmt of what the world is (no more than there is a 
neutral account of what a fact is). The difficulty is 
only a reflection of a much more general difficulty 
24strawson, 'Truth', Loq.ico-.l.inqu.i._c:tic Papers, London, 1971 , 
P2§00. 
2 6 Ib.id. , p . 201 . Dummett, 'Truth' , Froceed.inqs o[ t .. /Je Ar.istotel J .'-"ln .Society, 5 9 
( 1958-59) . 
- , ., 
for which Strawson has prepared us: that any direct 
attempt on a 'substantial' theory of truth would 
appear to involve us in finding new or special ways of 
characterising what it is ('in the world') for 
sentences of some sort to be true, ways that are 
independent and quite different from the ways in which 
the speakers of the language describe whatever they 
describe. But how is this possible? Surely the idea 
that the truth-condition of a sentence can be 
explained in terms intelligible quite independently of 
the understanding of the sentence itself and 
intelligible independently of the actual 
conceptualizations ·ff speakers of the sentence - is 
peculiarly suspect. 
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Here Wiggins seems to have gathered together the problem which I 
discussed in relation to the 'absolute conception of reality' with 
the problem involved in developing a theory of truth. And it is not 
just the difficulty of there being no neutral, no 'absolute', 
account of the way the world is, for as Wiggins correctly points 
out there is a mo~e general difficulty here. It is a difficulty 
which St.rawson has indeed alluded to in pointing out the problem 1n 
elucidating truth 1n terms divorced from the problem of 
understanding speakers or in terms of 'correspondence' ( a notion 
which seems to have no connection with the problem of understanding 
utterances), but it is a difficulty which Davidson has also 
diagnosed 1n terms of the scheme-content distinction. 
The connection here is clearest when we look to the 
conception of truth as a matter of correspondence between 
utterances (propositions or whatever) and the world (facts, states 
of affairs etc.). The problem of elucidating truth in terms of 
correspondence faces problems exactly analogous to those faced 1n 
27 
'What would be a Substantial Theory of Truth?', P.h.ilosop.h.ical 
Subjects: Es&"iys Presented to P.F.Strawson, ed. Zak Van Straaten , 
Oxford, 1980, p.192. 
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elucidating the relation between a conceptual scheme and its 
empirical content. Just as it is difficult to see what it is that a 
scheme is supposed to 'organize' or 'fit' so it is equally 
difficult to see what true sentences could 'correspond' to. 
Moreover the relation itself is problematic: what does it mean for 
a scheme to '£it' or 'organize' some content; for a sentence to 
\ 
'correspond' to some fact? Surely if it means anything at all it 
\ 
can only reduce to meaning · 'is true'. This was of course the gist 
of the Davidsonian argument of chapter four but the idea is also 
implicated in Davidson's considerations in relation to scepticism. 
There he similarly rejects the intelligibility of comparing beliefs 
with reality: one does not defeat the sceptic by trying to show how 
one's beliefs do reflect reality for such comparison makes no sense 
and what sense it has consists only in the assertion that the 
beliefs are true - which is no help in the justification of those 
beliefs. 
Reflecting Strawson's complaint that talk of 
correspondence does nothing to elucidate truth, Davidson claims 
that: 
... the notion of fitting the facts, or of being true 
to the facts, adds nothing intelligible to the simple 
concept of being true ... Nothing ... no th.inq, makes 
sentences and theories true: not experience, not 
surface irritations, not the world, can make a 
sentence true. That experience takes a certain course, 
that our skin is warmed or punctured, that the 
universe is finite, these facts, if we like to talk 
that way, make sentences and theories true. But this 
point is put better without mention of facts. The 
sentence 'My skin is warm' is true if and only if my 
skin is warm. Here is no reference to a fact a 
world, an experience, or a piece of evidence. 28 ' 
28 
'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' , p. 1 94. Compare this 
with Strawson, 'Truth', p .195: "The only plausible candidate for 
(Footnote continued) 
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In rejecting the scheme-content distinction we must reject the 
notion of their being two different sorts of t./J.inqs, such that 
truth is the right sort of relation - the right sort of 'fit' -
between them. There are no two sorts of things to relate: 
In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do 
not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated 
touch with the familiar objects whos19antics make our 
sentences and opinions true or false. 
What makes the scheme-content distinction, and all its 
associated notions, unintelligible is the impossibility of 
separating off the notion of truth from the notion of translation 
and from the concept of belief. These concepts are 'elucidated' 
together within an overall account of interpretation. In this 
respect Strawson and Wiggins are correct in insisting that the 
question of truth cannot be separated from the question of the 
understanding of speakers; it cannot be separated from the question 
of meaning. This connection between truth and meaning is indeed one 
of the central features, certainly the most recognized, of the 
Davidsonian account. 
:r.he Interna.l V.iev 
In the Pref ace to .Reason, T.rut./J and H.istor:v Putnam has 
28 (continued) 
the position of what (in the world) makes the statement true is the 
fact it states: but the fact it states is not something 1n t he 
w~~ld. It is not an object ... ". 
'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.198. 
- . ~ 
this to say: 
In the present work, the aim which I have in mind is 
to break the stranglehold which a number of 
dichotomies appear to have on the thinking of both 
philosophers and laymen. Chief among these is the 
dichotomy between objective and subjective views of 
truth and reason ... I shall advance a view in which 
the mind does not simply 'copy' a world which admits 
of description by One True Theory. But my view is not 
a view in which the mind ml'il,:es up the world, either 
(or makes it up subject to constraints imposed by 
'methodical canons' and mind-independent 
'sense-data') . If one must use metaphorical language, 
then let the metaphor be this: the mind and the world 
jointly make up the mind and the world. (Or, to make 
the metaphor even more Hegelian, the Universe makes up 
the Uni verse - with minds - c~ecti vely - playing a 
special role in the making up.) 
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Much of what Putnam says in defence of his 'internal realism' (for 
this is apparently the view which he advances) is certainly 
congenial to the views expressed here and to the account of 
Davidson being advanced. I say 'much' of what Putnam has to say 1s 
congenial for indeed some of Putnam's views are definitely 
un:ongenial. As I have already pointed out, Davidson explicitly 
rejects metaphysical realism, but he also rejects Putnam's internal 
realism along with it, and for good reason. While Putnam claims 
that his aim is "to break the stranglehold . . . [of] the 
dichotomy between subjective and objective views of truth and 
reason'' his actual account of internal realism (the internal 
perspective) seems still to be under the sway of that very 
dichotomy: specifically Putnam retains the notion of a conceptual 
scheme . 
We have already seen briefly how, 1n Heaninq and t.be 
Horal Sciences, Putnam gives an account of the indeterminacy of 
JO Reason,, Trut.b and Hi .... c:tory, p. x1. 
- ~ .. 
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translation in terms of the 'interest-relativity' of explanation. 
That idea 1n itself can be fitted very comfortably into the 
Davidsonian picture, but what cannot be fitted in is Putnam's 
claim, in discussing interest-relativity, that: "Given all of this, 
it is indeed unclear that there is any 'indeterminacy'. There may 
l . ' t' t l t . .:.- " 31 well be a (more-or- ess) unique correc rans a 10n .Lor us... . 
Much the same relativistic idea is reflected in the pages of 
Reason,, T.rut.JJ and History where Putnam writes: 
For an internalist like myself ... signs do not 
intrinsically correspond to objects, independently of 
how those signs are employed and by whom. But a sign 
that is actually employed in a particular way by a 
particular community of users can correspond to 
particular objects f.l.it.JJ.in t.JJe conceptual sc.JJeme of 
t.hose users. Objects do not exist independently of 
conceptual schemes. Ve cut up the world into objects 
when we introduce one or other scheme of description. 
Si nee the objects and the signs are alike .internal to 
the scheme of3Jescription, it is possible to say what matches what. 
Just as for Putnam translation 1s relative to a framework of 
interests, so meaning, truth and reason are made relative to a 
conceptual scheme. Putnam denies however that internal ism is "a 
facile relativism that says 'Anything goes'". 33 He maintains that 
there are external as well as internal constraints upon our 
conceptual schemes; there are 'experiential inputs' to knowledge 
although those inputs are not uncontaminated by our concepts. Here 
the old dichotomy of scheme and content looks to reappear 1n a form 
which is not too dissimilar to that employed by some relativisms 
and which is no less obscure. Putnam's internalism may not be a 
~1Heaninq and t.JJe Horal Sc.iences, p. 45. 




facile relativism { I leave that open) but it 1s relativism 
nonetheless. In this respect Putnam, for all his handwaving in the 
direction of "breaking the stranglehold ... of dichotomies", fails 
to break the hold of the dichotomy of subjective and objective. 
Putnam's rejection of the viewpoint of metaphysical 
realism - the exterr.ial viewpoint - is something with which Davidson 
, must agree, and it will also be a point of agreement uniting 
Davidson with a number of other writers in this area - notably 
Richard Rorty and Nelson Goodman. Yet as in Putnam's case the 
rejection of the external viewpoint is often accompanied, 
especially 1n Goodman's case, by what looks very much like the 
acceptance of the internal viewpoint - Putnam's interr1al realism. 
That is, metaphysical realism often seems to give way to some form 
of relativism. 
Earlier on I characterized relativism largely in terms of 
the notion of a conceptual scheme but what has to be recognized 
now, and was indeed already mentioned earlier, is that relativism 
can survive in some form even though the scheme-content distinction 
is largely abandoned (or at least is no longer explicit). In this 
form relativism typically insists on the plurality of 
'incommensurable' discourses. As a consequence there is also an 
insistence on a general distinction between two different sorts of 
discourse: the discourse which goes on according to agreed criteria 
'internal' discourse discourse which remains within one 
particular realm; and discourse which cuts across the boundaries of 
such agreement and which lacks any agreed criteria - 'external' 
discourse. With such a distinction we can avoid any talk of 
conceptual schemes as distinct from their content and yet we can 
- , .. 
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still end up with very much the same relativization of truth -
relativization to discourse, realm of discourse or, as in the case 
of Nelson Goodman, 'world'. 
Certainly Goodman, whose views, as expressed in his book 
w'ays oI ft'orldma.kinq, 34 · have received enthusiastic endorsement from 
Putnam, 35 openly declares his relativism and yet makes no explicit 
employment of the idea of a conceptual scheme at all. Indeed he 
seems to follow so very similar a path to Davidson that Goodman 
would even seem to agree with the Davidsonian attack on the 
scheme-content dichotomy. At a number of places Goodman claims that 
there is no clear distinction to be drawn between beliefs and 
-- _-percepts .. 3§ _ between theory . and fact~? .. _or between convention and 
content. 3~ _Moreover. Goodman's .well-known grue/bleen paradox. 3? .can 
be taken as having important parallels with the Quinean thesis of 
the indeterminacy of translation40 which, in its Davidsonian garb 
as the indeterminacy of interpretation, 1s fundamental to 
Davidson's arguments against the conceptual scheme idea. Yet 
Goodman also makes his relativism quite explicit, telling us that: 
Not only motion, derivation, weighting, order but even 
reality is relative ... Where we have ... systems or 
versions that .conflict ... their realms are less aptly 
regarded as within one world than as two different 
worlds, and even - since the t¥f refuse to unite 
peaceably - as worlds in conflict. 
341ndianapolis,1978. 35
'Reflections on Goodman's Ways of Worldmaking', Journ..9] oI 
Pjllosop/Jy, 76 ( 1979). 
37 fia.r_s oI w'orldma.k.inq, p.17. 38 Jb1_d., pp. 96-97. 
39 J.b.1d. , pp .116-120. 
40 Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Indianapolis, 1973. As well as with the Wittgensteinian rule following problem; see 
Saul Kripke, #ittqenste.in on Rules and Private Lanquaqe, pp. 58-59. 
Stroud also makes the connection between Goodman and Quine (and 




In Goodman's case there is no scheme-content distinction 
but there is a notion of differing worlds to which the truth of 
sentences is relativized. The notion of a 'world' thus plays the 
role of a conceptual scheme and presumably we can take 'discourses' 
as being associated with such 'worlds'. Goodman rejects any 
possibility of reconciling conflicting statements by reinterpreting 
such statements or by restricting their ranges of application. Thus 
Goodman's relativism 1s indeed a relativism about truth 
apparently without even the saving grace of an denial of 
translatability between different worlds. Worlds themselves can 
conflict, certainly statements can do so: 
... the familiar dictum "'Snow is white' is true if 
and only if snow is white" must be revised to 
something like "'Snow is white' is true in a given 
world if and only if snow is white in that world", 
which in turn, if differences between true versions 
cannot be firmly distinguished from differences 
between worlds, amounts merely to "'Snow is white' is 
true according to a true version if A,nd only if snow 
is white according to that version". 4L 
And just to make sure we do not mistake his relativism for 
something else, Goodman tells us "I am afraid that my rernark[s] 
about conflicting truth and multiple actual worlds may be 
passed over as purely rhetorical. They are not ... 1143 
Yet sometimes, for all his explicit avowal of relativism, 
Goodman does say things which make one wonder about just how 
relativist he can be. Certainly if he takes the rejection of the 
fact-theory, convention-content and belief-percept dichotomi es 
!1 M<tys of IYorldma.k.inq, p. 20 and p.116. 
43 Ibid., p.120 . 
.lb.id. , p . 11 0 . 
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seriously enough then one would expect any relativism to collapse 
also, as we have seen in preceeding pages. However Goodman does not 
draw this conclusion. Certainly there is a line of thought in 
Davidson's work which is not unsympathetic to the relativist 
impulses in Goodmanm. Indeed the holism which is the primary 
feature of the Davidson who appears in these pages can easily be 
\ 
given a relativist,ic glos·s. All it needs is for that holism to be 
coupled with the · idea that there are distinct and different 
interpretative 'wholes' , between which there can be no 
communication (for interpretation and communication requires 
agreement - which cannot be found outside of such an interpretative 
'whole' or network). This is perhaps putting it crudely but Goodman 
seems to take something like this sort of line. Most importantly he 
argues that there is no reason to suppose that we should be monists 
rather than pluralists in regard to worlds or discourses. Here his 
argument is very familiar in its Davidsonian echoes: 
While I stress the multiplicity of right world 
versions, I by no means insist that there are many 
worlds or indeed any; for as I have already 
suggested, the question whether two versions are of 
the same world has as many good answers as there are 
good interpretations of the words ''versions of the 
same world". The monist can always contend that two 
versions need only be right to .be accounted versions 
of the same world. The pluralist can always reply by 
aski~g whi~ the world is like apart from all 
versions. 
Such remarks do indeed have a Davidsonian ring to them. However 
such remarks are not what make Goodman a relativist: the relativism 
in Goodman derives from his treatment of truth. So far as truth is 
44 Ibid , p. 96. Goodman's comments here seem to suggest a 
Goodmanian version of the indeterminacy thesis. 
- ... 
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concerned Goodman seems happy to promote an almost complete 
anarchism. And while he and Davidson have so much else 1n common 
where they do diverge is just in how they each deal with truth. It 
is Davidson's careful attention to this matter which prevents him 
from falling into the enthusiastic relativism which Goodman finds 
so intoxicating. 
\ 
The other contemporary philosopher who seems to have much 
1n common with Davidson and yet who also seems to veer close to a 
relativistic view is Richard Rorly. Yet unlike Goodman, Rorly does 
not make any explicit admission of relativism; indeed, Rorty denies 
that his position, as developed in his more recent work (and 
notably in P.h.ilosop.hy and t/Je H.irror of Nature 45 ) is relativistic. 
Rorly has labelled himself a 'revisionary pragmatist' 
('revisionary' to distinguish it from the 'analytic' pragmatism of 
someone like Peirce46 ) and since he defines relativism primarily by 
reference to the notion of a conceptual scheme, he can write, as a 
comment on his own position as well as on pragmatism in general, 
that: 
Since pragmatists view beliefs as rules 
rather than as representations, and 
susp1c1ous of concepts and L"r .fortior.i of 




a bit of a 
Certainly the question of where Rorty stands on 
relativism is a difficult one and he by no means espouses the sort 
of overt relativization of truth to be found 1n Goodman. 
!~see also Consequences of Praqmati .... c,m. 
47 'Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth', pp.4-10. Ibid. , p . 3 2 • 
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Nevertheless the question 1s an important one in the present 
context since Rorty has taken up a great many of the ideas to be 
found in Davidson - particularly the attack on the scheme-content 
distinction and developed them in the context of his own 
pragmatism. And certainly the charge of relativism has been made 
against Rorty: Mary Hesse for one asserts that "Rorty has in effect 
\ 
abandoned the claim that relativism is an empty doctrine, and 
' 
replaced it by an admitted social relativism". 48 Moreo~r Rorty 
shares with Goodman an insistence on the autonomy of different 
realms of discourse and sometimes talks as if truth were indeed 
relativized, if not to conceptual schemes, then to discourses. 
Indeed there 1s in Rorty's work a distinction drawn 
between what he calls 'normal' and 'abnormal' discourse - a 
distinction he derives from Kuhn. Thus: 
Normal discourse (a generalization of Kuhn's notion of 
"normal science") is any discourse (scientific, 
political, theological or whatever) which embodies 
agreed upon criteria for reaching agreemen\9 abnormal discourse is any which lacks such criteria. 
Such a distinction must be open to a relativistic interpretation 
especially since Rorty talks about discourses as being 
incommensurable. The problem is that it is not terribly clear what 
the normal-abnormal distinction and the associated notion of 
incommensurability really amount to in Rorly's eyes. Certainly 
Philip Pettit, while recognizing Rorty's own 'coyness' on the 
matter, has responded to Hesse's charge of relativism by claiming 
that the distinction between abnormal and normal discourses need 
!~Hesse, 'Epistemology Without Foundations', p.58. 
P/J.ilosoph~y and t./Je Hirror of M'iture_. p.11. 
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not be taken relativistically at all.so 
Pettit reiterates Rorty's own reply to the relativist 
charge to the effect that that he can give no sense to the idea 
(which so fundamental to relativism) of a conceptual scheme and 
points out that Rorty has endorsed the Davidsonian arguments of 
'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' . 51 "This is a far cry from 
relativism" says Pettit-. 52 More importantly, however, Pettit 
distinguishes two ways in which the notion of abnormal discourse 
might be understood: 
The normal discourse from which the hermeneutic 
inquirer starts represents his orthodoxy. There are 
two ways in which the discourse can fail to be 
orthodox: one, it may be heterodox, contradicting his 
original beliefs; or two, it may be 'xenodox', 
involving beliefs of a different and un~~miliar kind, 
beliefs addressed to novel propositions. 
Pettit claims that, while Rorty does sometimes present abnormal 
discourse (the province, specifically, of hermeneutics rather than 
epistemology) as an encounter with the heterodox, a more charitable 
reading takes Rorty as meaning, by incommensurable discourses, 
mutually xenodox but not mutually heterodox discourses: 
If a discourse D2 is incommensurable in Rorty's sense 
within D1 - ie, its claims cannot be judged there -
then D2 is not heterodox from the standpoint of D1 -
ie, it does not contradict D1 ... Rorty's discussion 
of incommensurable discourses suggests that in such a 
case D2 will be xenodox strictly speaking, 
completely xenodox - from the sta~foint of D1: it 
will address different propositions. 
50Pettit, 'Philosophy After Rorty', P/J.ilosop/Jy, Jts H.istory and 
4:Jftor..iograp/Jy, ed. A. J. Holland, Dordrecht, Holland, 1985. 
J.b.id, p. 79. See Philosophy and t..he Hirror oI Nature, 
p~2299-311. 
53 'Philosophy After Rorty', p.79. 
54Pettit, 'Philosophy After Rorty', p.73. 
'"Heterodox", "Xenodox" and Hermeneutic Dialogue: A Reply to 
Mary Hesse· , Phil osop/Jy, Jts H.i,...c,tory and H.i .... c;torioqrap.hY, ed. 
A.J.Holland, Dordrecht, Holland, 1985, p.91. 
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And, claims Pettit, on such a reading the threat of relativism 
evaporates for there need be no incompatibility between the 
discourses concerned. 
Pettit acknowledges that the notion of incommensurable 
but incompatible discourses (in the sense of heterodox discourses) 
leads directly to relativism "with all its self-defeating 
paradoxes". 55 It is just this sort of relativism, consisting in a 
direct relativization of truth, which can be found in the work of 
Goodman. Where incommensurability is thought of in terms of 
mutually xenodox discourses, however, no incompatibility between 
discourses need arise56 and so, Pettit suggests, relativism and its 
paradoxes need not arise either. Indeed Pettit's interpretation of 
Rorty on this point does seem to be supported by comments which 
Rorty himself makes. 57 
Of course interpreting abnormal discourse in terms of the 
encounter with xenodoxy is not of itself sufficient to ensure that 
some form of relativism will not in fact arise - if relativism 1s 
to be avoided then care must be taken as to any restrictions on 
translatability (or interpretability) between otherwise 
'incommensurable~ discourses. At the very least it must be allowed 
that it will always be possible to bring such discourses into some 
sort of conjunction by moving to a broader level of interpretation 
- to a level which can encompass both discourses. 58 Generally 
~~'Philosophy After Rorly', p.79. 
57 Ibid. Comments quoted by Pettit, 'Philosophy After Rorly' , pp. 73-76 ; Ssg P.bilosop.by and t.be H.irror oI Nature, p. 267 and pp. 355-356. 
Such a move will probably always be required where the 
(Footnote continued) 
- . "' 
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speaking it 1s only if we can translate those discourses which we 
claim 'talk about different things' that we can know that such 
discourses are indeed 'talking about different things' rather than 
about the same things - only thus can we decide the question of 
their xenodoxy or heterodoxy. Indeed if we could not translate (and 
this is the Davidsonian argument against relativism again) we could 
make no sense of the question about what was being talked about 
since we could make no sense of there being any discourse. As we 
saw in chapter four many relativists do in fact attempt to escape 
the paradoxes of relativism, while still holding on to some sense 
of a relativization of truth, by denying the possibility of 
translation between conceptual schemes, languages, or whatever. In 
this way the problem of the paradox of relativism is no longer 
clear; but on the Davidsonian account this paradox is only eluded 
at the price of making relativism unintelligible in another way. 
58 (continued) 
discourses in question are anything less than whole languges -
wherever 'local discourse is concerned. For instance how could we 
translate the discourse of the poet or aesthetician into the 
discourse of the physicist? Indeed it often seems to be 
'incommensurablity' of this sort which Rorty has in mind in the 
notion of 'abnormal' discourse. However one should be very careful 
about claims of incommensurability even here. Not only are physics 
and poetics, for instance, embedded in a larger body of discourse 
but the distinction between the two might not always seem so clear 
as we, in this age of academic specialization, might take it to be. 
Certainly the distinction between physics (or natural philosophy) 
and poetics was not so obvious to someone like William Blake in his 
struggle with Newton (see Donald Ault's discussion of Blake and 
Newton, Visionary Physics: Bla.ke 's response to 1Vewton, Chicago, 
1974). That such distinctions are not so unambiguous as we might 
think is a lesson to be learned from the indeterminacy of 
interpretation; it is also a lesson which seems to be an element in 
Rorty's own work. On the matter of the relation between the 
discourse of physics and other discourses it is worth noting that 
it is not absolutely clear how Rorty views the relation between 
basic discourse (the 'atoms and the void' account of physi cs ) and 
non-basic discourse (aesthetics and poetics for instance ) . He often 
(Footnote continued ) 
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It is therefore important for Rorty in this respect, if 
he is to escape the relativist charge, that his sense of 
'incommensurability' have no taint of 'untranslatability' about it. 
Rorly does himself acknowledge this point59 but the problem is that 
the term has in fact had just this connotation - it was the 
connotation which seems originally to have attached to the term in 
work such as that of Kuhn .and Feyerabend. 60 Rorty does ~ndeavour at 
various places 'in P.h.ilosop/Jy and the H.irror of Nature to ensure 
that his use of incommensurable will not be taken as meaning 
'untranslatable' 61 and he even criticizes Davidson for 
"unfortunately" misinterpreting Kuhn "as meaning 'untranslatable' 
by 'incornmensurable'". 62 Yet Rorty does not help matters by 
comments such as the following: 
There is no special reason to think that any given 
one-word expression in one culture can be matched with 
a one-word expression in a very different culture. 
Indeed, we may feel that even lengthy paraphrases will 
be of little help, and that we mui\ just get into the 
swing of the exotic language game. 
Thus Pettit writes that: 
[Rorly] ·~· 1s ill served by the term 
'incommensurable', for it misleads him in two ways. He 
stipulates that it means 'in currently non-resoluble 
conflict', whether non-resoluble by us or by anyone. 
58 (continued) 
seems to deny supervenience between such modes of discourse ( see 
Philip Pettit, 'Philosophy After Rorty', pp.76-78). If Rorty does 
intend to claim some form of non-supervenience between discourses 
then this would mark an important difference between his views and 
tg~se of Davidson. 
60 P.IJ.ilosp/Jy and t../Je H.irror of M"iture, p. 302n. 35. But see Kuhn's comments in 'Reflections on My Critics', 
Critic.ism and t.he Growth o[ J(nowledqe, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan 
M~!grave, Cam.bridge, 1970, pp.267-270. 
b See P/J.ilosop/Jy and t..he H.irror of Mt:Jture, p.316 as well as the 
Pg~sage quoted immediately above. 
63 Ibid. , p. 302n. 35. Ib.id., p. 267. 
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Applying it then to another discourse he is misled 
into assuming, without argument, not just that the 
discourse is in internal conflict, but also that it is 
in conflict with his own. This unargued asumption has 
'incommensurable' come to mean 'in currently 
non-resoluble conflict with orthodox views', it takes 
on the sense, more or less, of 'heterodox'. But 
secondly, and more significantly, Rorty is misled so 
far as he never shakes off the ordinary usage of 
'incommensurable', though he explicitly disowns it. On 
this usage the word means 'untranslatable', at least 
in a straigh~frward way; it, has the sense, roughly, 
of 'xenodox' . · 
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Rorty' s use of the distinction of normal from abnormal 
discourse certainly raises difficulties. Yet if we do interpret 
Rorty as 'charitably' as possible on this matter then it is not 
clear if the distinction remains as a particularly significant one. 
If mutually xenodox schemes are mutually translatable in some sense 
(even if not in any straightforward way), as they must be to avoid 
relativistic implications, then the sense in which they 'talk about 
different things' can only mean that the current topics of 
conversation do not coincide - but of course they could coincide. 
So mutually xenodox discourses appear to be just discourses that 
are not talking about the same thing at the same time - different 
'conversations· might be an apt way to put it. Mutually heterodox 
discourses would be discourses which talk about the same things but 
hold conflicting beliefs about those things. 
In this respect we can make sense of both xenodoxy and 
heterodoxy so long as we are not denied some possibility of 
translation between the discourses concerned and, what is equally 
important, so long as those discourses are considered to be 
localized discourses. For of course the notion of an entire bel ief 
64
'Philosophy After Rorty', p.74. 
-- • Ir 
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system or language which was qlo.bally heterodox or xenodox with 
respect to our own belief system or language would be 
unitelligible. It would involve the notion of a belief system with 
which we could find no point of agreement and a language which we 
could not translate. For identifying beliefs and interpreting 
utterances is not possible unless there is substantial agreement in 
\ 
beliefs and unless most of the speaker's beliefs can be seen to be 
I 
true. Xenodoxy and heterodoxy only make sense against a wider · 
background of shared attitudes and generally true beliefs. 
The Davidsonian emphasis on the need for agreement 1n 
order to interpret is something which does in fact seem to be 
present in Rorty. Nevertheless while in Davidson agreement and 
truth are tied together in a quite special way Rorty often seems to 
see the notions of truth and objectivity as being just a matter of 
agreement. Thus he writes that: 
The application of such honorifics as "objective" and 
"cognitive" is never anything more than an expression 
~f ~e pr~nce of , or the hope for, agreement among 
1nqu1rers. 
And if 'truth' 1s 'correspondence to how things are' then truth 
must be seen as ''an automatic compliment paid to successful normal 
discourse rather than as a relation to be studied and aspired to 
throughout the rest of discourse". 66 For, according to Rorty, this 
is all that 'correspondence to how things are· can mean - it is a 
compliment. Moreover it is a compliment only properly employed in 
the context of 'normal' discourse for "To attempt to extend this 
compliment to feats of a.Lnormal discourse is 1 ike complimenting a 
~~Ph.ilosophy and t./Je H.irror o.[ M9ture. p.335. 
Ib.id. , p. 237; see also p. 298. 
- .. 
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judge by leaving him a fat tip: it shows lack of tact". 67 The idea 
behind the latter comment would seem to be that as truth and 
'correspondence to how things are' only apply within a realm of 
agreement among inquirers so they cannot properly be extended to 
cases of abnormal discourse where agreement 1s specifically 
lacking. 
These sorts of comments do not help Pettit's 'charitable' 
reading of Rorty on the normal-abnormal discourse distinction but 
they also suggest, perhaps more importantly, that Rorly's account 
of truth is ultimately a conventionalist one: the application of 
tenns such as 'true' and 'objective' is seen to be generally 
determined by the conventions of a particular discourse - it is 
determined by agreement among the participants in that discourse. 
Whatever we may conclude about Rorly's distinction between normal 
and abnorrnal discourse his attitude toward truth is surely 
sufficient to suggest a relativistic element 1n his thought. In 
discussing Goodman earlier I suggested that it is his cavalier 
treatment of truth which is the essence of his relativism. Much the 
same can, I think, be said for Rorly. 
The view that Rorty does ultimately espouse a form of 
relativism (albeit perhaps reluctantly) is reinforced by Rort.y's 
attitude towards philosophical argument in general and towards 
Davidson's arguments against scepticism in particular. To a large 
extent it was Rorty's attitude on matters such as this which I 
raised earlier68 in discussing transcendental arguments and 
:~.I.bid, p. 237. 
See chapter seven above pp.261-262;276-277. 
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verificationism. Davidson writes, in comparing his views with 
Rorty's, that: 
As Rorty has put it, ". . . nothing counts as 
justification unless by reference to what we already 
accept, and there is no way to get outside our beliefs 
and our language so as to find some test other than 
coherence" . About this I am . . . in agreement with 
Rorty. Where we differ, if we do, is on whether there 
remains a question how, given that we cannot "get 
outside our beliefs and our language so as to find 
some test other than coherence", we nevertheless can 
have knowledge of, and talk about, an objective public 
· world which is not of our own making. I think this 
question does ri~ain, while I suspect that Rorty 
doesn't think so. 
This question - the question which Davidson specifically attempts 
to answer in 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge' - is much 
the same sort of question which Rorty himself puts in the passage I 
quoted at the beginning of chapter eight, the question of how to 
reconcile the 'perspectival' character of knowledge with realism. 
Yet Davidson is quite correct in thinking that this is no longer a 
question which Rorty feels needs an answer. 
Certainly Rorty does not believe the sceptical question 
which is involved here is one which we should bother answering: we 
should simply stop asking it. The way Rorty often seems to want to 
deal with philosophical problems thus appears to be by bringing 
about a change in conventions, a change in attitudes, rather than 
having anything to do with philosophical argument. And, as Rorty 
wishes to recruit Davidson to the cause of his 'revisionary 
pragmatism', so Rorty claims that Davidson's supposed answer to the 
sceptic is not an answer at all, but is a refusal to answer insofar 
as Davidson offers a different language game, one 1n which 
69
'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', pp.426-427. 
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scepticism cannot arise, rather than a demonstration 
,.. 
Ot the 
t . , f . 70 seep 1c s con us1ons. 
In fact Rorty regards Davidson's anti-sceptical and 
anti-relativist position in general as involving more a change in 
language game than the deployment of philosophical argument. Thus 
Rorty interprets Davidson; not as arguing for the inconsistency of 
conceptual relativism, but as simply changing from talk about 
Metaphysical Truth, as some 'Platonic' Idea, to a more "homely and 
shopworn" sense of 'true', and in doing so suggesting that unless 
our relativist and scepticist worries can be made concrete, which 
so far they have not been, there is no reason to bother about 
trying to answer them. This sort of reading of Davidson is one 
which I considered - and largely rejected - in discussing the 
question of verificationism but it is clear that Rorly does read 
Davidson in just this way. Thus Rorty writes that: 
If you ask Dewey why he thinks Western culture has the 
slightest notion of what goodness is, or Davidson why 
he thinks that we ever talk about what really exists 
or say anything about it, they are 1 ike 1 y to ask you 
what makes you have doubts on the subject . . . They 
need not invoke verificationist arguments; they need 
simply ask why they should worry about the sceptical 
alternative until they are given some concrete ground 
of doubt ... The decision as to whether to have higher 
than usual standards for the application of words 
like "true" or "good .. or ''fed" is, as far as I can 
see, not a debatable issue. 7 
The need for some ground for doubt is certainly an idea 
present in Davidson's work but Davidson does not merely insist that 
70
'Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth', pp.27-28; this was even 
clearer in the earlier draft of this paper which Rorty read in 
C~~erra (and_ elsewhere) in 198~. _ 
Rorty, Pin J osop/J _ v and t./Je H.1rror of .Nature, p. 311 . 
- . ., 
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unless there is some concrete reason to doubt we do not need to 
worry about scepticism. Rather Davidson is concerned to show the 
way in which scepticism itself undermines the possibility of 
bringing forward any ground for doubt insofar as scepticism 
undermines the possibility of interpretation. Similarly it is not 
simply a refusal on Davidson's part to employ some 'Platonic' sense 
of truth, which is at the basis of his arguments but rather his 
I 
insistence · on seeing truth in the holistic environment in which it 
belongs - 1n relation to meanings and attitudes. 
In fact, while Rorty claims that Davidson's arguments are 
'ad /Jom.inem ' and can offer no general argument against scepticism 
and relativism, Davidson himself certainly seems to regartl them as 
having some such general application. This is because the ideas 
which Davidson attacks the scheme-content distinction, the 
separation of meaning and truth, meaning and belief - are ideas 
which are at the basis of relativistic and sceptical modes of 
thought. But for Rorty there can be no such 'general' arguments 
because for Rorly philosophical disagreement seems to be primarily 
a product of 'abnormal· discourse. It arises between different 
'language games'. Philosophical problems are thus done away with by 
changing the language games which we play. In this respect Rorty's 
reply to those who reject his revisionary pragmatism is often that 
they are simply out-of-date, living in the past, hanging on to an 
outmoded metaphysics, playing a language game which is no longer 1n 
fashion. 
Rorly attempts to present Davidson 1n a thoroughly 
'pragmatized' form to present him as rejecting a certain 
old-£ ashioned conception of truth rather than refut i ng it. Yet 
- , . 
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Davidson does conceive of himself as providing arguments, as 
pointing to confusions, as engaged in some project of philosophical 
elucidation. Nevertheless Davidson does not aim to do this by a 
process of reduction or by the exhibition of separate component 
concepts. Indeed quite the opposite is attempted: an interconnected 
network of concepts is elaborated through the interconnections of 
the concepts themselves. This is a pbint which I have made a number 
0£ times before and I must make it aga~n now. What Davidson offers 
1s an account of the method of interpretation but, as he says, "The 
methodology of interpretation is .•. nothing but epistemology seen 
in the mirror of meaning". 72 Davidson is concerned with 
epistemological and metaphysical issues but he attempts to see 
those issues within the context of the project of interpretation. 
The aim is to see the roles which the relevant notions of truth, 
meaning and belief must play in interpretation - to show the place 
such notions occupy, the use to which they are put, in 
interpretation, and in understanding, in general. It is thus that 
some 'elucidation' of those notions, and the issues with which they 
are involved, is achieved. 
It is Davidson's consideration of the role of truth in 
interpretation and of the interconnections between truth, meaning 
and the propositional attitudes which leads him to insist, with the 
realist, that "we ... can have know ledge of, and talk about, an 
objective public world which is not of our own making". This 1s 
something I shall be discussing further in the next and final 
chapter. Certainly while truth 1s given pride of place 1n 
72
'Thought and Talk', p.169: I have used this as the motto for my 
own work here. 
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Davidson ~s work, in Rorty it receives a very much reduced status. 
Indeed truth almost seems to be dispensed with altogether in 
Rorly's work; the important thing is not to get things 'right' but 
to be better able to cope, 73 to be suitably 'edified' , 74 to keep 
the conversation going. 75 Indeed the notion of human discourse as 
part of a 'conversation', the 'conversation of mankind' 76 brings 
' together the various themes in Rorty' s work - the rejection of 
'metaphysical' truth, the notion of differing ', and shifting 
language-games, the idea that 'true' may be seen as a compliment 
paid to a conversational partner. 
In Goodman too, as we have already noted, we find a 
similar downgrading is given to the notion of truth. Indeed a 
recurrent theme in Goodman's f+lays of ltlorldma.kinq is that questions 
of truth are often irrelevant: 
"The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth" would thus be a perverse and paralyzing policy 
for my worldrnaker. The whole truth would be too much; 
it is too vast, variable, and clogged with trivi a. 
The truth alone would be too little, for some right 
versions are not true - being either false or neither 
true nor false 77and even for true version rightness may matter more. 
We should cease worry 1 ng about truth, Goodman seems to say, and 
just accept the richness and diversity of worlds and versions which 
is then opened to us. If Goodman avoids the usual contradictions of 
a straight-out relativization of truth, then, perhaps, it is by 
refusing to accept that truth 1s something we ought to be overly 
;~P.h.z/osophy and t.he Hirror of Nature, p. 276, p. 359. 
75 Ib.1d., pp. 357-372, pp. 376-379. 
76 Ib.1:d., p. 377, p. 389f£. 
77 1b.1d., p.389; the phrase is originally Michael Oakeshott's. f+lays of lt'orlamaA~'nq, p.19, also pp.17-18, pp.120-121. 
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concerned with. "The message" Goodman tells us, "is simply this: 
never mind mind, essence is not essential, and matter doesn't 
matter" 78 and the truth about truth, it seems, is its triviality. , 
Now there is much to agree with in Rorty's defence of the 
'poetic' and the 'contemplative' and in his emphasis on edification 
as the goal of thinking . . Indeed, these are themes which have too 
' 
often been neglected in much recent analytic philosophy. Similarly 
in Goodman there are many parallel themes which also deserve 
consideration. Yet one cannot do justice to such themes unless one 
does justice to truth also. The notion of the 'conversation of 
mankind' unites many strands 1n Rorty's work and the notion has 
much to commend it also. Yet it would be a mistake to see 
'conversation' as the final goal, the telos, of mankind. One 
participates in conversation, not just to converse, but for all 
sorts of other reasons. Some conversations are better than others, 
even conversations have standards of assessment. Truth is not only 
important to the possibility of interpretation and hence 
communication and conversation itself but often we participate in a 
conversation because · of our interest in the t.rut./J. Participation 
in a conversation then means giving oneself up to the subject 
matter - to the truth of the matter itself. 79 
This sense of participation, of conversation, of truth, 
;~.lb.id.I p. 96. 
This is a notion crucial to much contemporary herrneneutic 
theory; it is an idea developed by Gadamer in discussing the notion 
of 'play' and the submersion of the players in the 'play' itself, 
see Truth and Hetnoa: pp. 91££; it is also involved in Gadamer's 
conception of the process of interpretation on the model of 
conversation or socratic dialogue. 
- . . 
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1s missing from Rorty and from Goodman. To say that, 1n 
conversation, there is no question of right or wrong, only the 
question of whether the conversation continues, is often to vitiate 
the very point of participation, of conversation itself. Thus 
Rorty's 'conversation of mankind' seems to turn out to be no more 
than a 'speak-easy'; keep the party going, keep the participants 
well-oiled and don't let · silence intrude. Above all, don't let 
anyone think they might actually have something to talk a.bout - for 
after all the conversation is what matters. This, I think, is where 
the relativism 'in Rorty' s position becomes acute. And something 
very similar happens with Goodman - a plethora of worlds, of 
versions, of discourse but nothing for discourse to be a.bout. 
Perhaps it is here too that something of the verificationist feel -
in Rorly at least - comes in: in the idea that there is no more to 
truth than what is involved in finding out whether this statement 
or that 'works', 'helps us get on', 'helps us cope', within a 
particular conversation. John Caputo has encapsulated the general 
uneasiness I feel at this point: 
If philosophy has abandoned the mirror of nature, it 
appears in Rorly to have ended up with a mirror play 
of words in which wo~s lead to more words but never 
to the matter itself. 
An important consequence of interpretative holism is the 
thesis of the indeterminacy of interpretation. Some elements of 
such a thesis seem to be present in Rorty and more explicitly in 
BO,The Thought of Being and 
of Heidegger and Rorty', 
pp.662-663. 
the Conversation of Mankind: The Case 
Review of Hetap/Jys.ics 36 ( 1 983 ) 
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Goodman. Such indeterminacy might be thought to be one source for 
the carefree attitude toward truth which these philosophers 
express. Certainly acceptance of the indeterminacy thesis might 
seem to lead to a relativization of interpretation. This appears to 
be just what happens in Putnam· s case: his consideration of the 
interest-relativity of explanation leads him to suggest that 
indeterminacy really amounts to the relativization of translation 
or 1nterpretation to some set of background interests. The same 
relativization easily carries over into a relativization of truth. 
Perhaps something like this happens in Goodman's case. Yet whatever 
may be decided about the relativism in Putnam, Rorty and Goodman 
the issue is certainly an important- one with respect to Davidson. _ 
For the consideration of the relativistic tendencies in these 
philosophers suggests the possibility of some form of relativism 
arising in Davidson's own work. Indeed we · can find a relativity 
thesis similar to Putnam's 'relativity of translation' in the work 
of Quine himself - in the 'ontological relativity' which derives 
from the Quinean theses of the indeterminacy of translation and 
inscrutability of reference. 
In the paper 'On the Reasons for Incleterrninacy of 
Translation' Quine explains how he sees the argument for the 
indeterminacy thesis as proceeding from two directions: one of 
these we have already discussed, the argument from the 
underdetermination of theory by evidence, 81 but the other, which we 
have so far not touched upon, is the argument from the 
inscrutability of reference. Quine tells us: 
81see chapter one, pp.17-20. 
- , . 
There are two ways of pressing the doctrine of 
indeterminacy of translation to maximise its scope. I 
can press from above and press from below, playing 
both ends against the middle. At the upper end there 
is the argument ... which is meant to persuade anyone 
to recognize the indeterminacy of translation of such 
portions of natural science as he is willing to regard 
as underdetermined by all posssible observations ... 
this I call pressing from above. By pressing from 
below I mean pressing whatever arguments for 
indeterminacy of transh'2tion can be based on the 
inscrutability of terms. 
\ 
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The indeterminacy of translation 1s thus seen as deriving, at least 
in part, from the inscrutability of the reference of terms. Such 
inscrutability is itself a form of indeterminacy of course but is 
nevertheless distinct from the more general problem of the 
indeterminacy of translation which is recognized as afflicting, not 
just terms, but whole sentences. As Quine says of his most famous 
example from {,lord and Object-. 
The gavaqa.i example was at best an example of the 
inscrutability of terms, not of the indeterminacy of 
translation of sentences. As sentence, Gavagai had a 
translation that was unique to within stimulus 
synonymy; for the occasion sentences 'Rabbit', 
'Rabbit-stage', and 'Undetached Rabbit part' are 
stimulus synonymous and holophrastically 
interchangeable. The gaVi-=iqa.i example had only this 
indirect bearing on indeterminacy of translation of 
sentences: one could imagine with some plausibility 
that some lengthy nonobservational sentences 
containing gavagai could be found which would go into 
English in materially different ways according as 
qavagai was equated with one g3 another of the terms 
'rabbit', 'rabbit-stage', etc. 
So, 1n this case, the inscrutability of the reference of 
'qavaga.i' might be seen to lead to a more generalised indeterminacy 
insofar as 'qavaga.i' might figure in larger sentence constructions. 
~~'On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation', p.183. 
ibid. I p • 18 2 • 
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Inscrutability will not however lead to general indeterminacy in 
translation of sentences in ever/ case. 84 That it does in some 
cases is, nevertheless, sufficient to make the link between the two 
theses. Thus Davidson claims that the thesis of the inscrutability 
of reference is important because the indeterminacy thesis "follows 
directly from it, and it is easier to give clear grounds for the 
thesis than for some other forms of indeterminacy·:: 85 
' 
The discussion of the difference · between the 
inscrutability and indeterminacy theses, in Quine and elsewhere, is 
not always clear. Much of the difficulty is dispelled however when 
it is recognized that the inscrutability of reference is itself, as 
suggested above, a form of indeterminacy. Quine himself has 
written in a way suggestive of inscrutability as a species of 
indeterminacy86 and it is interesting to see that he has also 
written in a way which suggests that the underdetermination of 
theory by evidence might be a reason behind the inscrutability of 
reference just as it lies behind the more generalized 
indeterminacy of translation. 87 Perhaps this is the difference 
between 'pressing from above' and 'pressing from below': the 
inscrutability of reference presses towards the indeterminacy of 
translation from below insofar as it is itself but a more 
specialized instance of such indeterminacy. 
The inscrutability of reference, Quine tells us, "not the 
84Quine refers, .ibid., to the example of the Japanese classifiers iR5 'ontological Relativity', pp.35-38, as an example of this point. 
86 'The Inscrutability of Reference', p.227. 
87 'on~ological Relativity', pp.34-35 . 
.l.b.1d., p.38. Davidson's discussion in 'The Inscrutability of 
Reference', pp.228-230, would seem to confirm this suggestion. 
- ~ . 
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indeterminacy of translation, 1s the substance of ontological 
relativity". 88 In other words, ontological relativity arises out of 
that specific indeterminacy which consists 1n the inscrutability of 
the reference of terms rather than out of the general fact of 
indeterminacy of translation. The thesis of ontological relativity 
is supposed to provide a solution to a problem arising directly out 
\ 
of the inscrutability thesis: \ 
We seem to be maneuvering ourselves into the absurd 
position that there is no difference on any terms, 
interlinguistic or intralinguistic, -objective or 
subjective, between referring to rabbits and referring 
to rabbit parts or stages; or between referring to 
formulas and referring to their GBdel numbers. Surely 
this is absurd, for it would imply that there is no 
difference between the rabbit and each of its parts or 
stages, and no difference between a formula and its 
GBdel · number. Reference would seem now to become 
nonse~~e not just in radical translation but at 
home. 
The solution which ontological relativity offers is to fix 
reference relative to some frame of reference - relative to some 
background language. So Quine writes that: 
... the inscrutability of reference ... made nonsense 
of reference. Fair enough; reference is nonsense 
except relative to a coordinate -system. In this 
principle
90
of relativity lies the resolution of our 
quandary. 
As Davidson largely accepts the Quinean thesis of the 
indeterminacy of translation (the differences between Davidson and 
Quine centre on .how muc,/J indeterminacy there 1s, not on whether 
there is any - see chapter two above) so too does he accept the 
thesis of the inscrutability of reference. What Davidson does not 
!8 'on the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation', p.183. 
s6'0ntological Relativity', pp.47-48 . 





accept is the thesis of ontological relativity, or as he puts it, 
the thesis of the relativity of reference: 91 
Quine and others have shown how to construct 
systematic examples of alternative schemes of 
reference such that, if one of them is in accord with 
all possible relevant evidence, others are. Quine 
argues that this fact should lead us to recognize that 
the relation of reference between objects and words 
(or their utterances) is relative to an arbitrary 
choice of a scheme of reference (or q-anslation 
manual), and in fact relative to a further basic 
parameter . . • I accept Quine' s thesis of the 
inscrutability of reference and therefore of the 
indeterminacy of translation ... But I do not see how 
these arguments show reference to be relative in the 
way that Quine thinks it is; indeed I think Quine' s 
own argumento/2 undermine the i
dea that ontology can be 
relativized. 
Davidson's claim is that the notion of ontological 
relativity is undermined rather than supported by the 
inscrutability thesis. Reference, Quine tells us, is relative, and 
relative to some background language - to some metalanguage. There 
is, however, an immediate problem here, which Quine himself points 
out, for the inscrutability of reference is universal and no 
language, not even one's own, 1s immune from it. Radical 
translation, as Davidson insists, begins at home. In this case the 
inscrutability of reference must extend also to the metalang1...1age, 
to which the relativization is made in the first place, and the 
metalanguage will require a meta-metalanguage to which reference 
can be relativized in turn ... and so on. Thus a regress will open 
up into an infinity of metalanguages. 93 
In an effort to clarify and resolve this difficulty Quine 
:1'The Inscrutability of Reference', p.228. 
93 Jbid, p. 223. 
'Ontological Relativity', p.49. 
-- , . 
suggests an analogy with questions of position and velocity: 
When we are given position and velocity relative to a 
given coordinate system, we can always ask in turn 
about the placing of origin and orientation of axes of 
that system of coordinates; and there is no end to the 
succession of further coordinate systems that could be 
adduced in answering the successive questions thus 
generated. In practice of course we end the regress 
of coordinate systems by something like pointing. And 
in practice we end the regress of background 
languages, in discussions of reference, by acquiescing 
in o~ 4 mother ton
gue and taking its words at face 
value. 
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We may be reminded here of some of the comments of the later 
Wittgenstein. At some point, Quine seems to be saying, "our spade 
is turned" and we simply have to acquiesce, to take a certain 
'framework' or language as 'given· .
95 There is something of this 
here. Yet it is here, also that the nature of Davidson's objection 
to Quine already becomes apparent. For although we can certainly 
'point' to locations in space, no such analogous 'pointing' is 
available to help us out 1n cases of reference - indeed reference 
itself is just a question of what we are 'pointing' to in our use 
of terms. If the regress is to be resolved by our 'acquiescing' in 
our home language, if we are indeed to take its words 'at face 
value', then this seems to imply a determinacy, a scrutability, on 
the part of our language and its words which is precisely what the 
inscrutability of reference denies.
96 
To be fair to Quine this is not all he has to say about 
the resolution of the regress, "what about position and velocity 
apart from practice?", he asks, and replies: 
~: .I.bid. . . . . 
96see P/J.1Josop/
J.1cal .lnvest.1gat.1ons, para. 217; also On Certainty. 
See 'The Inscrutability of Reference', pp.232-234. 
The answer, of course, is the relational doctrine of 
space; there is no absolute position or velocity; 
there are just the relations of coordinate systems to 
one another, and ultimately of things to one another. 
And I think that the parallel question regarding 
denotation calls for a parallel answer, a relational 
theory of what the objects of theories are. What makes 
sense is to say not what the objects of a theory are, 
absolutely speaking, but how one theory of objects is 
interpre~~le or reinterpretable 1n 
another. 
327 
This second line of reply 1s, as we shall see, much more the line 
favoured by Davidson, with one important difference: Quine's use of 
the phrase 'absolutely speaking' suggests that while there is no 
absolute way of specifying reference there is a relative way98 and 
this Davidson deies. However Davidson does not see the regress as 
the major problem here; indeed it is perhaps more a symptom of the 
problem than the problem itself 
The trouble is not that we must start a regress we 
cannot finish. The tro~~le is that we do not 
understand the first step. 
What puzzles Davidson is how to formulate the relativized 
concept of reference in the first place, and if we cannot do that 
then how can the regress even get under way? The problem with the 
notion of ontological relativity is that it presupposes that 
ontology can be fixed, that reference can be made scrutable, albeit 
in a relativized, perhaps even arbitrary, fashion. 100 And this of 
course, is what the inscrutability of reference denies. The regress 
of relativizations to an infinity of background languages is 
symptomatic of just this difficulty - the difficulty of making 
97
'ontological Relativity', pp.49-50. 
~~'The Inscrutability of Reference', p.238. 
10(1.bid I p. 234 • 
See 'Ontological Relativity', p.48. 
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sense of relativization itself. 
Relativization calls for something solid to relativize to 
and that there is anything solid is not only denied by the 
indeterminacy thesis but that indeterminacy thesis 1s itself 
presupposed in the argument for relativization. Quine's ontological 
relativity derives from the inscrutability of reference. So too do 
other relativity theses typically derive from some form of 
indeterminacy thesis or, more basically, from some version of 
interpretative or attitudinal holism. Indeed there are important 
similarities in this respect between Quine and also Putnam, Goodman 
and Rorty. More importantly, the problems in formulating a concept 
of relativized reference (or truth) must arise for these writers 
just as they do for Quine. What should be clear is that Davidson 
specifically rejects such relativization - what he puts in its 
place we shall see in chapter nine. 
Before going on to this matter, however, it might be 
worth pointing out how Davidson's rejection of any relati vization 
ties in with his conception of the nature of interpretion as a 
dynamic, dialogic process. Making sense of relativization is not 
only made difficult by the ubiquitous nature of interpretative 
indeterminacy but also by the fact that interpretation always 
proceeds in a piecemeal 
interpretative theories 
fashion and through the employment of 
or strategies which are typically 
occassion- or speaker-specific. In interpreting we have continually 
to take account of our often changing assessments of a speaker's 
beliefs, desires and other attitudes , as well as our assesments of 
the way in which he expects us to interpret his words. Thus the 
'theories' we actually employ in interpretation are not static, 
... - . .,. 
329 
well-defined structures but take the form of strategies which are 
continually being mod.if ied and extended - they take the form of 
what Davidson calls 'passing theories'. Such strategies are hardly 
likely candidates as the interpretative frames of reference to 
which relativization could be made. Something of this dynamic 
conception of the process of interpretation and communication is 
echoed in a comment which Mary Hesse makes on Philip Pettit' s 
revised version, 1 n terms of 'heterodox' and 'xenodox ' , of the 
Rortyan distinction between 'normal' and 'abnormal' discourse. 
Hesse writes: 
.•• discourses are not static and well-defined systems 
of logical entailment, but loosely structured and 
dynamic bodies of doctrine. There need not be any 
answer to the question 'Are they heterodox or 
xenodox?' unless they are artificially frozen into a 
form never realistically held by anybody at any time. 
And to do this is to trivialize the process of 
negotiation and ~ument, and to downgrade the concept 
of human reason. 
101 '"Heterodox" "Xenodox" and Hermeneutic Dialogue', 
' Its History and H.istor.iograp/Jy, ed. A. J. Holland, 
Holland, 1985, pp.89-90. 





A HOLISTIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTII 
:rrut.h an:/ Inte.rpretati on 
There are two ideas which Davidson attempts to marry 
together in his epistemology: first, the notion that knowledge is 
in some sense based on experience or observation: and second, that 
the _only evidence for a belief is other beliefs. 1 The attempt to 
marry these two notions reflects the marriage, within the principle 
of charity,· of the idea that the beliefs of a speaker must be taken 
as mostly true with the idea that those beliefs are generally in 
agreement with those of the interpreter. In the context of an 
account of truth Davidson can be seen as aiming to bring together 
both the correspondence and coherence theories of truth in such a 
way that, as he puts it, "coherence yields correspondence". Truth 
is seen to be a matter, not just of agreement - not just a 
conventional matter - but a matter of how the world is. 
Truth is seen in this way only within the context of an 
1see 'Empirical Content', p.486. 
·-
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overall theory of interpretation. Indeed it 1s Davidson's 
contention that this is the only way in which we can see truth. For 
scepticism and relativism, with all their attendant difficulties, 
are in fact the inevitable results of the attempt to view truth 
apart from interpretation - of the attempt to view truth as solely 
a matter of correspondence or of coherence. Indeed truth cannot be 
\ 
defined as correspondence or as coherence or even as the I 
conjunction of the two. What Davidson does 1s to show how both 
these notions are involved in the concept of truth by showing how 
truth fits into interpretation as a whole. So it is not a 
definition of truth which Davidson offers but a picture of truth in 
its proper place. In presenting such a 'picture' of truth we must 
draw upon much of what has been said in preceeding pages - in this 
respect this final chapter merely reworks ground that has already 
been worked over more than once before - but the focus now is 
specifically on the notion of truth. 
In attacking the notion of an alternative conceptual 
scheme Davidson claims that, at best, the notion must reduce to the 
idea of a conceptual scheme which is true but which cannot be 
translated into our own. The problem for such a notion is that we 
do not in fact seem able to prise the notion of truth away from the 
notion of translation, so we can make no sense of the notion of an 
alternative conceptual scheme. This same connection is encapsualted 
1n the Davidsonian idea that a theory of meaning will have the form 
of a theory of truth - an idea which has been made more perspicuous 
by John McDowell. The same connection between truth and 
translation, between truth and meaning, 1s explored a little 
--
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further by David Wiggins but specifically in the context of an 
attempt to provide a "characterization of truth in terms of meaning 
(or the enumeration of the marks of the concept of truth) assuming 
that meaning- is already understood". 2 While Davidson has used truth 
to get at meaning, Wiggins attempts to use the Davidsonian 
conception of meaning to shed light on truth. 
Wiggins takes to heart the idea that what matters is to 
find the point of the concept of truth, the purpose that is served 
by the notion. 3 Wiggins does this by fitting truth into the context 
of linguistic interpretation - truth is seen as a properly of 
sentences which is necessarily implicated in giving an account of 
the meaning of sentences. Here is the Davidsonian point (repeated 
and amplified by McDowell) that we can (largely) assimilate meaning 
to truth conditions. Wiggins explicitly ties that point to the 
McDowellian accotmt in order to provide a theory of meaning from 
which an account of truth can be read off. 
Crucial to the Wiggins account of a theory of meaning is 
the idea that such a theory must be constrained by what Wiggins 
calls 'anthropological' considerations4 such that interpretation is 
founded in the need to explain the overall behaviour and attitudes 
of speakers a point familiar enough from our discussions in 
chapter two. Wiggins himself rejects the Davidsonian principle of 
charity as inadequate to this task since, he claims, it is oriented 
p .195. Wiggins 
from Bernard 
of t./Je Se l .f~ 
2 
'What Would be a Substantial Theory of Truth?' , 
gets the phrase 'substantial theory of truth' 
Williams, 'Consistency and Realism', Pro.blems 
C~ridge, 1973, see pp.202-203. 
An idea expressed both by Dummett and Strawson. McDowell, as we 
saw earlier - in chapter two - makes a similar point and adopts a 
s~milar strategy with respect to meaning or sense. 
'What Would be a Substantial Theory of Truth', pp.198-205. 
- .. 
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towards maximization (of truths) rather than explanation and thus 
he expresses his preference for a principle more akin to Grandy's 
'principle of humanity'. 5 However on the account of charity set 
forth in Part I charity is not to be seen as at all restricted in 
this respect - indeed explanatory adequacy can be seen as the 
primary demand which the principle makes. Thus one of the claims of 
this dissertation is that · the connection between truth and meaning 
- or truth and translation - is indeed mirrored in the fact that by 
means of charity we are able to translate. As I said ear 1 ier, 
charity is a reflection of and derives from the fundamental notion 
of interpretative holism and that holism is itself the basis for 
the connection between meaning and truth. Still, whether we talk of 
charity or humanity or something else here 1s not terribly 
important for the moment - it is the connection between truth and 
meaning and the crucial role of truth in interpretation which needs 
to be stressed. 
From the part that truth plays 1n interpretation (a part 
which consists 1n the fact that we interpret utterances by 
reference to the environment of the speaker) Wiggins deduces 
certain essential characteristics of the truth-predicate, certain 
'marks of truth': first that truth is "that property which 
sentences have normally to be construed as aimimg to enjoy"; 6 
second, that, with respect to questions of truth, 0 there should 'be 
a tendency, under favourable conditions of investigation, for 
disagreement to diminish and for op1n1on to converge in 
~ Ibid. , pp . 1 9 8-1 9 9 . 
7J.b.id. I p.205. 
J.bid., p. 206. 
- ~ . 
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agreement'' ;7 third, that truth 1s a property such that "every 
statement which lacks it lacks it independently of a speaker's 
means of recognizing it"; 8 fourth, that every true sentence is true 
1n virtue of something (Wiggins admits that this does not add much 
to the first three characteristics);9 fifth, that every _ true 
sentence is compatable with every other true sentence,10 that is, 
''everything true must be consistent with every thing else that 1s 
true". 
These properties of truth are what truth must be lik~ if 
truth 1s to serve the role which it must serve in interpretation. 
Such a conception of trutn 1s a conception of truth as 
'anthropologically constrained', that is, the marks of truth which 
Wiggins deduces in fact derive from the anthropological constraints 
which Wiggins places on theories of interpretation. Indeed this 
conception of truth reflects the general constraints on 
interpretation which flow from interpretative holism: constraints 
of consistency, explanatory adequacy and so on - a consequence 
which lS relatively ' ' unsurpr1s1ng given that Wiggins· 
'anthropological constraints' are more or less just the constraints 
of the principle of charity (at least as presented here.) Truth, to 
put it 1n the terros I have employed, 1s in fact seen as 
'holistically constrained'. 
What makes this exercise more than just a revamping of 
the requirements of charity or humanity or whatever is that it 
exhibits a concept of truth which has all the characteristics which 
~ .!.bid. , p. 208. 
1d.b.id., p.209 . 
.1.b.id 
- ..- . 
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we might usually want to credit to the concept all the 
characteristics of a 'pre-analytic' conception of truth - but which 
has those characteristics as a necessary consequence of its 
participation in the development of a theory of interpretation. 
This is what truth must be like if interpretation is to be 
possible. 11 
' 
Wiggins predicts that it will be thought that in this 
characterization of 'normal' truth - truth as 'anthropologically 
constrained' - something has been left out: 
A characteristic preoccupation of the realist is the 
idea of the world as utterly independent of human 
conceptions of it. One who was concerned with realism 
in this sense and wanted a notion of truth that would 
fix the whole content of his realism would be strongly 
motivated to enrich mere assertibility ['normal' 
truth] by constraints that have little or nothing to 
do with interpretation. In the case of the second 
mark, for instance, he might gloss the convergence it 
speaks of in Peircean fashion, stipulating that for a 
sentence to be true in the serious and substantial 
sense is for it to express the opinion that "is £at2d to be ultimately agreed by all who investigate" ... 
But Wiggins replies that: 
... the conception of truth that this realism invokes 
is not truth as it inheres or fails to 111t·~~re ~in the 
great generality of the significant sentences of a 
whole language ... the contrast that this realist is 
in search of is not the contrast between mere 
assertibility and truth. It is the contrast between 
fully-fledged anthropocentric asserlibility (ordinary 
workaday truth that is) and absolute truth, where 
absolute truth is truth that satisfies a demand for 
11 This is perhaps to put the point somewhat more strongly than 
Wiggins himself does for he does make the qualification that ''the 
five marks . . . appear to fall short of being fully mandatory or 
absolutely essential to the possibility of all interpretation 
whatsoever", Ibid., p.213. If the marks do follow from the holistic 
nature of interpretation then there seems to be no need for this 
sort of qualification. Unless perhaps interpretation is being 
urgerstood in some extremely broad (or quite special ) sense. 
L.Ib.id., p.218. Note that Wiggin's use of the term 'assertability' 
to refer to 'normal truth' is a purely technical use; Ibid, p. 204. 
- .... 
objectivity which is at once special and goes far 
beyond anything that could £J required by the mere 
interpretability of language. 
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Davidson, of course, must reply more strongly here: he 
must claim, as I will, that the demand for objectivity that this 
realism makes, the realism we might say, of the metaphysical 
realist, 1s an objectivity which cannot be satisfied, it is an 
objectivity which cannot be made intelligible; and neither can the 
\ 
' 
notion of truth - the notion of 'metaphysical' truth - be made 
sense of either: 
The question . . . 1s ju.st . . . how well we understand 
the notion of truth, as applied to language, 
independent of the notion of translation. The answer 
is, I think, tha} 4 we do not understand it independently at all. 
Davidson's strategy 1n interpretation 1s, as we have 
seen, to take a Tarski style theory of truth as the form which a 
theory of meaning should take. Yet as Tarski' s theory has been 
regarded, by some philosophers at least, as essentially a 
correspondence theory of truth, so one might raise doubts as to how 
far Davidson really does get away from a correspondence account of 
truth. Moreover it is just such correspondence theories which seem 
to be part of the metaphysical realist's account of truth -
correspondence theories seem to be tied to the 'metaphysical' 
conception of truth which it seems Davidson must reject. 
Whether Tarski' s theory is a correspondence theory is a 
question Davidson has himself addressed. 15 Referring to the 
i ~ I .b.ia: , p . 21 9 • 
'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', p.194. 
- , ., 
Tarskian truth theory he writes: 
Such theories do not, 1 ike most correspondence 
theories, explain truth by finding entities such as 
facts for true sentences to correspond to. And there 
are good reasons, which can be traced back to Frege, 
for rejecting facts as entities that could play this 
role. On the other hand theories of truth of the kind 
considered here do require that a relation between 
entities and expressions be characterised 
('satisfaction'). It is not easy to see how a 
satisfactory route to truth can escape,, this step if 
the language the theory16 treats has the usual quantificational resources. 
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Davidson does reject the notion of truth as correspondence to the 
facts, but he does not wholly abandon the idea of correspondence. 
Indeed, the role of satisfaction in a theory of truth such as 
Tarski's seems to preserve some element of such a notion. 
In 'True to the Facts' Davidson quotes Strawson's 
description of J.L.Austin's 'purified version of the correspondence 
theory of truth': "to say that a statement is true is to say that a 
certain speech-episode is related in a certain conventional way to 
something 
comments: 
1n the world exclusive of ' t l'"" 17 1 se r . And Davidson 
It is this theory Strawson has in mind when he says, 
"The correspondence theory requires, not purification, 
but elimination". I would not want to defend the 
details of Austin's conception of correspondence , and 
many of the points I have made against the strategy of 
facts echo Strawson·s criticisms. But the debi lities 
of particular formulations of the correspondence 
theory ought not be held against the theory. If I arn 
right, by appealing to Tarski's semantical conception 
of truth we can defend a theory that almost exactly 
fits Strawson's description of Austin's 'purified 
version of the correspondence theory of truth'. And 
this theo!] deserves, not elimination, but 
elaboration. 8 
15
'True to the Facts', pp.37-54. Di6idson and Truth', pp.23-26. 
'Introduction', TJ, pp.xiv-xv. 17 Strawson, 'Truth' , p. 190: quoted 
See also Rorty, 'Pragmatism, 
1n 'True to the Facts', p.53. 
- , . 
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So Davidson does not abandon the correspondence theory, but only a 
certain sort of correspondence: the correspondence-to-facts sort. 
Indeed in a sense correspondence is required, not only insofar as 
the notion of satisfaction is needed, but also because of the way 
in which utterances are interpreted through connecting those 
utterances with features of the world. 19 Nevertheless, the 
correspondence theory which Davidson retains is not the usual 
correspondence theory but one which 1s thoroughly 'purified' 
indeed. Davidson says that his slogan is "correspondence without 
confrontation°. 20 
The notion of satisfaction, which seems so obviously to 
retain the old flavour of a correspondence between facts and 
sentences, is not a relation of the old sort at all but is instead 
a relation between open sentences and sequences of objects - a 
rather technical notion, to be sure. Yet, more importantly, we 
have to view the satisfaction relation as just part and parcel of 
the relating of words and the world - and hence the relating of 
words to meanings via attitudes - which is part of the overall 
project of interpretation. The satisfaction relation is not some 
special metaphysical relation between subjective and objective 
elements but, if anything, expresses how languctge and the world 
must be tied together. We interpret utterances by relating 
utterances to speakers' environments and this is what satisfaction 
18
'True to the Facts, pp.53-54. 19such a notion 1s suggested by Davidson's own comments 
'Empirical Content', p.486 - about the need to maintain the 
ipbuitions of both Schlick and Neurath. 
L 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.423. 
- ... 
339 
1s about. Yet in doing this we do not match up things from opposite 
sides of some ontological fence, for this 'matching up' cannot be 
done independently of our own beliefs. How we match up the 
utterances of speakers to objects and events 1n the world is 
dependent on the beliefs about those objects and events which we 
ourselves hold. 
Of course there is a colloquial sense 1n which we can 
talk of sentences as describing how things are, as corresponding to 
the facts. But such talk does not elucidate truth it merely 
substitutes another expression for the phrase 'is true'. Insofar as 
utterances and beliefs are identified by being connected with 
things in the world, so they can be said to be identified by being 
connected with known truths. In this respect truth is a primitive 
concept in interpretation - truth does not develop out of a theory 
of interpretation but is presupposed by it. Our understanding of 
the notion is presupposed - truth is not a defined notion but a 
defininq one21 - but it is also presupposed in the same sense as 
charity is an ontological presupposition of interpretation. And of 
course charity - agreement - and truth are tied together. 
Truth is foundational to interpretation, not in the sense 
that we must first determine the truth of a speaker's utterances in 
21 Admittedly truth is usually taken to be technically defined by 
Tarski in terms of satisfaction but the Tarskian notion of 
satisfaction is only a 'definition' of truth in a technical and 
somewhat attenuated sense (see Rorty, 'Pragmatism, Davidson and 
Truth', pp . 24-25). My point here is to emphasise Davidson's talk of 
truth as a 'primitive' notion - truth is not defined in terms of 
belief or meaning (or correspondence or coherence), rather, other 
concepts are defined in terms of truth: meaning is understood in 
terms of truth conditions; belief is understood in terms of a state 
which 'aims at truth'; etc. The concept of truth stands at the base 
of the Davidsonian account of interpretation. 
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order to interpret, but because we must already have an overall 
grasp of what is true in order to be able to interpret the meanings 
of utterances and identify beliefs. Of course having done that we 
may then decide on whether to count specific utterances as true, 
and in this sense our original assumption of the truth of a 
speaker's specific beliefs may be revised, but this is just the 
sense in which the ascriptions of belief which charity may counsel 
in its role as a methodological maxim may be revised. The 
presupposition of the overall truth of a speaker's beliefs - the 
ontological presupposition of charity is not open to such 
revision at all. Truth is presuposed by interpretation while the 
question of deciding on specific truths is part of the project of 
interpretation. 
Moreover the correlation of utterances with aspects of a 
speaker's environment is always a localized procedure: we attempt 
to connect this utterance with this true statement which describes 
the speaker· s environment (or an aspect of it) and in so doing 
arrive at an interpretation of the utterance. But it is always 
specific utterances which are treated 1n this way. Such 
'correspondence' (if it is to be called that) is a very localized 
'correspondence· which only has relevance for the practical task of 
interpreting speaker's utterances (no ontology of 'facts' is called 
f or22 ) and which cannot be extended to the entire body of a 
speaker's beliefs or utterances to provide any overall 
'correspondence' account of truth. This cannot be done partly 
because the practical circumstances of interpretation will not 
22see 'True to the Facts' for Davidson's rejection of the notion 
of truth as correspondence to 'the facts ' . 
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allow it but also because it is difficult to attach a sense to the 
overall content of a speaker's beliefs - beliefs have content only 
in relation to other beliefs with~~ the overall system of belief -
and because at the global level we cannot make the necessary 
separation (which would be necessary for there to be a relation of 
'correspondence') between the world and a speaker's beliefs and 
other attitudes. We cannot achieve such a separation for the same 
, reasons that we cannot separate off the notion of a conceptual 
scheme as distinct from some empirical content. 
Correspondence provides the specific connection with 
experience at the local level which 1s required for truth; 
coherence ensures the global truth in belief which is needed as the 
background for specific attributions of truth or falsity. In this 
latter respect 
correspondence 
coherence can be said to make possible 
as Davidson says, "coherence yields 
correspondence". 23 It makes it possible in the same sense that it 
is presupposed by interpretation. 
There is an element of 'correspondence' 1n Davidson's 
conception of truth - for whether a sentence is true is dependent 
on how the world is. However this does not mean that truth 1s a 
matter of 'corresnondence to facts'. Davidson writes that: 
.. 
Truth, as applied to utterances of sentences, shows 
the disquotational feature enshrined in Tarski's 
Convention T, and that is enough to fix its domain of 
application. Relative to a language or a speaker, of 
course, so there is more to truth than Convention T ; 
there is whatever carries over from language to 
language or speaker to speaker. What Convention T, 
and the trite sentences it declares true, like "'Grass 
is Green' spoken by an English speaker, is true if and 
only if grass is green", reveal is that the truth of 
an utterance depends on just two things: what the 
23
'A Coherence Theory of TnJth and Kriowledge', p.423. 
- -#. 
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wo~i as spoken mean, and how the world is arranged 
. . . 
We may say, almost equally, that truth depends on meaning and on 
attitudes. For Davidson, of course, 'how the world is arranged' 
cannot be given any unique answer. Indeed we may say also that how 
we describe 'how the world is arranged' depends on two things: what 
\ 
\ 
words mean and what attitudes we possess. Here the coherence 
I 
element in Davidson's account of truth comes to the fore once 
again: there "is a strong presumption in favour of the truth of a 
belief that coheres with a significant mass of beliefs ... belief 
is in its nature veridical". 25 Such a pres1..rrnption is required by 
the holistic nature of belief - too much error would make it 
impossible even to identify beliefs. Truth and belief are 
interdependent notions, brought together by meaning to form a (some 
might say,unholy,) trinity: 
Setting aside aberrant cases, what brings truth and 
knowledge together is meaning. If meanings are given 
by objective truth conditions there is a question how 
we can know that the conditions are satisfied, for 
this would appear to require a confrontation between 
what we believe and reality; and the idea of such a 
confrontation is absurd. But if coherence is a test 
of truth, then coherence is a test for judging that 
objective truth conditions are satisfied, and we no 
longer need to expla~p meaning on the basis of 
possible confrontation. b 
Relat.iv.ity,. Indetenn.inacy and 'Ahsolute' Iruth 
The two philosophical positions which I have called 
(following Putnam's suggestion) the 'internal' and the 'external' 
~: .l.b.id. Ip• 425 • 
26 .I.bid. , p. 424 and p. 432 . 
.I.bid. , p. 42. 
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views, each represent a different approach to the problem of the 
tension between 'subjectivism' and 'objectivism'; the tension 
between "the fact that all Knowledge is perspectival" and the fact 
that °Knowledge is about objects distinct from and independent of 
the experiencing subject". The proponent of the external view 
emphasises the 'objectivity' of that which knowledge claims to be 
about. The internal view provides an opposite emphasis, putting 
stress on the perspecti val - the 'subjectiye' - character of 
knowledge . Both of these views, insofar as they do not offer a 
reconciliation of conflict but assert a victory of one aspect over 
the other, turn out to be unsatisfactory. Neither the one nor the 
other is able to be made coherent. 
As I have presented Davidson, his aim is precisely to 
achieve a reconciliation here: to present a realism which can 
accommodate the apparently 'perspectival' character of Knowledge. 
It is the attempt to take account of that perspecti val character 
which seems to lead the interr1al view to become relativistic, and 
it is clear that although Davidson must reject relativism, in its 
usual formulations at least, he is not unsympathetic to the 
motivations behind it. This is evident in 'The Inscrutability of 
Reference' where Davidson writes: 
What we have shown, or tried to show, is not that 
reference is not relative but that there 1s no 
intelligible way of relativizing it that justifies the 
concept of ontological relativity. The relativization 
must appear in the language in which the relativized 
predicate occurs (and hence cannot be to that language 
or to a theory for that language), and we cannot claim 
that it settles the question of reference in any 
language. But there Js something to settle, and 
~el~7i vi zation is the only attractive way to settle 1t. 
27
'The Inscrutability of Reference', p.238. 
- ., . 
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After all, it would be absurd, as Quine says, to insist that there 
is no difference between talking about rabbits, rabbit parts or 
whatever and Davidson adds: 
Besides, there is the question to which we can give an 
answer: 'What scheme are you using in giving that 
interpretation of the speaker's words?' If I 
interpret (translq.te) a speakers's word 'Wilt' as 
referring to the shadow of Wilt, I will probably need 
to explain how I am interpreting his predicate 'is 
tall' in accord with a scheme congenial to my 
interpretation of 'Wilt'. In some sense or other, my 
interpretation or translat~gn 1s relative to, or 
based on, a specific scheme. 
The question is, in what sense is interpretation relative 
to a scheme and can we indicate this relativity in an acceptable 
way that will avoid the difficulties we discussed in the previous 
chapter? It almost seems that Davidson is in fact willing to accept 
the basic Quinean idea that interpretation needs to be relativized 
to a language scheme, for Davidson does in the end propose that: 
. . . the natural way to explain the sometimes needed 
explicit relativization is a familiar one: we take the 
speaker to be speaking one language or another ... 
sentences
29are true and words refer relative to a language. 
But surely this is very little different to the original Quinean 
proposal which Davidson rejected? Davidson does say that he hopes 
that the way out of the difficulties involved in relativization 
"is what Quine had in mind all along"JO and it does seem that while 
he accepts something of the point of relati vization what becomes 
~~ I.bid. 
30 J.bid., pp. 239-240. 
J.b.id., p.227. That it is what Quine had in mind is perhaps 
suggested by considerations put forward in the following section of 
this chapter - see below. 
- ., . 
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important for him is how the relativization is to be understood. To 
a large extent the key to understanding Davidson's relativization 
is the Quinean comment that "What makes sense is to say not what 
the objects of a theory are ... but how one theory of objects is 
interpretable or reintepretable in another". 31 For as Davidson puts 
it, when we make a relativization to some language, "All that we 
can say gets fixed by the relativization is the way we answer 
questions about reference, not reference itself'·. 32 
This distinction between reference and how we answer 
questions about reference might seem at first rather strange. But 
we can get some inkling of what is really going on here when we 
reflect on how Davidson generally conceives of the relation between 
language and the world - the relation which reference is all about. 
Davidson does not, as we have seen, accept the picture of the 
language-world relation which presents that relation on the model 
of the scheme-content relation. His attack on the scheme-content 
distinction is an attack on the idea that we can clearly separate 
language from world. Similarly Davidson does not consider the 
relation between words and objects as a relation of 'confrontation' 
between two different sorts of entities. The same line of thought 
is at work in Davidson's consideration of reference: the notion of 
reference as a relation between a word and an object which that 
word uniquely designates is a notion which Davidson must firmly 
reject. Indeed the indeterminacy of interpretation will make the 
notion suspect for there wi 11 be many ways to pair up words and 
~1see. 'The Inscrutability of Reference', p.238. 
Ib.id., p. 239, see also p. 238. 
- , . 
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obJects . 0 
3 6 
In saying that rE-fE-rf:nce is not fixed by rE:lat1vizat1on , 
Davidson is really saying that there is nothing there to get fi xed 
anyr...1ay. This lE:, thE: problem T~1th ontolc,gical rE:lativity: 1t 
suggests that there 1s a determinate referential relationship when , 
1n fact, there is ~4 none_ . ..., For thE:rE: is no 2,pecial relationship 
between words and their object.3 which we can call 'reference' . 
Davidson says of thE: theory of intE:rpretation which he has 
developed: 
A gerE:ral and pre-analytic notion of truth 1s 
pre.supposed by the theory . I t 1s because we have this 
notion that we can tell what counts as evidence for 
the truth of a T-8entence. But tbs same is not 
requirE:cl of the concepts of satisfaction and 
reference. Their r ole is theoretical, and so we know 
all there is t know about them when we know how they 
operate to characterize truth . We don't need a 
general cc1ri·:: :pt ~,£ referE:nce 1n the constructic,n of an 
i .... 
aaequate theory.~~ 
~~See 'RE-a.lity Wit.hcut ReferencE: '. 
0 
·csrtainly this seems to be the problem which worries Davidson in 
'The ln;2.crut-:1b1 l1ty of Re ference' but .J .J.C.Srnart cla1ff1,3 that tht:: 
reason (perhaps t.hE: re2.l rea.2.c,n·? ) for Davidsc,n 's r<::jecti0n of 
ontolog1c~l relativity 1s that Davidson as3umes that at bottom all 
languages h,::ive a. cc,mmc,n quantif ic5tional structure and this 1s 
sufficient to block the relativity thesis . This point 1s related to 
Davidsc,n 's cl&im, not~d in chaptE-r two (p . 68 at~·eJ , that 
ind'="term1nacy w1il be les:3 en hi.:::·. i:..ccour1t than on Q1..:ins'2, "partly 
bE:caus0 ... the uniqueness of qu-:1.nt1ficational 2,tructurf: is assured 
if Convsnt1on T 1s sat1sf1ed" ( 'Ee- lief and the Ba;;i= c f Meaning·, 
p .153)' . Hc,wE-ver David2.on has also said that in attE-rnpting to app_y 
Tarski· 2. truth d2f1n1tion to natural language:::, "~,harpness of 
applicati on is lost ... Satisfactic,n of Tarski· s Convent ion T i2. no 
longer ~va.113.ble 63 a formal te2it" ( 'The Method uf Truth in 
Metaph1s1cs ·, p . 204) . In that c~se perha-s thE- un1que-r2ss of 
quant1f1~3ticn~: 3tructure ma· not be so a32ursd ~fter all. 
Whale\ er-, in the pre2,ent contE-:~t I think it 12 fair to say that 
even 1r D~v1ds0n dcc.s b~l12ve that quant1£1cat1,nal un1quen2s3 
r11les -,ut r':='.lati vi ty th12 TE-eel nc,t preclucl'= hi 2, f:-rnpl oyrnE-nt c,f other 
argument3 aga1n3t ont~lJg1cal rel~tiv1t~ al3o . Moreover 1t is al20 
1mport2ln _ t ::, ri::- •:c,gn12E- that 1av 1clson do2s ssem tc, ::i.cc2pt some (:,if 
· hs b~21(: 1ntu1t1:m;3 ·,,;h1ch mot1 v-:.tc rE-l.:1t.1 v1i=/ e-ven 1~ he ::::nnc·t 
,:1.c ·-::ept 1]u1nE- · .; ·.H:1.y ct!: 2.~t12fyinq th:=:-.=E- 1ntu1tic,n:::--: ~ • 
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As is indicated by the title of the paper from which this quotation 
comes, Davidson's conception of reality is of a 'reality without 
reference'. There is no general question about reference, then, 
only questions about how to Jnterpret. The theory of interpretation 
is primary, and as a theory of interpretation is best served by a 
theory of truth, so truth has a certain primacy also - how we are 
to answer questions about reference is simply a question of how we 
are to i'-pterpret utterances, that is, of how we are to assign truth 
conditions: 
We don't need the concept of reference; neither do we 
need reference itself, whatever that may be. For if 
there is one way of assigning entities to expressions 
(a way of characterizing 'satisfaction' J that yields 
acceptable results with respect to the truth 
conditions of sentences, there will be endless other 
ways that do as well. There is no reason, then, to 
call any one of these semantical relations 'reference' 
or 'satisfaction' . . . This conception of how to do 
theory of meaning is essentiallly Quine's. What I 
have added to Quine's basic insight is the suggestion 
that the theory should take the form of a theory of 
absolute tr1.1th. If it does take this form, we can 
recover a structure of sentences as made up of 
singular terms, predicates, connectives, and 
quantifiers, with ontological implications of the 
usual sort. Reference, however, drops out. It plays 
no essential role in-gxplaining the relation between 
language and reality. 3 
The problem of how to mark, 1n an unobjectionable way, 
the relativity of interpretation to a scheme, has thus been brought 
back to the question of how to interpret utterances. And here it 
is natural to say that how we interpret utterances wi 11 depend on 
what language we take the speaker to be speaking. However as 
35
·Reality Without Reference', pp.223-224. These comments 
reinforce the idea the Davidson does not offer a definition of 
truth - truth is a primitive notion on which interpretation is 
~~ed . . __ 
.1.b.1d. , p. 224 and p. 2L'.S. 
- ., ., 
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Davidson points out there are some subtleties in how we understand 
this. Most importantly, we must recognize the now familiar point 
that there 1s no one unique determination of what language a 
speaker is speaking - interpretative holism (the interdependence of 
meanings and attitudes) will see to that. Provided we make 
compensatory adjustments in the beliefs and desires which we 
attribute to a speaker, "we can ,take the same person to be speaking 
\ 
different languages". 37 This poi'nt has important consequences for 
truth, for if we can take a speaker to be speaking different 
languages according to how we assign beliefs and so on, then we can 
also take a single utterance to belong to more than one language 
and thus, depending on the language, as having differing, even 
conflicting truth values - for different languages may assign it 
different truth conditions. Davidson writes: 
Ian Hacking once put this puzzle to me: how can two 
theories of truth both be acceptable if one theory 
makes a certain utterance true and the other does not? 
Isn't this a contradiction? It is not a contradiction 
if the theories are relativized to a language, as all 
theories of truth are. Our mistake was to suppose 
there is a unique language to which an utterance 
belongs. But we can without paradox take that 
utterance to belong to one or another language, 
provided we make a 3ihift in other parts of our total theory of a person. 
So truth, for Davidson, 1s 'relative', not to a 
conceptual scheme, or a world or 'version· , or to a 'realm of 
discourse', but to a language. And though we may indeed call this a 
relativization of truth it is perhaps more correct to see it as a 
theory of c.9.fi,._c:olute truth. 39 For as Davidson puts it: 
~~'Th~ Inscrutability of Reference', p.239. 
J.b.1d. I pp• 239-240 • 
- ~ . 
. . . the truth of an utterance depends on just two 
things: what the words mean, and how the world 1s 
arranged. There is no further relativism to a 
conceptual scheme, a way of viewing things, a 
perspective. Two interpreters, as unlike in culture, 
language and point of view as you please, can disagree 
over whether an utterance is true, but only if they 
differ on how things are 4~n the world they share, or what the utterance means. 
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It is the holistic nature of interpretation which , makes possible 
' 
and, indeed, demands the sort of relativization of. truth which 
' 
Davidson proposes. It is that holism which can also be seen as 
lying behind the inscrutability of reference in particular and the 
indeterminacy of translation in general. 
Davidson's relativization of meaning may suggest 
similarities with the relativization of meaning which many 
relativists employ in order to escape Protagorean contradiction. 
The difference is that Davidson's relativization is not tied to any 
untranslatability thesis but, in virtue of the indeterminacy which 
arises from the holistic nature of interpretation, is actually 
opposed to such notions. However the holistic way 1n which 
interpretation proceeds can itself be seen as providing the basis 
for the conception of truth as absolute. The requirement of 
39navidson uses the term 'absolute' (in 'In Defense of Convention 
T' - see pp.69ff) to describe the Tarskian account of truth in 
contrast to other theories which define a 'relativized' notion of 
truth truth in a model, a possible world, etc. (but note 
Davidson's comments in 'In Defense of Convention T', pp.74-75). The 
term thus has a technical usage in Davidson which is largely absent 
from my use of the tern here. My own talk of 'absolute' truth is to 
emphasise the sense in which Davidson holds that truth is not 
relative to a perspective, a conceptual scheme or whatever 
(notwithstanding the apparent 'relativization' of truth to 
languages) and how all truths remain cons~stent with one another -
in this respect Davidson's 'absolute' conception of truth, as I am 
concerned with it, is a conception of truth as 'holistically 
c~astrained r. 
'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.425. 
- , . 
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charity , whi ch i t self flows from interpretative holism, is a 
requirement of consistency and this is just what is embodied in the 
not i on of t rut h as absolute . Truth, as conceived by Davidson, is 
holistically constrai ned. 
The absol ute character of truth 1s something which is 
only evident on a global s cale . For at a local level different yet 
equally acceptable theori es of interpretation may indeed appear to 
I 
conflict in their assignments of truth values: at such a local 
I 
level it may even appear as if it is the same proposition which is 
being given such conf l icting assignments of truth. Globally, 
however, truth must always retain i ts absolute character because of 
course it is at the global level t hat t he overall constraints of 
consistency and coherence - the r equirements which follow from the 
holistic character of bel i ef and are encapsulated in charity - must 
properly apply. Inconsistency and conflict can be tolerated - just 
as error and disagreement can - but only at a local level. The 
ontological presuppos ition of charity and of the overall truth and 
coherence of beliefs must r emain. 
Indeed it i s difficult to see how we could make sense of 
there being conf l ict at the global level between empirically 
equivalent theor ies of interpretation: there are, apart from 
anything else, problems about the individuation of theories in this 
respect. This 1s because indeterminacy must affect even the 
interpretat i on of theories of interpretation (which is why we 
cannot even make sense of relativization to such theories). In that 
case the same problems about identifying conceptual schemes, 
languages or whatever will arise for the identific:ttion of theories 
of interpretat ion : there will be no unique answer to the question 
- ~ . 
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'is this scheme the same as that one?'. 
At this point one might wonder just how to make sense of 
the indeterminacy thesis itself for typically that thesis is taken 
as consisting in the claim that for any speaker or community of 
speakers - for any body of utterances - there will more than one 
satisfactory theory of interpretation (or translation). But if it 
is not possible to clearly distinguish between theories of 
interpretation then this account of indeterminacy cannot be wholly 
correct since there will be no clear sense to the idea of there 
being different but equally acceptable theories of interpretation. 
To some extent this problem was adumbrated in the 
discussion, 1n chapter two, of Davidson's conception of actual 
interpretative practice as always a matter of bending prior 
interpretative theories to suit the current (and transient) 
interpretative situation. Thus our actual interpretative theories 
are always passing theories adapted to demands of the ocassion and 
so interpretation is always something which proceeds at a local 
level - with respect to specific utterances, specific speakers. We 
do not interpret whole belief systems or whole sets of utterances 
for the holistic nature of interpretation means that we can never 
arrive at a position where we can say that interpretation has come 
to an end - we can always reinterpret the evidence on which our 
interpretations are based, moreover there is always new evidence on 
the horizon - new utterances, new circumstances, new actions -
which our theories have to encompass. Interpretation is a dynamic, 
ongoing activity. In fact one of the problems which attaches to 
relativism and scepticism is that they assume the possibility of 
interpreting and identifying overall systems of bel i ef or 
- , . 
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discourse, something which the holistic and dynamic character of 
interpretation rules out. 41 
Yet in this respect we can perhaps resolve the problem of 
making sense of indeterminacy by seeing the indeterminacy thesis as 
just a way of expressing the holistic, dynamic, characteristics of 
interpretation. Indeterminacy can be seen as the thesis that the 
aveneues of interpretation and reinterpretation are never closed 
off. Moreover, while there may be no sense to the idea of global 
differences between theories of interpretation, different theories 
may be conceived of in terms of different ways of connecting up 
specific beliefs, utterances, desires and so on. While we cannot 
make sense of g 1 obal differences we can, it seems, make sense of 
local ones. 
Such a conception of indeterminacy does in fact appear to 
be present, to some extent at least, in Quine's own comments on the 
indeterminacy of translation. In word and (J.bject Quine states the 
indeterminacy thesis as the claim that: 
... manuals for translating one language into 2.::-1,,ther 
can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with 
the totality of Sffech dispositions, yet incompatible 
with one another. i 
Yet Quine seems to accept that such a statement of the thesis needs 
some qualification: specifically he considers that the 
41 Indeed the character of interpretation in this respect also 
undermines the notion of 'empirical equivalence ' a notion 
typically employed in the context of indeterminacy. The problem is 
that the evidence on which interpretation is based is itself 
subject to the indeterminacy which flows from the holistic nature 
of interpretation (see chapter two p.47 ) and thus there is no clear 
sense in which differing theories can be equivalent with respect to 
t~2 evidence. word and O.bject, p. 27. 
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indeterminacy of translation may be better understood as a matter 
involving differing theory formulations rather than differing 
t/Jeor.ies. Those theories between which indeterminacy obtains are 
supposed to be theories which are empirically equvalent, that 1s, 
no empirical evidence can tell in favour of one over the other. 
Quine comments: 
It may be protested that when two theories agree thus 
in point of all possible sensory determinants they are 
in an important sense not two but one. Certainly such 
theories are, as wholes, empirically equivalent. If 
something is affirmed in the one theory and denied in 
the other, one may argue that the particular form of 
words affirmed and denied is itself unlike in meaning 
in the two cases but that the containing theories as 
wholes have the same net meaning still. Similarly one 
may protest that two systems of analytical hypotheses 
are, as wholes, equivalent so long as no verbal 
behaviour makes any difference between them; and, if 
they offer seemingly discrepant English translations, 
one may again argue that the apparent conflict is a 
conflict only of parts seen out of context. Now this 
account is fair enough, apart from its glibness on the 
topic of meaning; and it helps to make the principle 
of indeterminacy of translation less surprising. When 
two systems of analytical hypotheses fit the totality 
of verbal dispositions to perfection and yet conflict 
in their translations of certain sentences, t..he 
confl .ict is prec.isely a confl .ict of p_7rts seen without 
t..he iv.holes. The principle of indeterminacy of 
translation requires notice just because translation 
proceeds little by little and se~5ences are thought of 
as conveying meanings severally. 
Quine has followed up this line of thought more recently, 
notably 1n the p.::-tper 'On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the 
World' but also in a shorter paper titled 'Relativism and 
Absolutism' . 44 In both these papers Quine presents indeterminacy as 
obtaining with respect to theories which are empirically 
equivalent, perhaps not logically equivalent45 and yet nevertheless 
:~Ibid., pp. 7B-79. 
Hon.1'...qt, 6 7 ( 1 984). 
- , . 
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reconcilable g1 ven the appropriate "reconstrual of predicates". 46 
In this respect Quine appears to consider the conflict which seems 
to be present between empirically equivalent theories with respect 
to which indeterminacy applies as a conflict which can always be 
reconciled: 
We are thus left only with empirically equivalent 
theory formulations that are logically reconcilable. 
\ 
If we subscribe to one of them as true, we can call 
them all true and vie~ them as different descriptions 
of one and the same world. We are no strangers, after 
all 1 to strange4~anguages. If this be relativism, make the most of it. 
Quine attributes this line of argument to Davidson48 and it 1s 
indeed the sort of resolution to the problem of taking account of 
the ideas of relativity which we have seen Davidson does himself 
propose. Yet the idea is to some extent already present in Quine's 
own work. Moreover from Quine' s presentation of the idea we can 
also see how it involves a slightly different way of understanding 
the indeterminacy thesis. 
Quine is surely right to acknowledge that there is a 
certain sense in which, under indeterminacy, differing theories are 
one. However he is equally right to demur for if all theories were 
reducible to one then we would, presumably, be back at the position 
45Note that Quine countenances the possibility that empirical 
equivalence need not imply logical equivalence or even logical 
compatibility: in 'On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World' 
(p.322) Quine considers the notion of the complete 
underdetermination of theory (to be distinguihed from the 
indeterminacy thesis and from the more familiar underdetermination 
thesis arising from epistemic holism) as illustrated by "theory 
formulations which are empirically equivalent, logically 
incompatible, and irreconcilable by appropriate reconstrual of 
p~6dicates". 
'On Empirically Equivalent Systems of The World', pp.319-320. 
:;·Relativism and Absolutism', p.295. 
IbJd. 
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of metaphysical realism. Moreover, it is hardly to be expected that 
we ever could so reduce all theories (this is to some extent 
K5rner's objection to transcendental deductions) and there 1s 
indeed a certain glibness about the notions of meaning and 
translation involved in the assertion that the theories are one. 
The proper course is to acknowledge that there are no intrinsic 
limitations on the reconciliation of theories of translation - they 
can always be reinterpreted - much as differing l~nguages cannot be 
intelligibly conceived to be intrisically untranslatable. Indeed we 
ought really to view the apparent relativization of truth to 
languages which Quine and Davidson suggest in terms of the the 
advice that how we interpret must always be taken into account 1n 
deciding on questions of truth. Questions about the truth of 
utterances can only be answered 1n the context of the overal 1 
project of the interpretation of such utterances. 
The account of indeterminacy given by Quine may shed some 
light on the sorts of examples which Davidson has used to 
illustrate the indeterminacy thesis. 49 - examples from decision 
theory and the measurement of temperature. These examples can seem 
rather puzzling for, apart from anything else, they do not seem to 
allow for the possibility of there being any conflict over truth. 
Yet Quine and Davidson both agree on this as a possibility under 
indeterminacy. However given what we have said about how conflict 
can only ever be local and must disappear at the global level such 
examples need not seem so strange after all. Perhaps this 
conception of indeterminacy will also explain Davidson's comments 
49 1n 'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', p.154, and 'Reality 
Without Reference·, pp.224-225. 
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about how meaning remains invariant between different yet 
empirically equivalent theories - this is just what Quine suggests 
in the passage quoted above - meaning could be considered to remain 
invariant just insofar as the different theories could be 
considered as one. 
Thus, although we may find that apparently differing 
theories of interpretation may assign differing truth, conditions to 
utterances and hence lead to differing truth values being assigned 
also, such differing theories ought not to be seen as 
irreconcilable. As Quine suggests, we can view such conflicts over 
truth as "precisely a conflict of parts seen without the wholes" 
and perhaps even consider "that the containing theories as wholes 
have the same net meaning still". _ Indeed as the assignment of 
I 
differing truth values is made possible by the holistic nature of 
interpretation so the holism of interpretation means that conflict 
between such di£ fering assignments 1s never beyond resolution. 
Once interpretative holism is taken into account we can see that 
all truths remain compatible. 
Yet of course the presumption of global consistency of 
beliefs or truths - the presumption of the 'absolute' character of 
truth cannot consist in the preslrrnption that there 1s one 
complete set of true propositions. Such a notion seems to be the 
realist's conception of 'the complete description of reality'. 
Instead the presumption of the coherence of truth is to be seen, 
first, 1n the form of a demand for consistency in our 
interpretative practice and in our own beliefs, and, second, as a 
precondition which stands behind our interpretation and makes it 
possible (this latter is tied to the role of charity as an 
- , . 
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ontological presupposition of interpretation). In both respects the 
'one-ness' of truth is the unitary thread which holds together our 
otherwise fragmented interpretations of ourselves and others. It is 
a unity which reflects the holistic nature of interpretation and 
the holistic nature of the relation between attitudes, behaviour 
and the world. 
In his enumeration of the five 'marks of truth' David 
Wiggins g1 ves as the third mark that truth - normal truth or 
assertibility, as Wiggins puts it - is: 
. . . a property such that every statement which lacks 
it lacks it independently of a speaker's means of 
recognizing it; and every statement which it possesses 
it wependently of a speaker's means of recognizing 
it. 
In support of this 'third mark' Wiggins writes: 
We have many beliefs without knowing how we came by 
them. But of no genuine belief do we think that, if 
we were to scrutinize it afresh or for the first time, 
the question of its correctness would be simply 
arbitrary or dependent on the will of the maker of the 
judgement ... Unless the content of the belief happens 
to be something which, from the nature of the case, it 
is up to me to decide at whim ( say 'I '11 touch that 
lamp post'), there must be something potentially 
resistant and outside the act of judgement itself, 
upon which the mind can gain purchase and qo [orr,.,;ard 
in judgement or denial. The assertibility [or truth] 
of a judgement cannot consis~1 . . . in the bare fact that the judgement is judged. 
As is the case with all of Wiggins' rmarks of truth', this third 
mark cannot be separated from the other four. In particular, it 
must be closely related to the second, fourth and fifth marks: to 
~~'Wh~t Would be.,a Substantial Theory of Truth', p.208. 
IbJd, pp.209-.slO . 
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the requirements that there should be a tendency towards agreement 
over truths, that every true sentence is true in virtue of 
something, and that every true sentence ought to be compatible with 
every other true sentence. Together these 'marks of truth' can be 
taken as marks of the 'objective' and 'absolute' character of truth 
without which sentences would lack any property in virtue of which 
they could be interpretable. Here, then, we have a sense of 
'objectivity' which ties this notion to its role, and the role of 
'absolute' truth, in interpretation. 
Insofar as philosophers such as Rorty and Goodman 
downgrade truth, they fail to appreciate the interdependence of 
truth and meaning and the nature of the holistic constraint of 
charity. The roles of truth and objectivity in interpretation are 
indeed encapsulated in the need for charity if we are to interpret. 
For what charity comes down to is the notion that we are able to 
interpret primarily because of our access to some shared world. It 
is by making connections between speakers, their utterances and 
their environment that interpretation proceeds. Indeed the 
recognition of this point was crucial to the rejection of 
scepticism 1n chapter three. As Davidson says, "Communication 
begins where causes converge", interpretation begins where a world, 
t./Je world, is shared between interpreter and interpretee. This 1s 
the idea of charity as an ontological presupposition; the idea of 
ontological holism. As Davidson writes: 
Communication depends ... on each communicant having, 
and correctly thinking that the other has, the concept 
of a shared world, an intersubjective world. But the 
concept of an intersubjective world is the concept of 
an objective world, a w~1ld about which each 
communicant can have beliefs. 
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The objective world is required by the possibility of 
interpretation but the objective world is not the world as given by 
'the one complete and true description of reality'. There are many 
ways of describing the world - as many ways as there are ways of 
interpreting utterances. 53 It is the objective world which is what 
charity emphasises we must all share - the agreement charity 
prescribes is agreement with respect to the world. But of course 
there is no one set of beliefs charity prescribes us to agree upon 
and there is no one description of the world which is the world as 
objectively given. Charity points to a relationship the 
relationship between speakers, their utterances, their attitudes, 
their environment as the basis for the possibility of 
interpretation; objectivity needs to be understood in terms of this 
same sort of relationship: a holistic relationship - a relationship 
of interconnectedness. It is such holisrn which is the basis for 
Davidson's conception of truth and for his conception of the world 
- something encapsulated in the idea of interpretative holism as an 
ontological as much as an epistemological thesis. 
In 'The World Well Lost' Rorly writes that: 
I want to claim that ''the world" is either the purely 
vacuous notion of the ineffable cause of sense and 
goal of intellect, or else a name for the objects that 
inquiry at the moment is leaving alone: those planks 
in the ~oat which are at the moment not being moved 
around. 
It seems that the only sense which Rorly can attach to the notion 
of the world is either as something ineffable and dispensable 
52
'Rational Animals', p.327. 53see Goodman, 'The Way the World Is', Problems and Projects, 
I~~ianapolis and New York, 1972. 
'The World Well Lost', p.15. 
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("cause of sense and goal of intellect") - in which case he would 
perhaps consider that no sense had been attached to the notion - or 
as just what we happen to agree upon for the moment. However the 
notion of the world as "cause of sense and goal of intellect" does 
not, once we recognize the connection of truth with .belier: have to 
be ineffable, but at the same time it does not have to have only 
one, true description. And the many descriptions which can be true 
of the world are true of the same world in the sense that those 
descriptions are always capable of reconciliation - in a sense they 
are merely different formulations of the same description. Moreover 
that they should be descriptions of the same world is a necessary 
presupposition of our being able to understand them as descriptions 
of anything at all. Yet insofar as this shared world is indeed open 
to many different descriptions so it would be a mistake to identify 
that world with any specific set of beliefs which, for the moment, 
we might share. 
'The world' 1s not just what we agree it to be - we can 
be, and often are, wrong. Similarly what is true is not what we 
agree to be true. This is a point which Davidson emphasises: as he 
writes "Agreement does not make for truth, but much of what is 
agreed must be true if some of what 1s agreed is false''. 55 And this 
requirement of truth in beliefs 1s of course just the requirement 
of a shared, inter-subjective world our agreement 1s also 
agreement with respect to that world, w.it/J respect to what .is true. 
Agreement and truth are indeed tied together. Rorty, however, seems 
to see agreement as basic to truth when in fact it is the other way 
55
'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics', p.200. 
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around - truth is basic to agreement. 56 Indeed it is truth which 1s 
basic to interpretation. 
56The difference, as Philip Pettit puts it ('Habennas on Truth and 
Justice', Harx and Har.xisms, ed. G.H.R.Parkinson, Cambridge, 1982, 
p.213), is between something being true because it is agreed upon 
or being agreed upon because it is true. The latter is Davidson's 
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